S' 



THE YEAR OF BATTLES : 



OR THE 



FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870-71. 



COMPRISING A UISTORT 0.F ITS ORIGIN AND CAUSES, THE BIOGRAPHIES OF THE KING OF 
PRUSSIA, THE EX-EMPEROR OF FRANCE, AHD THE STATESMEN AND GENERALS OF THK 
TWO COUNTRIES ; THE FINANCIAL, SOCIAL, AND MILITARY CONDITION OF EACH, 
THE ■WEAPONS IN USE, AND AN ACCURATE HISTORY OF ALL THE MIL- 
ITARY MOVEMENTS AND BATTLES OF THE WAR, THE REVOLUTION IN 
FRANCE, THE SURRENDER OF PARIS ; THE CONCLUSION OF 
THE WAR, THE TREATY OF PEACE, AND THE ORGANIZA- 
TION OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. 



L. P. BKOCKETT, M. R, 

AUTHOR or "history of the civil war," "camp, battle-field AND HOSPITAL," 
"woman's work IN THE CIVIL WAR," "oUR GREAT CAPTAINS," ETC., ETC. 



WITH MAPS, PLANS OF BATTLES, AND NUMEROUS PORTRAITS, 
ILLUSTRATIONS, AND BATTLE SCENES. 



By CHEISTIAN WEBER. 



1/ 




SOID ONLY BY SUBSCRIPTION. 



New ^ork: 

J. W. GOODSPEED & CO., 37 PARK ROW, 

GOODSPEED & CO., Chicago : A. II. HUBBARD, Philadelphia : 

H. H. NATT & CO., Cincinnati, Ohio. 

1871. 



Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1871, 

By L. p. BROCKETT, M.D. 

In the Office of the Librai'ian of CougresB at Washingto». 



THE NEW YORK PRINTING COMPANT, 

•J05, 201, SJ9, -.11, 213 East 12th Street. 






X} ^ 



PEEFACE. 



I^HE writer feels that no apology is necessary for the 
. attempt here made to portray the progress of a war 
which, in its rapid movement, its terrible destructiveness, 
and its stupendous results, is without a parallel in his- 

The ties which bind us to both the great nations 
which have been engaged in this sanguinary conflict — 
ties of kindred, friendship, and commercial intercourse — 
have made every step of its progress more interesting to 
us as a people than any other war of modern times, 
except that in which we ourselves were so recently en- 
gaged ; and these considerations are sufficient to com- 
mend to popular interest any work which gives suc- 
cinctly, lucidly, and accurately, the events of such a 
contest. 

A large experience in historical composition, and 
especially in the preparation of histories of our own war, 
has, the writer would fain hope, given him some special 
qualifications for undertaking this work. It has been his 
first aim to secure as complete accuracy as possible ; and 
hence he has had recourse to official reports and docu- 
ments, where they were to be had, and also to the testi- 
mony of intelligent and capable eye-witnesses of the 
various battles. The work is not, however, a mere com- 
pilation of war correspondence and official documents. 
Every battle has been carefully studied, and plans drawn 
of the position of each army and the course of their 
movements ; and the writer has not felt disposed to rest 
satisfied without attempting to convey to his readers the 



4: PEEFACE. 

same clear and vivid idea of eacli battle wliich liis care- 
ful studies had enabled him to attain. 

The preliminary chapters, giving the history of the 
causes of the war, the military, naval, and financial posi- 
tion of the two countries, the description and comparison 
of their weapons, and biographical sketches of the prom- 
inent actors in the war, will be found, he hopes, to pos- 
sess ilitrinsic value, irrespective of the war itself Ihey 
are from authentic sources in all cases, and in many 
instances from such as are not generally accessible. 

The maps and plans are compiled from the best 
German and French sources, and from the official reports 
of the battles and sieges, and are believed to be remark- 
ably accurate. The portraits are from undoubted origi- 
nals, and these, as well as the drawings of weapons and 
battle-scenes, are the work of some of our best artists. 

The material for the work has been ample, and while 
for the official narratives, biographies, &c., we have gone 
directly to the French and German sources, w^e have 
found some of the best descriptions, both of the toj)ogra- 
phy and the actions themselves, in the correspondence of 
Major Forbes and Mr. Holdsworth w^ith the London 
Daily JVezos, the war-letters of the New York Tri- 
1/U7ie, Herald, World, and Times, the Cincinnati Ga- 
zette and Commercial, SiViA the Cmirrier des Mats-Unis, 
and the admirable " Diary of the War " of the Army 
and Navy Journal. We have been indebted also for 
many items to the various statistical and biographical 
works, in which both England and the Continent so 
greatly excel us. 

If the work shall accomplish its purpose of gratify- 
ing the natural anxiety of our people to know more fully, 
accurately, and minutely, the particulars of the greatest, 
and, we would fain hope, also the last of modern wars, 
the ambition of the author will be fully satisfied. 

L. P. B. 

Brooklyn, K T,, April, 1871. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

The remote and proximate cauaes of tbe "War.— Encroacliments of France tipon Gel-many in tlio 
past three hundred years.— Alsace and Lorraine.— Westphiilia and the Rhine Provinces.— 
Belgium.— Restoration of the last three to their rightful owners.— Avenging Waterloo.— 
The Rhine and Adriatic boundary.— Movements of Napoleon III to accomplish this.— His 
jealousy of Prussia.— His preparations for War.— The introduction of the Chassep6t rifle and 
the ifii)-ai7ZeMse.— The want of genuine preparation for the War on the part of France.— 
Other reasons for the War.-France restive.— The ^Ze6(saie.— Napoleon's health.— Religions 
motives.— France in a secondary position.— The occasion of "War.- Tho Ilohenzollern candi- 
dacy.— Sketch of Prince Leopold.— Protest of the French Emperor.— His interview with 
General Prim.— Declination of Prince Leopold.— New pretexts.— The alleged insult to 
Count Benedetti.— The missives sent to German States supposed to be disaffected.— The 
French declaration of War PP- 13-19 



CHAPTER II. 

Biographical sketches.- Wilhelm I, King of Prussia.— His birth, education, absolutist princi. 
pies.— His Accession to the Throne.— His personal appearance, manners and character. 

Napoleon IIL— His parentage, birth, education.— Joins tlie Carbonari.— Involved in Italian 
Conspiracies.— Attempts authorship.— Becomes the legal heir of Napoleon I.— The Strasbourg 
affair in 1S36.— His banishment to America.— Is coldly received thore.—His return to Switzer- 
land.— Death of his mother.— His escape to England.— Publication of his Idets Napoleoniennes 
and Eiveries PoUtiqucs.—The Boulogne fiasco.- His arrest, trial, and sentence to imprison- 
ment at Ham.— His studies and writings at H.im. —Escape to England in 1846.— His life in 
England.— The Revolution of 1848.— Election of Louis Napoleon to the National Assembly — 
His" return to France.— His election as President.— His policy.— His aspirations for permanent 
and supreme power.— Efforts to change th(3 Constitution.- Uneasiness of the French people. 
—Tho coup d'itat of Dec. 2, 1851.- The firstpZeiwciie.— Further steps toward despotism.— 
Proclaims himself Emperor.— " The Empire is Peace."— His Marriago.—Alliance with Eng- 
land.— The Crimean "War.— Hia policy as Emperor.- Birth of the Prince Imperial.— Over- 
estimation of Napoleon IIL— The Italian "War.— His mismanagement.— The compact with 
Cavour.— The threatening attitude of Prussia.— Treaty of Villafranca.-Napoleon's disap- 
pointment.— Acquisition of S.avoy and Nice.— His failing health.— Troubles —The attempt to 
interveneinbehalf of tho Southern Confederacy.— The War with Mexico.- He makes a dupe 
of Maxunilian.— Sad end of this War.--The Cochin China and Chinese War3,—Thepromise 
of reforms.— The Austro-Prussian War.— Prussian superiority demonstrated.— His offers 
to and demands upon each of the belligerents.- Their rejection.- Ills Life of Cresar.- Hia 
determination to bring on a Wax.— Hia charaeter in brief PP- 20-S8. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER III. 

Biographical sketches coiitinned.— Count von Bismarok-Schonhausen.— Ilits birth and education. 
—Entrance upon public life.— A Conservative.— His pamphlet, "Prussia and the Italian 
Question."— Minister at St. Petersburg and Paris.— Premier, and Cabinet Minister.— His 
bold measures.— The opposition evoked.— The Danish War.— The War with Austria.— The 
■wisdom of his measures demonstrated.— His extraordinary abilities and foresight.— His per- 
sonal appearance. — His scholarship. — His impaired health. 

General von Moltke.— His birth and education.— Military studies at Copenhagen.— Straitened 
circumstances.— His eminent attainments.— His rapid promotion.— His mission to Turkey 
and Asia Minor.— Authorship.— His advancement to thepositionof Chief of Staff.— His hercu- 
lean labors.— His remarkable topographical and geological knowledge.— His extraordinary 
prescience and knowledge of the character of his antagonists. — His personal exploration of 
military routes.— His interview with General de ■Wimpffen.— Personal appearance and man- 
ners. 

The French Premiers and War Ministers.— Ollivier and Rouher.— General licboeuf.— Birth and 
education.— Promolion.—Coramandantof Polytechnic School. — Chief of Artillery. —General 
of Division, 185T.— Distinguished in the Italian War.— Minister of War in 1S67.— His cor- 
rupt management relative to the Chassep6t rifle.— His recklessness and dishonesty. 

Count do Palikao.— His birth, education and military career.— His experiences in Algeria» 
Prance and China. — His stem and cruel disposition. 

Other French generals.— The old soldiers.— The three Marshals.— Marshal MacMahon.— His 
birth and education.— Early career in Africa.— His courage and daring.— Ability as a 
tactician.— Capture of the Malnkoff.— His skilful strategy at Magenta.— Duke of Magenta.— 
Eeprescntative of France at King "Wilhelm's coronation.— Subsequent command in France 
and Algeria. 

Marshal Cunrobert.— His birth and education.— His African career.— Adhesion to Louis N"apo- 
leon. — Service in the Crimean War.— In the Italian War.— Senator of France. 

Marshal Bazaine.— His education.— Military experience in Algeria, Spain, and the Crimea.— His 
part in the Mexican Expedition.— His cruelty, greed, and mismanagement there. — His 
corruption and rapacity. 

The French corps-commanders, Frossard, J)e Failly, I'Admirault, &c.— General de Wimpflen.— 
Gon. Trochu PP. 39-55. 



CHAPTER IV. 

Biographical sketches continued.— Prince Friedrich Karl.— Birth and education.— His entrance 
into the Army.— His fondness for military studies.— Frederick the Great his exemplar.— A 
staff-oflBcer under von Wrangel in 1848, in the first Schleswig-Holstein War, and the Baden 
Campaign in 1849.— Commander of the Prussian Contingent in the Danish War of 1864 — His 
gallantry in the assault on Diippel.- His command of the first Army in the Austrian War ol 
1866.— Sudowa. — His pamphlet on improvements in military organizations. — The changes 
■which followed.— His interTiew ■\vith von Moltke. — Prince Friedrich Wilhelm.— Birth, ed- 
ucation. — A pupil of von Moltke. — A corps-commander in 1S64. — Commander of the Second 
Prussian Army in 1856, and the hero of Sadowa.— His ability in handling large bodies of 
troops. 

General von Steinmetz.— Birth, education.— Wounded at Dannegko^w in 1813.— Entered Paris 
■with the Allies in 1815.— " The Lion of Skalitz."— A stern, imperious old man.— The Ger- 
man corps and army commanders pp. 57-63. 

CHAPTER V. 

Financial condition of France and Germany Difficulty in arriving at the facts relative to tha 

French finances The latest statistics of French revenue and expenditure — The constant 

deficits —Seven loans from 1854 to 1870.— Cost of the Wars during the reign of Napoleon III,— 



CONTENTS. 7 

Imports and Exports The national debt— Its enormous amount. — Valuation of property in 

France. 

Financial condition of the North German Confederation Revenues of 1869-70 Ordinary 

and Extraordinary Expenditure. — Eevenue of Prussia Her Expenditure with about tho 

Bame population. — Her Expenditure only two sevenths of that of France No deficits.—. 

Items of Expenditure. — The national debt of Prussia, small. 

Social condition of tho two countries. — Intelligence and Morals in Germany. — Condition of Franco 
in these respects. — Military and naval strength of the two countries. — Over-statement of 
French military strength. — ^Under-estimate of Prussian military power. — Causes. — The 
French reports of their Army. — Its vast numbers and presumed elEcient condition. — The 

reserves, National Guard and Garde, Mobile Almost two millions of soldiers— on paper. 

— The actual numbers. — One half the Army only existing on paper. — Tho German Armies.— 
Their actual numbers in each arm of the service. — Even these estimates largely exceeded. 

The Navies of the two Nations. — Great number of vessels in the French Navy — 55 Iron-clad 
Steamers. — Analysis of the character of these. — Their efficiency more apparent than real.— . 
Their meagre success. 

Prussian Navy. — ^Vessels few in number, but of remarkable efficiency. 

The Cannon of the German Army. — Krupp's rifled breech-loaders. — ^Their great range and 
accuracy. 

The French bronze Napoleons — muzzle-loaders. — The Mitrailleuse, its character and destruo- 

tiveness. — The Needle-gun Full description of its mechanism. — The different methods of 

obturation or closing of the cylinder upon the barrel The Chassepot rifle — Its construction. 

— Comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the two pp. 64-91. 



CHAPTER VI. 



The circumstances attending the declaration of "War, in detail. — Gen. Prim's visit to Napoleon 
IIL — His correspondence with Prince Leopold. — His acceptance of the candidacy. — The 
King of Prussia's disapproval.— The Prince's persistence. — The French demand on Prussia, 
July 6. — Count Benedetti's instructions. — Mr. Ripley's account of the interviews of Benedetti 

with the King The demand of the French Government The offensive way in -which they 

were presented. — Napoleon's preparations for immediate War The declaration of War. — 

The activity which followed, all over Christendom. — Return of King Wilhelm from Ems to 

Berlin His address to the Prussian Legislature. — ^War-loan voted. — Address of Napoleon 

III Its melodramatic character. — His address to the Army at Metz, July 2Sth. — The circu- 
lar of von Bismarck to the Prussian representatives at the courts of Foreign Powers. — Efforts 

of the French Government to counteract the damaging efi'ect of this exposure Attempts of 

other European Powers to effect a settlement. — Their futility Letter of Pope Pius IX to 

Napoleon III and King Wilhelm. — King Wilhelm's reply. — Forward movements of the 
French advance-guard. — Skirmishing. — Circulation of addresses by the Emperor among 
the South Germans, and the people of Sohleswig-Holstein and Hanover. — Failure of these 
addresses to win any adherents to his cause pp. Q^IOS. 



CHAPTER VII. 



The War begun. — King Wilhelm takes command of the German forces, August 2d. — His ad- 
dress to the troops, at Mayence. — Strength and position of the French forcai on the 2d of 
August. — The German forces and their positions. — The affair at Saarbruck. — The Emperor's 
letter to the Empress. — ^The Tranquil Infant's baptism of fire. — Movements of the two armies. 
— ^The French fortify the Spicheren Hills back of Saarbruck. — MacMahon advances to Weis- 
senburg. — Battle of Weissenburg, Aug. 4 The Crown-Prince's report of the action. — Ad- 



CONTENTS. 

dress of Prince Friedrich Karl Gen. von Steinmetz'6 address to the First German Army.— . 

The battle of Spicheren heights or Forbach, Aug. G Report of von Steinmetz — Account of 

the New York Tribune correspondent. — Casualties of the battle. — The advance of the 

Crown-Prince toward Woerth. — The Battle of Woertli Attempts of the French commander 

to rally his troops — Hie retreat to Saverne Marshal MacMahon's report to the Emperor — 

King "Wilhelm's despatch to the Queen.— " Our Fritz."— Napoleon IIPs despatches.- "He 

goes to the Centre." — Gen. Leboeuf's report Attempts to keep the news from the French 

people. — The proclamation of the Empress. — The statement of the Minister. — Changes in 
the French goverimient and military commands pp. 107-129. 



CHAPTER VIII. 



Indications of .1 coming revolution Addresses and orders of Prince Friedrich Karl, the King, 

and von Steinmetz. — Their humane tenor. — Strasbourg summoned to surrender. — Proclama- 
tion of Gen. Uhi-ich in reply. — Proclamation of King Wilhelm to the French people. — Par- 
ticulars of MacMahon's def|ht at Woerth. — His order to his soldiers The reenforcements he 

received from De Failly, Caiirobert, and De Caen. — His march towards Paris. — Pursuit by 
the Crown-Prince of Prussia. — Bazaine falls back upon Metz, and decides to retreat upon 
Verdun and Paris, leaving a large garrison at Metz. — The rapid advance and severe pressure 
of the Germ.in armies upon his rear. — Crossing of part of the Second Army at Pont k Mous- 

Bon — Napoleon III quits Metz, leaving an address to the inh.ibitants The battle of Cour- 

celles, east of the Moselle Conflicting accounts. — The German report. — Correspondents' 

reports King Wilhelm's despatches. — French official report. — The Emperor's despatch to 

Eugenie. — Bazaine's necessity for retreat. — Critical position. — The two routes to Verdun. — 
His determination to seize and control one or both. — The battle of Vionville, or Mars-la- 
Tour, on the 16th of August. — Terrible fighting. — The Mars-la-Tour road completely blocked by 
the Second German Army Bazaine falls back to the line of Gravelotte. — The battle inde- 
cisive Heavy losses. — The German report. — Bazaine's reports Statement published in 

Paris. — Possibility of Bazaine's retreat by the Conflans road. — Napoleon III leaves Verdun 

with the little prince for Eheims. — The battle of Gravelotte The official account in the 

Army and Kavy Journal King Wilhelm's despatches from Rezonville. — The New York 

Tribune correspondent's account. — Frightful slaughter. — The battle continues into the nighl 
— Account of another correspondent. — The execution done by the Mitrailleuse at close quar- 
ters. — French and German artillery practice pp. 130-167. 



CHAPTER IX. 

Gen. Trocha appointed Governor of Paris by the Emperor. — His proclamation to the people of 
Paris. — Organization of a committee of defence. — Gen. Trochu's address to the people and 

appeal to the soldiers Gen. MacMahon's movement on Chalons He tirrns northwestward 

to Rheims — The attempt to raise the siege of Metz. — The route taken. — The movement a 
blunder. — Reasons why. — Difficulty of the country for rapid marching. — MacMahon's advance 

reaches Rethel and M.dziferes The pursuit by the German aiToies. — The lines on which they 

moved. — The action of August SO. — The advantage gained by the Germans Crossing the 

Meuse — The 1st of September.— The intention to rest the German troops that &ny Change 

of plan — Orders issued — The plan of attack Position of the German armies The French 

ti-oops forced back to Sedan — They enter the town with the French The white flag raised 

King Wilhelm's account of the battles and surrender. — The terms of capiiulation.-TelegraHia 
from the King. — Gen. von Moltke's order for carrjiiig out the capitulation.— Count von Bis- 
marck's letter describing his part MacMahon wounded early in the fight.— De AVimpffen's 

address to his soldiers — Controversy concerning the Emperor and de Wimpffen. — Descrip- 
tion of the battle and surrender by a French officer.— Narrative of the Tribune's correspond- 
ent with the German army , pp. 167-223. 



CONTENTS, 



CHAPTER X. 

The sortie of Marshal Bazaine •on the 31st of August and Sept. 1st. — He attempts to force a pass- 
ago for his troops to the northeast of Metz. — Why this direction was taken. — Severe fight- 
ing He is beaten hack at all points and retires behind the fortifications of Metz General 

Stielile (chief of staff to Prince Friedrich Karl) telegraphs the repulse of the sortie. Gen- 
eral Maiiteuffcl's despatch. — The minor fortresses still holding out Condition of affairs at 

Paris. — The people deceived. — Their sudden awakening Great excitement. — Cries of La 

Decheance. — Count de Palikao's official statement. — The vote of decheance demanded. The 

Revolutionists force tlie gates of the Tuileries. — The Empress escapes The three proposi- 
tions before the Cor2}S Legislatif.~Ad]o\\mment of the Chamber Tine reassembling of the 

Chamber amid tbe turmoil of the mob— Its dissolution The assembling of the Republicans. 

— The downfall of the Empire declared The Republic proclaimed and the members of the 

government announced.— Emmanuel Arago Mayor of Paris Eochefort released from St. 

P61agie and made a member. — Address of the new republican government to the people 

The circular of M. Jules Favre to neutral powers Its defiant spirit.—Its folly M. Favre»8 

negotiations for peace, — His interview with Bismarck The preliminary question of the 

power of the Provisional Government to bind the people of France Favre's proposals, and 

Bi.smarck's rejoinders. — Rejection of Bismarck's proposals by the French leaders Removal 

of the Government to Toul. — Their proclamation respecting the peace negotiations. Bis- 
marck's circular on the same subject.— His reasons for the claim made. — Advance of the 

German armies toward Paris.— Its investment complete on the 20th of September Surrender 

of Toul, Sept. 23d and of Strasbourg, Sept. 27tb.— The condition of the French army and peo- 
ple — Unwisdom of the leaders — The suicidal policy of siill'ering an army of 430,000 men and 

a population of two millions to be besieged.— Losses of the French Their whole available 

force.— The want of leaders — Condition of Paris.— Exaggeration of the most trifling success 

and manufacture of wholesale falsehoods in regard to defeat of the Prussians. The reaction 

in the feeling of sympathy at first manifested for the French Republic in consequence of 
these falsehoods.— The two-headed French government.— Efibrts to raise the army of the 
Loire— The irregular troops of the Republic— Sorties from Paris and Metz.— The sortie 
from Paris of the 19th of Sept.— Ducrot defeated and routed.— Subsequent sorties unsucceBs- 
fill.— The German troops overrun large districts of France.— The new levies unable to resist 
them. — The report of the German commission in regard to operations in the region of the 
Loire.— Tbe Partisans of Gers — Capture of Orleans.— Its value as the centre of a rich dis- 
trict from which supplies could be dniwn — Its strategical importance Other towns captured. 

—Predominance of Red Republicanism in Marseilles and Lyons Fear of the German 

tiociis in the smaller towns of France The desolated tract between the Rhine and Paris 

Surrender of Metz — Magnitude of the surrender Statistics of officers surrendered The in- 
dignation of the Provisional G-ovcrnmentat this surrender Their proclamation Bazaine 

denounced as a teaitor.— The real condition of France understated in this proclamation.— 
Hopeles-sness of its situation.-The energy and executive ability of Gambetta of no avail ex- 
cept to aggravate the severity of the conditions on which peace could eventually be made.— 
The approach of famine and revolution.-Intense pride and conceit of the French people 
and their leaders.- Apostrophe to France pp_ 224-251. 



CHAPTER XL 

The siege of Paris.-The capture of the Heights of Sceanx (Battle of ChatiUon) by the Germane. 
-Culpable negligence of Trochu in not fortifying this point.-IIis folly in attempting to re- 
capture them with a single corps of half-organized troops. -Trochu's reconnoissnnce and 
sortie of Sept. SO. -Its failure-Position of the several corps of German troops around Paris. 
—Breadth of the cordon ; its facilities for rapid concentration on any point.— Its lines never 
broken.-French sorties.-The sortie of Oct. 28 against Le Bourget.-Its failure.-Temporary 
Re volution. -Raising armies in the Provinces to compel the raising of the siege.— Gambetta 
at Tour.s.— Ilia ability as an organiser. -The establishment of camps.— The expulsion of tba 



10 CONTENTS. 

Army of the Seine from Orleans and its vicinitj-, Oct. 10, by General von der Tann — Move- 
ments of the Gfrmans to drive the French Army of the Loire out of the Loire Valley.— The 
determination of Gambetta to crush von dcr Taun and relieve Paris.— Recapture of Orleans 
by the French after a vigorous resistance by von der Tann, Nov. 9-10.— Exaggerated an- 
nouncements of the victory.— General d'Aurelles de Paladines' report.— Gambetta's gloiifica- 
tion of the General.— The other French commanders, BourbaM, Ducrot, de Chanzy, and Faid- 
herbe.— General von der Tann falls back, but General d'Aurelles do Faladines does not ad- 
vance, but fortifies his camp around Orleans.— Gambetta dissatisfied.- Movements of tho 
Gei-man commanders. General von Voights Rhetz and the Duke of Mecklenburg.— They pass 
by the Army of the Loire without an engagement, and move westward.— General d'Auvellos 
is ready to move the last of November.— His lines too much extended.— The fight at Beauno 
de Rolando.- Only part of the French force brought into actioso.— The arrival of Prince 
Friedrich Karl causes the defeat of the French.— Their heavy losses.— General dAurelles 
attacks the German centre, Dec. 1.— Desultory fighting for five days.— The defense of Orleans. 
— The attack by the Germans in full force.— General d'Aurelles driven back.— The Array of 
the Loire cut in two, and two corps pushed across the Loire.— Orleans evacuated and given up 
by tho French.- Retreat of the three Army Corps under General de Chanzy to Blois, and sub- 
sequently toward Le Mans.— Heavy losses of the French.— Constant fighting for eight or ten 
days.— "A blessing in disguise."— The sortie of Generals Ducrot and Trochu from Paris, 
Nov. 30-Dec. 4.— The district lying on the bends of the Marne selected.— Why.— Large force 
engaged in the sortie.— Details of the movement.- General Trochu's reports.— Major Forbes' 
account. — Topography of the battle-ground. — Movements and counter-movements of tho two 
armies.— General Ducrot'e order of the day pp. 256-280. 



CHAPTEE XII. 

The situation.— All not yet lost, though imperiled. — Unimproved opportunities.- Orleans. — Du- 
crot's sortie.— Gambetta's blunders.— Sending Bourbaki to the east of France.— Gambetta's 
dispatch to General Trochu.- The real state of aflTairs.- Capitulation of important posts. — 
Tours surrendered. — The condition and position of de Chanzy's and Faidherbe's armies. — The 
occupation of Amiims.- Another sortie (Deo. 21 and 22) of the French garrison against the 
Saxon Corps. — Heavy losses of the French. — The sortie a failure.- Details of the engage- 
ment, — Bombardment of Fort Avron, Dec. 27. — Capitulation of MeziSres. — Silencing of 
French forts.— Defeat of General Faidherbe's army, Jan. 2-4, 1871.— Rocroy captured.— The 
final pursuit and defeat of de Chanzy, Jan. 5-12.— Prince Friedrich Karl undertakes tho pur- 
suit in person, and sends the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin to execute a flank move- 
ment. — The battle of Jan. 10, near Le Mans.— Description by an eye-witness. — The battle of 
Jan. 11.— The Grand Duke's flanking movement.- Description,— The night attack.— The 
French surprise and panic— General von Voights Rhetz occupies Le Mans.— The losses on 
both sides. — General de Chanzy's order of the day.— He retires with the remnant of his army 
to the vicinity of Laval, and attempts no further offensive movements.— Sketch of de 
Chanzy pp. 281-299. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

General Bourbaki's Army of the East.— The position of affairs in Eastern France. — Siege of Bel- 
fort. — Its gallant resistance. — Reasons why Gambetta made this eastern movement.— The 
policy of doubtful wisdom. — The size and condition of the Army of General Bourbaki. — His 
reputation.- The objects he had in view.— His attacks on General von "Werder's force.— Severe 
fighting, Jan. 13-18.— Bourbaki repulsed and defeated.— He commences a retreat.— His re- 
port.— Reenforceraent of von Wevder. — Approach of Manteuffel. — Bourbaki crowded on to the 
Swiss frontier.— He attempts suicide. — General Clinchart succeeds him. — Heavy losses. — Tho 
French are pushed over the border, and surrender 80,000 men to the Swiss.— General Faid- 
herbe's last attempt to advance on tho route to Paris.— He is oulnambered, outflanked, and 



CONTENTS. 11- 

defeated by General von Goeben, and diiven into and out of St. QuQnt:n.-His retroftt to 
Oambrai.-nis report.-Heavy losses.-Retreat to Lisle.-Surrender of Longwy.-rerllous 
condition of Garibaldi in the vicinity of Dijon. -Ineffectual sortie of Jan. 13.-The final 
sortie of General Trocbu.-Details.-Bombardment of P-.iris. -Removal of General Trocbu.- 
The Outlook.— Summary of the situation.— Condition of the great armies.— De Chanzy, 
Bourbaki, Garibaldi, Faidherbe.-The schools of instruction for soldiers. -The state oi 
affairs in Paris.— Famine.— Fever.— Morals.— Eiots.— Famine and ruin in the provinces.— 
No hope.— Favre seeks an interview with Count von Bismarck to obtain an armistice in which 
to negotiate for the conclusion of the war. -The state of affairs ditferent from that in Sep- 
tember and November.- The armistice concluded.- Its conditions.- The territory surren- 
dered.— The substantial capitulation of Pari?.— Number of French prisoners of war.— Boss of 
French population.— Meeting of the National Assembly at Bordeaux.— Gambetta's restrictive 
decree.— It is annulled by his associates, and he removed from oface.— The election.— Com- 
plexion of the Assembly.— No party has a clear majority.— Choice of M. Grevy as President 
of the Assembly, and of M. Adolphe Thiers as Provisional President of the Republic.- His 
Cabinet.— The negotiation of the preliminary treaty.- Its provisions.— A heavy burden for 
France.— It is ratified by the National Assembly March 1, and by the Emperor ATilhelm I. 
March 5.— The Germans enter Paris March 1, and leave it March 3.— The Parisian mob quiet, 
—General d'Aurelles de Paladines in command.— The Emperor's despatch.- Return of the 
Germans, except the Army of Occupation, to Germany.— Condition in which the war left 
France.— The Red Republicans.— The future of France.— The Government to be.— What will 
it be? -The national debt of France.— Its crushing weight.— President Thiers' address to the 
nation on taking office pp. 300-324. 



CHAPTER XIY. 

Review of the -whole campaign.— The manner and bearing of the French Emperor and the 

Prussian King contrasted The aOair at Saarbruck.— A great boast over a small matter.— 

Thfr" Tranquil Infant."— Terror of the Emperor at the defeats of Forbach, "Weissenbourg, 
and "Woerth.— nis despatches.— Bazaine's retreat upon Metz.— His attempt to fall back 

toward Paris Too late.— The sanguinary battles of CourccUes, Vionville, and Gravelotte — . 

The gTcat blunder of MacMahon.— The pursuit — MacMahon caught astride the Mouse.— 
Terrible slaughter of the battle of Aug. 30— The fighting of August 31st and Sept. 1st — 
MacMahons army forced into Sedan, and then compelled to surrender — Gen. de AVimplfen 
in command Napoleon's surrender.- The French revolution.— The " Government of Na- 
tional Defense."— Its unwisdom.— Their early peace negoliations.— Their refusal to cede any 
territory or surrender any of their strongholds.— The elections for a Constituent Assembly 
indefinitely postponed.- Investment of Paris.— The two-headed French Government.— Sur- 
render of Strasburg.— Capture of Orleans.- Gambetta's exertions to raise new armies.— 
Regular and irregular troops.— Credit due him notwithstanding all his failings.— Steady 
proVess of German conciuest.— C.ipitulation of Metz, Oct. 27th ; of Dijon, Oct. 30th ; of New 
Breisach, Nov. 6th, and of Verdun, Nov. 9th ; Thionville surrendered Nov. 25th.— Sorties 
repulsed.— Temporary success of the French at Coulmiers, Patay, and Orleans.— Failure of 
the great sortie from Paris, Nov. 29 to Dec. 2.— Recapture of Orleans by the Germans, and 
division of the Army of the Loto by Prince Friedrioh Karl, Dec. 4.— The two Armies of the 
Loire and of the East.— Removal of d' Aurelles de Paladines from command.— The rising tide 
of disaster.— Surrender of Rouen, Beaugency, Dieppe, Pfalzburg, Montmedy, Vendome, 
Nuits, Tours, Sangre, Blois, Bapaume, Fort Avron, and other forts in the vicinity of Paris, 
during the month of December.— Attempt of General Faidherbe to advance toward Paris.— 
EiB repulse, defeat, and route by General von Goeben ; General de Chanzy pursued and 
utterly defeated in the neighborhood of Lc Mans.— Garibaldi but just escapes defeat.— Bour- 
baki's disaster, retreat, and final surrender.- The negotiation of the armistice, the election, 
and meeting of the National Assembly.— Thiers elected Provisional President.- The pre- 
liminary treaty negotiated and ratified.- The closing scenes of the war.— The remarkabia 
character of the war— its slaughter, its surrenders, its weapons.- Its destruction of life and 
property.— The effect on the two nations— politically, Eocially, and religiously.- The peril of 
failing to heed these lessons ...pp. 32^-340, 



12 CONTENTS. 

APPENDIX I. 

Philanthropy of the "War. — Organization of nn International Sanitary Commission in 1866. — Its 
banner and badge. — Formation of Ambulance Corps early in the present "War. — Actiyity of 

the Empress in France The zeal of Queen Augusta, the Crown-Princess Victoria, Princess 

Alice, the Grand Duchess Louise of Baden, and the Crown-Princess Caroline of Saxony 

The Grand Duchess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. — Assistance rendered by Miss Clara Barton, 
Miss Safford, Mrs. Evans, &c.— The organization of Ambulance Corps in both annies. — The 
aid and service rendered by American gentlemen in Paris, and of others in the German 
armies. — Their strength overtasked in these labors, — Liberal gifts for the relief of the sick 
and wounded in Prance and Germany.— Munificence of Count Henri de Chambord.— Large 
contributions from Great Britain and the United States.— The wounded French in Germany. 
— Their general kind treatment.— German wounded prisoners in Prance. — The organizationa 
for distribution of Bibles, tracts, periodicals, and moral and religious reading.... pp. 341-343. 



APPENDIX II. 

Biographical sketch of Louis Adolphb Thiers, Provisional President French Eepublic. 

pp. 344-350. 



CHAPTEK I. 



THE war of 1870, between France and Germany, is often 
denounced as " wanton," " causeless," and " unprovoked ; " 
and in one aspect of the case this is true ; for tlie immediate 
causes of the war were trivial, and could only have led to a 
conflict where one or both parties were eager for a pretext for 
fighting. Had these been the only grounds on which the contest 
was based, it could not have occurred ; for, if the rulers had 
been such fools as to knock their heads together on the question 
of a possible Spanish succession, their people would have pro- 
tested against it. 

The true origin of the war, though perhaps unjustifiable on 
the part of the Frencli Emperor, lies farther back, and appeals 
to higher motives and jealousies than a petty question of succes- 
sion to a foreign throne. There have been, for two hundred and 
twenty years past, almost constant encroachments by France 
upon the provinces of the old German empire. Some of these, 
like the old provinces of Alsace and Lorraine (the old Elsass and 
Lothringen of the Germans), gained by treaty, by seizure, by the 
intrigues of French Bishop-princes, or by the real or supposed 
exigencies of mercantile policy, France has been allowed to 
keep ; and though 1,007,477 out of the 1,097,000 inhabitants of 
Alsace, and 351,681 out of the 1,291,000 inhabitants of Lorraine, 
were Germans, yet the severest measures of oppression have 



14: THE GREAT WAR 

been resorted to by tlie French Government to compel the peo- 
ple to abandon all use of the German language, customs, and 
manners. The natural boundary between France and Germany 
is the Yosges range of mountains, not the Rhine ; and thougli 
Napoleon I, among his other conquests of territory belonging to 
other nations, seized and held, for six or eight years, the German 
provinces lying west of the Rhine (Dusseldorf, Cologne, Aachen 
or Aix-la-Chapelle, Coblentz, Hesse, Treves, Birkenfeld, and the 
Palatinate), and carved out from them the kingdom of "West- 
phalia, over which he placed his brother Jerome, yet the in- 
justice of their being torn from their natural affinities was so 
great, that, by the treaty of 1815, they were restored to Ger- 
many. In the 3,108,000 inhabitants of these provinces, there 
are not more than 10,000 people to whom French is their mother- 
tongue. 

Napoleon I had also absorbed Belgium, with its 2,667,000 
inhabitants of Flemish origin, in his conquests, and, nniting it 
with Holland, had placed his brother Louis over it. These king- 
doms were taken from France by the treaty of 1815, and have 
since, under different designations, maintained a separate exist- 
ence. 

Under the Bourbons of the Restoration, and under Louis 
Philippe, France made no effort to recover these territories — 
Belgium, Holland, and the Rhenish provinces — which were so 
alien from her in race and language, and which she had possessed 
but so short a time. Contenting herself with increasing wealth 
and prosperity, and the possession of Alsace and Lorraine, which 
she had held from one to two centuries, her policy was rather 
that of a cordial understanding with the nations adjacent than 
one of territorial aggression. 

But after the Revolution of 1848 and the accession of Louis 
Napoleon to the Presidency, and especially after the coup d'etat 
and the establishment of the Empire, the hearts of the French 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 1£ 

people were fired by the usurper with the hope of regaining all 
the territory they had ever possessed under the first Napoleon. 

No sooner was the new Emperor firmly seated on his throne, 
than, while carefully promulgating his declaration that " the 
Empire was peace," he began to plot for the accomplishment of 
his long-cherished purposes of avenging "Waterloo, and extending 
the bounds of France to the Rhine on the east, and to the Adri- 
atic on the southeast. Crafty and reticent, yet wholly unscrupu- 
lous, he made every move on the political chess-board with a 
view to these ends. He duped England into an alliance which 
should enure to his benefit ; made war with Russia, ostensibly 
on behalf of Turkey, but really to cripple her resources and pre- 
vent her interference with his schemes ; joined Italy in a war 
with Austria, in the hope of obtaining a large slice of Italy for 
his reward ; and when Prussia, cognizant of his plans, declared 
that the Rhine must be defended on the Adige, withdrew and 
accepted, somewhat ungraciously. Savoy and Nice as the com- 
pensation for his seiwices. To amuse his people and keep them 
in training for the great war he purposed to begin as soon as he 
felt strong enough for it, he made war upon the Cochin-Chinese, 
and sent his armies to Mexico to establish a throne there for 
Maximilian, and to be on hand to interfere, if he could drag any 
other European power into the plot, in behalf of the Southern 
Confederacy. The blunder he made was a serious one, and he 
felt it keenly. Meantime, his old foes, the Prussians and Austri- 
ans, were fighting each other, and he ofi'ered his aid to each in 
turn, demanding, as his price, the Rhine provinces and Belgium. 
Austria could not, and Prussia, strong in her military organiza- 
tion and her skilled troops, would not, entertain his proposals. 
When, after seven weeks of hard fighting, he found Prussia tri- 
umphant, Austria humbled, and the North-German Confedera- 
tion an accomplished fact, with a certainty that a united Ger- 
many would follow in time, he was greatly enraged, and his de- 



IQ THE GREAT WAR 

mauds for a share of the territory which he had done nothing to 
earn, being treated with contempt, he began to comprehend that 
Prussia was becoming too strong for him. 

Thenceforward he commenced preparations for a desperate 
struggle with his enemy, the time and place of commencement 
to be determined by circumstances. But even in this prepara- 
tion he blundered sadly, blinded by the demoralizing effects of 
the corruption which he had encouraged in the nation. The 
wonderful success of Prussia w^as not, as he supposed, due to her 
needle-guns or her improved artillery, excellent as they were, so 
much as to her admirable military organization, which made 
every able-bodied man in the realm an experienced soldier, and 
w^hich required of every officer that thorough topographical 
knowledge and military skill which enabled them to handle their 
troops efficiently. 

For the needle-gun the French Emperor substituted the 
chassepot rifle, in some respects a superior weapon ; his bronze 
cannon were not greatly inferior to Krupp's steel artillery ; and he 
had in the mitrailleuse a w^eapon very efficient at short range ; 
but he lacked what was far more important — skilful and efficient 
officers, men of thorough honesty, integrity, and military ability ; 
and a large part of his army were untrained and undisciplined. 

Official peculation and falsehood had permeated every por- 
tion of his army and sapped its very life-blood. That he had 
converted to his own use a part of the appropriations for the 
army, was but a small part of the trouble ; ahnost every officer, 
from the highest to the lowest, had followed his example. Where 
he supposed he had a hundred soldiers fully armed and equipped, 
there were found but fifty, and these imperfectly supplied with 
arms and ammunition. His officers knew nothing of the topog- 
raphy of France or Germany ; their military education had been 
acquired either in Africa, Cochin-China, or Mexico, and they had 
tio experience in fighting an intelligent and educated foe. These 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 17 

tilings tlie Emperor neglected to take into account ; and, infatu- 
ated with Ill's hatred of Prussia, he sought diligently for an occa- 
sion to declare war, meantime endeavoring to imbue the French 
people with the sentiment that the Rhine was the only true 
boundary of France on the northeast. 

There were not wanting other motives to lead to this war. 
France was restive under his system of repression and espionage. 
The great cities, Paris, Marseilles, Lyons, Bordeaux, were bitterly 
hostile to him. The Corps L''gislatif, or popular branch of the 
Legislature, was at each election increasing the number of oppo- 
sition members, and on every side were the hoarse growlings of 
a coming storm. The artfully-phrased ballot, submitted to tho 
popular vote or plebiscite in May, 1870, was, by adroit manage- 
ment and no little direct exertion of authority, carried in his 
favor by a majority of nearly six millions ; but the opposition 
was nevertheless strong and intelligent, and a considerable frac- 
tion of his army voted with it. His own health was evidently 
failing, and the only prospect for his dynasty lay in a war which 
should rouse the old enthusiasm of the French, and drown their 
dislike of him in their love of military glory. 

Nor were religious motives lacking. Eugenie, whose reli- 
gious zeal increased as her beauty faded, had for her confessor an 
artful Jesuit, high in rank in that powerful order. The condi- 
tion of the Pope was becoming desperate. Italy was in revolt 
against his temporal power and his new dogma of Infallibility ; 
Austria was no longer his faithful defender ; Spain was in revo- 
lution, and there remained only the eldest son of the Church, the 
Emperor of the French, on whom the Pope could call for aid. 
Prussia, the leading Protestant nation, was gaining strength 
every day. Its pride must be humbled, and this could only be 
accomplished by a great war ; and, even if the Emperor should 
fall in the fray, she, the devout daughter of the Church, and the 
young Prince Imperial, could, under Catholic influence, have a 
2 



18 THE GKEAT WAR 

better and stronger hold upon the nation than in any other way. 
Such were the arguments addressed to the Empress, and through 
her to the Emperor, by this skilful Jesuit. 

Apart from his passion for the perpetuation of his dynasty, 
which seemed to make war his ouly alternative, the Emperor 
may reasonably be supposed to have had some feeling for the 
position of France as one of the great powers of Europe. Prus- 
sia had humbled Austria, and now ranked, or would soon rank, 
first among the European powers, where she had, till lately, been 
fourth. Her position menaced France. Should she relinquish 
her prestige to a State so lately her inferior ? If she would not, 
she must subdue this proud, haughty nation before it became too 
strong to be subdued. 

And so, after years of waiting, during which all Europe had 
been kej^t in constant alarm by the defiant attitude of the French 
ruler, now threatening one and now another. Napoleon III be- 
lieved he had found or made his opportunity for a war with 
Prussia. 

Spain, which, in the autumn of 1868, had overthrown its 
Bourbon dynasty and had been drifting along since that time 
under a Regency and a Provisional Government, had sought 
"widely, but, from one cause or another, inefi'ectually, for a suit- 
able candidate for her vacant throne. To all who were named 
there seemed to be some objection, either on the part of adjacent 
nations and rulers, or of the Spanish people themselves. Gen- 
eral Prim, the real though not the nominal ruler of Spain, was a 
personal friend of Louis Napoleon, and had a long conference 
with him respecting the succession^to the throne in the Spring 
of 18Y0. Soon after his return to Madrid it was given out, at 
first semi-officially, and afterward by the Spanish Government 
itself, that Prince Leopold Hohenzollern, of Sigmaringen, would 
be the candidate for the vacant Spanish throne, and on a canvass 
of the Constituent Assembly, it was ascertained that there was 




PRINCE LEOPOLD OP IIOHEN-ZOLLEEIS-. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 21 

a probability of his election. The Prince Leopold was a cadet 
of a younger branch, and somewhat remotely connected with the 
reigning family of Prussia ; his mother was a Beauharnais, a 
niece, we believe, of Queen Hortense, the mother of Louis Na- 
poleon ; so that he was a distant relative of both the King of 
Prussia and the Emperor of France. He was, however, a 
younger son of his father, the ruling prince of Sigmaringen, and 
had entered the Prussian army, where he had risen to the rank 
of Colonel. 

Immediately on the announcement of his candidature, th^ 
French Emperor protested most vigorously, and aimounced his 
fixed determination to make any effort to put a Hohenzollern 
upon the Spanish throne a cause of war against Prussia, which 
power, he assumed, had prompted the movement from hostility 
to him. Prussia promptly disavowed all previous knowledge of 
Prince Leopold's candidature, and the King expressed his disap- 
proval of it, though, from the relations which existed between 
tbe German princes, he was not in a position to prohibit it abso- 
lutely. This difficulty was, however, soon obviated by the 
prompt declinature of the candidacy by Prince Leopold himself, 
and by his father for him. It really looked, for the time, as if 
there would be no war after all ; and there were not a few states- 
men of surrounding nations who believed that the whole move- 
ment was a trap into which Louis ]!^apoleon and General Prim 
had sought to inveigle Prussia, that the Emperor might have a 
justifiable pretext for declaring war against her, and that Prussia, 
understanding the trick, was determined to foil it. 

But the inflammatory circulars, addresses, and proclamations 
distributed by the French Emperor am.ong his people, had roused 
such bitter hatred against Prussia throughout France, that war 
was inevitable. He had roused, but could not lay, the storm, 
even if he desired it. The apparent aversion of Prussia to a war 
made him more anxious to compel her to accept its arbitrament, 



22 THE GREAT WAE 

and making demands which Prussia could not accept — such as, 
that Prussia should give substantial guarantees that no Prussian 
prince should ever become a candidate for the Spanish throne, 
professing that otherwise the balance of power was likely to be 
disturbed. The French Minister at Berlin was directed to press 
the demands offensively upon the King of Prussia, and per- 
formed the work so zealously as to cause his dismissal from the 
Prussian Court. This was nsed as an additional grievance bj 
the Emperor, w^io immediately declared war, basing his justifica- 
tion on these grounds : the insult to his minister ; the refusal of 
the King of Prussia to prohibit, absolutely. Prince Leopold's can- 
didature, and his unwillingness to offer material guarantees that 
he would not permit anyiPrussian prince to be a candidate for 
the Spanish throne in the future ; and, finally, the danger to the 
peace and balance of power in Europe from the action of the 
Prussian King. Every nation in Europe knew that l^apoleon III 
did not really make war on these grounds, but because he wanted 
the Phenish provinces and Belgium, and wanted to humble Prus- 
sia and her great statesman, Bismarck ; and, while some of the 
European powers were not averse to seeing Prussian arrogance, 
as they phrased it, a little lowered, they were all aware that no 
justifiable pretext for war had been made out. 

IlTapoleon III had sent his emissaries and missives throughout 
Bavaria, "Wurtemburg, Baden, and Hanover, in the hope of 
alienating them from the Prussian cause ; but he met with no 
encouragement from that quarter, and found, when it was too 
late, that he had all Germany, instead of Prussia, to fight. 

Such was the origin and such the immediate causes of the 
war which, in six weeks, has caused a slaughter of nearly a quar- 
ter of a million of men, and produced extraordinary changes in 
the condition of Europe. Let us next trace the personal history 
jf the two raonarchs, their counsellors, and their leading com- 
manders. 




WILKELM, EMPEEOE OF GEEMAJfY. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 25 



CHAPTER II. 

AMOI^G the conspicuous personages in this great contest, the 
first place belongs to the King of Prussia by right of 
seniority. He is not a man of as remarkable intellectual abilities 
as Bismarck, nor of as profound military knowledge as Yon 
Moltke ; but, though naturally, and as a result of his early edu- 
cation and prejudices, an absolutist, he has, through the influence 
of his ministers, become so far liberalized as to grant constitu- 
tional privileges to his people ; and his manliness, integrity, and 
straightforwardness have so endeared him to his people, that he 
may justly be regarded as the most popular monarch in Europe. 
WiLHELM Fkiedeich Ludwig, better known as William I, 
King of Prussia, was born March 22, 1797, and is, therefore, 
seventy-three years old. He entered the military service very 
young. As a child, he witnessed the humiliation of his father 
by the first I^Tapoleon, and he engaged in the avenging cam- 
paigns of 1813 and 1814. In 1840 he was appointed governor 
of Pomerania. The revolution of 1848 drove him from Prussia, 
for he was at that time a bitter hater of democracy. After nine 
months in England, he returned, and was elected a member of 
the National Assembly, but took no part. In the same year he 
commanded the troops that put down the Baden insurrection. 
During the Crimean war he was anxious to have Prussia take 
sides with Russia. October 23, 1857, owing to the ill health 
and insanity of his brother, Frederick AVilliam lY, the govern- 
ment was placed in his hands ; October 9, 1858, he was declared 
regent ; January 2, 1861, he became king. For the first four or 



26 THE GREAT WAR 

five years of his reign his tendencies to absolutism brought him 
into repeated collisions with the popular branch of the Prussian 
legislature, and rendered him unpopular as a king ; but the v/iso 
counsels of Count Bismarck, and the material change in his 
policy, have of late greatly endeared him to his people. He is 
described as stalwart, deep-chested, with a square, rugged face, 
and bristling gray mustache, cold, implacable eyes, and a heavy 
jaw ; yet, in his intercourse with his people, and especially with 
children, the grim face relaxes, and it is easy to see that the 
stern old man has a kindly and tender heart. His military 
education was very thorough, and he handles large bodies of 
troops with great ability. During the war of 1866, as well as 
the present war, his despatches from the field of battle have 
always been modest, frank, and truthful, underrating rather than 
exaggerating his successes, and always giving full credit to 
others for victories. His messages to Queen Augusta have 
been so fraught with feeling, and so free from any thing like 
elation or bombast, as to be models of what war-despatches 
should be. 

His opponent, the originator of the war, though a younger 
man, has a longer and more eventful record, though not a more 
creditable one. 

With his usual imperiousness, iN'apoleon I compelled, in 
1802, his brother, Louis Bonaparte, to marry Hortense Beau- 
harnais, the daughter of Josephine. The match was repugnant 
to the wishes of both the parties, Louis being already openly the 
suitor of Erailie Beauharnais, Josephine's niece, and Hortense 
secretly, if not openly, betrothed to General Duroc. As might 
have been expected, the marriage proved an unhappy one, and 
resulted in a separation in 1810. Hortense became the mother, 
in this period, of three sons, the youngest bearing the name of 
Charles Loms IiTapoleon, being born April 20, 1808. King 
Louis hesitated long before acknowledging the legitimacy of this 



BETWEEN FKANCE AND GERMANY. 2T 

third son, and only consented finally at the i^rgent solicitations 
and threats of his brother. There was a Dutch admiral at that 
time on terms of intimacy with Queen Ilortense, to whom 
rumor assigned the paternity of the boy, who certainly resem- 
bled him more strongly than he did any of the Bonapartes. 
After the age of two years, his residence was with his mother, 
at Paris, until 1815, and he was, as a child, a favorite of Napo- 
leon I. 

After the Eestoration, the ex-Queen Hortense spent her sum- 
mer . at Augsburg, or at the castle of Arenenberg, near Lake 
Constance, and her winters in Italy ; and her two sons (the eld- 
est child had died in 1807), who accompanied her, received but 
an imperfect and desultory education. They studied German 
and the classics, though with such interruptions that they never 
became remarkable proficients in any thing. Both joined the 
revolutionary society of the Carbonari, in Italy, and were impli- 
cated in several of the Italian conspiracies. After the revolution 
of July, 1830, and the accession of Louis Philippe to the throne, 
the younger asked permission for himself and family to return to 
France ; and this being refused, he requested to bo allowed to serve 
as a private soldier in the French army. The French Govern- 
ment answered these requests by a renewal of the decree for his 
banishment. He concealed his chagrin at this action at the time, 
but thenceforth did not cease to plot for the overthrow of the 
Orleans dynasty. In the beginning of 1831, he and his brother 
left Switzerland, and settled in Tuscany, from whence, a month 
later, both took part in the unsuccessful insurrection at Rome. 
The fatigues and exposures of that period led to the death of 
his elder brother at Forli, March 17, 1831 ; and Louis Napoleon 
escaped through Italy and France to England, where he re- 
mained a short time, and then retired to the castle of Arenen- 
burg, where his mother still resided. Soon after his arrival 
there, the Duke of Reichstadt, the only legitimate son of Napo- 



28 THE GREAT WAR 

leon I, died, and Louis Napoleon became the legal lieir of the 
family, and the claimant of the imperial throne of France. His 
efforts were secretlj directed, from this time, to the overthrow 
of Louis Philippe, and he had succeeded in winning the favor 
of some of the distinguished men of the time to his projects. 
Outwardly, during this time, he appeared to be very quiet. He 
wrote, between 1832 and 1835, three works, which attained a 
small and limited ciiculation ; but he was never sufficiently well 
educated to be master of a good French style, and his grammat- 
ical and rhetorical blunders greatly marred the effect of these 
and all other of his literary performances. The books ]3repared 
at this time — " Political Reveries," " Political and Military 
Considerations in Regard to Switzerland," and a " Manual of 
Artillery " — were the crude productions of a young man of 
imperfect education, unaccustomed to profound thought, and 
with very little knovdedge of human nature. The " Manual 
of Artillery," a mere technical book, is incomparably the best 
of the three, and received from some of the military journals a 
favorable notice. 

But he was restless, and sick of this quiet life. Some of his 
correspondents in France had encouraged him in the belief that 
France was ripe for a revolution, and he resolved to attempt it. 
There was always a melodramatic tendency in his mind, and 
this led him to model his intended attack on the return of 
Napoleon I from Elba. His associates in the plot were Colonel 
Vaudrey, of the 4:th Artillery, then stationed at Strasbourg, and 
M. Victor Fialin, afterward better known as the Due de Per- 
signy. 

On the 30th of October, 1836, Louis Napoleon suddenly 
made his appearance in Strasbourg, was presented to a part of 
the garnson by Colonel Yaudrey, v/ho at the same time an- 
nounced to the soldiers that a revolution had taken place in 
Paris, and was accepted by the 4th Artillery and a portion of 




NAPOLEON ni., LATE EMPEEOK OF FEANCE. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 81 

some other regiments. The prompt action of Gen. Yoirol and 
Colonel Tallandier arrested the movement. The troops hesi- 
tated ; in a few minutes more, the epaulettes and decorations of 
the would-be Emperor were torn from him. He was arrested 
without delay, and forwarded to Paris. Louis Philippe felt too 
secure in his place to be vmdictive ; the attempt, in fact, illus- 
trated its own impotence ; and the culprit was dealt with very 
leniently. Within three weeks he was shipped to ISTew York, 
without any conditions being attached to his release, and $3,000, 
the gift of Louis Philippe, in his pocket. He was first taken to 
Eio Janeiro, where the vessel delayed but a few days, and then 
Bailed for the United States. He was landed at Norfolk, in 
March, 183Y, and thence made his way to ISTev/ York, where he 
remained until some time in May. His residence in America 
was not marked by any events at all to his credit. His rela- 
tives, Joseph Bonaparte, at Bordentown, and the Patterson- 
Bonapartes at Baltimore, turned the cold shoulder to him. His 
hare-brained adventure at Strasbourg had stamped him as an 
adventurer ; his personal habits were reckless, and his associa- 
tions not at all respectable ; and he had not the passport to good 
society. 

The news of the serious illness of his mother recalled him to 
Switzerland. He reached Arenenberg shortly before her death, 
which occurred on the 3d of October. In the following year his 
account of the Strasbourg afi'air was published by Lieutenant 
Laity, who had also been concerned in it. Louis Philippe took 
offence at the statements it contained, and demanded his extra- 
dition from the Swiss Government, which, in spite of Louis 
Napoleon's citizenship, would probably have been compelled to 
accede, had he not relieved_ it from the embarrassment by 
migrating to England. Here, in 1839, he published his Idees 
WapolSoniennes, which were widely circulated. They reiterated 
the assertion of his Reveries Politiques^ that France could only 



32 THE GREAT WAR 

be developed by a Napoleonic ruler, and assailed botli tlie policy 
of tbe Orleans family and its right to the throne. 

Although, in 1840, the Orleanist rale was still firmly estab- 
lished in France, Louis Napoleon, yielding less to the impatience 
of his small band of followers in London, than blindly and reck- 
lessly trusting his fortunes to chance, organized a new attempt. 
Accompanied by Count Montholon (one of the companions of 
Napoleon at St. Helena) and about fifty others, he crossed the 
Channel in a small steamer, and landed at Boulogne. One of 
the " properties " of the expedition was a tame eagle, which — 
according to the gossip of the day — had been trained to alight 
on the Prince's head by the lure of a piece of raw beefsteak 
attached to his hat. Tlie landing was made, the bluffs ascended, 
and the garrison summoned to acknowledge their legitimate 
commander ; but the eagle forgot his lesson, and the soldiers had 
not yet learned theirs. The first alighted upon a post, instead 
of the selected head, and the second charged upon their self- 
styled sovereign and his adherents. Plunging into the sea in 
his endeavor to regain the steamer, Louis Napoleon was dragged 
out, dripping and collapsed, and forwarded a second time to 
Paris. This attempt was even more disastrous than the first ; 
for at Strasbourg a part of the garrison (deceived by Colonel 
Yaudrey) had actually declared for him ; whereas at Boulogne 
not a single soldier appears to have done him reverence. 

Louis Philippe, it must be admitted, acted with great moder- 
ation. The life of the conspirator, who had abused his first 
forbearance, was in his power ; but he brought him to trial 
before the House of Peers, where he was defended by Berryer, 
then the first advocate in France, and acquiesced in the sentence 
of perpetual imprisonment. Nay, more ; it was reported, and 
generally believed, that the escape in 1846 was accomplished 
with the knowledge and tacit connivance of the French Govern- 
ment. Louis Napoleon's imprisonment in Ham — a small place 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 



33 



near St. Qiientin, about half-way between Paris and the Belgian 
frontier — was voluntarily shared by Dr. Conneau, a physician 
who had faith in his destiny. During the six years at Ham, 
however, the prisoner was not idle. He occupied himself 
chiefly with political studies, and wrote three works — " Historic 
Fragments " (published in 1841), a comparison between the fall 
of the Stuart dynasty in England and certain features of French 
history ; an " Analysis of the Sugar Question " (1842), in which 
he took ground against specially favoring production in the 
French colonies ; and, finally, an essay on the " Extinction of 
Pauperism," which was the most important of all, inasmuch as 
it indirectly favored the communistic theories which were then 
rapidly taking root amoug the laboring classes of France. He 
proposed that the Government should advance funds to establish 
settlement and cultivation in all the waste districts of the coun- 
try, and that the profits of the undertaking should be appropri- 
ated to the support and elevation of the manufacturing classes. 
He asserted, moreover, his own intention " to act always in the 
interest of the masses, the sources of all right and of all wealth, 
althougli destitute of the one and without any guaranty for 
attaining the other." 

Toward the end of 1845, the ex-King Louis, then ill at Flor- 
ence, made an appeal to the French Government for the release 
of the only son who bore his name. After a long consideration, 
the appeal was refused ; but the refusal was followed, in May, 
1846, by the escape of Louis Napoleon from Ham. With Dr. 
Conneau's assistance, disguised as a workman, he walked out of 
the fortress carrying a board upon his shoulder, easily made his 
way to the Belgian frontier, and thence to England. 

His long confinement, and the evidence of literary ability in 
his published works, had by this time partly removed the 
impression of folly and pretension which the attempts at Stras- 
bourg and Boulogne had cast upon his name ; and during his 



34 THE GREAT WAR 

second residence in England he appears to have associated with 
another and better class of society. He was welcomed to Lady 
Blessington's receptions at Gore House, was a frequent visitor of 
Sir John (then Dr.) Bowriug's, and made a strong impression 
on Walter Savage Landor at Bath, by declaring to him, confi- 
dentially, that he would yet reign in France. Generally, how- 
ever, he was reticent, impassive, and abstracted ; his destiny was 
credited by very few, and his abilities doubted by most. Dis- 
appointment, ridicule, exile, imprisonment, and privation, had 
taught him prudence. 

Then came, startling all Europe, the revolution of February, 
1848. Louis Napoleon's shrewdness and self-control at such a 
crisis contrast remarkably with his former recklessness. The 
Bonapartist faction in France was not large at that time, but it 
was very active. Lamartine, originally a Legitimist, knew the 
power of a name among the people, and the Executive Com- 
mittee (in May), probably at his suggestion, laid before the 
National Assembly a proposal to renew the decree of 1832, and 
banish the Bonaparte family from France. This was rejected 
by the Assembly, and Louis Napoleon, who had been brought 
before the people as a candidate by his followers, and had been 
elected Deputy from four departments, was free to visit Paris. 
Nevertheless, he still delayed, from an apparent disinclination to 
create trouble. After having announced to the President of the 
National Assembly, on the 14th of June, that he was ready to 
perform any duty with which the people might chai-ge him, he 
forwarded a letter, the following day, resigning his place as 
Deputy in the interest of peace and harmony. This step greatly 
increased his popularity, and he was immediately rechosen 
Deputy hy four other departments. 

Thereupon he left England, reached Paris on the 24th of 
September, and, on the 26th, took liis seat in the National 
Assembly. He made a short address, taking strong ground in 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANT. 35 

favor of the preservation of order and the development of demo- 
cratic institutions. His manner as a speaker was stiff and un- 
impressive, liis accent was slightly foreign, and General Cavai- 
gnac, then temporary dictator, and candidate for the Presidency, 
seems to have greatly -under-estimated both his ability and the 
chances of his popularity. 

The Bonapartists had used every means in their power to 
unite the numerous discordant elements in the nation upon him ; 
and, thanks to their adroit management and the lack of any 
popular name for a rallying-cry among the other parties, they 
were successful. The election was held on the 10th of Decem- 
ber, 1848, and the result gave evidence of an almost complete 
union of all other parties against that of the Republic of Order 
represented by Cavaignac. The latter received 1,460,000 votes ; 
Louis Napoleon, 5,500,000 ; and Lamartine a comparatively 
trifling number. The two monarchical parties designed mak- 
ing use of Louis l!^apoleon as an instrument to weaken the 
Republicans, trusting that his own incompetency would com- 
plete the work, and hasten a counter-revolution. When, there- 
fore, on the 20th of December, he was installed as President 
of the French Kepublic, it was under auspices seemingly very 
fortunate, because the hostile influences were temporarily held 
in abeyance. Cavaignac, a noble Spartan nature, had restored 
France to order, although the blood he had shed, in saving the 
country lost the country to him. The new President, with no 
record of offence except against the banished dynasty, took quiet 
possession of the realm which another had made ready for his 
hands. 

His policy, which was speedily developed, was to improve 
the social and business condition of France, and at the same 
time to pursue a gradually increasing system -of repression, till 
he had cmshed out the last vestige of liberty. The French 
people of tlie middle and lower classes love to be ruled with a 



36 THE GREAT WAR 

strong hand, so that tlieir social prosperity is assured and their 
love of glory gratified ; and he succeeded more easily, perhaps, 
than even he had anticipated. A system of internal improve- 
ments was planned and put in execution ; indnstry of all kinds 
revived, and the change from the depression produced by the 
uncertainties of the previous year was felt as a happy relief by 
the whole population. All this time the liberty secured by the 
Constitution was steadily contracted ; the Government became 
firmer and more repressive in its character ; the restless move- 
ments of factions were dealt with more severely as the mass of 
the people became more contented under their new prosperity. 
Although the point to which this policy tended was now toler- 
ably clear, it was still difficult to point to any act as specially 
indicative of it. "While violating the spirit of the Constitution, 
while advocating or opposing universal suffrage, according to 
the exigencies of his policy, his speeches were so worded as to 
make it appear that he was the sole defender of the Constitution, 
concerned only to shield it from the aggressions of the National 
Assembly. 

In January, 1851, a completely Bonapartist Ministry was 
appointed ; but the Assembly, having voted its lack of confi- 
dence, another Ministry was substituted. An attempt was then 
made to change the Constitution in such a manner that the 
President's term of office might be extended, since an immediate 
reelection was prohibited; but, after a very fierce and stormy 
discussion, the proposition failed to receive the requisite major- 
ity of three fourths. The Assembly was soon afterwards ad- 
journed until ISTovember, which gave the Prince-President time 
to mature his plans. His term would expire the following 
Spring ; the Prince de Joinville was already named as a candi- 
date ; the elements of opposition, although without combination, 
were increasing in strength, and the temper of the French peo- 
ple was anxious and uneasy. In this juncture, he called about 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 3Y 

him men wqo were equally cimning, daring, and unprincipled — 
General St. Arnaud (who was made Minister of War in October, 
1851), De Mornj, Persigny, and Fleury. All of these appear 
to have been made acquainted with his plans, and two of them 
— St. Arnaud and De Moray — were his chief instruments in 
carrying them into execution. 

On the 13th of ]^ovember, 1851, the ISTational Assembly, by 
a large majority, defeated the proposition for universal suffrage, 
and the Prince-President and his co-conspirators speedily deter- 
mined upon a desperate measure. Before daylight on the morn- 
ing of the 2d of December, 1851, seventy-eight prominent men 
were seized, many of them being dragged from their beds, the 
National Assembly forcibly dissolved (220 of the Deputies hav- 
ing been arrested and imprisoned the same day), Paris declared 
in a state of siege, and the people called upon to elect a Presi- 
dent for ten years, with power to select his own Ministry, and a 
Government consisting of two Chambers, with limited powers. 
All legal opposition and protest was crushed under foot. Paris 
arose against the outrage, and, until the night of December 4, 
its streets ran with blood. Entire quarters of the city were 
given up to murder and plunder. Men, women, and children, 
natives and foreigners, were shot and bayoneted indiscrimi- 
nately. The greatest pains have been taken to suppress the 
dreadful details, but the number of persons butchered cannot 
have been less than 5,000, and may have been twice as many. 
Within the next month, according to the Bonapartist, Granier 
de Cassagnac, 26,500 persons were transported to the penal 
colonies of Cayenne and Africa, where the greater number of 
them died. 

The blow was so sudden and terrible that the spirit of the 
nation was utterly paralyzed ; even indignation was lost in the 
deeper sense of horror and fear. The mask was removed, and 
the Empire in a nearly absolute form already existed. The 



38 THE GREAT WAR 

people knew this when they were called upon, to v^ote upon the 
questions proposed hy Louis JSTapoleon. Public opinion was 
equally suppressed throughout the provinces ; the most alarming 
socialistic dangers were invented and threatened ; every promi- 
nent man was ordered to declare himself instantly for one side 
or the other ; the business classes were kept excited by rumors 
of plots and outbreaks ; the press everywhere was effectually 
muzzled ; and when the election was held, a few days later, the 
result was : 7,600,000 yeas, 650,000 nays. 

In January, 1852, he ordered the confiscation of all the 
property belonging to the Orleans family ; in February, the last 
vestige of liberty was taken from the press ; in May, the IlTapo- 
leonic eagles were distributed to the army ; and in December 
the Prince-President, Louis ISTapoleon Bonaparte, became Napo- 
leon III, Emperor, " By the Grace of God and the will of the 
French people " ! Having assured himself that resistance was 
paralyzed for a time, liis next objects were, first, to allay the 
distrust of the other European powers by showing that the Em- 
pire was Peace; and secondly, to bring -about a war, in order 
to satisfy his army. 

After various imsuccessful attempts to ally himself by mar- 
riage with some of the reigning houses of Europe, he abandoned 
the quest, and in January, 1853, married Eugenie Marie de 
Guzman, Countess de Teba, a Spanish lady, though descended, 
on her mother's side, from a Scottish family. 

In the summer of 1853 he succeeded in forming an alliance 
with England, which, a few months later, was riveted by the 
Crimean war. In this war, through the ability of his generals 
and the inefl&ciency of some of the English officers, he managed 
to secure the lion's share of the glory for France, and, under a 
great show of disinterestedness, to cause the material successes 
to enure to his own advantage, while the heaviest burdens came 
upon his ally. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 39 

The Empire was not Peace, but it seemed to be Order. The 
country was covered with a network of railways, harbors were 
created, a fleet built and manned, Paris was pierced in all direc- 
tions with broad and splendid streets, the Empress inaugurated 
a new era of luxury, labor was plentiful, money was plentiful, 
morals were pleasantly relaxed, and the French people were free 
to enjoy the good things of this life, so long as they abstained 
from meddling with politics. The material justification of the 
Empire became popular throughout Europe, and even with many 
Americans. An Imperial Prince was born in March, 1856 — an 
only one, and again a resemblance to !N"apoleon ! Even persons 
not superstitious began to incline toward the theory of " des- 
tiny." With his positive power and his increasing prestige, it 
was now possible to relax somewhat of his former caution, and 
for a few years the world, convicted of having undervalued him, 
persisted in atoning for its offence by interpreting his stolidity 
as depth, his reticence as wisdom, his straining after theatrical 
effect as the force and daring of genius. From 1853 to 1861 he 
was the most over-estimated man in the world. Every turn and 
winding of his apparently subtile policy, every new disclosure 
of his seemingly imj^enetrable plans, was accepted as an evidence 
of greatness by a majority of the civilized races. 

It would, perhaps, be unfair to say that sympathy for the 
Italian cause had no part in bringing on the war of 1859. He 
was scarcely insensible to so many early associations ; he knew 
the tremendous under current of resistance and aspiration in 
Lombardy, the Romagna, and the Duchies, and felt that there 
were the seeds of great popularity, if not power, in his policy. 
But there were two other equally powerful considerations : he 
would abolish the relentless determination of the Carbonari, and 
he would increase the territory of France by the annexation of 
Savoy. (There is little doubt that the latter clause was agreed 
upon when Cavour visited Napoleon III at Plombieres, before 
3 



40 THE GREAT WAR 

tlie war.) His course being decided, there remained only the 
finding of a pretext, whidi Austria blunderingly furnished, in 
April, 1859. Although JS'apoleon's Ministry were reported to 
be unfavorable to the war, it was hailed with great enthusiasm 
by the masses of the people. 

After entering Piedmont, the Emperor delayed three weeks, 
plotting and planning, before commencing hostilities. He had 
an interview with Kossuth, and agreed with the latter upon a 
plan for cooperating with the Magyar and Sclavonic population 
of Austria. Tuscany had already risen, the Romagna was stir- 
ring, and there were movements in Naples and Sicily. The 
Emperor's design was to secure the former for Prince Napoleon 
and the latter for the Murats ; a united Italy was the farthest 
thing possible from his plans. But he was forced to simulate a 
generosity he did not feel, and to give battle with no other gain 
than Savoy and Nice assured in advance. After a small engage- 
ment at Montebello, the battle of Magenta, on the 4th of June, 
gave Milan and Lombardy to the French and Italian ai-mies. 
The Emperor's reception in Milan was warm and cordial, but a 
storm of uncontrollable joy surged around the path of Victor 
Emanuel. Tuscany had by this time claimed the latter's protec- 
torate, and the drift of popular sentiment throughoiTt Italy was 
no longer to be mistaken. Tlie Emperor found himself em- 
barked on a new current, and his first business was- to withdraw 
successfully. 

Taking this view of the matter, the battle of Solferino was a 
piece of great good luck. The Sclavonic conspiracy had so far 
succeeded that the Croat regiments in the Austrian army refused 
to serve; the Emperor Francis Joseph trusted in Gyulai, the 
most incompetent of generals ; and Yenice, in the Austrian rear, 
was thoroughly prepared, and only awaited the signal to rise. 
On the other hand. Napoleon III appeared to the world as com- 
mander of the united French and Italian armies. His mistakes 



BETWEEN FKANCE AND GERMANY. 41 

were skilfully concealed by his Marshals, and even tlie blunder 
which so nearly made him an Austrian prisoner was so retrieved 
as to make it seem an act of personal daring. The victory was 
more complete than thjjt of Magenta ; it satisfied French vanity, 
gave IlTapoleon III the Very position he desired, and enabled him 
to convert his real disappointment into apparent forbearance. 

By this time other forces were fast developing into form, and 
he took good note of them while seeming impassive and imper- 
turbable. The Pope, in spite of the French garrison at Kome, 
threatened excommunication. The spirit of Germany was thor- 
oughly aroused, and even in Prussia the phrase was current, 
" The Khine must be defended on the Adige." This was geo- 
graphically false, but politically true ; for the plans of Napoleon 
III, from the moment his rule was assured, embraced the exten- 
sion of France to the Alps (which was now accomplished), then 
to the Rhine, from Basle to tlie sea, including Belgium. This 
was the price he meant to pay France for the permanency of his 
dynasty. Moreover, had he not already said, in the Idees Najpo- 
Uoniennes, " After a victory, offer peace " ? The peace of Yilla- 
franca, which cut Italy to the heart, betrayed Hungary and 
Croatia, bewildered Europe, but gave relief to the anxious 
nations, and increased prestige to the Emperor, was the inevitable 
result of his policy. 

His disappointment, however, was bitter. Basing his own 
imperial power upon the Plebiscite, he was powerless to inter- 
fere, when all Italy, except the little Eoman territory held by 
French troops, pronounced for a united nationality under Yictor 
Emanuel. Savoy and Nice wxre acquired, it is true ; the names 
of Magenta and Solferino were added to those of the Alma and 
the Malakoff ; the influence of France was more potent than 
ever in the councils of Europe : but more than this was neces- 
sary. The doubt in the permanence of his dynasty was general, 
even among his own adherents. The French appetite for glory, 



4:2 THE GREAT WAR 

he knew, was only satisfied for a little while by sncli minoi 
results as he had obtained in the Crimea and Lombard j ; it 
craved undiluted success, overwhelming victory. Meanwhile, 
the benumbing horror of the coup cfetat of December, 1851, 
was beginning to fade from men's minds ; the undying Eepub- 
lican instinct of the mind of France began to show signs of its 
life ; and even the intelligent un -Republican classes, who had 
acquiesced in the Empire, recognized the social and moral de- 
generation which had followed its establishment. His great suc- 
cesses were beginning to be followed by indications of a change 
of fortune. His own health, from a complication of disorders, 
was precarious ; his boy had been frail and sickly from his earli- 
est infancy ; the Empress, with the already perceptible waning 
of her beauty, was coming more and more under the influence 
of her confessor and the Jesuits every year ; and her Spanish 
bigotry was loosing her hold — never very strong — upon the 
hearts of the nation. The Republican element was becoming 
strong in the cities, and it was evident that something must be 
done, or there was slight hope for the continuance of his 
dynasty. A great European war was not to be undertaken with- 
out a better pretext than he could find just then ; but he sought 
a quarrel with Mexico, meaning to use it as a pretext for inter- 
fering in our war, and used his best endeavors to drag England 
into a bold intervention with him on behalf of the Southern 
Confederacy. How miserably he failed in both projects, is 
within the recollection of all ; and the execution of the gallant 
but unfortunate Maximilian, whom he made his tool and dupe in 
-his Mexican enterprise, and the plaintive laments and lifelong 
insanity of the hapless Carlotta, must even now fill his soul with 
horror for his treachery. 

He also made some small experiments in the way of war in 
Cochin-China and China, but his success was not commensurate 
with his expenditure, and there was not glory enough to satisfy 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 43 

the greed of the Frencli nation. He ]3romised constitutional 
and political reforms, the freedom of the press, the liberty of 
interpellation, the partial control of the finances by the Corps 
Legislatif, or House of Representatives ; but his reforms were 
so much less than his promises, that they only excited discontent 
and induced no gratitude. 

In the midst of these vain strivings after a success which 
constantly eluded his grasp, a severer blow fell upon him than 
any he had yet experienced. Prussia, which he had ever re- 
garded as a second-rate power, declared war against Austria in 
1866, and his tender of assistance to Austria for a consideration 
(the Rhine provinces and Belgium) being rejected, he oifered his 
assistance to Prussia on similar terms (Baden and Wurtemberg 
being substituted in this case for the Rhenish provinces), only to 
have it rejected with contempt. In seven weeks Prussia had 
thoroughly defeated Austria, fighting a great battle (that of 
Sadowa), which entirely overshadowed his own battles of 
Magenta and Solferino ; and this seven weeks' war had led to 
changes in the map of Europe the most important which had 
occurred since 1815 ; changes, too, in regard to which he had 
not been consulted. He vs^as rash and foolish enough to demand 
from the victorious party a share of their territory ; but his 
demand was promptly and justly refused. 

It had been his boast that he had made his uncle, Napoleon 
I, his model, and he had written a " Life of Caesar," for the 
purpose of demonstrating the divine right of great commanders 
to absolute authority over the people, and their right and duty 
to transmit this power to their nephews, or other heirs ; but here 
was a state of things to which there was no parallel in his 
uncle's career, and he was wholly at fault. The prestige of the 
Bonaparte name was fast passing away both at iiome and 
abroad, and it was a serious question how it could be recovered. 
From the day of the rejection of his proposed treaty with Prus- 



44 THE GREAT WAR 

sia, in 1867, it had been evident to Lim that he must fight Pi-us- 
sia, and seize and hold the Ehenish provinces and Belgium, or 
lose his throne. The measures he had taken for the ]-eorganiza- 
tion of his army, and for arming them with improved weapons, 
we have already detailed. What the result was, we shall see 
presently. It is, nevertheless, a sad commentary on our boast- 
ed progress in the nineteenth century, that an unprincipled 
adventurer, with no higher intellectual ability than Louis Napo- 
leon possessed, and guilty of so many and so great crimes, could 
have ruled one of the foremost nations of the world for twenty- 
one years, and have been recognized by the other monarchs of 
Europe as their peer. 



BETWEEN FKANCE AND GERMANY. 4,5 



CHAPTER III. 

THE ruling spirit of Prussia, since 1862, has been Count 
Kakl Otto von Bismaeck-Schonhausen, one of the most 
able and remarkable statesmen of the present century. His 
great ability has been shown quite as much in his skill in lead- 
ing, controlling, and influencing King William I to adopt meas- 
ures which were directly in opposition to his views and preju- 
dices, as in any of his direct ministerial acts. The King was, 
partly by nature and partly as a result of his education, a firm 
believer in the divine right of kings, an intense absolutist, opin- 
ionated, wilful, and stubborn, and it required the utmost tact 
and magnetic power to lead him in any other direction than that 
in which he had determined to go. But this stern, positive, 
wilful old man has been moulded by Count Yon Bismarck into 
almost another being, and has now the personal love of those 
who, in 1864 and 1865, were bitterly hostile to his measures. 
The man who could accomplish such results, and, while keeping 
peace between king and people, lead both forward in unity, har- 
mony, and progress, to a higher and better condition as ruler 
and ruled, is deserving of honor and fame as a great statesman. 

Kakl Otto von Bismarck was born at Schonhausen, in the 
province of Saxony, April 1, 1814. He was of an ancient and 
noble family, who had long been in the service of the Prussian 
and Saxon rulers. He was educated for the legal profession, at 
Gottingen, Berlin, and Greifswald, and entered the army for a 
time after obtaining his degree of Doctor of Philosophy, serving 
first in the light infantry, and afterward as an officer of the 



4,6 THE GREAT WAR 

Landwehr, or Eescrves. He did not enter on public political 
life till his thirty -second year, being elected to the Diet of Sax- 
ony in 1846, and to the general or United Diet in 1847. In the 
latter he soon became the leader of the Junkers, or conservative 
party, and distinguished himself for eloquence and logical abil- 
ity. He opposed the adoption of the constitution offered to 
Prussia, fought most vehemently against the prevalent democ- 
racy of the period, and, it is said, declared, in one of his most 
brilliant speeches, that the great cities of Europe ought to be 
razed to the ground, because they were the centres of democracy 
and constitutionalism. He has grown, since that time, to like a 
constitutional government better than he did, but he is, to-day, 
far from being a democrat. 

His course in the Diet attracted the attention of the King, 
Frederick William lY, and, in 1851, he assigned him to the 
difficult and important post of Privy Councillor to the Prussian 
embassy at Frankfort. In this position he laid down the princi- 
ple that Prussia could not fulfil her mission in Germany until 
Austria should be driven out of the Confederation. In 1852 he 
-was sent on a special mission to Yienna, and there, as at Frank- 
fort, showed himself the constant and vigilant adversary of 
Count Rechberg, the Austrian premier. A pamphlet, written 
w^ith great ability, appeared in 1858, entitled " Prussia and the 
Italian Question," and was very generally— and probably cor- 
rectly — attributed to him. It had no small influence in shaping 
the subsequent course of Prussia in the war between Austria 
and France and Italy, in the ensuing year. In 1859, Yon Bis- 
marck was Minister to St. Petersburg, and in 1860 he visited 
Paris. In May, 1862, he was transferred by the present King 
of Prussia to the French embassy, but remained at Paris only 
till September, v^hen he was summoned to Berlin as premier of 
the new Cabinet, with the double duty of Governor of the 
King's household and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 49 

He liad already attained, liigli distinction as a diplomatist and 
jDarliamentarian, but his new position was one of much greater 
difficulty, and requiring a higher order of talent, than any he 
had previously filled. He inherited from the Ministry which 
had preceded hira a chronic quarrel with the House of Deputies 
(answering to our House of Representatives) of the Prussian 
Legislature. The King and his Cabinet had deemed it indispen- 
sable to reorganize the army, and substitute for the militia a 
system of military training which should make every able-bodied 
man in the realm an educated soldier, owing and giving to the 
nation three years of military service, and subsequently forming 
a member of the Landwehr, or reserve force, liable to be called 
npon for service in actual war. Connected with this weve 
changes promoting greater efficiency among the officers of the 
army, and training the whole nation in the nse of arms. The 
necessity of this reorganization grew out of the position of Prus- 
sia in relation to Germany. Either she, a nearly pure German 
power, or Austria, whose population was largely made up of 
non-German nationalities, must lead Germany. If Prussia was 
to take this place, she must be prepared to fight for it ; if she 
yielded it to Austria, she became only a second-rate power, 
without any considerable influence in Europe. If, as was prob- 
able, Austria would not relinquish her position without fighting, 
Prussia must be prepared to contend with a power superior to 
her in numbers and her equal in resources. It was the duty of 
the Prussian Government to be prepared for such a conflict, yet 
to give any hint of its probability would be to court defeat. 
The King, therefore, under Bismarck's advice, though himself 
opposed to a war with Austria for any cause, went forward and 
reorganized the army, expending large sums and doing his w^ork 
very thoroughly, and then demanded from the Diet the neces- 
sary appropriations for it. These the House of Deputies per- 
sistently refused, and, when the House of Nobles voted them, 



50 THE GREAT WAR 

impeached their action as illegal. The Ministry insisted on the 
appropriations, and were vehemently denounced by the Depu- 
ties. At length the King, finding the Deputies intractable, 
closed their session by a message through Bismarck. The uext 
House elected under this excitement proved equally intractable ; 
they could not or would not understand the necessity for this 
reorganization of the army, and urgently demanded that no 
money should be withdrawn from the Treasury for the purpose. 
Bismarck was firm and decided against all this opposition, and, 
when the press became abusive, he warned and finally sup- 
pressed the most noisy of the papers. Meanwhile the war with 
Denmark drew off a part of the opposition ; and when, in 1866 
the crisis came, and Prussia, having formed an alliance with 
Italy, declared war with Austria, defeated her in seven weeks, 
and reorganized the German Confederation, with herself at its 
head, and all the German States, except Austria, either confed- 
erated or bound to her by treaties offensive and defensive, the 
wisdom of Bismarck's course became obvious, and those whc 
had denounced him most bitterly were now loudest in his praise. 
Gifted with a remarkable insight into the motives of men, and 
especially of monarchs and political leaders. Count Yon Bis- 
marck has measured his strength as a diplomatist with the ablest 
men in Europe, and has invariably maintained his position. He 
was aware, after the battle of Sadowa, that war with France 
would come as soon as Louis ISTapoleon could find a tolerable 
pretext for it ; and, while carefully avoiding any act of provoca- 
tion, he had been quietly using all his energies in making ready 
for it. Thus it happened that, when the declaration of war 
came, Prassia was all ready to take the field, and Prance was 
not. 

In person, Bismarck is a portly but intellectual-looking man, 
with a keen, brilliant eye, great self-command, yet with a quick, 
nervous manner, partly perhaps the result of ill health. He is a 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 51 

fine scholar, tliorougWy familiar with most of the languages of 
Europe, and speaking them fluently, and even idiomatically. 
His herculean labors for the past five years have permanently 
impaired his health, and compelled him to take long vacations 
for its partial restoration ; but he possesses great executive abil- 
ity and remarkable powers of endurance. 

While Germany is indebted to Count Yon Bismarck for the 
political and diplomatic measures which accompanied and fol- 
lowed her recent remarkable reorganization, the strategical plans 
of the successful war of 1866, as well as those of the Franco- 
German war of 1870, are due to the extraordinary scientific and 
mihtary ability of General Yon Moltke, a man every way as 
remarkable in his special department as Yon Bismarck is in his. 

Kakl Hellmuth Beknhakd, Baron Yon Moltke, was bom in 
Parchim, Mecklenburg, October 26, 1800. He was from an old 
and distinguished Mecklenburg family, which had contributed 
several statesmen to both Denmark and Germany. Soon after 
his birth, his father, a military officer, left Mecklenburg, and 
acquired an estate in Holstein, where young Yon Moltke spent 
the first twelve years of his life ; and this has led some of his 
biographers incorrectly to speak of him as a native of Holstein. 
He and his brother were sent to the Military Academy in Copen- 
hagen, and the iron discipline, thorough training, and military 
frugality of that institution, exerted a favorable efiect upon a 
mind constituted as his was, and laid the foundation of an admi- 
rable character. In 1822 he entered the Prussian army as cor- 
net. His parents having at this period lost their entire fortune, 
he was left without any means whatever, and suftered very many 
hardships in maintaining himself in his position, the pay of the 
subordinate officers in the Prussian army being at this time very 
small ; yet he managed to save enough to acquire a very thor- 
ough knowledge of the modern languages of Europe, which sub- 
sequently proved of great advantage to him. His favorite 



52 THE GREAT WAR 

studies, however, then and since, were the physical sciences. 
iNot Alexander Von Humboldt himself studied with more care 
and zeal the minute topography and the geological structure of 
the adjacent countries, than did this young and accomplished 
officer. Though without powerful friends to facilitate his promo- 
tion, his eminent abilities soon procured him a favorable position 
in the general staff ; and his advance, solely from his merit, was 
remarkably rapid for a Prussian staff-officer. In 1835 he was 
sent by the Prussian Government to Turkey and Asia Minor, to 
make inquiry concerning the war between the Sultan and Me- 
hemet Ali. He remained in the East for four years, and his 
report shows that he had made himself a complete master of the 
whole Oriental question. 

After his return, he pubhshed anonymously several works of 
great merit, descriptive of the country and the Egyptian war. 
He was advanced, in a short time, through the different ranks 
to that of lieutenant-general, and, finally, to be chief of the gen- 
eral staff of the Prussian army. In this capacity he drew up, 
even to its minutest details, the plan of the reorganization of the 
Prussian army and Landwehr, or Reserve, and to the perfection 
of this plan is unquestionably due much of the success which has 
since attended the Prussian warfare. At the commencement of 
the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, his wonderful topographical 
knowledge was made manifest. His plans for the movement of 
the Prussian armies indicated a most intimate and thorough 
acquaintance with every hill, mountain, defile, ravine, and 
stream in their course. Even their places of encampment were 
designated, and the progress they would be expected to make 
and the obstacles they would have to encounter, were all desig- 
nated. His strategic prescience was equally remarkable. He 
foresaw the fatal delays of Benedek and the unavailing impetu- 
osity of Clam-Gallas, and had so arranged the time of marching 
of the different armies as to render their junction at the right 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 53 

time morally certain. The unexpected obstacles wliicli delayed 
the Crown-Prince, and prevented his reaching the battle-iield of 
Sadowa till afternoon, had well-nigh produced a disaster; but 
even here Yon Moltke's careful allowance of time brought all 
right in the end. Both Prince Friedrich Karl and the Crown- 
Prince had been his pupils in mih'tary science, and especially in 
strategics ; and the latter especially was a great favorite with 
him. That he had for years foreseen the Franco-Prussian war 
of 18Y0, is certain ; and more than one of the French peasants 
and bourgeois have recognized in the grave, silent general-in- 
chief, so absorbed in his maps, a venerable Professor of Geology, 
who, some three years ago, hammer in hand, and with a younger 
companion (the present Crown-Prince) who had a great predilec- 
tion for botany, rambled over the ramparts and suburbs of Stras- 
bourg, Weissenburg, Toul, and Metz, examining most carefully 
the fortifications, chipping off here and there a bit of stone as a 
geological specimen, and, with his companion, exploring every 
stream, ravine, and hill, in search of botanical specimens for 
then- herbariums. So careful was their survey, tliat, with the 
aid of their excellent maps, they were far more familiar with the 
minute topography of the entire theatre of the war, and the 
weak points of all the fortifications, than all the French stafi" 
together. 

When General "Wimpffen hesitated in regard to surrendering 
at Sedan, General Yon Moltke demonstrated to him, in the few- 
est possible words, that such was the position of the German 
troops, and so complete their command of every avenue of 
escape or of resistance, that his surrender had been a foregone 
conclusion since the previous day. 

General Yoa Moltke is a man of dignified and imposing per- 
sonal appearance, but of great modesty and simplicity of man- 
ners. He is reserved and taciturn, but alM'-ays, whether in con- 
versation, in giving commands to his officers, or in the heat of 



54 THE GREAT WAR 

battle, maintains tlie same composure and equanimity. The 
army have given him the surname of " The Silent ; " but when 
he does speak, his words are well worth hearing. He is said 
to be, to this day, more fond of physical than military science ; 
but his reputation in the future will rest mainly on the fact that 
he has been, in a much higher sense than the distinguished 
Carnot, " an organizer of victories." 

Of the French premiers, war ministers, and chiefs of staff in 
the last days of the Empire, there were none who compared 
with Bismarck and Yon Moltke for ability or diplomatic skill. 
The diplomacy was of less consequence, since the Emperor him- 
self managed the intercourse of France with foreign powers, 
and inspired the correspondence, which his Ministers put in form. 

The position of Chief of Staff, which was often, in France, 
associated with the office of War Minister, was one of great 
importance and responsibility ; but IS'apoleon Ill's theory of 
government required that this officer also should be his tool and 
do his bidding. It resulted from this theory that, whether the 
premier were Ollivier or Rouher, and the chief of staff Leboeuf 
or De Palikao, they were alike the creatures of their master, 
bound to do his will and discarded at his pleasure. 

Of Ollivier and Rouher it is hardly necessary to say much. 
The latter was a man of considerable ability, but intensely abso- 
lutist in his views, and the supple tool and mouthpiece of ITapo- 
leon III. Ollivier had been a Republican, and for some years a 
leader of the Opposition, but, since 1863, his fidelity to that party 
had been suspected. He continued from that time to cultivate 
more and more friendly relations toward the Emperor, whom he 
had formerly attacked with great bitterness, and, after receiving 
from him several lucrative temporary appointments, he was, in 
the winter of 18Y0, called to take Rouher's place as Prime 
Minister. His administration was every way weak and unfortu- 
nate. Irritable, and possessing little dignity of manner or char- 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 55 

acter, lie was goaded most unmercifully by his former associates, 
the Kepublicans ; aud, uneasy in his position, which he could not 
but feel was a false one, he lost his temper under their sharp 
questioning, and alternately wrangled and threatened, till he 
presented a most pitiable spectacle. Questioned concerning 
governraent delinquencies which he knew, but had neither the 
tact to conceal or defend, he became, at times, furious in his 
threats, which he had not the courage to put in execution. At 
the declaration of war, there was a momentary hush of the dis- 
cord ; the feeling of patriotism for the time dominated over the 
hostility of the Opposition to the Emperor, and a man of shrewd- 
ness and tact would have availed himself of this opportunity to 
regain the prestige he had lost ; but Ollivier had not the ability 
to accomplish this, and very soon he was again wrangling with 
Favre, Gambetta, and the other Eepublican leaders. 

At his first reverses the Emperor did not hesitate to throw 
overboard this man, who had sacrificed his reputation and char- 
acter for his favor, and for a brief period the Count of Palikao 
took his place as premier. 

Of the Count we shall have occasion to speak hereafter. 
General Edmond Leboeuf, Minister of War and Chief of 
Staff of the French army at the beginning of the war, had a 
good, though by no means the highest, reputation as a military 
leader among the French generals. He was born ISTovember 6, 
1809, and received his military education at the Polytechnic 
School in Paris and the School of Artillery at Metz. At 
twenty-eight years of age he was a captain, and, nine years later, 
major of a regiment of artillery. In 184:8 he was made assistant 
commandant of the Polytechnic School, where he remained till 
1850. In 1852 he was promoted to a colonelcy, and during the 
whole of the Crimean war served as chief of artillery. In 1854 
tie was made brigadier-general, and in 1857, general of division. 
Ill the Italian war of 1859 he was again chief of the large artil- 



56 THE GREAT WAR 

leiy force there engaged, and distinguished himself for bravery 
and skill, receiving the rank of Grand Officer of the Legion of 
Honor from the Emperor in August, 1859. He was subsequent- 
ly appointed aide-de-camp to the Emperor, and made liead of 
the Artillery Bureau. On the death of Marshal Niel, in 1869, 
he was made Minister of "War, and introduced some essential re- 
forms in the organization of the army. The taint of corruption, 
however, had attached to him. On tlie appointment of a com- 
mission to decide upon a new breech-loading rifle for the French 
army, there were many patterns offered, but he excluded all 
except the chassepot, in the manufacture of which he had a 
large interest; and this gun, though inferior to several of the 
others, was supplied in immense quantities to the French army. 
"With his downfall, the reputation of the rifle fell also ; and in 
the midst of the war, the French Provisional Government, and, 
indeed, the successor of Leboeuf, began to order American pat- 
terns of rifles, which stood the test of actual warfare much bet- 
ter, but which Leboeuf had rejected because he could make no 
profit on them. It is averred, also, that large quantities of the 
chassepot rifles, of imperfect and defective construction, were 
passed by the inspectors and placed in the hands of the soldiers, 
by the orders of this corrupt "War-Minister. Subsequently to 
his removal from office, he is said to have acknowledged tiiat he 
knew that neither the nation nor the army were prepared for 
war, but that he did not dare to tell the Emperor so, lest he 
should excite his displeasure. 

Charles Guillaume Marie Appolinaire Antoine, Cotjsin-Mon- 
TAUBA2f, CoMTE DE Palikao, the succcssor of Leboeuf as Minister 
of War, and subsequently for a brief period also premier, is an 
old man of higher military reputation, more executive ability, 
and probably of greater honesty and integrity, than his prede- 
cessor ; but, educated in the Algerian wars, and naturally of a 
stern and cruel nature, he was not the man to be the leadei 



BETWEEN I'RANCE AND GEEMANT. 59 

-either in war or diplomacy of a great and generous people. He 
was born June 24, 1796 ; educated at the Polytechnic school. 
At twenty-eight years of age he was a cavalry officer, and had 
won distinction in Algeria. At forty years of age he was 
major ; and, nine years later, colonel of Spahis (the irregular 
but terrible dragoons of the African army). In 1851 he had 
been promoted to he brigadier-general, but was actually in com- 
mand of a division. His promotion to the rank of major-gen- 
eral came in 1855, and with it the military governorship of Con- 
stantine. Not long after, he was recalled to France and placed 
in command of one of the grand military divisions — a post to 
which his forty years of active service entitled him. In 1860 
he was appointed commander-in-chief of the joint expedition 
against China of the French and English forces. His move- 
ments here were n"iarked by great celerity and success. The 
forts of Taku, at the mouth of Peiho, were captured, after a 
severe engagement, on the 20th of August ; the successful battle 
of Palikao fought September 21st ; the summer palace of 
the Chinese Emperor destroyed, and the victorious troops en- 
tered Peking, October 12th ; the treaty of peace negotiated, and 
General Montauban left China in December of the same year. 
Abundant honors were heaped upon him for this service. The 
Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor (its highest decoration) was 
conferred upon him in December, 1860. He was appointed 
Senator in 1861, and created Count of Palikao in 1862, with a 
liberal dotation, which, however, was strongly resisted by the 
Corps Legislatif. He was made commander of the Fourth 
Army Corps in 1865, and a member of the Cabinet in 1870. 
His lifelong experience in fighting Kabyles, Berbers, and Chi- 
nese, had not qualified him specially for civilized warfare, and 
it was alleged by the Prussians that to his counsel was largely 
due the employment in this war of the savage Turcos and Spa- 
his, whose excesses and brutality have here, as elsewhere, 
4 



eO THE GREAT WAR 

brought down upon them the reprobation of the civilized 
world. 

Of the French military commanders distinguished in former 
wars, several, as General Changarnier — a Republican in politics, 
but one of the ablest of the French generals in his day — Marshals 
Raudon, Yaillant, and Baraguey d'Hilliers, and the Count De 
Palikao, were too old for active service ; others, as General Tro- 
chu, were not specially in favor with the Emperor, and were only 
grudgingly allowed inferior commands. Those designated to the 
three armies were Marshals MacMahon, Canrobert, and Bazaine. 
A brief sketch of the previous career of these men may be of 
interest, as throwing light upon their action during the war. 

Marshal Maeie Edme Pateick Maukice ds MacMahon, 
Duke of Magenta, born at Sully, July 13, 1808, is a descendant 
of an old Irish Catholic family attached to the Stuarts. He 
entered the military school of St. Cyr in 1825, won his first 
laurels in Algeria, where he fought in numerous battles and 
minor engagements. An incident in the African campaign 
shows his intrepid character. At the close of the successful 
battle of Terchia, General Achard wished to send an order to 
Colonel Rulhieres, at Blidah, between three and four miles off, 
to change the order of his march. This commission he entrust- 
ed to MacMahon, and offered him a squadron of mounted chas- 
seurs as an escort. He declined their protection, and rode off 
alone. His journey lay entirely through the enemy's country, 
which w^as rugged and irregular. About six hundred yards 
from Blidah was a ravine, broad, deep, and precipitous. Mac- 
Mahon had ridden close to the ravine, when suddenly he beheld a 
host of Arabs in full pursuit of him from every side. One look 
told him his chances. There was no alternative but to jump 
the treacherous abyss or be butchered by his pursuers. He set 
his horse's head at the leap, put spur and whip to it, and cleared 
the ravine at a bound. The pursuing Arabs, dismayed, ventured 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. gj 

no further, and only sent after the daring soldier a shower of 
bullets as horse and rider rolled over on the other side, with the 
poor steed's leg broken. At the attack on Constantine he re- 
ceived further promotion. His superiority as a tactician became 
soon apparent, and was fully appreciated and pewarded by 
rapid advancement. His long career as a military commander 
in the colony, and his never-ceasing activity in behalf of the 
firm establishment of French authority in Northern Africa, 
w^ere interrupted, for some time at least, by his recall to France 
in 1855. It was not, however, the intention of the Government 
to let him remain inactive ; he was, on the contrary, imme- 
diately assigned to the command of a division of infantry form- 
ing part of the army under Marshal Bosquet. Here he laid the 
foimdation of his military glory. On the 8th of September, the 
perilous honor devolved on him of carrying the Malakoff, which 
formed the key of the defences of Sebastopol. The impetuous 
ardor of his troops proved irresistible. They entered the works 
and maintained for hours a desperate conflict with the Russians. 
Pellissier, the commander-in-chief, believed the fort was mined. 
He sent MacMahon orders to retire. " I will hold my ground," 
was the reply, " dead or alive." Success crowned his bravery, 
and the tricolor soon floated above the fortress. In 1857 he 
returned to Algeria, forced the revolting Kabyles into submis- 
sion, and was soon after appointed commander-in-chief of all the 
French forces there on land and sea. The outbreak of the Ital- 
ian war, in 1859, caused his return to France, when he was 
assigned to the command of the Second Corps of the Army of 
the Alps. Here his brilliant movement on the Austrians, turn- 
ing a threatened defeat into a victory at Magenta, and conceal- 
ing the blunders of his imperial master, were rewarded by the 
conferring on him the titles of Duke of Magenta and Marshal 
of France, on the field of battle. In November, 1861, he was 
Bent to Berlin to represent France at the coronation of William 



52 THE GREAT WAR 

I, tlie present King of Prussia ; and in the splendor of his 
appointments, and the magnificence of his retinue, outshone al] 
the other representatives of foreign courts. In October, 1862 
he succeeded Marshal Canrobert in the command of the Third 
Army Corps ; and, two yeaxs later, was made governor-general 
of Algeria, where he introduced many administrative reforms. 
He was recalled from Algeria shortly before the opening of the 
Franco-German war, and took an active part in organizing the 
army for service. Marshal MacMahon bears the reputation of a 
gallant, manly, and honest officer ; and though his long expe- 
rience in Algeria had partially disqualified him for civilized 
warfare, and made him reckless of those details on which, in a 
contest with an able and intelligent foe, all success depends, yet 
he deserves the reputation of being the best of the French army 
commanders. 

Marshal FKAwgois Certain Caneobeet, born in the Depart- 
ment of Gers, June 27, 1809, was admitted to the military 
school of St. Cyr in 1825, which he left in 1828, to enter the 
4Yth Kegiment of the Line as second lieutenant, and soon after 
joined the military expedition to Mascara, fought bravely in 
several engagements against the hostile tribes in l!Torthern 
Africa, and assisted at the storming of Constantino in 1837. He 
was sent back to France in 1839, for the purpose of forming a 
battalion for the foreign legion out of the dispersed bands of 
Carlists. He succeeded in this, and returned to Africa in 184rl, 
where he was entrusted with the command of a battalion of 
light infantry and of the 64:th Eegiment of the Line, suppressed 
the rebellion of Bon Maza, and, during eight months of desper- 
ate fighting, forced most of the revolting tribes of Kabyles into 
submission. He was engaged in various parts of JSforthern 
Africa for nearly eight years, led some of the most daring and 
adventurous expeditions into the interior, and everywhere distin- 
giuished himself by his coolness, bravery, and quick adaptation 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 63 

to tlie warfare to whicli lie had to resort. Keturning to France, 
he proved, by his services to Louis ll^apoleon, that he meant tc 
be a firm supporter of the new regime, and has ever since been 
one of the stanchest friends and adherents of the second empire. 
He was made general of division in 1853, took part in the expe- 
dition to the Crimea, and when Marshal St. Arnaud felt his end 
approaching, he transmitted the command of the entire French 
army to Canrobert. This was in accordance Avith an order 
given in a private letter by the Emperor Kapoleon himself. 
Having won new laurels at the sanguinary battles of Tnker- 
mann, Balaklava, and Eupatoria, he conferred with Lord Rag- 
lan, commander of the British forces, and urged him to partici- 
pate in an immediate assault on Sebastopol. The two command- 
ers being unable to agree, and Lord Raglan sternly refusing to 
cooperate in the intended movement, Canrobert resigned in 
favor of General Pelissier, and left the Crimea two months after. 
During the Italian campaign, in 1859, he commanded the Third 
Army Corps, fought at Magenta, and afterwards contributed 
most essentially to the decisive victory of the French army at 
the battle of Solferino, sustaining Marshal IsTiel at a critical 
moment against the furious assault of a powerful Austrian 
column. By virtue of his rank as Marshal (to which he was 
promoted in 1856), Canrobert is a Senator of France, and, in 
that capacity, opposed strongly the maintenance of the temporal 
power of the Pope in March, 1861. He commanded the camp 
at Chalons from June to October, 1862, and was then promoted 
to the command of the Fourth Army Corps at Lyons, which he 
yielded, two years later, to Marshal MacMahon. During a few 
years past he has been residing in Paris, attending the sessions 
of the Senate, and watching over the interests of the army. He 
is a man of considerable ability, but not free from the taint of 
the corruption and demoralization which has pervaded all 
classes m connection with the imperial court. 



64 THE GREAT WAR 

The third of these army-commanders, and incomparahlj the 
worst, was Marshal FiiANgois Acuille Bazaine, born February 
13, 1811, a descendant of a family well known in French mili- 
tary history, who studied at the Polytechnic School in Paris, 
and entered the army in Africa when twenty years old. After 
six years of uninterrupted warfare against the Kabyles and 
other hostile tribes, he was assigned to the foreign legion, and 
sent into Spain, in 1837, to suppress the Carlist movement in 
that country. He returned to Algeria in 1839, joined the expe- 
dition against Milianah and Morocco, and was for several years 
governor of the Arabian subdivision of Tlemcen. During the 
Crimean war, where he was in command of a brigade of infan- 
try, he is said to have distinguished himself by his bravery and 
by his talent for organization. "When the Russians had evacu- 
ated Sebastopol, Bazaine was made Governor of the place. He 
toot no part in tlie campaign against Austria in 1859, but was 
entrusted with the command of the first division of infantry of 
the expedition to Mexico, in 1862. The Emperor J^apoleon, 
taking advantage of the civil war then raging in the United 
States, conceived the idea of establishing an empire at our 
Southern frontier, hoping thus to prepare the way for the final 
supremacy of the Latin race on this continent. The attempt 
proved a failure. French pride was humiliated, and the army 
compelled to reemtyark, towards the close of 1866. 

General Bazaine succeeded Marshal Forey in tlie command 
of the expedition in October, 1863, and continued to be its chief 
till his hasty departure in 1866. His whole course was marked 
by a cruelty and barbarity which would have been disgraceful 
in a savage chief. Regarding the Mexicans as barbarians, he 
showed liimself far more cruel than they. He organized, from 
the vilest desperadoes he could hire, what he called " counter- 
guerilla bands," to fight the irregular Mexican troops ; and the 
atrocities committed by these wretches, and never reproved by 



BETWEEN PRANCE AND GERMANY. 65 

him, exceed belief. His unscrupulous rapacity, and his constant 
intrigues against the heroic Maximilian, M'ould of themselves be 
sufficient to stain a character none too fair without these blots. 
In 1864, Bazaine was made Marshal of France, having, the year 
before, received the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor. Cor- 
rupt, rapacious, and false even to his friends, Bazaine's appoint- 
ment to a high command in the army in the war of 1870 waa 
the most discreditable to the Emperor of any act of his in con- 
nection with the war ; and it is no more than fair to believe that 
it was only because Napoleon III was too fully in the power of 
this bold, bad man, to help himself, that he assigned him to this 
position. 

Of the corps-commanders, General Frossard, the late chief 
of the Emperor's household, and governor of tlie Prince Im- 
perial ; General De Failly, first distinguished in tlie Italian war, 
and subsequently (in 1867) sent to Rome to put down the Gari- 
baldian movement ; Count Ladmiran.lt, late commander of the 
Second Army Corps ; General Douay, an active officer of the 
Mexican expedition, and General Bourbaki, an officer of Greek 
family, distinguished both in the Crimean and Italian wars, were 
the most prominent. 

Later in the war. General De Wimpffen, a brave and gal 
lant officer, came from Algeria, where he had served for several 
years, to join MacMahon's army, to take command in conse- 
quence of MacMahon's being severely wounded, and to surren- 
der the army, all within thirty-six hours. 

General Tkochu, who was at first ignored as being out of 
favor with the Emperor, but eventually, in the time of his dis- 
tress, assigned to the command of Paris and its fortifications, 
bears the reputation of being an honest, brave, and capable 
officer, on whose character, public or private, there is no stain. 
He was born in the department of the Morbihan, March 12, 
1815; was educated at St. Cyr, and at the stafi- school. A 



66 THE GKEAT WAR 

lieutenant in 1840 and a captain in 184:3, lie was attached to 
Marshal Bugeaiid's staff in Algeria, and, like all the rest of the 
French officers, took his ten years' or more of training there. 
In 1853 he was aide-de-camp to Marshal St. Arnand in the 
Crimea, with the rank of colonel ; and, in 1854, had risen to 
the rank of brigadier-general. In 1859, as major-general, he 
went through the Italian campaign, winning distinction for 
bravery and military skill. He was made grand officer of the 
Legion of Honor in 1861. As we shall see further on in this 
history, he has displayed, since the commencement of his com- 
mand in Paris, great skill and remarkable executive ability 
under the most trying circurast-ances in which a commander 
could be placed, and has won the confidence of all as a patriot, 
who sought his country's good in preference to his own, or that 
of any aspirant to power. Such men are so rare, that it is but 
right that their names should be honored when they are found. 




GENEEAL TKOCHU, GOYEElSrOR OF PARIS. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. G9 



CHAPTER ly. 

WITH brief sketches of a few of the principal German com- 
manders, we hasten to the consideration of another branch 
of our subject. 

The ablest of the Prussian commanding generals — the ven- 
erable chief of staff always excepted — though by no means the 
oldest, is Prince Fkiedeich Kael Alexak-dee, son of Prince 
Karl, and nephew of the King of Prussia. He was born March 
20, 1828. Like all Prussian princes, Priedrich Karl had to 
enter the Prussian army when scarcely ten years old, it being 
considered necessary that every descendant of the house of 
Hohenzollern, no matter what his individual inclination may 
be, should become fully acquainted with the military service of 
his country, and that, whatever career he may ultimately follow, 
he may be called upon at any moment to draw his sword for 
the defence of Fatherland in times of danger. With Friedrich 
Karl, however, there was no need of compulsion. The war- 
like spirit of his ancestors animated him even in his earliest 
youth, and induced him to devote himself with enthusiasm to 
his military studies. The result of this innate love of every 
thing connected with the army goon became apparent in the 
rapid progress he made in the military school of instruction. 
The study of the life and glorious deeds of Frederick the Great 
filled his leisure hours, .and it is said that he was on several occa- 
sions severely reprimanded for passing entire nights over the 
history of the " Seven Years' War," and the study of the plans 
of battle adopted by that illustrious captain. At the outbreak 



YO THE GREAT WAR 

of the first war of Schleswig-Holstein, in 184:8, lie was assigned 
to the staff of the commander-in-chief of the Prussian forces, 
General Yon Wrangel, when, at the battle of Schleswig, his 
impetuosity and his entire disregard of all danger, while im- 
perilling his life at every instant, did not fail to encourage the 
troops, and materially aided in securing the victory to the Prus- 
sian eagle. During the campaign in Baden in 1849, he likewise 
distinguished liimself on various occasions. Fifteen years of 
peace now followed, during which the Prince resumed his theo- 
retical studies of the science of w^ar, made himself familiar with 
all branches of the army, and showed conclusively his superior 
talent for the organization as well as for the skilful disposition 
of large armies. The disregard of treaties bj Denmark result- 
ing in a declaration of war against that power by Austria and 
Prussia, the second campaign in Schleswig-Holstein was soon 
entered upon, and, although General Yon "Wrangel was at first 
appointed commander-in-chief of the combined armies, the com- 
mand of the Prussian division was intrusted to Prince Friedrich 
Karl, December 15, 1863. He at once recognized the forti- 
fied place of Diippel to be one of the greatest Danish strong- 
holds, and a formidable barrier to the advance of the German 
armies into Danish territory. He therefore decided upon a 
regular siege and investment of the position. The severity of 
the winter in these northern latitudes interfered considerably 
with his operations, and it was not until April, 1861, that he 
fchouo;ht safe to order first the bombardment and then the storm- 
ing of the fortifications. Twice the assault was repulsed with 
serious slaughter, until, at last, the intrepid commander grasped 
the flag of the regiment of Poyal Guards, and, personally lead- 
ing his troops to a third attack, drove the enemy out of his 
stronghold and gained a decided victory, the Danes losing over 
5,000 men and 118 pieces of artillery. Being defeated in several 
other important engagements, the Danes saw the impossibility 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 71 

of furtlier resistance, and a treaty of peace was signed on Octo 
ber 30, 1864, At the outbreak of hostilities between Prussia 
and Austria in 1866, Prince Friedrich Karl was called to 
the command of the first division of the Prussian armj, imme- 
diately marched his troops to the frontier, which he crossed on 
June 23, and, in ordering the attack upon the forces of the 
enemy, addressed his men with the words : " May your hearts 
beat toward God, and your fists upon the enemy," A succes- 
sion of splendid victories at Liebenau, Turnau, Podol, Miinch- 
engratz, and Gitschin, having forced the enemy into the interior 
of Bohemia, Prince Friedrich Karl, who knew the Austrians 
to have occupied a formidable position on the heights beyond 
the Bistritz, requested the Crown-Prince Friedrich Wilhelm to 
come to his assistance with . the second division of the army, but 
attacked the enemy on the morning of July 3, without awaiting 
his arrival. The Prussians fought desperately, but the position 
of the enemy was so well chosen and their artillery so favorably 
placed, that the Prince could not gain a decided advantage over 
them, and it was not until the arrival of the second division, 
under the Crown-Prince, that the enemy lost ground, retreated 
under the deadly fire of the Prussians, and was finally com- 
pletely routed, running in all directions and in the wildest con- 
fusion. This ended the celebrated battle of Sadowa. The 
enemy was pursued from the 5th to the 12th. Briinn was taken, 
and the Prussian troops found themselves near the capital of 
Austria, ready, at a moment's notice, to march upon Vienna. 
The interference of France resulting in the treaty of Prague, 
this ever-memorable campaign was at an end, Austria humili- 
ated, and her former military prestige lost forever. As might 
be anticipated from a man who had taken such a conspicuous 
part in the brilliant achievements of the Prussian army, our 
hero, although proud of his troops, and willingly admitting their 
superiority over any European army which could then be mar- 



72 THE GREAT WAR 

slialled against them, had nevertheless become aware of some 
serious drawbacks and errors hitherto overlooked in the organi- 
zation of the Prussian army, and at once concluded to advocate 
such reforms as his experience had convinced him to be abso- 
lutely necessary. Meeting with opposition in high quarters, he 
is said to have resolved to submit his opinions to the approval 
of the highest military authorities ; and it is generally believed 
that he is the author of an anonymous pamphlet published in 
Frankfort, which has attracted the greatest attention from the ' 
Government, and has been the cause of the recent important 
reforms in the Prussian army. 

It appears that the views expressed in this publication gained 
the approbation of the Chief of Staff, Yon Moltke ; and the 
consequence was that, after a free conference with the Prince, 
changes were made which have, during the recent campaign, 
demonstrated that the Prussian army is in every respect by far 
the best in Europe. Of the part taken by the Prince in the war 
of 18'70, we shall have occasion to speak hereafter. 

Scarcely inferior to Prince Friedrich Karl in general military 
ability, and, judging from his admirable generalship in the 
recent campaign, fully his equal in handling his troops, is the 
Crown-Prince Fkiedeicfi Wilhelm, eldest son of the King of 
Prussia, and heir-apparent to the German throne. The Crown- 
Prince was born October 18, 1831, and received the thorough 
scientific and military education which all the Prussian princes 
are required to obtain. He was a diligent student, and particu- 
larly fond of physical science. Later, he was a pupil of Yon 
Moltke, and learned from him the principles of strategy and 
tactics which he has since so skilfully reduced to pi-actice. He 
took part as a corps-commander in the Danish war of 1864, 
came to the rescue at Sadowa in 1866, and turned what had 
nearly been a drawn battle, if not a defeat, into an overwhelm- 
ing victory. In the cam23aign of 1870, as w^e shall see, he has 




GENERAL STEINMETZ. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 75 

had tlie command of tlie army wliicli has done the hardest fight- 
ing.; and, in the full prime of manhood and the maturity of his 
powers, he has displayed a tact, judgment, and skill in handling 
his troops, and in his rapid movements and persistent pursuit of 
liis enemy, which rank him among the great generals of our 
time. 

The other general who has been most distinguished in the 
campaign of 18Y0 is the veteran Kael Feiedkich Yon Stein- 
METZ, " The Lion of Skalitz." He is one of the veterans of the 
!N"apoleonic wars (1812-15), and, though a little too much inclined 
to adhere to the old traditions of the Prussian army, is never- 
theless a very able and skilful oflQcer. Yon Steinmetz was born 
December 27, 1796, was sent to the military school at Culm at 
the age of ten years, and soon showed a decided predilection for 
the army. He was a little over sixteen years old when he was 
ordered to Berlin and assigned to the corps of General York. 
Two years later he received his commission as lieutenant, was 
wounded at the battle of Dannigkow, fought with distinction at 
Konigswartha, where a ball took away one of his fingers, while 
another wounded him severely in the thigh. But such was the 
ardor of his warlike temper, that, although unable to walk, he 
insisted upon taking part in the battle at Bautzen, in May, 1813, 
on horseback. He fought in France in nearly all the engage- 
ments of 1814, and entered Paris with the armies of the Allies. 
During the long term of peace which now followed, he studied 
military science to great advantage, and, after advancing rap- 
idly to the rank of captain, he was soon after assigned to the 
stafi". During the dispute between Austria and Prupsia, in 
1850, on account of the Electorate of Hesse, Yon Steinmetz was 
ordered to Cassel, and afterward appointed commandant of the 
place. Although it was his earnest desire to participate in the 
second campaign in Schleswig-Holstein in 1864, he was ordered 
elsewhere, and had to remain inactive against his will. During 



76 THE GKEAT WAR 

the campaign against Austria, Yon Steinmetz commanded tlie 
Fifth Army Corps, and vanquished and dispersed three different 
Austrian army-corps within tlie almost incredible short space of 
four days. Here it was that the Prussian cavalry, who had been 
hitherto considered as inferior to the Austrian, or rather Hunga- 
rian, horsemen, proved that they were not only their equal, but 
in many respects their superiors. His triumphant victory at 
Skalitz, against forces of more than twice the numerical strength 
of the corps he commanded, procured for him the name, "The 
Lion of Skalitz." Throughout the entire campaign Yon Stein- 
metz did not meet with a single reverse, although he was often 
compelled to fight with the odds decidedly against him. He has 
been accused, like many other great generals, of being too reck- 
less of the lives of his troops when intent upon gaining a vic- 
tory, and this fault is said to have led to his being relieved of 
the command after the battle of Gravelotte ; but while there 
may be truth in the charge, these men of relentless wills, after 
all, sacrifice fewer lives by delay, sickness, and despondency, 
than men of less decided purpose and energy. At the begin- 
ning of the war General Yon Steinmetz was assigned to the 
command of the First German Army, consisting of the First, 
Seventh, and Eighth Army Corps ; the Second Army being 
under the command of Prince Friedrich Karl, and including the 
Second, Third, INinth, and Tenth Army Corps ; and the Third 
Army under the Crown-Prince of Prussia, composed of th<3 
Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh, and the two Bavarian Army Corps. 
There w^as also a Fourth Army, composed of the Fourth and 
Twelfth Army Corps and the Saxon and Prussian Guards, under 
the command of Friedrich August Albert, Crown-Prince of 
Saxony, a well-educated and skilful ofiicer, born in 1828, and 
who commanded the Saxon contingent of Austria in the war of 
1866. A Fifth Army, composed of the "Wurtemberg and Baden 
contingents, under the command of General Werden, has also 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. YY 

participated in the war, being engaged in the siege of Stras 
bourg ; while the Landwehr, or Keserves, formed tlie Sixth and 
Seventh Armies, the former under the command of Friedrich 
Franz, Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, a brave and 
accomplished oflScer, and the latter under General Yon Canstein, 
at Berlin, and General Loewenfeld, in Silesia. The corps-com- 
manders were all men of experience and ability ; and the whole 
army, composed as it was of different nationalities of the Ger- 
man race, manifested the most remarkable harmony and obe- 
dience. 



78 THE GEEAT WAR 



CHAPTER V. 

THE financial condition of tLe two countries wliieli are the 
principals in this war is an important item in its relations 
to their ability to endure a great war. It is, however, a matter 
of no small difficulty to arrive at the exact facts in relation to 
the financial condition of France, since the statements of her 
Ministers of Einance under the empire were irreconcilable with 
themselves and with each other. In the first place, they gave 
the " project of the budget," or estimate of the receipts and 
expenses of the next year ; then, a year or two later, the " recti- 
fied budget," or corrected estimate for the same year ; and, a 
year or two later still, the " definitive budget," or ascertained 
amount of the expenses of perhaps three years before ; and 
these estimates would vary from forty-five to fifty millions of 
dollars from each other. And, what was worse even, these de- 
finitive statements did not represent the actual expenditure ; 
and, in the course of sixteen years, loans were contracted in all 
to the amount of fi ve hundred and fifty million dollars, to sup- 
plement the current revenue. There is too much reason to 
believe that fraud and peculation were rife in every department 
of the Government. As nearly as can be ascertained, however, 
the following statement represents pretty accurately the financial 
condition of France in the beginning of 1870. 

The total revenue received in France, in 1869, was $425,- 
744,360, being |54,800,612 in excess of that of the United 



BETWEEN FKANCE AND GERMANY. YO 

States. This sum was raised by customs duties and an elaborate 
system of inland revenue, wliicli directly affects all interests in 
the empire. 

The principal items of this revenue were : 

Direct taxes $65,903,732 

Registration, duties, and stamps 86,789,200 

Customs and salt duties 20,724,600 

Departmental and Communal taxes 45,649,166 

Wine and spirit duties 46,943,200 

Tobacco monopoly 49,531,600 

These figures serve to show the sources relied upon for reve- 
nue in France, and which will have to bear, in the futurC;, a 
large portion of the present war expenditure. 

The estimated expenditure for the same period was $44^,- 
668,130, formed of items such as the following : 

Interest on the funded and floating debt $74,449,153 

Ministry of tlie Interior 40,049,587 

Ministry of War 74,172,155 

Ministry of Finance 23,889,565 

Ministry of Marine and Colonies 32,267,684 

Collection of revenue 46,855,023 

The military expenditure of France during a year of pro- 
found peace was, it appears, in round numbers, $74,000,000 ; 
such being the burden entailed by the French standing army of 
404,000 men, irrespective of their forced withdrawal from pro- 
ductive industry. The marine, in addition, exacted, including 
colonial expenditure, the sum of $32,267,684. In the presence 
of this large revenue it cannot be said that France has been, as 
the United States were at the commencement of hostilities, free 
for yeai^ from heavy taxation, and consequently all the better 
prepared to meet the burdens of war. On the contrary, her 
expenditure was augmented in the following extraordinary pro- 
portions, and has since these years rather increased than dimin- 
ished. 

5 



80 TEE GREAT WAR 

1853 $371,000,000 

1853 441,600,000 

1854 416,800,000 

1855 434,000,000 

1856 433,400,000 

1857 457,400,000 

The ordinary revenue in tlie twelve years from the establish- 
ment of the empire till the end of 1863, increased from $297,- 
400,000 to $452,800,000 ; while the expenditures augmented in 
the same twelve years from $302,600,000 to $457,400,000. 
"With the exception of 1855, when the revenue was raised high 
above the average by special means, there was not a year with- 
out a large deficit. To cover the ever-recurring financial de- 
ficits, the Government, between the years 1854 and 1870, pro- 
cured a series of loans, seven in number, in sums, as to nominal 
capital, varying between $50,000,000 and $150,000,000^ These 
loans were raised on a new principle — that of borrowing not 
from a few large banking-houses acting as agents, but directly 
from the people, or the mass of small capitalists, both in France 
and other countries. This course was highly successfal. The 
fifth loan, for instance, which was offered in 1859 and issued at 
6Q francs, 30 centimes — bearing 3 per cent, interest, was received 
with the offer, on the part of half a million persons, of 
4,487,000,000 francs, or sixteen times the amount required. 

The following shows the cost of the three principal wars of 
the empire, and the drain upon the population which they 
caused : 

Cost. Loss of men. 

Crimean war $1,700,000,000 80,000 

Austrian war 800,000,000 60,000 

Chinese and Mexican wars 300,000,000 65,000 

Total $3,300,000,000 305,000 

In connection with the increased expenditure referred to, it 
should be borne in mind that the material wealth of France has 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 81 

rapidij increased, mainly owing to the intervals of peace which 
she enjoyed. Her home industries have suffered from the opera- 
tion of the commercial treaty with England, but, despite that, 
their expansion has been great and general, if we except ship- 
building. The imports and exports in 1860 and 1868 contrast as 
follows : 

Imports. Exports. Total. 

1860 $379,466,965 $455,425,223 $834,892,188 

1868 679,714,400 581,358,000 1,261,073,400 

One legacy which ISTapoleon III will leave France is an 
enormous increase in her national debt. It was, in 1853, 
$1,103,238,91:0. In 1868 it was $2,766,344,622, or two and a 
half times greater. This is exclusive of a floating debt amount- 
ing to about $173,200,000, consisting of Treasury bills, funds 
from savings banks, the Army Dotation Fund, and other liabil- 
ities. 

This debt, as stated in the revenue returns, entails an annual 
interest of $74,449,153, which is, however, much below the total 
expenditure, on account of interest, pensions, and annuities, 
which, in 1869, amounted to $128,225,000, or very nearly the 
interest on our debt the same year. Despite the increase in the 
national debt, French credit has improved. On June 29, 1870, 
before the fears of war awakened the tremulous capitalists, 
Eentes bearing 4^ per cent, interest sold for 104, and 3 per 
cents, for 72.65. 

The computed value of the real property in France is 
$16,000,000,000 : the rural properties are valued at $10,000,- 
000,000, and the town properties and buildings at $6,000,000,000. 

Turning now to the financial condition of Germany and 
Prussia, we find a different state of affairs. The finances of 
both the North German Confederation and the Prussian kino:- 
dom were in a good condition, and the debt comparatively small. 



82 THE GREAT WAR 

Tlie revenue and expenditure of the ISTortli German Confed- 
eration for federal purposes is not large. Tlie federal budget for 
the year 1870, passed by the Diet, April 24, 1869, was based upon 
an estimate of expenditure, in round numbers, of $56,000,000, 
to be covered to the extent of $39,000,000 by Prussia, and the 
remainder by the other States of the Union. The total expendi- 
ture for 1869 was calculated at '72,Y34:,601 thalers, or about 
$54,550,950, of which the ordinary and extraordinary disburse- 
ments were distributed as follows : 

Thalers. 

For the Federal Chancellery, &c 193,913 = $145,435 

For Consulates 375,650 = 206,738 

For the Federal Army 66,340,275 = 49,755,206 

For the Federal Navy 1,868,979 = 1,401,734 

EXTBAOKDINART EXPENDITTJEE, 

Thalers. 

For the Federal Chancellery 150,000 = $112,500 

For the General Post Administration 27,999 = 21,000 

For Telegraphs 332,780 := 243,085 

For the Federal Navy 3,550,000 = 3,662,500 

The estimates for this year are, of course, now far below 
what will be required. 

The revenue of Prussia, according to the budget accounts in 
1869, was $126,652,370, and the expenditure the same. The 
revenue and expenditure of Prussia has, since 1865, been almost 
stationary, and no deficits have marked her annual financial 
returns — a feature unusual in most European budgets. Tliis 
revenue, in 1869, was raised to the extent of $31,500,000, from 
direct and indirect taxes, to the amount of $14,180,443, which 
includes the share of the ZoUverein customs. 

The State railroads, mines, forges, and other Government 
monopolies, yielded the greater part of the balance. In the 
estimate for 1869, the branches of expenditure were as follows : 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 
EXFENDITUKE FOR THE YEAR 1869. 

Current Expenditure. 

Thalers. 

Ministry of Finance 17,617,117 

Ministry of Commerce and Public 

Works 41,603,775 

Ministry of State 73,356 

Total current expenditure 59,294,148 

Administrative Expenditure. 

Ministry of Finance 33,026,658 

Ministry of Commerce and Public 

Works 9,018,874 

Ministry of Justice 15,943,780 

Ministry of the Interior 8,242,488 

Ministry of Agriculture 3,283,648 

Ministry of Public Instruction 

and Ecclesiastical Affairs 6,232,004 

Ministry of State 394,659 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 914,630 

Charges for the HohenzoUern ter- 
ritory 220,628 

Total administrative expenditure. 75,267,369 
Charges on Consolidated Fund. 

Addition to the " Kroudotation " 

of the King 1,500,000 

Interest on Public Debt, includ- 
ing railway debt 16,973,637 

Sinking fund of debt 8,178,433 

Annuities 429,753 

Chamber of Lords 40,910 

Chamber of Deputies 243,000 

Miscellaneous 122,807 

Total charges on Consolidated 

Fund . 27,488,540 

Total ordinary expenditure 162,050,057 = $127,537,543 

Extraordinary expenditure 5,486,437 = 4,114,828 

167,536,494 = $125,652,371 



84: THE GREAT WAR 

The public debt of Prussia is very light, and has been almost 
entirely incurred since 1850. While six and a half years of the 
large French annual revenue is represented by the amount of the 
French debt, that of Prussia amounts to only one and a half 
years of her moderate annual receipts. The total debt of the 
kingdom, both old and new provinces, amounts to $188,497,520, 
exclusive of the small liabilities incurred by the annexed prov- 
inces for the establishment of State railroads. 

The revenue and expenditure of the other German States is 
unimportant. The same economy is apparent in their financial 
affairs as in the Prussian, the standing armies being the only 
serious bui'den. 

It follows, from the solvency and well-managed finances of 
Prussia, that her credit is untarnished. During fifty-five years 
the German people have (excepting the recent Austrian war) 
been undisturbed by war, and have been enabled to develop the 
immense resources of their fertile territory and accumulate 
large material wealth. 

The social condition of the two countries ofiers an equally 
striking contrast. In Germany, and especially in Prussia, edu- 
cation is well-nigh universal. The population of the North 
German Confederation, in 1867, was 29,653,038, and that of 
South Germany 8,869,328 ; making a total of 38,522,366. Of 
this population, only an infinitesimal proportion are unable to 
read and write, while the greater part have a good public-school 
education. 

The great advantages of this thorough education have made 
themselves visible in the improved social condition and greater 
intelligence of the masses, and have made them vastly better 
soldiers in a cause where their patriotic feelings were enlisted. 
It has resulted, too, in a larger- measure of thrift and business 
snterprise throughout the whole of Germany, Nearly every 
town has its thriving manufactory ; and though the price of 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 85 

labor is low, it is advancing, and with it the wealth of the com- 
munity. 

The social condition of France is not so good. The wealth, 
intelligence, and business activity of the country, and, to a large 
extent, its poverty and crime also, have been concentrated in 
Paris and two or three other large cities. Education is very 
much neglected. Thirty per cent, of the conscripts (who repre- 
sent very fully the male adult population of France) cannot read 
or write. The school-age of children is only from seven to thir- 
teen, and nearly a million, or about one fifth of the entire num- 
ber of children between these ages, do not attend school. 
Morals are, as is well known, at a veiy low ebb. One eighth of 
the births (taking city and country together) are known to be 
illegitimate, and a still larger proportion are concealed by infan- 
ticide, which is so prevalent as to make the percentage of 
increase of population in France smaller than that of any other 
European State. As a nation, the French are brave, full of 
dash, and, when properly trained, good soldiers ; bnt under 
existing circumstances they have been badly led and but indif- 
ferently trained, and the lack of high intelligence has made 
them less effective as soldiers than the Germans. The country 
communes are, for the most part, very poor, and there is much 
less intelligence and enterprise than in Germany. The peas- 
antry in Germany do not live any too well, but they have more 
and better food than the same class in France. 

The statements which were at first put forth in regard to the 
military and naval strength of the two countries proved subse- 
quently to be erroneous, the errors being, however, in opposite 
directions — the army of France being greatly overrated, and 
that of Prussia and the North German Confederation singularly 
understated. In regard to France, the overestimate was the 
result of two causes : one, the national tendency to exaggeration, 
and to regard the official statements of the army on paper as 



SQ THE GREAT WAR 

having tlieir full equivalent in the actual depots and barracks ; 
and the other, that neither the public, the Emperor, nor any one 
of his officials, knew the full extent of the system of frauds 
which had pervaded every department of the service. 

The underestimate of tlie Prussian Government of its forces 
was also attributable to two causes : the natural cautiousness of 
the Prussians leading them to make allowances beyond the 
actual deficiencies ; and the indisposition on the part of the Gov- 
ernment to lay before the people the vast amount of their mili- 
tary strength, lest, as in previous years, it should be regarded as 
in excess of their need, and a useless expenditure. 

The French army, it was reported, when war was first de- 
clared, including the active army, the reserve, the National 
Guard, and the numerous less important branches, would make 
up the imposing array of 1,350,000 men. The active army, 
according to the official statistics, comprised : staff, 1,082 ; gen- 
darmes, 24,548 ; infantry, 250,900 ; cavalry, 61,683 ; artillery, 
37,959 ; engineers, 7,845 ; military train, 8,954 ; commissariat, 
11,208. It was said to be commanded by 8 marshals, 86 gen- 
erals of division, and 160 generals of brigade. To this active 
army of 404,794 men was to be added the reserve of 400,000 ; 
318 battalions of infantry of the National Guard, numbering 
508,800 men in all, and 123 batteries of artillery, and 5 compa- 
nies of pontoniers, numbering together 29,923 men. 

Beyond this vast force, it was said, were the Garde Mobile, 
answering to the English disembodied militia, as the National 
Guard did to the Yolunteers. The Garde Mobile consisted, it 
was said, of about 600,000 men, who had a skeleton organization 
of officers, but had not been called out for any actual service ; 
but it was believed by the French people that they would be a 
very formidable addition to their military force, and probably be 
fully capable of meeting on equal terms the German soldiers of 
,the line. Here, then, were military organizations which could. 




THE ASTEONOMICAL CLOCK IIST THE CATHEDRAL 
OF STEASBTTRCr. 



BETWEEN FEANCE AND GERMANY. 89 

on an emergency, throw nearly two million soldiers into the 
field. This was not, to be sure, an extravagant estimate, as the 
population of France was about thirty-eight millions. But the 
sanguine French people forgot, or rather did not know, that 
such had been the facilities for procuring substitutes by a money 
payment, that not less than one fifth of the conscripts of any 
year released themselves from service by the payment of a com- 
mutation, which, instead of being employed by the Government 
in hiring substitutes, was perverted to private purposes; another 
fifth v^as declared exempt foT various causes more or less just ; 
and a third fifth, though nominally on the rolls, and pay and 
rations drawn for them, had their existence only there. Thus it 
happened that, of a conscription nominally of 125,000 men, not 
over 50,000 or 55,000 were actually in the service. Thus, 
though, as stated above, the army on the peace-footing amounts 
to 404,000 men, and the first reserves to as many more, yet from 
both there were at no time more than 350,000 men to take the 
field, and it is doubtful if even this number- ever actually report- 
ed for duty. 

On the 2d of August the strength and position of the French 
army were reported as follows : 

First Corps, MacMahon's, 45,000 men, at Strasbourg ; the 
Second Corps, Frossard's, 30,000 men, at St. Auld ; the Third 
Corps, Bazaine's, 30,000 men, at Metz ; Fourth Corps, L'Admi- 
ranlt's, 30,000 men, at Thionville ; Fifth Corps, De Failly's, 
30,000 men, at Bitche and Saorguemines ; Sixth Corps, Can- 
robert's, 30,000 men, at Chalons ; Seventh Corps, Douay's, 
30,000 men, at Besangon and Belfort ; the Eighth Corps, Bour- 
baki's, 30,000 men, at Metz. (This was the Imperial Guard.) 
Cavalry, 34,000. Total, 309,000. With artillery and the re- 
serve cavalry, nearly 350,000 men. It is not probable that these 
army-corps were all full, or, indeed, very nearly so. Far sooner 
than should have been necessary, both the ll^ational Guard and 



90 THE GREAT WAR 

the Garde Mobile v^evQ called out ; and yet, outside of the gar- 
rison of Paris and the other great cities, it would seem to have 
been impossible to keep up an army of much more than 300,000 
men. Early in the war there were bands of Franc-tireurs, a 
kind of guerillas, not uniformed, and recognizing no special alle- 
giance to any particular corps, organized in all parts of France ; 
and these, like guerillas generally, while fighting in their irregu- 
lar way the common enemy, took occasion also to do some plun- 
dering on their own account among their countrymen. Includ- 
ing these irregular troops, the armies in the field, and the garri- 
sons of Paris and other cities, there may have been possibly a 
million of men in all in the field ; but deductiDg the dead, 
wounded, and prisoners, and the deserters, it is doubtful if there 
were, on the 15th of October, 650,000 French troops under arms. 
The following statement of the military strength of Germany 
at the beginning of the war is condensed from an elaborate ar- 
ticle in the Frankfurter Zeitung {Frankfort Gazette)^ the highest 
German authority on the subject, and is undoubtedly drawn 
from official sources. It is evident, from several circumstances, 
that tlic computation was made in April, 18T0, and, therefore, 
when there was no immediate prospect of war. It is remark- 
able that, before the 1st of October, the King of Prussia should 
have been able to bring into the field a force considerably ex- 
ceeding this computation, notwithstanding the inevitable shrink- 
age of troops when called into the field. 

The IlTorth German Confederation comprises 23 States, in- 
cluding Hesse, the northern part of which alone belongs to the 
Confederation. Prussia has military conventions with the king- 
dom of Saxony, with several Thuringian States, with Hesse, 
Mecklenberg-Schwerin and Strelitz, with Oldenburg, &c., where- 
by the armies of all these States are closely bound up with the 
Prussian forces. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 91 

The forces of the North German Confederation are as fol- 
lows* 

Line. — Infantry : 4 Prussian regiments of Foot Guards, 4 
Prussian regiments of Grenadier Guards, 1 Prussian regiment 
of Fusilier Guards, 15 regiments of Grenadiers of the line, YY 
regiments of Infantry, 13 regiments of Fusiliers, 4 Hessian regi- 
ments of 2 battalions each, 1 Prussian battalion of Chasseurs of 
the Guard, 1 battalion Sharpshooters, 16 battalfons of Chas- 
seurs ; total infantry, 118 regiments and 18 battalions — 368 
battalions in all. 

Cavalry : 10 regiments Cuirassiers (including two regiments 
of Guards), 11 regiments Dragoons (including 2 regiments of 
Guards), 18 regiments Hussars (including 1 regiment of Guards), 
21 regiments Lancers (Uhlanen), (including 3 regiments of 
Guards), 6 regiments Light Cavalry (including 2 regiments of 
Guards). Total cavalry, T6 regiments. 

Artillery : 1 regiment of Field Artillery (Guards), 12 regi- 
ments of Field Artillery, 1 Hessian division of Field Artillery, 
1 regiment of Siege Artillery (Festungs Artillerie) (Guards), 
8 regiments of Siege Artillery, 4 divisions of Siege Artillery, 1 
division Eocket Train ; in all, 13 regiments and 1 division Field 
Artillery, and 9 regiments and 1 division of Siege Artillery, 

Engineers: 1 battalion of Pioneers of the Guard, 12 bat- 
talions of Pioneers, 1 Hessian company of Pioneers. 

Train : 13 battalions and 1 division of Baggage, Ammuni- 
tion, &c.. Train. 

Landwehe. — 97 regiments of infantry, two battalions each — 
194 battalions ; 12 reserve battalions — 12 battalions ; 4 regi- 
ments of the Guard, three battalions each — 12 battalions. 
Total, 218 battalions. 

If we summarize the foregoing, we have the following result : 

Field-Aemt.— Infantry, 394,310 men ; Cavalry, 53,528 men ; 
Artillery, 1,212 pieces. 



92 THE GREAT WAR 

Keserve.— Infantry, 145,944 men; Cavalry, 18,991 men; 
Artillery, 234 pieces. 

Gakkison Tkoops.— Infantry, 143,924 men ; Cavalry, 10,208 
men ; Artillery, 234 pieces. 

In the above computation are not reckoned the armies of the 
allied South German States, vs^hich now follow : 

Bavaria. — 16 regiments of Infantry of 3 battalions each ; 
10 battalions Chasseurs ; 10 regiments of Cavalry ; 2 brigades 
of Artillery ; which give 69,064 men in Field troops, 26,Y57 
men Eeserve, and 22,614 Garrison troops; making, in all, 
117,435 men and 240 guns. 

Wtjrtemberg. — 8 regiments of Infantry of 2 battalions each ; 
2 battalions of Chasseurs ; 4 regiments of Cavalry ; 2 regiments 
of Artillery ; which give, in Field troops, 22,0T6 men ; Keserve, 
6,540 ; Garrison troops, 5,064 ; making, in all, 34,680 men and 
6Q guns. 

Baden. — 6 regiments of Infantry of 3 battalions each ; 3 
regiments of Cavalry ; 3 Field divisions of Artillery ; giving 
16,656 Field troops ; 3,995 Keserve, and 9,640 Garrison troops ; 
making, in all, 30,291 men and 64 guns. 

Thus the auxiliary troops which the three South German 
States would bring to the aid of the North German Confedera- 
tion amount to the respectable figure of 169,802 men, and 370 
guns. 

The aggregates are: Field Army, 555,634 men and 1,584 
guns ; Eeserves {Landwe/ir), 201,207 men and 234 field-pieces ; 
Garrison troops, 192,450 men and 234 pieces of artillery. 
Grand total, 949,291 men and 2,052 guns. That the German 
army in the field since the beginning of the war has consider- 
ably exceeded 1,200,000 men, does not admit of a doubt. 

But if the Germans had a decided preponderance in military 
strength, the French were, in turn, greatly their superiors in 
naval power. In this direction, indeed, France claimed to be 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 93 

second to no nation in the world, and only equalled by Great 
Britain, which for so long a period had boasted of " ruling the 
waves." The French people, it is true, do not naturally take 
to maritime pursuits ; their commercial marine has been at all 
times smaller and less efficiently manned than that of many 
smaller nations, and their very large and well-appointed navy 
was not so well manned as that of Great Britain, its vessels 
being supplied with Crews by conscription, and these not always 
from the coasts ; so that, though the French navy has had no 
important naval battles to test its prowess, it is hardly to be sup- 
posed that it would be found much superior in fighting ability 
to its old reputation. 

The French naval force consisted, in January, 18Y0, of 
74:,664: officers and men. There were 2 admirals, 0. Eegnauld 
de Genouilly and F. T. Treliouart ; 6 active vice-admirals, and 
30 active counter-admirals. The fleet, on the 1st of January, 
1870, was composed as follows : 

Number. Guns. 

Screw steamers, iron-clad 55 1,033 

Screw steamers, non-iron-clad 233 2,618 

Wheel steamers 51 116 

Sailing-vessels 100 914 

Total 439 4,680 

Besides these there were 8 screw steamers, iron-clad, with 
68 guns, and 23 non-iron-clad, with 144 guns, building. 

If this large number of vessels were all in commission, or 
capable of being rendered readily effective, it would indeed 
have been the most powerful of navies ; but this was very far 
from being the case. A little analysis of the vessels composing 
the navy will readily demonstrate this. Of the 63 iron-clads 
afloat and building in 1869, 2 only were ships of the line — the 
Magenta and Solferino ; 18 were iron-clad frigates, varying from 
800 to 950 horse-power, carrying from 12 to 32 guns, and having 
crews of from 5Y0 to 600 men, and the greater part were costly 



94 THE GREAT WAR 

experiments of untried models ; 9 were iron-clad gunboats, of 
several different models, carrying usually 12 guns and 310 men, 
and probably, for real service, the most efficient vessels of tbe 
navy ; 7, described as iron-clad coast-guards, were of very 
varied capacity and horse-power, for the most part carrying 
only 1 or 2 guns. Among these was the Kochambeau, origi- 
nally named the Dunderberg, built in Kew York for our Gov- 
ernment, but, not exactly meeting its views, sold, in 1867, to 
tlie French Emperor ; another was a cupola-ship with a powerful 
ram, named the Taureau. The remaining 27 were floating bat- 
teries, of use for the protection of their own rivers and coasts, 
but not adapted to offensive warfare. Of these, 12 were so 
constructed that they could be taken to pieces and transported 
overland to navigable rivers for warfare along their banks : b 
or 8 of these were sent to Strasbourg, to be put together there 
and sent down the Khine, but fell into the hands of the Ger- 
mans on the capture of that city. Of the non-armored screw 
steamers very few were in commission, 27 of the 29 ships of the 
line of this class being laid up in ordinary, with very little 
probability of their ever being commissioned again ; 112 were 
despatch boats or transports, as were M of the paddle steamers. 
The 100 sailing-vessels were mostly employed as guards of the 
fisheries. Still, after making these deductions, there remained 
a formidable naval force, from which great things were expected. 
The blockade of the German coast was assigned to 16 of the 
iron-clads, mostly of the frigate class, and to 11 of the best of 
the despatch boats not armored. Other vessels of the navy 
hovered around neutral ports, like Liverpool and "New York, in 
the hope of catching some of the German steamers. Owing to 
their great draught, however, the iron-clads were not capable of 
approaching near enougli to the German ports to do any mis- 
chief, and their only exploits up to the 15th of October had 
been the capture of 15 or 20 unarmed merchantmen. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 9Y 

The Prussian navj was small, "but its vessels were well con- 
structed, and some of tliem were more than a match for any 
single vessel of the French navy. The following was their num- 
ber, January 1, 1870 : 

Number. Guns. 

Iron-clada , . . 6 70 

Frigates and corvettes 9 203 

Gunboats 23 54 

Yachts 1 3 

Paddle-corvettes 3 15 

Sailing-vessels 59 315 

Total 101 658 

The aggregate horse-power of the steam portion of the fleet 
was 7,020, and the crews, officers, and marines numbered 3,878 
men. The great success of the Prussian armies soon rendered 
naval action of very little importance, and, shortly after the 
revolution occurred, the blockade of the German ports — never 
very effective — was practically abandoned. Let us next con- 
sider, as one of the problems materially affecting the success of 
the war, the armament of these forces, whether on the land or 
the sea. It has often been said, though incorrectly, that Prussia 
owed her victories over Austria, in 1866, to her superior artillery 
and her needle-guns. These victories were due, in the first 
place, to the genius of von Moltke and the thorough organiza- 
tion and training of the Prussian forces ; but it is not to be 
denied that the artillery and needle-guns in the hands of thor- 
oughly trained soldiers contributed largely to the result. 

The cannon in use in the German army are mostly of steel, 
breech-loaders, of different sizes and calibres as required, but 
mostly of one general pattern, devised by Herr Krupp, a Prus- 
sian founder, at whose extensive works most of them were made. 
The steel of w^hich they are made is of the low but malleable 
grade produced by the Bessemer and other kindred processes. 
Most of these cannon are rifled, and their range, accuracy, and 



98 THE GREAT "WAE 

toughness is extraordinary. A Frencli authority., writing of the 
battles around Sedan, states that, on the morning of the surren- 
der, the Emperor was, with his staff, suddenly subjected to a 
terribly severe cannonade, the shot and shell being thrown with 
most uncomfortable accuracy, and, on inquiry, found that they 
came from a Prussian battery 4,900 metres (a little more than 
three miles) distant. One of the best of the French batteries 
was put in position to reply to it, but its shot and shells fell into 
the Moselle, not over 1,500 metres, or less than one mile, from 
the battery. 

The French cannon are mostly of bronze, muzzle-loaders, 
and of the pattern claimed by the Emperor as his own, and 
named " ISTapoleons." They are greatly inferior to the Prussian 
guns in range, accuracy, and ease of handling, and not superior 
to them in tenacity. The French, in the war of 18Y0, have, 
however, introduced one weapon which, with some modifica- 
tions, seems likely to play an important part in wars hereafter. 
It is the mitrailleuse, or, as it is sometimes called, the mitra- 
illeur, a weapon analogous to, though hardly as effective as, our 
Gatling battery. The principle of this new and destructive 
weapon is somewhat like that of the revolver, or the many- 
chambered pistol, applied to a species of field-piece. A num- 
ber of barrels of a calibre sufficient for an inch-ball are grouped 
around a central steel staff, and, metallic cartridges being sup- 
plied, they are, by a simple crank-movement, forced into the 
several barrels, and discharged with great rapidity, from two to 
three hundred per minute. The range which presents any con- 
siderable accuracy, in the French mitrailleuse, does not much 
exceed a mile, but within this range the weapon is exceedingly 
destructive. The Prussians had examined the Gatling battery, 
acknowledged to be the most effective of all the guns of this 
class, but had not been favorably impressed by it ; but their 
late experiences have probably changed their opinion. The 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 



99 



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100 THE GREAT WAR 

Fosberiy batterj, or mitrailleuse, does not seem to be tlie most 
perfect form of this destructive weapon, experiments in England 
proving the decided superiority of the Gatling battery to it in 
all respects ; but there can be no doubt that it will in some form 
add a formidable weapon to the armament of civilized nations. 
It will not take the place of cannon, and it will be liable to be 
destroyed by cannon-shot and shell at long range ; yet the expe- 
rience of the war proves that it has its place, and an important 
one, in both offensive and defensive warfare. There have been 
rumors of a steam mitrailleuse worked with the frightful velocity 
of which that powerful agent is capable, but there are evidently 
difficulties to be overcome before this combination can be made 
practicable. * 

The weapons with which the rank and file of the two armies 
were provided also deserve our attention. The Nddelgewehr^ 
or needle-gun of the Prussians, has now been in use in their 
armies more than twenty years. It has been slightly modified 
and improved in such a way as to increase its certainty of dis- 
charge, and, perhaps, slightly its accuracy, but the principle of 
the gun is the same as in 1848. 

The Prussian needle-gun is the invention of Hekr Dreyse, 
a gun-manufacturer, who spent thirty years in trying to con- 
struct a perfect breech-loading rifle that would be of practical 
use in war. 

There is no necessary connection between a breech-loading 
gun and the method of firing by the penetration of a needle 
into a detonating cap or fulminating powder within the cartridge ; 
but the desire to dispense with the separate application of the 
percussion caj), as his predecessors had done with the more 
clumsy mechanism of the flint and match-locks, led Ilerr Dreyse 
to seek the best and simplest method of combining these two 
qualities — loading at the breech, and firing by a needle. The 
greatest, as it was the earliest, objection to breech-loading fire- 



BETWEEN PRANCE AND GERMANY. 



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102 THE GREAT WAR 

arms has been their tendencj to foul by the escape of a portion 
of the gases of the powder and the residuum of water and in- 
combustible, or, at least, unconsumed matters left after repeated 
firing. There are two methods of overcoming this difficultj, 
which is in danger of preventing the perfect closure of the 
breech upon the barrel. The first is bj a method of closing 
which shallefiectually prevent the escape of gas at the breech ; 
the second, bj the adoption of a cartridge which shall cleanse 
the barrel and joint at each discharge. There are difficulties in 
both. Obturation, or the complete closing of the breech upon 
the barrel, is effected in three distinct ways : 

1. By inserting a cylinder into the barrel, or by inside or 
internal obturation. 

2. By shoving the open end of the barrel into the movable 
closing-piece so that the latter encompasses the end of the barrel, 
called outside or external obturation. 

3. By closing the end of the barrel with a flat, massive piece 
of metal, which method is denominated flat obturation, and can 
only be resorted to where metallic cartridges are used, like those 
invented for the Lefancheux gun, the Spencer or Henry rifle, 
&c., &c. 

Of these three methods of obturation, the first is objection- 
able and imperfect, inasmuch as the cylinder to be inserted into 
the barrel of the gun conies into immediate contact with the 
gas-development, and with the dirty residue of the powder, in 
consequence of which the free forward and backward movement 
of the closing mechanism is soon materially checked, and the 
rapid loading of the gun seriously interfered with. The third 
method depends wholly upon the use of metallic cartridges, which 
are too expensive for a large army. The firing of these breech- 
loaders is also much less rapid than that of the Prussian needle- 
gun and the Chassep6t, as it is necessary, after each discharge 
of the gun, to remove the metallic cap or the cartridge, often 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 103 

firmly inclosed in tlie rear end of the barrel, except where, as 
is the case with some American rifles, there is an automatic 
arrangement for throwing out each shell by the firing of its 
successor. 

The Prussian needle-gun is, we believe, up to this day, the 
only one in the manufiicture of which the external obturation 
has been resorted to, in preference to the other methods. And 
just to the application of this system one of the most essential 
advantages of the needle-gun can be attributed, as the metallic 
plates coming into contact in the process of obturation are not 
directly exposed to the danger of becoming overheated, and the 
closing mechanism is kept free from all obstruction by the resi- 
due of powder, from which the Chassepot, with its internal 
obturation, sufiers so severely. This inconvenience, which is 
called, in French, " crachement,^^ has been partly overcome by 
the application of India-rubber knobs, which, however, become 
in their turn dangerous to the working of the needle. 

The needle-gun consists, as regards its breech apparatus and 
needle-lock, of three concentric hollow cylinders, with a solid 
cylindrical bolt, to which the needle is affixed, inside the inner- 
most. The rear end of the barrel is firmly screwed into the 
head of the chamber which is fixed to the stock of the piece, 
and is open at the rear end. The upper half of the cylinder is 
cut away at the front end for j-ather more than the length of the 
cartridge, to secure its ready admission. From the rear of this 
opening to the back of the chamber a groove is cut sufficiently 
wide to allow the square pillar of the breech-liandle to pass 
along it. In the middle of this groove is a right-angled shunt 
stopping the breech-handle Avhen drawn backwards, unless it is 
turned downwards, when it may be completely drawn out at 
the rear end. This breech-handle is connected with and forms 
part of the breech-piece, a solid steel cylinder moving within 
the chamber, and having its front end bevelled with an inward 



104: THE GREAT WAR 

slope to fit tlie external Level of the rear end of the barrel, thus 
closing it perfectly, and forming the external ohtnration of 
which -we have already spoken. Firmlj screwed within the 
breech-piece is a solid block of metal, with a conical projection 
extending to the base of the cartridge, called a tige^ or pillar. 
Through this block is the channel in which the needle works. 
Inside the breech-piece cylinder is another, with its springs con- 
stituting the lock of the gun. It slides within the breech-piece, 
and is retained from falling out by a spring, which catches in 
a notch at the rear end of the breech-piece. Along the bottom 
of this cylinder is a groove to admit the passage of the trigger, 
and at the back of the chamber is a short upright handle, by 
means of which the weapon is cocked. Lastly, within the lock 
is a solid steel bolt having the needle firmly fastened in its front 
end, and its motions regulated by a strong spiral spring. "When 
the cartridge (which is of paper) is thrust into the chamber, and 
moved forward by the act of half-cocking to its place, the point 
of the needle and the end of the tige touch the base of the 
cartridge, but the spiral spring is relaxed, and without power ; 
when the gun is at full-cock, the spring is compressed, the bolt 
to which it is attached drawn back and held in place by the 
trigger, which catches upon a shoulder of the bolt in front of 
the spring. In the act of firing, the trigger releases this shoulder 
of the bolt, the spring asserts its power, and the bolt shoots 
forward, driving the needle unerringly to the fulminate in the 
centre of the cartridge. Here is no opportunity of fouling, for 
the cartridge wipes out the barrel, and the closely-fitting bevel 
allows no escape of gas. The construction of the gun is so sim- 
ple, that, without screw-driver or any other implement, it can 
readily be taken to pieces and cleaned or repaired. Its weight 
— eleven or twelve pounds — is an objection to it, but it has good 
qualities sufficient to balance this. 

The Chassepot rifle is a needle-gun, but varying in many 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 



105 



and important particulars from the Ziind nadelgewehr, or Prus- 
sian needle-gun. It was invented by M. Cbassepot, tlie Frencli 
Inspector-General of arms, in 1863 (but improved in 1866), to 
supply tbe demand of tlie Frencli Government for a gun which 
should be different from, yet equal to, the Prussian weapon. A 
much smaller amount of time has been expended over it than 
over its rival, and it has several serious defects. Its method of 
closing the breech is by internal obturation, or the thrusting the 
chamber into the barrel ; and hence, for the reasons already 
stated, is more liable to foul, and to have its free movement in 
loading checked and obstructed. This difficulty has proved so 
great in the war of 1870, that the French have abandoned the 
gun, and are supplying their troops as fast as possible with the 
Remington rifle, an American weapon. Its spiral spring is 
shorter and weaker than the Prussian, and hence more liable to 
fail ; and the rubber knob on the end of the cylinder, intended 
to close the joint completely against fouling, is apt to press on 
the needle and form a crust, which interferes with its free 
motion. The French fire rapidly, and after a number of rounds, 
in all the recent battles, they invariably manifested their im- 
patience at the foulness and obstruction of their rifles by blow- 
ing into them, shaking them, and trying to clear them — which 
only made them v/orse. 

M. Ignatius ISTeumann, of Liege, Belgium, a gun-manufacturer 
of great intelligence and experience, an acknowledged atuhority 
on all subjects relating to fire-arms, after long experimenting 
with the two guns, thus gives his verdict in regard to them : 



THE NEEDLE-GUN. 

" 1. It is impossible to open 
the gun as long as the spiral 
spring is strained, while, on the 
other hand, the spring cannot 



IHB CHASSEPOT. 

" 1. The mechanism of the 
gun is such as to necessitate the: 
straining of the spiral spring 
previous to the opening of the 



106 



THE GREAT WAR 



be strained unless the gun is 
completely closed. Tlius all 
danger from want of precaution 
in opening and in closing tlie 
gun is averted, and it is just 
as fully secured against an un- 
foreseen or accidental explosion 
when loaded as when unloaded. 
This may be considered the 
best and most perfect "rest." 



" 2. The Prussian needle-gun 
is the only breech-loader which 
has the external obturation, by 
which it is protected against all 
' orachement^ as well as against 
all other obstructions to the free 
movement of its closing mechan- 
ism. 



" 3. The gun can be taken 
apart by any soldier without the 



chamber. Therefore, the load- 
ing of the gun takes place, and 
all the movements of the cylin- 
der have to be executed, with 
strained spring ; and the slight- 
est touch on the trigger is sure 
to cause the projecting of the 
needle into the percussion-wa- 
fer, thus exploding the gun and 
endangering the lives of those 
around. Admitting the Chas- 
sepot to be a weapon the effi- 
ciency of which it would be im 
prudent to question or to sneer 
at, we cannot be blind to the 
fact that, in the hands of a nerv- 
ous and excited French soldier, 
it may eventually prove almost 
as dangerous to his own com- 
rades and superiors as to the 
enemy. 

" 2. The internal obturation 
produces ^ cracliement^ and in- 
terferes with the proper loading 
of the gun through accumula- 
tion of dirt from powder-resi- 
due and gas. This takes place 
as soon as the India-rubber knob 
at the head of the cylinder loses 
its elasticity and is not replaced 
in due time. 

" 3. The closing mechanism 
is not as easily taken apart as 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 



lOY 



necessity of using special tools 
for tliat purpose ; its cleaning 
is very easy, and repairs, while 
seldom necessary, require but 
little time and skill. 



"4. The cartridge is undoubt- 
edly the best hitherto invented, 
while its manufacture is easy 
for the initiated ; the igniting 
material lies in the solid case of 
the fulmmate, cannot be pushed 
forward through the action of 
the needle, and is sure to cause 
the explosion of the powder- 
charge without fail. The posi- 
tion of the fulminate, between 
the projectile and the powder, 
insures its instantaneous remov- 
al from the barrel of the gun at 
every shot. 

" 5. The needle-gun is of sim- 
ple and solid construction, and 
just heavy enough to make it 
useful in a bayonet-charge when- 
ever the contending armies come 
into close contact." 



is the case with the Prussian 
weapon. The closing cylinder 
moves up and down in its en- 
casement on a little screw, which 
is easily broken by any impru- 
dent or too forcible pull, when 
the gun is rendered unfit for use. 
" 4:. The cartridge is of diffi- 
cult construction, and is not 
sufficiently protected against 
spoiling when on the road for 
any length of time. The pro- 
jectile does not always get free 
from its paper cover in due 
time, in all which cases the ball 
drops short of its destination. 



"5. The Chassepot is too 
light, and its construction is not 
sufficiently solid for a weapon 
of thrust. In a close encounter 
its inferiority will no doubt soon 
become apparent." 



Besides the defects and disadvantages above enumerated, the 
Chassepot labors under another serious drawback in the rapid 
formation of a crust on and near the point of the needle, com- 
posed of India-rubber and the residue of the igniting matter 



108 THE GREAT WAR 

and tlie powcler-cliarge ; tlie needle becomes useless, as it fails 
to effect the explosion of the powder through the percussion- 
wafer. If the percussion-wafer was placed in front of the 
powder-charge, so that the needle would have to pierce through 
the same before reaching the igniting matter (as is the case with 
the Prussian needle-gim), the needle would not become ineffi- 
cient, and would remain clean without any interference on the 
part of tlie soldier. But the spiral spring of the Chassep6t is 
too short and too weak to admit of any such change of con- 
struction. The objection recently made to the Prussian needle- 
gun, that its spiral spring was apt to get weakened and unable 
to propel the needle with sufficient force to pierce the cartridge, 
is futile, as nothing occurred either during the campaign in 
Schleswig-Holstein in 1864, or during the memorable ten days' 
campaign in Bohemia in 1866, to warrant such a surmise. It 
is also asserted that the calibre of the Prussian gun is too large, 
and the projectile consequently too heavy, rendering the carry- 
ing of a great number of cartridges extremely onerous to the 
soldier. We are enabled to refute this statement also, for the 
construction of the needle-gun is such as to admit of the use of 
small projectiles in spite of tbe large calibre. The circumstance 
that the ball is imbedded in the fulminate, wherewith it forms 
one compact mass, and obtains its rotation by means of the 
fulminate entering into the four grooves of the barrel, facilitates 
tlie firing of smaller projectiles than those originally used. . To 
sum up, N^eumann says : 

" The Prussian needle-gun does not shoot better nor fire 
further than any other breech-loader, but its material advan- 
tages over all those invented in France, Belgium, England, and 
elsewhere, cannot be denied. It is entirely erroneous to suppose 
that it was not introduced into the armies of other European 
powers on account of its real or alleged shortcomings or defects. 
France especially was actuated in its decision in the premises by 



BETWEEN mANCE AND GERMANY. 109 

petty jealousy only. They didn't want it because they did not 
want it ; they were unwilling to admit its superiority because 
somebody else had possessed it before them whom they couldn't 
think of ever imitating. Such is human nature." 



110 THE GREAT WAR 



CHAPTER YL 

'E have deemed it necessary, to a full understanding of tlie 
position of the two contending powers, to go thus fuUj 
into the history of their antecedents, their financial, social, and 
military condition, the history of their leaders, and the peculiar 
weapons of the opposing parties. "We now proceed with the 
narrative of the opening of the "war. There had sprung up, 
partly, perhaps, from the coldness and jealousies of France, a 
very cordial feeling between the Spanish Government since the 
revolution of 1868, and Prussia, and there had been a more than 
usually frequent interchange of civilities. General Prim, who 
was personally very Mendly to the French Emperor, had sounded 
the Prussian Minister to Spain in regard to the candidacy of 
one of the Ilohenzollern princes for the Spanish throne, indi- 
cating his preference for the elder brother of the family of 
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, but the proposition not being very 
favorably received, ft had been allowed to drop, not, however, 
till the General had alluded to its possibility before the Cortes. 
In May, or early in June, General Prim had an interview with 
the French Emperor at Biarritz, and, almost immediately after 
his return, proposed to the Spanish Cortes the name of Prince 
Leopold, second son of Prince Carl Anton, the head of the 
house of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, for the vacant throne of 
Spain, and a large majority of the Cortes accepted his candi- 
dacy. A correspondence with the Prince resulted in his expres- 
sion of his willingness to be the candidate of the Cortes for the 
position. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. Ill 

Prince Leopold was from an independent branch of tlie 
Holienzollern familj, having no claims on the succession to the 
Prussian throne, and were not in any sense directly responsible to 
it for their action, unless it was treasonable to the reigning house 
of Prussia to the Prussian King. The Prince was about thirty- 
five years of age, highly educated, very wealthy, and a Catholic, 
and held the nominal rank of colonel in the Prussian army. 
The King of Prussia was, when the matter was laid before him, 
prompt to express his disapprobation of it, believing that it 
would prove another Maximilian affair, and that the Prince 
would lose his head. 

In spite of this disapproval, the Prince gave his consent to 
be a candidate. On the 4th of July, 1870, General Prim ad- 
vised Senor Olozaga, Spanish Minister at Paris, of his selection 
of Prince Leopold, and the sanction of it by the Cortes. On 
the 6th of July, Baron Werthei-, Prussian Minister at Paris, 
loft that city for Ems to consult with the King relative to this 
affair. On the 6th of July, the French Government sent a note 
to Count Benedetti, the Emperor's Minister at Berlin, instruct- 
ing him to demand the disavowal of Prince Leopold's candidacy 
by Prussia, and the withdrawal of his name from the list of 
candidates for the Spanish crown, on the ground that France 
would consider his elevation to that position as a check and 
menace to her, which she would not under any pretext permit. 

Count Benedetti, himself a Corsican, and of very fiery tem- 
per, acting also evidently under instructions from the Emperor, 
made haste to present the matter as offensively as possible to 
tne King of Prussia. Mr. George Eipley, of the Tribune staff, 
was in Berlin at this time, and has given a most accurate and 
graphic account of the series of interviews between the Count 
and the King, the truth of which is certified to by the King and 
his personal suite. 

The first audience, Mr. Eipley says, took place on July 9, 



112 



THE GREAT WAR 



at tbe request of Count Benedetti. It was demanded by him 
that the King slionld require the Prince of Hohenzollern to 
withdraw his acceptance of the Spanish crown. The King re- 
plied that, as in the whole affair, he had been addressed only as 
the head of the family, and never as the King of Prussia, and 
bad, accordingly, given no command for the acceptance of the 
candidature, he could also give no command for withdrawal. 
On the 11th of July, Count Benedetti requested a second audi- 
ence, which was granted. In this interview he was urgent with 
the King to prevail upon Prince Leopold to renounce the crown. 
The King replied that the Prince was perfectly free to decide 
for himself, and that, moreover, he did not even know where he 
was at that moment, as he was about to take a journey among 
the Alps. On the morning of July 13, the King met Benedetti 
on the public promenade before the fountain, and gave him an 
extra sheet of The Cologne Gazette, which he had just received, 
with a private telegram from Sigmaringen, relating, the with- 
drawal of the Prince, remarking, at the same time, that he him- 
self had heard nothing from Sigmaringen, but should expect 
letters that day. Count Benedetti replied that he had already 
received the information the evening before from Paris, and, as 
the King regarded the matter as thus settled, the Count wholly 
unexpectedly made a new demand, proposing to the King that 
he should expressly pledge himself never to give his consent in 
case the question of the candidature should at any subsequent 
time be revived. The King decidedly refused to comply with 
any such demand, and, when Benedetti returned to his proposal 
with increasing importunity, stood by his answer. In spite of 
this, a few hours after, the Count requested a third audience. 
Upon being asked what subject was to be considered, he gave 
for answer that he wished to renew the discussion of the morn- 
ing. The King declined another audience, as lie had no answer 
but that already given, and, moreover, all negotiations must 




1 ^^ 'K J/ 
y 10 



LOUIS 11. OF BAVAKIA. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 115 

now take place through the Ministry. Benedetti requested 
permission to take leave of the King npon his departure from 
Ems, which was so far granted that the King bowed to him as 
the latter was leaving the railway station the next day for 
Coblenz. Each of the interviews of Benedetti with the King 
had the character of a private conversation. The Count did 
not once pretend to be acting in his official capacity. 

. In the preceding statement, which is sanctioned by the King 
himself, no mention is made of the rudeness of Benedetti in 
forcing himself upon His Majesty while indulging in the recrea- 
tion of a walk on the crowded promenade of Ems. It is gen- 
erally regarded, however, as a studied insult on the part of the 
French Minister, and is commented on with indignation by the 
German press. Such a violation of diplomatic courtesy could 
hardly have been accidental. ISTot even the excitement of a 
sudden surprise could excuse the incivility ; but there was no 
surprise in the case ; the Count had received the news the night 
before, and had at least twelve hours to meditate his course of 
action. The affair was witnessed with astonishment by the 
numerous spectators of the scene, who drew their own augury 
of its probable consequences. It was interpreted as a sign of 
hostility toward Prussia, and two days after came the declaration 
of war. 

The actual demands of the Erench Government upon the 
King are contained in a subsequent despatch from Baron 
Werther, the Prussian Minister at Paris. In a conversation 
with the Duke de Gramont, the latter remarked that he re- 
garded the withdrawal of Prince Leopold as a matter of second- 
ary importance, but he feared that the course of Prussia in 
regard to it would occasion a permanent misunderstanding be- 
tween the two countries. It was necessary to guard against this 
by destroying the germ. The conduct of Prussia toward France 
had been unfriendly. This was admitted, to his certain know- 



110 THE GREAT WAR 

ledge, by all the great powers. To speak frankly, lie did not 
wish for war, but would rather preserve amicable relations with 
Prussia. He hoped that Prussia had similar dispositions. He 
was satisfied with the intentions of the Prussian Minister, and 
they could accordingly freely discuss the conditions of recon- 
ciliation. He would suggest the writing of a letter to the Em- 
peror by the King, disavowing all purpose of infringing upon 
the interests or the dignity of France in his authorizing the 
acceptance of the Spanish crown by Prince Leopold. The King 
should confirm the withdrawal of the Prince, and express the 
hope that all ground of complaint between the two Govern- 
ments would thus be removed. ISTothing should be said in the 
letter concerning the family relations between Prince Leopold 
and the Emperor. 

The refusal of the Kiag to accept the humiliating conditions 
proposed by the French Government has called forth the liveliest 
approval and sympathy in all parts of Germany. 

As early as the 8th of July, the Emperor had ordered two 
corps dJarmee to be ready for immediate movement, one under 
the command of Bazaine, the other of Leboenf. This, it will 
be noticed, was the day before Benedetti's first interview with 
the King. On the 12th, French troops passed through Paris on 
their way to the frontier. On the 14:th, the French fleet sailed 
to blockade the German ports. On the 15th, war was declared 
by the French Corps Legislatif 2ig2ims,t Prussia, at 1.50 p. m., on 
these grounds : First, the insult offered at Ems to Count Bene- 
detti, the Fiench Minister, and its approval by the Prussian 
Government ; second, the refusal of the King of Prussia to 
compel the withdrawal of Prince Leopold's name as a candidate 
for the Spanish throne ; and third, the fact that the King per- 
sisted in giving the Prince liberty to accept the crown. 

On the same day Count Bismarck warned German vessels to 
hasten to ports of shelter ; Holland ordered the mobilization of 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 117 

her army ; Austria professed neutrality, unless a third power 
intervenes ; King William returned to Berlin from Ems ; the 
German army was ordered to be put in motion ; the President 
of the United States recommended to Congress a temporary and 
partial relaxation of the navigation laws. 

On leaving Ems at an early hour on the morning of the 
15tli, King Wilhelm found a great crowd of citizens assembled 
to witness his departure, and said to them in parting, " God is 
my witness that I have not desired war ; but if 1 am forced into 
it, I will maintain the honor of Germany to the last man." The 
enthusiasm for the war, forced upon them by France, was intense 
throughout Germany, the patriotism and war-like spirit of the 
people of South Germany and Schleswig-Holstein, both of which 
had been a few years before at war with Prussia, apparently 
rising higher even than that of the citizens of the l^orth Ger- 
man Confederation. Addresses of the most earnest character to 
the King were adopted everywhere, and the legend, " With God 
for King and Fatherland," blazed out all over Germany. The 
Prussian Legislature, called in extraordinary session at Berlin, 
was a unit for prompt and vigorous war. The King opened the 
session with a brief address, which was greeted with the wildest 
enthusiasm. The King said Prussia had no interest in the selec 
tion of the Prince of Hohenzollern for the Spanish throne, 
except that it might bring peace to a friendly people. It had, 
nevertheless, furnished the Emperor of the French with a pre- 
text for war unknown to diplomacy, and, scorning peace, he had 
indulged in language to Germany which could only have been 
prompted by a miscalculation of her strength. Germany was 
powerful enough to resent such language and repel such violence. 
He said so in all reverence, knowing that the event was in God's 
hands. He had fully weighed the responsibility which rested 
on the man who drives into war and havoc two great and tran- 
quil nations yearning for peace and the enjoyment of the com- 
1 



118 THE GREAT WAR 

morj blessings of Christian civilization and prosperity, and for 
contests more salutary than those of blood. Those who rule 
France have shrewdly studied tbe proper methods of hitting tbe 
sensitive pride of that great neighbor-nation, and, to promote 
selfish interests, have misguided it. " Then," concluded the 
King, " as our fathers before us have done, let us fight for liberty 
and our rights against the wrongs inflicted by a foreign con- 
queror ; and as He was with our fathers, so God will be with 
us in a struggle without which Europe can never enjoy lasting 
peace." 

After the King's speech had been delivered, a loan of 
120,000,000 thalers was carried unanimously, amid the wildest 
expressions of enthusiasm by all parties. The enthusiasm was 
not so great in France, nor the Legislature so unanimous ; there 
were a considerable number of the Hepublican members who 
perceived that the war was proclaimed in the interests of the 
Napoleonic dynasty, and therefore opposed it ; but the French 
people are excitable, and the cry of glory and conquest rendered 
most of them deaf to reason for the time, and the war could be 
said, in general, to be popular with them. 

As we have already said, the Emperor delayed his departure, 
as it was thought at the time very singularly, from Paris, after 
the declaration of war. It is now known that he was astounded 
to find how utterly unprepared his army was for moving, and 
made vain and desperate efforts to undo the evil wrought by 
years of corruption and firaud. Finding, at length, that his 
enemy was fidly ready for him on the frontier, he issued, on 
the 23d of July, the following address to the people of France : 

" Frenchmen : There are in the life of a people solemn mo- 
ments, when the national honor, violently excited, arouses itself 
irresistibly, rises above all other interests, and applies itself with 
the single purpose of directing the destinies of the nation. One 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 119 

of those decisive hours has now arrived for France. Prussia, to 
whom we have given evidence, during and since the war of 1856, 
of the most conciliatory disposition, has held our good-will of 
no account, and has returned our forbearance by encroachments. 
She has aroused distrust in all quarters, necessitating exaggerated 
armaments, and has made of Europe a camp where reign dis- 
quiet and fear of the morrow. A final incident 'has disclosed 
the instability of the international understanding, and shown 
the gravity of the situation. In the presence of her new pre- 
tensions, Prussia was made to understand our claims. They 
were evaded and followed with contemptuous treatment. Our 
country manifested profound displeasure at this action, and 
quickly a war-cry resounded from one end of France to the 
other. 

" There remains for us nothing but to confide our destinies 
to the chance of arms. We do not make war upon Germany, 
whose independence we respect. "We pledge ourselves that the 
people composing the great Germanic nationalities shall dispose 
freely of their destinies. As for us, we demand the establish- 
ment of a state of things guaranteeing our security and assuring 
the future. We wish to conquer a durable peace, based on the 
true interests of the people, and to assist in abolishing that pre- 
carious condition of things when all nations are forced to employ 
their resources in arming against each other. 

" The fflorions flao; of France which we once more unfurl 
in the face of our challengers, is the same which has borne over 
Europe the civilizing ideas of our great revolution. It repre- 
sents the same principles ; it will inspire the same devotion. 

" Frenchmen : I go to place myself at the head of that gal- 
lant army, which is animated by love of country and devotion 
to duty. That army knows its worth, for it has seen victory 
follow its footsteps in the four quarters of the globe. I take 
with me my son. Despite his tender years, he knows the duty 



120 THE GREAT WAR 

his name imposes "upon him, and he is proud to bear his part in 
the dangers of those who fight for our coimtry. May God bless 
our efforts. A great people defending a just cause is invincible. 

" Napoleon." 

In this address there is evident not onlj a disposition to mis- 
represent the real causes of the war, but a somewhat flippant 
appeal to the French passion for glory, and a manifestation of 
that tendency to theatrical effect which has given a tinge of the 
ludicrous to so many of his public performances. The allusion 
to his son, a backward and very mediocre boy of fourteen, was, 
to say the least, in very bad taste. 

The Emperor did not, however, leave at once on the promul- 
gation of this address ; at least, he did not reach Metz, with his 
very luxurious and amply provided train, until the 28th of July, 
when he at once issued the following address to the soldiers on 
taking command of the army. When we consider that he knew 
fiilly the condition and weakness of his army, and was, at least, 
tolerably informed concerning the powerful and perfectly organ- 
ized foe with whom he had to contend, some of its assertions wUl 
be thought remarkable : 

" Soldiers : I come to take my place at your head to defend 
the honor of the soil of onr country. You go to combat against 
one of the best-armed of European countries ; but other coun- 
tries, as valiant as this, have not been able to resist your valor. 
It will be the same to-day. The war which now commences 
will be long and hardly contested, for its theatre will be places 
hedged with obstacles and thick with fortresses ; but nothing is 
beyond the persevering efforts of the soldiers of Africa, Italy, 
and Mexico. You will prove once more what the French army 
is able to accomplish, animated by a sentiment of duty, main- 
tained by discipline, influenced by love of country. Whatever 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 121 

road we may take across our frontiers, we will find upon it 
glorious traces of our fathers, and we will show ourselves worthy 
of them. 

" All France follows you with ardent prayers, and the eyes 
of the universe are upon you. Upon our success depends the 
fate of liberty and civilization. Soldiers, let each one do his 
duty, and the God of Battles will be with us. 

" Napoleon. 
" At the General Headquarters at Metz, July 28, 1870." 

During this period, when both nations were summoning 
their forces into the field, but before any serious conflicts had 
occurred, Count von Bismarck, the Prussian Premier, on the 
29th of July, addressed to the Representatives of Prussia at the 
Courts of neutral powers a circular giving an expose of secret 
propositions made by N^apoleon III to Prussia in May 1866, and 
since repeated with slight variations, and always accompanied 
with threats, which showed most conclusively what were the 
motives which prompted him to declare the war just com- 
menced. 

Before the Danish war, says Count Bismarck, the French 
Legation at Berlin urged an alliance between France and Prus- 
sia for purposes of mutual aggrandizement. France, antici- 
pating war with Austria as a consequence of the Danish war, 
made overtures relative to the restoration of the Luxembourg 
frontier of 1814, the acquisition of Saarburg and Landau, while 
a broader settlement of the boundary question on the basis of 
language was not to be excluded. These instances, in May, 
1866, took the form of propositions for an alliance offensive and 
defensive, the manuscript original of which is in the Foreign 
Oflice here. These propositions are as follows : 

First. Should the Congress of the powers assemble, Italy to 
have Venetia and Prussia the Duchies. 



122 THE GREAT WAR 

Second. Should the Congress disagree, alliance offensive and 
defensive will be made between France and Prussia. 

Third. Prussia to open hostilities against Austria within ten 
days after the dissolution of the Congress. 

Fourth. Should no Congress meet, Prussia to attack Austria 
within thirty days after the signature of the present treaty. 

Fi^'ih. Napoleon to begin hostilities against Austria as soon 
as Prussia begins, despatching 300,000 men during the first 
month across the Rhine. 

Sixth. No separate treaty shall be rpade by either power 
with Austria. When a joint treaty is made, the following are 
to be the conditions : 1. Yenetia to go to Italy. 2. Prussia to 
select German territory at will for annexation, the number of 
mhabitants not to exceed 8,000,000 of souls ; the territory thus 
acquired to become a part of the kingdom of Prussia, without 
federal rights. 3. France to have a liberal share of the Rhine 
provinces. 

Seventh. A military and maritime allegiance to be made 
between France and Prussia, to which Italy may be a party 
should she so desire. 

This programme, the circular states, was rejected in June, 
1866, in spite of the threatening urgency of France. The pro- 
posals were incessantly renewed with modifications sacrificing 
Belgium and South Germany, but they were never seriously 
entertained by Prussia. For the sake of peace, however, it was 
thought best to leave Napoleon to his delusions. No word 
implying approval was returned ; time was counted on to revo- 
lutionize France, and extinguish the scheme ; hence the long 
delay and silence. The attempt against Luxembourg failing, 
France repeated her former propositions, making the specifica- 
tions clear in regard to the acquisition of Belgium by France, 
and South Germany by Prussia. These last propositions were 
formulated by Count Benedetti himself, and it is improbable 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 123 

that lie wrote tliein without the authority of the Emperor, as 
they are the same which were made four years ago under threat 
of war as the alternative of theii* refusal. Any one acquainted 
witli these antecedents must have known that, had Prussia 
acquiesced in the seizure of Belgium, France would soon have 
found another Belgium in Prussian territory. 

Some effort was made by the imperial Government to weaken 
the force of this damaging ex])osure, and to convince the neutral 
powers that the propositions had been suggested by Prussia ; 
but the falsity of this was so apparent that it obtained no cre- 
dence from any body. The neutral powers, which had at first 
given indications of sympathy with the Emperor, were, after 
the publication of this document, and the circulation of photo- 
graphic copies of the manuscript of Benedetti, much less dis- 
posed to depart from the strictest neutrality, and thus the con- 
test was narrowed clown to the two belligerents. 

Efibrts, however, were not wanting on the part of other 
powers to effect a reconciliation, and to avert a war which, it 
was evident, must be so terrible in its results. Great Britain, 
Pussia, and Austria exerted all their power with both parties, 
but in vain ; the French Emperor would not, and Prussia, as 
she was situated, could not, make any such concessions as would 
have secured peace. One of the most noteworthy of these efibrts 
for reconciliation was that of Pope Pius IX, who, in the midst 
of troubles which shortly after deprived him of his temporal 
power, which France had for some years maintained for him, 
addressed letters both to the Emperor and King Wilhelm, of 
which latter the following is a copy : 

" Yovn Majesty : In the present grave circumstances it may 
appear an unusual thing to receive a letter from me ; but, as the 
Yicar on earth of God and peace, I cannot do less than offer my 
mediation. 



124" THE GREAT WAR 

" It is my desire to witness the cessation of war-like prepara- 
tions, and to stop tlie evils — tlieir inevitable consequences. My 
mediation is that of a sovereign whose small dominion excites 
no jealonsy, and who inspires confidence by the moral and reli- 
gions inflaence he personifies. 

" May God lend an ear to my wishes, and listen also to those 

I form for your Majesty, to whom I would be united in the 

bonds of charity. 

" Pius. 

" Given at the Vatican, July 22, 1870." 

A postscript adds : 

" I have written identically to the Emperor." 

What reply, if any, the Emperor made to the letter addressed 
to him, is not known ; but the King of Prussia promptly re- 
turned the following courteous answer, which, however, effect- 
ually forbade all hope of any successful result from the proffered 
mediation : 

" Most August Pontiff : I am not surprised, but profoundly 
moved at the touching words traced by your hand. 

" They cause the voice of God and of peace to be heard. 
How could my heart refuse to listen to so powerful an appeal ? 
God witnesses that neither I nor my people desired or provoked 
war. 

" Obeying the sacred duties which God imposes on sovereigns 
and nations, we take up the sword to defend the independence 
and honor of our country, ready to lay it down the moment 
those treasures are secure. 

" If your Holiness could off^er me, from him who bo unex- 
pectedly declared war, assurances of sincerely pacific dispositions, 
and guarantees against a similar attempt upon the peace and 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 125 

tranquillity of Europe, it certainly will not be I who will refase 
to receive them from your venerable hands, united as I am with 
you in bonds of Christian charity and sincere friendship. 

(Signed) 'i Wilhelm." 

The blockading fleet sailed from Cherbourg on the 25th of 
July, and the Emperor being unable to be present at their 
departure, sent the Empress with a proclamation to be read to 
the officers and crews. The Yice-Admiral of the squadron 
having delivered a somewhat boastful address, full of laudation 
of the imperial family, the Empress read, it was said, in tones 
full of emotion, tlie Emperor's proclamation, as follows : 

" Officers and Seamen : Although I am not in your midst, 
my thoughts will follow you upon those seas where your valor 
is about to be displayed. The French navy has glorious remi- 
niscences. It will prove itself worthy of the past. When, far 
from the soil of our country, you are face to face with the 
enemy, remember that France is with you ; that lier heart throbs 
with yours ; that she invokes upon your arms the protection of 
Heaven. While you are combating at sea, your brethren in 
arms will be strnggling with the same ardor for the same cause 
as yourselves. Do you reciprocally second each other's efforts, 
the same success will crown them. Go ! display with pride our 
national colors. On beholding the tri-colored flag floating over 
our ships, the enemy will know that in its folds it bears every- 
where the honor and the genius of France. 

" Napoleon. 
" Palace of St. Cloud, 23d July, 1870." 

The headquarters of the French army and its Emperor and 
commander were at Metz, but the advance was thrown forward 
to the Ehine as early as July 19, though in small force. On 
that day a company of French skirmishers crossed the frontier 



126 THE GREAT WAR 

and seized a small custom-lioiise on tlie frontier near Saarbruek. 
!N"o, resistance was offered. On the 20th a French soldier was 
shot by a Prussian fusileer. On the 23d a Prussian force from 
Saar-Louis crossed the border, and made a reconnoissance in the 
direction of St. Avoid and Metz. There was some skirmishing, 
but no serious engagement. On the 26tli there was another 
slight engagement, and the French were repulsed. The 2Yth of 
Julj was observed as a day of fasting and prayer throughout 
the IsTorth German Confederation. The period between the 
declaration of war and the 1st of August was industriously 
occupied by the agents of the Emperor in circulating hundreds 
of thousands of addresses to the people of South Germany, of 
Hanover, and of Schleswig-Holstein, urging them to unite with 
France against their old enemy, Prussia, or at least to paralyze 
her by their determined neutrality. Kever was so vast an 
amount of advice bo perfectly wasted. Without a dissenting 
voice, the South German States— Hanover, and foremost of all 
Schleswig-Holstein— had hastened to declare- their adherence to 
Prussia and Germany in this war for God, King, and Father- 
land, and there was no evidence that, among those twelve mil- 
lions of people, the Emperor IsTapoleon HI had a single adherent. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 127 



CHAPTER YII. 

As we have already said, the Emperor reached Lis head- 
quarters at Metz and took command of the army in person 
on the 28th of July. King Wilhelm left Berlin for the front 
with his chief of staff, General von Moltke, on the 31st, and, 
aiTiving at his temporary headquarters at Mayence on the 2d 
of August, issued the next day the following brief address to his 
troops : 

" All Germany stands united against a neighboring state, 
which has surprised us by declaring war without justification. 
The safety of the fatherland is threatened. Our honors and otir 
hearths are at stake. To-day I assume command of the whole 
army. I advance cheerfully to a contest like that in which, m 
former times, our fathers, under similar circumstances, fought 
gloriously. The whole fatherland and myself trust with confi- 
dence in you. The Lord God will be with our righteous cause." 

On the 1st of August the French attacked the Germans near 
Saarbruck in small force, and after some fighting were repulsed. 

On the 2d of August the strength and position of the con- 
tending armies were reported as follows : 

The French army. — First Corps, MacMahon, 45,000 men, a*. 
Strasbourg. Second Corps, Frossard, 30,000 men, at St. Avoid 
Third Corps, Bazaine, 30,000 men, at Metz. Fourth Corps, 
I'Admirault, 30,000 men, at Thionville. Fifth Corps, De Failly, 
30,000 men, at Bitche and Saarguemines. Sixth Corps, Can 



128 THE GREAT WAR 

robert, 30,000 men, at Chalons. Seventh. Corps, Douay, 30,000 
men, at Besangon and Belfort. Eighth Corps (Guards), Bour- 
baki, 30,000 men, at Metz. Cavalry, 34,000. Total, 309,000. 
"With artillery and reserve cavalry, about 350,000 men. 

The left wing had before it at this time the Moselle and the 
French Nicd, the centre the Saar, and the right vs^ing the Lauter 
in front. 

The German armies having been assembled at camps on the 
Rhine, began to move forward. The entire regular German 
force consisted of eighteen corjps d^armee, containing 40,000 men 
each at their normal strength. The First Army, under Stein- 
metz, had the First, Seventh, and Eighth Corps ; the Second 
Army, under Prince Friedrich Karl, the Second, Third, Kinth, 
and Tenth Corps ; the Third Army, under the Prussian Crown- 
Prince, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Corps, and the two Ba- 
varian Corps. The Fourth Army, under the Crown-Prince of 
Saxony, containing the Fourth and Twelfth Corps, and the 
Saxon and Prussian guard, occupied in the regular advance the 
right of the Crown-Prince ; the Fifth Army, under General 
"Wei'den, had the Wurtemberg and Baden divisions, engaged in 
the siege of Strasbourg ; the reserves were composed of the 
Sixth Army, under the Grand Duke of Mecklenberg-Schwerin, 
on the Rhine, and the Seventh Army, under Generals von Can- 
stein at Berlin, and Loewenfeld in Silesia. The defence of the 
northern coast was committed to these reserves. The advance 
to the French lines was made by the First Army, against the 
French left wing ; Second Army, Prince Friedrich Karl, against 
the centre ; and the Third Army, Crown-Prince of Prussia, 
against the French right wing. 

The French forces being scattered over a line of eighty-five 
to ninety miles in length, MaeMahon, after a council at Metz, 
received orders to make a flank march toward De Failly, at 
Bitche. He sent the corps of General Douay to Weissenburg 



BETWEEN PRANCE AND GERMANY. 129 

to cover the movement. General Frossard, witli the Second 
Corps, advanced on Saarbruck, and, after seven hours' fighting, 
drove out the three battalions of infantry, three squadrons of 
cavalry, and three guns, -which formed the German force there. 
The Emperor was present with the Prince Imperial. 

On his return to Metz, after the battle, the Emperor sent the 
following despatch to the Empress : 

"Louis has received his baptism of fire. He was admirably 
cool and little impressed. A division of Frossard's command 
carried the heights overlooking the Saar. The Prussians made 
a brief resistance. Louis and I were in front, where the bullets 
fell about us. Louis keeps a ball he picked up. The soldiers 
wept at his tranquillity. We lost an ofiicer and ten men." 

On tlie 3d of August the French commenced fortifying the 
Spicheren hills, back of Saarbruck. The next day, August 4th, 
the Third German Army, under the Crown-Prince of Prussia, 
crossed the Lauter and advanced upon the corps of General 
Douay, posted behind the fortifications of "Weissenburg, thus 
entering upon French territory as the French had the day pre- 
vious invaded Germany. A glance at the map and a reference 
to the position of the two armies will show that this movement 
was made by the advance-guard of the German army of the left, 
under the Crown-Prince of Prussia, against the French right, 
under Marshal MacMahon. The defences behind which the 
French general and his troops were posted extended from the 
town of Lauterburg, northwesterly to Weissenburg. After cross- 
ing the Rhine at Maxau, the Baden and Wurtemberg troops 
marched against Lauterburg ; the Fifth and Eleventh Prussian 
Corps marched west of the Rhine against the centre of the 
works ; and the Bavarian Fourth Division against Weissenburg. 
The first shot was fired at 8.30 A. m. The Crown-Prince stood 
on the Schweigen hill, north of the town. "Weissenburg was 



ISO THE GREAT WAR 

occupied by the Seventy-fourth French regiment, and on the 
Gaisberg hill, south of the place, were the First Turco regiment. 
Fifth and Fiftieth line, three light batteries of artillery, and one 
of mitrailleurs. These troops also occupied Altstadt, on the 
riglit of the French position. Altstadt was quickly taken by 
the Ninth Prussian Division ; Weissenburg, after sharp resist- 
ance, by the Bavarians and some battalions of the Fort^'^-seventh 
and Forty-eighth regiments, and the Grenadiers marched against 
the Schafenburg hill, where the mitrailleurs were stationed. 
The mitrailleurs did not, in this action, do the terrible execution 
expected of them ; the German columns steadily advanced with- 
out firing a shot, and the position was taken. There was no 
fight at Lauterburg, which was found to be unoccupied by the 
French, and, after midday, all the German troops were concen- 
trated for the action at Weissenburg. The defeat of the French 
became a rout, which was continued in disorder to "Woerth. 
Thus in this first combat between the veteran troops of the 
French and the citizen-soldiers of Prussia, the former were not 
only completely beaten, but showed an ominous lack of steadi- 
ness and morale. The German losses were over 700 in killed 
and wounded. The French losses were much greater in killed 
and wounded, and one gun and 1,000 prisoners were also taken 
from them. 

The report of this action, made to the King by the Crown- 
Prince of Prussia, adds the following particulars : 

" The French infantry in action at Weissenburg and Gais- 
berg belonged to the First Corps, the cavalry to the Fifth Corps. 
Except an attack undertaken to cover the retreat, the French 
stood on the defensive during the whole engagement. Most of 
the French troops in the engagement conducted themselves with 
much spirit, and held their ground manfully. Only after retreat 
had become inevitable did they appear as if seized by a sudden 



BETWEEN FKANCE AND GERMANY. 131 

panic. At tliis crisis troops of the Corps MacMalion, whicli 
had not yet been under fire, threw away their caps, knapsacks, 
tents, &c., and decamped, leaving even their provisions behind 
them. The Algerian troops exhibited the same temper as the 
French. There was no perceptible difierence between them and 
their European comrades. 

" The infantry, whose battalions were not above 800 strong, 
opened fire at 1,500 paces. This makes hitting a mere matter 
of chance, and has a tendency to demoralize a man in the use 
of his weapon. Our practice of forming company columns and 
outflanking the enemy's tirailleurs has fully answered. The 
French cav^alry, even if numerically equal to our own, invari- 
ably declined attack. Our artillery fired slower, but much more 
effectively than the French. The mitrailleuse battery fired three 
rounds at a distance of 1,800 paces against our artillery, but did 
no damage. It was soon silenced by our guns." 

The next day, in their onward march, the Third German 
Army (the left wing) found all the villages filled with Fi-ench 
wounded, and the impression made by the defeat at Weissenburg 
far more profound than they had expected. The inhabitants of 
these villages had believed a defeat of the French impossible. 
Leaving the left wing of the German forces to pursue their 
enemy to Woerth, let us turn our attention westward along the 
German line to Ilomburg, in Khenish-Bavaria, almost forty 
miles distant, where the German centre (the Second Army, 
under Prince Friediich Karl) are preparing to cross the Saar. 
The Prince, who is accounted the ablest of the Prussian gen- 
erals, issued, on the 5th of August, the following order to his 
troops : 

" Soldiers : By command of the King you begin to-day the 
forward march against the enemy. The ffor.s of Prussia have 



132 THE GREAT WAR 

always distinguished themselves in presence of the enemy. On 
this occasion, too, you will win laurels, so that the fatherland 
can look upon you with pride. Show, by a calm demeanoi 
toward friend and foe, that you are worthy children of Prussia." 

The point toward which this army, like the others, is march- 
ing, is Metz, then the headquarters of the French armies ; but all 
three of the armies on the frontier are destined to see severe 
fighting before they reach that city. 

The First German Army, under the veteran General von 
Steinmetz, also move forward upon Saarbruck, crossing the Saar 
on the 5th of August, and as they are about to come into con- 
flict with the enemy, the lion-hearted old commander addresses 
them in these words : 

" SoLDiEES : You will very shortly have the opportunity of 
standing in presence of the enemy. With God's help you will 
maintain your old fame, and add new laurels to those on your 
standards of the year 1866, when I had the honor to lead you ; 
and the fatherland wall look with pride upon her sons. Show 
that you belong to an army worthy of the civilization of cen- 
turies, by a calm and friendly demeanor, temperate bearing, 
respecting the positions of strangers, whether friend or foe. On 
each one of you rests the responsibility of maintaining the honor 
and fame of the whole fatherland." 

Sooner even than their commander had expected, the First 
German Army was called to a fierce and bloody battle ; one 
fought at such odds, and under such discouraging circumstances, 
that it is a wonder that the Germans could ever have won the 
victory. The losses on both sides wxre very heavy ; heaviest, 
of course, on the German side, since they were the attacking 
party, and had to climb the very steep Spicheren hills under 



BETWEEN PRANCE AND GERMANY. 133 

a terrible fire ; but their victory was complete. The battle is 
known as the battle of Spicheren heights, or as the battle of 
Forbach. The official report of tbe battle by von Steinmetz 
states the facts without exaggeration, and with more complete 
fairness than most reports of its class. It is as follows : 

" On the forenoon of August 6, the Seventh Corps d'Armee 
pushed its vanguard to Herchenbach, one and a quarter German 
miles northwest of Saarbruck, witli outposts stretcbing as far as 
the river Saar. The preceding night the enemy had evacuated 
its position on the drilling-ground of Saarbruck. 

" Toward noon the cavalry division under General Rhein- 
haben passed tbrougb the town. Two squadrons formed the 
van. The moment they reached the highest point of the drill- 
ing-ground, and became visible to spectators on the south, they 
were fired at from the bills near Spicheren. 

" The drilling-ground ridge overhangs a deep valley stretch- 
ing toward Forbach and Spicheren, and bordered on the other 
side by the steep and partly-wooded height named after the 
latter village. These hills, rising in almost perpendicular ascent 
several hundred feet above the valley, form a natural fortress, 
which needed no addition from art to be all but impregnable. 
Like so many bastions, the mountains project into the valley, 
facing it on all sides, and afibrding the strongest imaginable 
position for defence. French officers who were taken prisoners 
on this spot confess to having smiled at the idea of the Prussians 
attacking them in this stronghold. There was not a man in the 
Second French Corps who was not persuaded in his own mind 
that to attempt the Spicheren hills must lead to the utter anni- 
hilation of the besiegers. 

" Between 12 and 1 o'clock the Fourteenth Division arrived 
at Saarbruck. Immediately proceeding south, it encountered a 
strong force of the enemy in the valley between Saarbruck and 



134: THE GREAT WAR 

Spiclieren, and opened fire forthwith. Upon this General Fros- 
Bard, who was in the act of withdrawing a portion of his troops 
when the Prussians amved, turned round and reoccupied the 
Spicheren hills with his entire force. A division of the Third 
Corps, under General Bazaine, came up in time to support him. 
" The Fourteenth Division at first had to deal with far supe- 
rior numbers. To limit the attack to the enemy's front would 
have been useless. General von Kamecke, therefore, while 
engaging the front, also attempted to turn the left flank of the 
enemy by Stiring ; but the five battalions he could spare for this 
operation were too weak to make an impression upon the much 
stronger numbers of the French. Two successive attacks on 
his left were repulsed by General Frossard. Toward 3 o'clock, 
when all the troops of the division were under fire, the engage- 
ment assumed a very sharp- and serious aspect. 

" Eventually, however, the roar of the cannon attracted 
several other Prussian detachments. The division under Gen- 
eral von Barkenow was the first to be drawn to the spot. Two 
of its batteries came dashing up at full speed to relieve their 
struggling comrades. They were promptly followed by the 
Fortieth Infantry, under Colonel Kex, and three squadrons of 
the Kinth Hussars. At this moment the vanguard of the Fifth 
Division was espied on the Winterberg Hill. General Stiilp- 
nagel, whose van had been stationed at Sultzbach the same 
morning, had been ordered by General von Alvensleben to 
march his entire division in the direction from which the sound 
of cannon proceeded. Two batteries advanced in a forced march 
on the high road. The infantry were partly sent by rail from 
Nuenkirchen to Saarbrnck. 

" At about 3.30 o'clock the division of Kamecke had been 
Bufiiciently reenforced to enable General von Goben, who had 
arrived in the meantime and assumed the command, to mak« a 
vigorous onslaught on the enemy's front. The chief aim of the 



BETWEEN" FRANCE AND GERMANY. 135 

attack was the wooded portion of the declivity. The Fortieth 
Infantry, supported on its right by troops of the Fourteenth 
Division, and on its left by four battalions of the Fifth Division^ 
made the assault. A reserve was formed of some battalions of 
the Fifth and Sixteenth Divisions as they came up. 

" The charge was a success. The wood was occupied, the 
enemy expelled. Penetrating further, always on the ascent, the 
troops pushed the French before them as far as the southern 
outskirts of the wood. Here the French made a stand, and, 
combining the three arms of the service for a united attack, 
endeavored to retrieve the day. But our infantry were not to 
be shaken. At this juncture the artillery of the Fifth Division 
accomplished a rare and most daring feat. Two batteries liter- 
ally clambered up the hills of Spicheren by a narrow and pre- 
cipitous mountain-path. With their help a fresh attack of the 
enemy was repulsed. A flank attack directed against our lefl; 
from Aislingen and Spicheren was w^arded off in time by bat- 
talions of the Fifth Division stationed in reserve. 

" The fighting, which for hours had been conducted with the 
utmost obstinacy on both sides, now reached its climax. Once 
more the enemy, superior still in numbers, rallied his entire 
forces for a grand and impetuous charge. It was his third 
attack after we had occupied the wood ; but, like the preceding 
ones, this last effort was shortened by the imperturbable calm- 
ness of our infantry and artillery. Like waves dashing and 
breaking against a rock, the enemy's battalions were scattered 
by our gallant troops. After this last failure the enemy beat a 
rapid retreat ; fifty-two French battalions, with the artillery of 
an entire corps, stationed in an almost unassailable position, had 
thus been defeated by twenty-seven Prussian battalions, sup- 
ported by but the artillery of one division. It was a briUiant 
victory indeed. "We had every thing against us — numbers, 
guns, and the nature of the locality — ^yet we prevailed. 



136 THE GREAT WAR 

"Darkness fast setting in afforded its valuable aid to the 
enemy in effecting liis retreat. To cover tliis backward move- 
ment the French artillery were stationed on the hills skirting the 
battle-field on the south, where they kept up a continuous but 
harmless fire for a considerable time. 

"The ground was too difficult for the cavalry to take any 
part in the action. Nevertheless, the fruits of the victory were 
very remarkable. The corps under General Frossard being 
entirely demoralized, dispersed. The road it took in its hasty 
flight was marked by numerous wagons with provisions and 
clothing ; the woods were filled with hosts of stragglers, wan- 
dering about in a purposeless way, and large stores and quan- 
tities of goods of every description fell into our hands. 

" While the battle was raging at Spicheren Hill, the Thir- 
teenth Division crossed the Saar at "Werden, occupied Forbach, 
seized vast magazines of food and clothing, and thus forced 
General Frossard, whose retreat was covered by two divisions 
of General Bazaine, which had come up for this purpose, to 
withdraw to the southwest, and leave free the road to St. 
Avoid. 

" The losses were very serious on both sides. The Fifth 
Division alone has 230 dead, and about 1,800 wounded. The 
Twelfth Infantry has 32 officers and 800 men dead or wounded ; 
next to this the Fortieth, Eighth, Forty-eighth, Thirty-ninth, and 
Seventy-fourth have suffered most. The batteries, too, have 
encountered terrible loss. The number of killed and wounded 
on the enemy's side is at least equal to our own. The un- 
wounded prisoners in our hands already exceed 2,000, and are 
increasing hourly. We have also captured 40 pontoons and the 
tents of the camp." 

A correspondent of the 'New York Trihune, who was on the 
field four days later, and carefully gleaned the particulars of the 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 137 

battle, sent to that paper a very graphic description of it. Un- 
der date of August 11, he says : 

" Yesterday I went over the field of Spicheren, where there 
was a very sharp fight on Saturday — in fact, what would have 
been called a battle before the present century, there having 
been more than 20,000 men on each side engaged. Taking the 
road from Saarbruck to Forbach, one climbs a hill which com- 
mands the town, and which was used by the French, in their 
attack, as a place for their batteries. Once on top of the hill, 
a level plateau, from 1,000 to 1,200 yards deep, extends as far 
as the hills which rise to the left of the village of Spicheren. 
On these hills the French took position on Saturday last, their 
line extending for about a mile from the hills, across the high- 
road for Forbach, in front of a manufactory, and down to the 
railway-cutting. They were enabled completely to sweep the 
plain in front of them ; and, looking at its level, unbroken ex- 
panse, one wonders how a single Prussian ever passed it alive. 

" The French position on the hills was naturally a very 
strong one, and that on the plain had been strengthened by an 
intrenchment thrown up in front of the troops. About 10 
o'clock in the morning the Prussians began the attack with 
eight pieces of artillery in position on the crest of the hill above 
Saarbruck. But these pieces did small execution, as their fire 
had little effect on the French sharpshooters on the rocks above 
them. 

" After about an hour of artillery-fire from the Prussians, 
with slight effect, the heights were ordered to be stormed by 
-two battalions of the Fourteenth Regiment (from Pomerania) ; 
these men, some 2,000 strong, flung down their knapsacks and 
rushed across the intervening plain and up the hill, the artillery 
and the rest of the division covering the advance by their fire. 
But the French fire from the brow of the hill was too fearful, 



138 THE GREAT WAR 

and, in spite of tlie leading companies having actually reached 
the top, it was impossible to drive out the French ; nor was the 
attack on the plain directed against the village of Spicheren 
more successful. The French were stronglj posted in a manu- 
factory at the entrance to the village, and swept all the plain 
for nearly a mile with their Chassepots. After a little time the 
Seventy-fourth Regiment, Hanoverian (this should be noted as 
showing how little foundation there is for the idea that the 
Hanoverians will not fight against the French), went at the 
heights again. They succeeded in gaining the top, but could 
only just maintain themselves there, and were thinking of retir- 
ing, as night was coming on and the French had brought three 
mitrailleuses, which did much execution at close quarters, into 
action. Suddenly drums were heard on the right of the French 
position, in a wood which they believed would effectually pro- 
tect their left flank. This was the advance-guard of General 
Zastrow's corps, and their arrival settled the battle, the French 
being completely outflanked, and compelled to retire in some 
disorder to Forbach, losing many prisoners, as some of their men 
were caught between the two bodies of Prussians. 

" But the Prussian victory was not obtained without terrible 
loss on their side. Of some 20,000 men engaged, there were 
over 2,000 killed and wounded, or more than one in ten. On 
Wednesday, when I visited the heights, there were still many 
French and Prussians unburied, some of them looking as if only 
asleep. What has been said about the frightful effect of the 
Chassepot bullet does not seem to have been exaggerated, for 
many of the wounds on the Prussian bodies were horrible to 
look at. I noticed one man whose whole face was one big 
wound, a ball having struck him just under the eye and made 
a hole one could have put one's fist into. There was little con- 
tortion in the bodies, as was to be expected, most of the wounds 
being gunshot ones. There was, however, some hand-to-hand 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 139 

fighting in tlie final struggle for the top of the hill. The mus- 
kets and bayonets which covered the ground were bj'oken and 
bent with blows given and received. Even the French officers 
taken prisoners admit the great dash and bravery shown by the 
Prussians in their attack on hills which I can say from expe- 
rience were difiicult to climb without an alpenstock. They own 
that the mitrailleuses used by the French were very deadly at 
close quarters, but they afiirm that at any distance the balls fly 
so wide that they are little to be dreaded. Though some of the 
bodies are still unburied, most of them are interred, and pious 
hands have raised rough wooden crosses above the graves, with 
the names of those who sleep below inscribed on them. Fros- 
sard's division made so precipitate a retreat from Forbach, that 
they left many baggage-wagons and tVie whole of their pontoon- 
train behind them. Thus it happened that they did not break 
the railway up at Forbach ; not a rail, as far as I can see — and 
1 have been all along the line from St. Avoid to Saarbruck — has 
been disturbed." 

The casualties of this battle, as subsequently ascertained, 
were : General Frangois, killed ; the French (Frossard's Second 
Corps) retreated in great disorder, losing 3,000 to 4,000 prison- 
ers, and probably as many more in killed and wounded ; quan- 
tities of stores, trains, and camps were captured. The Fifth 
German Division lost 239 dead, and 1,800 wounded; the Twelfth 
Eegiment, 832 dead and wounded ; other regiments and the bat- 
teries also lost very heavily. 

While this severe fighting was in progress between Saar- 
bruck and Forbach, and the First German Army were gallantly 
and successfully struggling against superior numbers, a greater 
and more destructive battle was raging the same day between 
the Third German Army (the left wing, commanded by the 
Crown-Prince, Friedrich Wilhelm, of Prussia) and the French 



140 THE GREAT WAR 

riglit wing, led by Marshal MacMahon, the bravest and ablest 
of the French generals. 

AVe left the Crown-Prince in close pursuit of the French, 
whom he had defeated and routed on the 4th of August at Weis- 
senburg, and who fled toward Woerth. This is a village of 
about 1,300 inhabitants, on the eastern slope of the Yosges, 
twelve miles S. W. of Weissenburg. On the heights west of 
Woerth the French found a favorable situation to make a stand 
against the Crown-Prince, and being largely reenforced, and 
commanded by MacMahon in person, they were sanguine of 
victory. Nowhere during the war did the French troops mani- 
fest more determined and desperate valor, and nowhere did they 
approach more nearly to a great success than in this battle. 
The Crown-Prince's report of it does full justice to the bravery 
and skill of his antagonist. He says : 

" On the 6th of August reliable intelligence was received at 
the headquarters of the Third Army, that Marshal MacMahon 
was busily engaged in concentrating his troops on the hills west 
of Woerth, and that he was being reenforced by constant arrivals 
by railway. In consequence of these advices it was resolved to 
lose no time in effecting a change of front, which had been de- 
termined upon a few days previously, but not yet executed. 
The Second Bavarian and the Fifth Prussian Corps were to 
remain in their respective positions at Lembach and Prensch- 
dorf ; the Eleventh Prussian Corps was to wheel to the right 
and encamp at Holschloch, with van pushed forward toward the 
river Saner ; and the First Bavarian Corps was to advance into 
the neighborhood of Lobsann and Lampertsloch. The Cavalry 
Division remained at Schonenburg, fronting west. The Corps 
Werder (Wiirtemberg and Baden Divisions) marched to Reimers- 
willer, with patrols facing the Ilaguenau forest. 

" The Fifth Prussian Corps, on the evening of the 5th, 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 141 

pushed its van from its bivouac at Prensclidorf on to the height 
east of Woerth. On the other side of the Saner numerous 
camp-fires of the enemy were visible during the night, the 
French outposts occupying the heights west of the Sauer, oppo- 
site Woerth and Gunslett. At dawn of the 6th skirmishes com- 
menced along the line of the outposts, which caused the Prussian 
vanguard to send a battalion into Woerth. At 8 o'clock steady 
firing was heard on the right (Bavarian) flank. This, and the 
fire the enemy directed against Woerth, caused us to station the 
entire artillery of the Fifth Prussian Corps on the heights east 
of this place, and try to relieve the Bavarians. A little later 
the Fifth Corps was ordered to break off the engagement, it 
being the intention of our generals to begin the battle against 
the concentrated forces of the enemy only when the change of 
front had been effected, and the entire German army was ready 
to be brought into action. At 7.45 o'clock the Fourth Division 
(Bothmer) of the Second Bavarian Corps (Hartmann), induced 
by the heavy fire of the outposts near Woerth, had left their 
bivouac at Lembach, and, proceeding by Mattstall and Langen- 
Salzbacli, after a sharp engagement penetrated as far as Nesch- 
willer, where they spread, fronting to the south. At 10.30 
o'clock this Bavarian Corps, supposing the order to break off 
the engagement, which had been given to the Fifth Prussians, 
to extend to themselves, withdrew to Langen-Salzbach. Tlie 
enemy being thus no longer pressed on his left, turned all his 
strength with the greatest energy against the Fifth Prussians 
at Woerth. Reenforcements were continually thrown in by rail. 
Finding the enemy in earnest on this point, and perceiving the 
Eleventh Prussians to approach vigorously in the direction of 
Gunstett, the Fifth Prussians immediately proceeded to the 
attack, so as to defeat the enemy, if possible, before he had time 
to concentrate. The Twentieth Brigade was the first to defile 
through Woerth, and marched toward Elsasshausen and Frosch- 



142 THE GREAT WAR 

wilier ; it was promptly followed by tlie Nineteenth Brigade. 
The French stood their ground with the utmost pertinacity, and 
their fire was crushing. Whatever the gallantry of our Tenth 
Division, it did not succeed in overcoming the obstinate resist- 
ance of the enemy. Eventually, the Ninth Division having been 
drawn into the fight, the whole Fifth Corps found itself involved 
in the sanguinary conflict raging along the heights west of 
Woerth. 

" At 1.15 p. M. orders were given to the First Bavarian Corps 
(Yon der Tann) to leave one of its two divisions where it stood, 
and, sending on the other as quick as possible by Lobsann and 
Lampertsloch, seize upon the enemy's front in the gap between 
the Second Bavarian Corps at Langen-Salzbach and the Fifth 
Prussian Corps at Woerth. The Eleventh Prussians were or- 
dered to advance to Elsasshausen, skirt the forest of Niederwald, 
and operate against Froschwiller. The Wiirtemberg Division 
was to proceed to Gunstett and follow the Eleventh Prussians 
across the Sauer ; the Baden Division was to remain at Saner- 
burg. 

" At 2 o'clock the combat had extended along the entire line. 
It was a severe struggle. The Fifth Prussians fought at Woerth, 
the Eleventh Prussians near Elsasshausen. In his strong posi- 
tion on and near the heights of Froschwiller, the enemy ofiered 
us a most intense resistance. The First Bavariari Corps reached 
Gorsdorff, but could not lay hold of the enemy fast enough ; 
the Second Bavarian had to exchange the exhausted troops of 
the Division Bothmer, who had spent their ammunition in the 
fierce fights of the morning, for the Division Walther. "While 
the Division Bothmer fell back, the Brigade Scleich of the 
Division Walther marched upon Langen-Salzbach. The Wur- 
temberg Division approached Gunstett. 

" At 2 o'clock fresh orders were given. The Wiirtemberg 
Division was to turn toward Keichshofen by way of Ebersbach, 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 143 

to threaten the enemy's line of retreat. The First Bavarian was 
to attack at once and dislodge the enemy from his position at 
Froschwiller and in the neighboring vineyards. Between 2 and 
3 o'clock the enemy, bringing fresh troops into the field, and ad- 
vancing with consummate bravery, assumed the offensive against 
the Fifth and Eleventh Prussian Corps. But all his assaults 
were beaten off. Thus the fight was briskly going on at "Woerth, 
neither party making much progress, till at length the brilliant 
attack of the First Bavarian Corps at Gorsdorff, and of the First 
Wiirtemberg Brigade on the extreme left at Ebersbach, decided 
the fate of the day. 

" Toward the close of the battle the French attempted a 
grand cavalry charge against the Fifth and Eleventh Corps, 
especially against the artillery of these troops. Our artillery 
awaited them in a stationary position, and repulsed them with 
severe loss. The infantry did so likewise. This last experiment 
having failed, the enemy, at 4 o'clock, evacuated Froschwiller, 
and retreated through the mountain-passes in the direction of 
Bitche. The cavalry of all our divisions were despatched in 
pursuit. 

" The cavalry division which, on account of the diflicult 
ground, which allowed little scope for its manoeuvres, had been 
left at Schonburg, were ordered, at 3.30 o'clock, to advance to 
Gunstett. On the morning of the Yth this cavalry corps began 
the pursuit in the direction of Ingweiler and Bronstweilcr. All 
the troops who had taken part in the engagement bivouacked 
on the battle-field, tlie cavalry at Gunstett, the Baden Division 
at Sauerburg. 

" Our losses are great, but cannot, as yet, be exactly esti- 
mated. The enemy lost 5,000 unwounded prisoners, thirty guns, 
six mitrailleuses, and two eagles. The enemy's troops arrayed 
against us were General MacMahon's army, and the Second and 
Third Divisions of the Sixth Corps." 



144: THE GREAT WAR 

The Frencli attempted to make a stand at Niederbronn with 
their artillery, but the guns were captured by the Bavarian 
troops, and active pursuit was made on all the roads by the 
German forces, the French flying in confusion. The military 
chest of the Fourth French Division was captured. At Saverne, 
twenty-five miles S. W. of Woerth, Marshal MacMahon rallied 
his disheartened troops, and from thence, on the Yth of August, 
despatched his official report to the Emperor. As the army of 
the Crown-Prince, however, occupied the territory between him 
and Metz, his communication with the Emperor was broken, 
and was not resumed for several days ; so that, for ten days or 
more, the right wing of the French army was entirely cut off 
from the remainder. 

The Marshal's report was as fojlows : 

" Saveene, August 7. 
" SniE : I have the honor to acquaint your Majesty, that, on 
the 6th of August, after having been obliged to evacuate Weis- 
senburg on the previous evening, the First Corps, with the object 
of covering the railway from Strasbourg to Bitsche, and the prin- 
cipal roads connecting the eastern and the western slopes of the 
Vosges, occupied the following positions : The First Division 
was placed, its right in advance of Freichsweiller, and its left 
in the direction of Keichshoffen, resting upon a wood which 
covers that village. Two companies were detached to ITeun- 
viller, and one company to Joegersthal. The Third Division 
occupied, with the First Brigade, some low hills which run from 
Freichsweiller and slope toward Guersdorfi". The Second Bri- 
gade rested its left on Freichsweiller, and its right on the village 
of Elsasshausen. The Fourth Brigade formed an uneven line 
to the right of the Third Division, its First Brigade facing 
toward Gunstedt, and its Second Brigade opposite the village 
of Marsbroun, which, on account of insufficient strength, it was 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 145 

unable to occupy. The Division Dumesnil, of the Seventh 
Corps, which had rallied to me early on the morning of the 6th, 
was placed in rear of the Fourth Division. There were held in 
reserve the Second Division, in rear of the Second Brigade of 
the Third Division, and the First Brigade of the Fourth Divi- 
sion. Finally, still further in the rear, was the Brigade of Light 
Cavalry, under the command of General Septeuil, and Division 
of Cuirassiers, under General de Bonnemain. Michel's Cavalry 
Brigade, under the command of General Dechesmes, was sta- 
tioned in the rear of the right wing of the Fourth Division. 
At 7 o'clock in the morning the enemy appeared before the 
heights of Guersdorif, and opened the action with a cannonade, 
which he immediately supported with a sustained fire from his 
tirailleurs upon the First and Third Divisions. The attack was 
so vehement that the First Division was obliged to efi*ect a 
cbange of front, advancing upon its right wing, in order to 
prevent the enemy from turning the general position. A little 
later the enemy largely increased the number of his batteries, 
and opened fire upon the other position which we occupied on 
the right bank of the Sauerbach. Although even more heavy 
and more strongly. marked than the first, which was still main- 
tained, this second demonstration was but a feigned attack, 
which was warmly repulsed. Toward noon the enemy directed 
his attack toward our right. Clouds of sharpshooters, supported 
by considerable masses of infantry, and protected by upward of 
sixty pieces of artillery placed upon the heights of Gimstedt, 
rushed upon the Second Division and upon the Second Brigade 
of the Third Division, which occupied the village of Elsass- 
hausen. Despite repeated offensive movements vigorously exe- 
cuted, and notwithstanding the well-directed fire of the artillery 
and several brilliant cavalry chargeSj our rigbt was broken after 
many hours' obstinate resistance. It was 4 o'clock. I ordered 
a retreat. It was protected by the First and Second, which pre- 



14:6 THE GREAT WAR 

sen ted a boM front, and enabled the other troops to retire with- 
out being too closely harassed. The retreat was effected upon 
Saverne by Niederbronn, where the Division of General Gnyot 
de Lespard, belonging to the Fifth Corps, which had just arrived 
there, took up position, and did not withdraw until nightfall. 
I submit inclosed with this report to His Majesty the names of 
officers wounded, killed, or missing, which have been reported 
to me. This list is incomplete, and I will forward a complete 
return as soon as I shall be in a position to do so. 

" MacMahoit." 

King Wilhelm telegraphed to the Queen, on the night after 
this battle, as follows : 

" Good news. A great victory has been won by our Fritz. 
God be praised for His mercy. We captured 4,000 prisoners, 
thirty guns, two standards, and six mitrailleurs. MacMahon, 
during the fight, was heavily reenforced from the main army. 
The contest was very severe, and lasted from 11 o'clock in the 
morning until 9 o'clock at night, when the French retreated, 
leaving the field to us. Our losses were heavy." 

The two defeats (of Frossard and MacMahon), both occur- 
ring on the same day, were a veiy severe blow to Napoleon 
III, but, with his accustomed stoicism, he telegraphed to the 
Empress : 

"Marshal MacMahon has lost a battle. General Frossard, 
on the Saar, has been obliged to retire. His retreat was effected 
in good order. All can be reestablished." 

The next day further disasters to the French cause were 
reported, Haguenau, a considerable town of Alsace, was cap- 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 147 

tured by the Baden Cavalry, the French taken prisoners, or 
driven out, and the town occupied by the Germans. The same 
cavaLy overran the greater part of Alsace, taking many pns- 
oners, and beleaguering Pfalzburg, Bitche, and Luneville. ' At 
the west, Saargemund was occupied, and Forbach taken after a 
slight action. On the 7th of August the Emperor telegraphed 
to the Empress : 

" My communication with MacMahon being broken, I had, 
until yesterday, but little news of him. General Laigle informed 
me that MacMahon had lost a battle agait.it very considerable 
forces of the enemy, and that he had withdrawn in good order. 
The battle began at 1 o'clock, and did not appear very serious 
until gradually increasing reenforcements came up on the ene- 
my's side, without, however, compelling the Second Corps to 
fall back. Only between 6 and 7 o'clock, as the enemy became 
constantly more compact, did the Second Corps, and the regi- 
ments from other corps which served as his supports, fall back 

upon the hills. The night was quiet. I go to the centre of our 

. . „ j 

position." 

Major-General Leboeuf, commanding the French forces, re- 
ported the same day to the Minister of the Interior : 

" After a series of engagements, in which the enemy brought 
heavy forces into the field, Marshal MacMahon was forced to 
fall back from his first line. The Corps of General Frossard had 
a fight yesterday, from 2 o'clock in the afternoon, with an entire 
army of the enemy. Having held his position until 6 o'clock, 
he ordered a retreat, which was made in good order." 

dp to the evening of the Tth of August all unfavorable news 
had been carefully kept from the people of Paris. The battle 



148 THE GREAT WAR 

of "Weissenhurg had been represented as a Frencb victory ; but 
tbis deception was suspected and resented by the people, and 
the Empress found herself compelled to acknowledge partially 
the misfortunes which had befallen the army. Accordingly, the 
following proclamation was made public in the evening, though 
dated in the morning. 

" Fkenchmen : The opening of the war has not been favor- 
able to us. "W"e have suffered a check. Let us be firm under 
this reverse, and let us hasten to repair it. Let there be but one 
party in the land — that of France ; a single flag — that of the 
national honor. I come among you, faithful to my mission and 
duty. You will see me the first in danger to defend the flag of 
France. I adjure all good citizens to maintain order. To agi- 
tate would be to conspire with our enemies. 

" Done at the Palace of the Tuileries, the Yth day of August, 
18Y0, at 11 o'clock a. m. 

(Signed) " The Empress Eegent, 

"Eugenie." 

This proving unsatisfactory, as giving no details, the Minis- 
ters very reluctantly published the despatches of the Emperor 
and Marshal Leboeuf ; and as they were by this time thoroughly 
alarmed, they appended also the following appeal, signed by the 
Ministers then in Paris. 

" Details of our losses are wanting. Our troops are full of 
elan. The situation is not compromised ; but the enemy is on 
our territory, and a serious effort is necessary. A battle ap- 
pears imminent. In the presence of this grave news our duty 
is plain. We appeal to the patriotism and the energy of all. 
The Chambers have been convoked. "We are placing Paris with 
all possible haste in a state of defence. In order to facilitate the 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY, 149 

execution of military preparations, we declare tlie capital in a 
state of siege. There must be no faint-lieartedncss, no divisions. 
Our resources are immense. Let us pursue the struggle without 
flinching, and the country will be saved. 

" Paris, the 7th of August, 1870, at 10 p. m. 

" By order of the Empress Eegent." 

In connection with these demonstrations, other changes 
were dictated by JSTapoleon III and made by the Government. 
Among these were the dismission of Marshal Leboeuf from the 
command of the army, and the appointment of Marshal Bazaine 
in his place, and the promotion of General Trochu to be Major- 
General in the army and commander of Paris. Ollivier was 
also compelled to resign his premiership, and Palikao made 
Premier. 

9 



150 THE GREAT WAR 



CHAPTEE yill. 

THEEE were, indeed, at this time, indications of the speedy 
approach of a revolution in Paris, lioarse mutterings of the 
coming storm whicli was destined to overthrow the dynasty of 
the Man of December — the despot who for twenty-one years had 
crushed pitilessly the liberty which lie professed to cherish, and 
to which he owed his own elevation to power. A few days more 
of grace were left to him, but most of them were passed in fierce 
battles and overwhelming defeats. 

"We resume our narrative in chronological order. While the 
First Army (General von Steinmetz's) and the Third Army (the 
Crown-Prince Priedricb Wilhelm's) had both done some des- 
perate fighting with the French, and the latter, in particular, 
had signalized its valor both at Weissenburg and "Woerth, the 
Second, or Army of the Centre, commanded by Prince Friedrich 
Karl, and with which the King of Prussia had his headquarters, 
had not been in any engagement. Indeed, they did not leave 
their position around Ilomburg, in Ehenish-Bavaria, until the 
6th of August, and the King did not move forward until the 8th 
or 9th. On the 6th, before marching to the frontier-hne on the 
Saar, Prince Friedrich Karl issued the following order, bearing 
evidence, like most of the German proclamations, of the desire 
of the German commanders to conduct the war on civilized and 
Christian principles : 

" Soldiers of the Second Akmy : You enter upon the soil 
of France. The Emperor Kapoleon. has, without any reason, 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 151 

declared war upon Germany, and his army are our enemies. 
The French people has not been asked if it wished to carry on 
a bloody war with its German neighbors. A reason for enmity 
is not to be found. Meet the feeling of the peaceable inhab- 
itants of France with a like sentiment ; show them that, in our 
century, two civilized people do not forget their humanity even 
in warring with each other. Bear always in mind how your 
fathers would have felt if an enemy— which God forbid !— over- 
ran our provinces. Show the French that the German people 
confronting its enemy is not only great and brave, but also well 
controlled and noble-minded." 

Two days later the King issued from his headquarters at 
Homburg the following general order to all the armies in the 
field : 

" Soldiers : The pursuit of the enemy, forced back after 
bloody fighting, has already carried a great part of our army 
over the frontier. Many corps will enter upon the French soil 
to-day and to-morrow. I expect that the self-discipline with 
which you have heretofore distinguished yourself will be also 
especially maintained in the enemy's territory. "We carry on 
no war against the peaceable inhabitants of the land ; it is, on 
the contrary, the duty of every honest soldier to protect private 
property, and not to allow the good reputation of our army to 
be marred by even one example of lawlessness. I depend upon 
the excellent feeling which possesses the army, but also upon 
the vigilance and rigor of all commanders." 

On the same day the veteran von Steinmetz, from his head- 
quarters at Saarbruck, addressed his troops, already baptized in 
blood in the fierce fight for the possession of the heights of 
Spicheren, in the following determined language : 



152 THE GREAT WAE 

" SoLDiEKS OF THE Ferst Akmy : Bj command of His 
Majesty tlie King, the First Army will to-morrow cross the 
French boundary. Let us greet this first result of our previous 
efforts as we enter upon the enemy's territory with a hearty 
hurrah for our wise, supreme war-leader. Of your good conduct 
in the struggle which awaits us with an equally brave army, I 
am assured by your love of the fatherland, your courage, and 
your just pride, which forbid you to suffer the insults cast upon 
us by an intemperate opponent, to remain unnoticed. But the 
peace-loving citizen and countryman, as you will say yourselves^ 
stands under the protection of the humanity which is compre- 
hended in Prussian discipline. I trust that you will never 
falsify either the one or the other by excesses which can never 
be countenanced by your superiors. When and where the 
enemy confronts us, I expect that he will be attacked with the 
gi'eatest determination. For the cavalry it is already a principle 
of long standing that it always attacks first. The excuse, that 
there was nothing to be done, I can never allow, wben the 
thunder of the cannon can be heard. On the contrary, each 
detachment of troops must march toward that direction, and, 
arrived upon the battle-field, inform itself upon the condition 
of the fight, in order to attack at once, in the best way. The 
same sound must also serve as a guide to each superior com- 
mander in a pitched battle. One thing more. What can be 
done on one day must never be distributed over two days. 
Only with the greatest energy can great results be attained, and, 
with them, the peace which God will give us after victorious 
combat." 



On the 9th of August the Baden contingent of the German 
army approached Strasbourg, and summoned it to surrender. 
General Uhrich, the French commander, refused, and the next 
day issued the following proclamation : 




GEX. VKFJCII, THE HEROIC DEFENDEROF STKASBURG. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. I55 

" Disturbing rumors and panics have been spread, either by 
accident or design, within the past few days in our brave city. 
Some individuals have dared to express the opinion that the 
place would surrender without a blow. We protest energetic- 
ally, in the name of a population courageous and French, against 
these weak and criminal forebodings. The ramparts are armed 
with 400 cannon. Tlie garrison consists of 11,000 men, without 
reckoning the stationary National Guard, If Strasbourg is 
attacked, Strasbourg will defend herself as long as there shall 
remain a soldier, a biscuit, or a cartridge. The well-affected 
may reassure themselves ; as to others, they have but to with- 
draw. 

" The General of Division, TJheich. 

" The Prefect of the Bas-Ehin, Baron Pkon. 

" Strasbourg, August 10." 

On the 11th of August the three German armies forming 
the advance all stood upon French soil, and King Wilhelm 
addressed to the inhabitants of the departments then in posses- 
sion of the German army the following proclamation : 

" "We, Wilhelm, King of Prussia, give notice to the inhab- 
itants of the French departments in possession of the German 
army as follows : After the Emperor jSTapoleon had attacked 
by sea and by land the German nation, which desired, and still 
desires, to live at peace with the French people, I assumed the 
chief command over the German armies in order to repel this 
attack. In the progress of events I have had occasion to cross 
the French boundary. I make war with the French soldiers, 
and not with the citizens of France. These will, therefore, con- 
tinue to enjoy a perfect security of their persons and their 
property just so long as they do not deprive me, by their own 
hostile acts against the German troops, of the right to extend 



156 THE GREAT WAR 

to them my protection. The generals "who CG;amand tlie dif- 
ferent corps will establish by especial i-egulations, which shall 
be brought to the knowledge of the public, the measures which 
are to be tahen against communities or against single persons, 
who set themselves in opposition to the usages of war. They 
will in similar manner fix every thing in regard to requisitions 
which shall be demanded by the necessities of the troops. They 
will also fix the rate of exchange between German and French 
currency, in order to make the single transactions between the 
troops and the people easy." 

The defeat of Marshal MacMahon at Woerth, with the sub- 
sequent slight but disastrous engagements at INiederbronn and 
Keichshofen, was found to be even more appalling than was at 
first supposed. His losses, as ascertained some days later, wei*e 
more than 9,000 killed and wounded, and 6,500 prisoners, 
besides a very considerable number of deserters. Making the 
best of this great yet inevitable misfortune, he issued, on the 
9th of August, the following order of the day to his remnant of 
an army : 

" SoLDiEES : In the battle of the 6th of August, fortune 
betrayed your courage, but you yielded your positions only 
after a heroic resistance which lasted not less than nine hours. 
You were 35,000 against 140,000, and were overwhelmed by 
force of numbers. Under these conditions defeat is glorious, 
and history will say that in the battle of Froschweiler the 
French showed the greatest valor. You have suffered heavy 
losses, but those of the enemy are much greater. Although yon 
have not been successful, you see a cause for your misfortune 
which makes the Emperor satisfied with you, and the entire 
country recognize that you have worthily sustained the honor 
of the flag. Let us show that, though subjected to the severest 



BETWEEN FKANCE AND GERMANY. 157 

tests, the First Corps, forgetting tliese, closes up its ranks, and, 
God aiding us, let us seize great and brilliant revenge." 

The necessity for strong reenforcenients compelled MacMahon 
to summon to his aid General De Failly (a portion of whose 
corps had already been with him at Woerth) and Generals Can 
rohert and De Caen, both of whom were in southern Alsace. 
With all these troops, however, he could only gather from 
50,000 to 60,000 men, so far had the real numbers of the French 
army-corps fallen below their nominal standard, and so numer- 
ous, even in this first stage of the war, were the deserters. The 
nominal strength of these four army-corps had been 200,000 
men. Having obtained these reenforcements, MacMahon fell 
back to ISTancy and Toul, his objective being Paris by way of 
Bar-le-Duc and Chalons, as he saw very clearly that, unless a 
strong force was interposed between Paris and the Prussian 
armies, they could not be checked in their victorious march 
toward the French capi^l ; and the probability of their reach- 
ing that city was much greater than that of tlie French entering 
Berlin as conquerors, as the Emperor had promised them at the 
beginning of the war. It was necessary, moreover, that he 
should be in a position to receive the large reenforcements yet 
to be sent out from Paris, that he might attack the Prussians in 
flank, while Bazaine, who was now in chief command under the 
Emperor, and was gathering a large army in the neighborhood 
of Metz, should attack them in front. These plans, however, 
were destined to be suddenly and completely ft'ustrated. The 
Crown-Prince of Prussia, who, after the battle of Woerth, ascer- 
tained what was the line upon which MacMahon was retreating, 
and had drawn his own array northM^ard to Saar-union, to within 
reach of the other armies, commenced a relentless pursuit of the 
French general through N'ancy and Toul, leaving to the German 
reserves the siege and reduction of the small fortified places on 



158 THE GREAT WAR 

the route, and pressed on liis rear tTirough Commercj, Bar-le- 
Due, and Chalons, not relinquishing the pursuit when Mac- 
Mahon turned northward and attempted to create a diversion in 
favor of Bazaine. 

Meanwhile, as we have already intimated, Bazaine, falling 
back from St. Avoid, which had been for a time his headquar- 
ters, concentrates as large a force as possible in the vicinity of 
Metz, the strongest and best-provided of the French fortresses, 
but found, to his great annoyance and dismay when he reached 
the Moselle, that an infantry force, the advance of Prince Fried- 
rich Karl's army, had secured an eligible location for crossing 
that river at Pont-a-Mousson, less than twenty miles south of 
Metz. "With his large army, now numbering probably 150,000 
or more troops, it would not answer for him to be shut up and 
besieged in Metz by the Prussian armies ; yet he was in great 
peril of being caught there, for General Frossard, who came in 
with his corps from St. Avoid on the 13th of August, reported 
himself pressed closely all the way by the Germans ; the ad- 
vance of von Steinmetz's army and the Second German Army 
(Prince Friedrich Karl's) were known to be coming in great 
force from the south. The Emperor and the Prince Imperial 
thought it necessary to leave Metz, and did so at 11 a. m. on 
Sunday, going, however, no farther than Longueville, near Metz, 
that day. He left the following address to the inhabitants of 
Metz, which was posted about the city after his departure : 

" On quitting you to fight the invaders, I confide to your 
patriotism the defence of this great city. You will never allow 
the enemy to take possession of this bulwark of France, and I 
trust you will rival the army in loyalty and courage. I shall 
ever remember with gratitude the reception I have found within 
your walls, and I hope that in more joyous times I may be able 
to return to thank you for your noble conduct." 



160 THE GREAT WAR 

This effort to withdraw Bazaine's army from Metz had been 
in spite of tlie attempted secrecy, observed by the Prussian com- 
manders, and a reconnoissance in force ordered to prevent 
it. Bazaine was moving his advance across the Moselle, on 
the Yerdun road, when the advance-guard of the First Army 
(von Steinmetz's) fell upon his rear-guard about 4 p. m., and 
compelled some of his divisions to face about to resist the attack. 
The First and Seventh Corps of the First Army soon came up 
to support the attack ; and the Ninth Corps of the Second 
Army, having arrived from Pont-a-Mousson, joined in. The 
foregoing plan of the roads and villages west of Metz, and of 
the position of the Prussian and French forces, will materially 
aid our understanding of this and the battles of the following 
days. 

The battle of Sunday, August 14th, was most severe on the 
east side of the Moselle, toward which the different corps of the 
First Army were rapidly marching to cross the river at Jouy. 
Coiney, and various other points between Metz and Pont-a-Mous 
son. Bazaine, desirous of making good his retreat upon Yer- 
dun, and finding that the Prussians were in large force in the 
woods around Borny, a small village east of the Moselle, at the 
junction of the Boulay, St. Avoid, and Forbach roads, and in 
the villages to the northeast of that village, determined to re- 
pulse their attack ; and when they opened fire upon the out- 
works of Metz, I'Admirault's corps, which was just starting for 
Yerdun, together with the Third Corps, De Caen's, and the 
Imperial Guard, under General Bourbaki, and the garrison of 
Fort St. Quentin, advanced to the attack. The battle raged 
from a little after 4 p. m. to nearly 9 p. m. The French make no 
mention of their position at the beginning of the fight, but only 
speak of the German force as near Borny ; but the Germans say 
that the French line at the beginning was Nouilly, Noisseville, 
Montay, and Colombey, and that they were forced back into the 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 161 

fortifications of Metz, and held there by the threatening position 
of the Second Array, which was across the Moselle, and com- 
manded the road to Yerdun by Mars-la-Tour. The accounts of 
the two parties are conflicting, but both agree that it was a very 
severe action, and that the losses were heaviest on the side of 
the Prussians, though they accomplished their object of detain- 
ing the French in Metz until they could bring tlieir own troops 
across the Moselle, and flank and defeat all the efforts of the 
French general to retreat toward Paris. 

The German account of tlie battle, which is ofiicial, but gives 
very few details, is as follows : 

" The combats of the 14th, 16th, and 18th of August are 
closely connected with each other. After the defeat sustained 
by their advanced guard at Saarbruck on the 6th, and in conse- 
quence of the complete dissolution of their right wing under 
Marshal MacMahon, the bulk of the hostile army retreated on 
the line of the Moselle. The fortress of Thionville and the very 
important position of Metz, with its intrenched camp, gave 
extraordinary strength to this line. A direct attack upon it 
would have been difficult. The armies were, therefore, directed 
south of Metz toward the Moselle, in order to pass the river 
above the fortress, and so attack the enemy. The movement of 
great masses, which could only be carried on in a considerable 
breadth of country, had to be secured by special precautions. 
The First Army, consequently, undertook to cover this march. 

" As the enemy for a time seemed disposed to await an attack 
on the east side of Metz, on the right bank of the Moselle, in a 
strong position on the French side, the nearest divisions of the 
Second Army were so approximated to the First Army as to be 
able promptly to support it. Meantime the other corps of the 
Second Army had already crossed the Moselle. The enemy 
consequently saw himself forced, in order not to lose his com- 



162 THE GREAT WAR 

munications with Paris, to evacuate the right bank of the 
Moselle before Metz, as he could not venture to attempt an 
attack on our movement. The advanced guard of the First 
Army, pushing on toward him, promptly discovered this retreat, 
and in the encounter of the 14:th of August threw itself on the 
French rear-guard, forcing it forward on the marching columns 
of their main army. The enemy was obliged to move round 
some of his divisions to support it, while on our side the entire 
First and Seventh Corps, and some detachments of the nearest 
(Ninth) Army Corps of the Second Army, joined in the engage- 
ment. The enemy was forced back and pursued till under 
shelter of the cannons of the Metz forts on the right bank of 
the Moselle. This combat had, moreover, this great advantage, 
that it delayed the enemy's retreat. This advantage it was pos- 
sible to profit by." 

Correspondents on both sides supply the following additional 
items respecting the battle : 

" With all the caution used by the French in attempting to 
conduct the evacuation secretly, they could not escape the vigi- 
lant Germans. About 4 p. m. the preparations of the troops 
lying among the advanced works of Metz were so apparent, that 
two divisions were ordered to reconnoitre these troops. One 
division marched along the highway from St. Avoid, the other 
by another road south of the former. The latter got into action 
first, and attacked so boldly that De Caen's corps, and parts of 
Frossard's, were forced to face about. The French occupied, in 
the beginning, Servigny, Noisseville, Montay, Colombey. On 
the right (German) wing the First Army-Corps advanced against 
l^oisseville and Montay, and on the left wing the Seventh and 
half of the Ninth Corps were engaged. While the infantry 
were maintaining a heavy fight, the artillery of the First and 



BETWEEN" FRANCE AND GERMANY. 163 

Thirteentli Divisions, fourteen batteries in all, succeeded in 
taking up a position in the general form of a liorse-shoe on the 
bills north of Montaj, and poured a concentric and well-deliv- 
ered fire until nightfall upon the enemy's line, which proved 
verj effective, in spite of the setting sun and an unfavorable 
"wind. The French showed less skill in using their guns. The 
French were gradually driven backwards, and their positions 
repeatedly stormed. Toward evening General I'Adrairault, 
determining, as a last resort, to make an offensive movement, 
attempted with his Fourth Corps to turn the right wing of his 
enemy toward Servigny ; but General Manteuflfel, bringing up 
his reserves, repulsed the attack. At 10 o'clock the Germans 
returned to their bivouacs. The French were held back for a 
day more, which invaluable time was put to good use by the 
troops hurrying over the Moselle at Pont-a-Monsson, where 
Prince Friedrich Karl was pushing northwestward toward the 
French line of retreat. Losses heavy on both sides. French 
accounts say that most of their men were wounded in the feet. 
Marshal Bazaine was said to be slightly wounded in the foot by 
a shell which killed his horse : 1,200 to 1,500 of their wounded 
were brought back in Metz. The Germans were thought to 
have lost 2,600 to 3,500. 

" The regiments most closely engaged on the French side 
were the Sixty-ninth, JSTinetieth, Forty-fourth, Sixtieth, Eighti- 
eth, Thirty-third, Fifty-fourth, Sixty-fifth, and Eighty-fifth of the 
line ; the Eleventh and Fifteenth Foot Chasseurs ; and the Eighth, 
Kinth, and Tenth batteries of the First Pegiment of Artillery. 
Those which sufi'ered most were the Forty-fourth and Ninetieth 
of the line, and the Fifteenth Foot Chasseurs. The colonel of 
the Forty-fourth was kiUed ; the colonel of the Third Horse Chas- 
seurs, and Generals Duplessis and Castanier, were wounded." 

King Wilhclm sent the following despatches on the 15th : 



1Q^ THE GREAT WAR 

" Yesterday evening victorious combat near Metz, by troops 
of the Seventh and First Army-Corps. Details still wanting, 
I am going at once to the battle-field. 

" The advance-guard of the Seventh Corps attacked, last 
evening towards 5 o'clock, the retreating enemy, who took up 
a position and called reenforcements from the fortress. Parts 
of the Thirteenth and Fom'teenth Divisions, and of the First 
Corps, supported the advance-guard. A very bloody fight 
spread along the whole line ; the enemy was thrown back at all 
points, and the pursuit was carried as far as the glacis of tLe 
outworks. The neighborhood of the fortress permitted the 
enemy to cover his wounded to a great extent. After our 
wounded were cared for, the troops withdrew at daybreak into 
their old bivouacs. The troops are reported to have all of them 
fought with a wonderful energy and gayety not to be expected. 
I have seen many of them, and have thanked them from my 
heart. The joy was overpowering. I spoke with Generals 
Steinmetz, Zastrow, ManteuflFel, and Goben." 

The French official account is less extravagant than that of 
the correspondents, but greatly exivggerates the Prussian losses, 
while underrating its own. 

" On taking command. Marshal Pazaine, seeing the country 
invaded on three sides by the armies of Prince Friedrich Karl, 
Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, and Marshal Steinmetz, contemplated 
uniting the scattered French troops at Metz, in order to be able 
to confront the enemy. One point in this movement was at 
Borny, a small village at the junction of the Boulay, St. Avoid, 
and Forbach roads. There the enemy advanced, confident of 
triumph after his easy victory at Styring. "While, therefore, on 
Sunday, August lith, the enemy had decided to cross the Mo- 
selle and leave Metz behind him, a great movement was taking 



BETWEEN FEANCE AND GERMANY. 155 

place in tlie French camp. General I'Admiranlt was preparing 
to turn Metz on the north, and thus separate himself from Gefn- 
eral De Caen, who would enter the city, when the enemy, who 
was well posted at Noisseville, Montay, and Coiney, had the 
boldness to open fire on us. The troops halted. The soldiers 
of I'Admirault, who had already left by the ravine of Yalliere, 
returned and advanced toward the Prussians. In an instant the 
fire thus opened from Yalliere to Grigy by way of Borny, being 
a length of nearly six miles. The Prussians never resist such 
an attack. The cannonade continued from 4 to 5 o'clock. It 
ceased then for an hour, to allow the infantry and mitrailleuses 
to do their work, and recommenced at 6.30, ceasing only when 
the enemy had entirely abandoned their positions. It was one 
of the most glorious feats of the war. The enemy left 8,000 
dead on the field, while our loss was scarcely 1,000. General 
Picard, commander of one of the divisions of the Imperial 
Guard, told me, next day, that he had never seen any thing so 
terrible as the battle-field of Boruy. Eows of men were lying 
in the order they stood ; and the w^ounded were, in some cases, 
under the dead. This was the work of the French mitrailleuses. 
It must be said, however, that the Prussian steel-cannons did us 
considerable damage." 

The Emperor sent the following despatch to Eugenie, dated 
at Longueville, on Sunday night, at 10 o'clock : 

" The army began to cross to the left bank of the Moselle 
this morning. Our advance-guard had no knowledge of the 
presence of any force of the enemy. When half of our army 
had crossed over, the Prussians suddenly attacked in great force. 
After a fight of four hours, they were repulsed with great loss 
to them. 

" I^APOLEON." 



166 THE GREAT WAR 

But, tliougli boasting of his success in repulsing the enemy, 
Bazaine was too skilful a general not to be aware tbat it was a 
vital necessity of his position to be able to retreat to Yerdun. 
After this severe battle, then, the whole night of the 14th was 
spent in moving his army across the Moselle, leaving General 
Changarnier with a strong garrison in Metz. An armistice of 
twenty-four hours was asked by the Germans, to bury their 
dead who had fallen the previous day in the battle of Borny, 
but their reconnoissances demonstrated the fact that all the 
French army except the garrison had left Metz, and been placed 
by Bazaine in eGhelon right and left from Kezonville, facing 
southwestward, with headquarters of the Emperor and Marshal 
Bazaine in Gravelotte. The Guards, Second, Third, and Fourth 
Corps of the French army, lay between Metz and Doncourt in 
two lines, facing southwest. The two roads leading to Yerdun, 
the one by Mars-la-Tour, the other by Conflans, have their point 
of junction at Gravelotte. The possession of one or both these 
roads was indispensable to Bazaine, and he was prepared to 
light fiercely and persistently for it. 

lie knew that the Second German Army (Prince Friedrich 
Karl's) had been, since the 13th, diligently and rapidly pushed 
forward from Pont-a-Mousson across the Moselle to Thiancourt, 
and thence to Mars-la-Tour, and that it was blocking the south- 
ernmost of these roads ; but he was not probably aware that 
the left and centre had been, since Sunday, crossing the Moselle 
south of Metz, and were taking position east of the Second 
Army, but within supporting distance of it ; nor was he aware" 
of the other important fact, destined to turn the fortunes of the 
terrible battle of the 18th, that the right wing of the First 
Army, under tlie immediate command of von Steinmetz him- 
lelf, was at this very time (the 15th and 16th of August) pon- 
toon ing the Moselle north of Metz and between that city and 
Thionville. and would at a critical moment be hurled with 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 167 

crusliing for(;e on liis right wing, effectnalJy cutting liim ofl 
from the Coniians road. Tor the present, however, he was 
simply concerned to regain possession of the Yerdmi road by 
Mars-la-Tonr, and for this, on Tuesday, August 16th, he fought 
another desperate battle. The advance-guard of Prince Fried- 
rich Karl, which had been hurrying forward by forced marches 
from the right bank of the Moselle, reached the southernmost 
Yerdun road near Mars-la-Tour early on the morning of the 
16th, and attacked the left wing of the French army. General 
von Alvensleben, with the Third Corps, opened the conflict, and 
a bloody battle, with divisions from all the corps under Bazaine's 
command, was gradually developed as the troops on each side 
came up. The Fifth German Division (General Stiilpnagel) 
fought from 9 A. m. until 3 p. m. without supports. Then the 
Tenth Corjjs, the Seventeenth Division of the Mnth Corps, and 
the Hessian Twenty-fifth Division, one after the other, came up,, 
and after six hours more the defeat of the French was complete. 
The positions they had occupied Avere in the hands of the Ger- 
mans. They lost 2,000 prisoners, among whom were two gen- 
erals, and seven guns. The victory was claimed by both sides ; 
by Bazaine, because he had nearly held his position (he waa 
driven back nearly to Gravelotte) ; by the Prussians, with m.or© 
reason, because they had held possession of the road, and hadi 
inflicted on the French much heavier losses than they had sus- 
tained. It was clear, however, that the battle was^ indecisive,. 
and that another must be fought before it could be detenmined 
which side should finally win. 

The German official report was as follows : 

" Two roads lead from Metz to Yerdun, the direction which 

the French army had to take in case of a retreat upon Paris. 

Those corps of the Second Army which had already passed the 

Moselle were immediately directed against the southern road, 

10 



IQg THE GREAT WAR 

the one most easily readied, in order, if possible, to arrest the 
enemy's ilank-march on that side. This important task was 
brilliantly accomplished through a bloody and victorious battle. 
The Fifth Division (Stiilpnagel) threw itself on the Frossard 
Corps, which covered the enemy's flank. The French army, 
with almost all its corps, was gradually engaged, while, on the 
Prussian side, the rest of the Third Army-Corps, the Tenth 
Army-Corps, a regiment of the ITinth Corps, and a brigade of 
the Eighth, took part. Prince Friedrich Karl assumed the com- 
mand. The gronnd first won by us in a twelve hours' struggle 
was victoriously held, the south road from Metz to Yerdun was 
gained and retained, and the enemy's retreat to Paris hy this 
road cut off. The conduct of our troops was truly heroic. Our 
loss was very considerable, but that of the enemy infinitely 
greater, as could be seen by examination of the battle-field. 
Until the 19th it was impossible to bury the French dead, and 
the great number of corpses of the Imperial Guard evidenced 
the enormous losses of that elite force. In the French official 
account the strength of our troops is reckoned at double its 
actual numbers. The Emperor's proclamation on leaving Metz, 
as also other French official documents, leaves no doubt that the 
main army had the certainly quite natural intention of retreat- 
ing to Yerdun." 

On the other hand, Bazaine reports : 

" This morning the army of Prince Friedrich Karl directed 
a spirited attack against the left wang of our position. The 
Cavalry Division (Torton) and the Second Corps (Frossard) 
maintained a stout resistance to the attack. The corps, which 
were placed in echelon right and left from Rezonville, appeared 
gradually upon the battle-field, and took part in the combat, 
which continued until nightfall. The enemy had deployed 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. ICO 

heavy masses of men, and attempted several attacks, -wliicli 
were stontly repulsed. Toward evening appeared a new army- 
corps, which attempted to cat off onr left wing. We have 
everywhere maintained our position, and inflicted heavy losses 
upon the enemy ; our losses are also great. At the moment 
when the battle raged at its height, a regiment of Uhlans at- 
tacked the general staff of the Marshal ; twenty men of the 
escort were put liors de comlat^ the captain commanding killed. 
At 8 o'clock the enemy was repulsed on the whole line." 

On the 17th Bazaine writes again : 

" Yesterday, during the entire day, I gave battle between 
Vionville and Doncourt. The enemy was repulsed. We 
remained in our positions. I interrupted my movement for 
some hours in order to bring up ammunition. We have had 
Friedrich Karl and Steinmetz before us." 

The following additional details of this battle were published 
in Paris : 

" Prince Friedrich Karl attacked our right, and was firmly 
met. The corps of General Argand, at Rezonville, hastened 
into the action, which ceased only with night. The Prussians 
repeatedly attacked us, and were as often repulsed. Toward 
night a fresh corps sought to turn our position, but was beaten 
off. Our losses are serious. General Battaille is wounded. 
By 8 o'clock in the evening the enemy were repulsed along the 
entire line. He had 120,000 men engaged." 

Yionville is nine miles west of Metz ; Doncourt three miles 
north of Yionville. The French General Le Grand was killed ; 
he was commander of a cavalry division. Fourth Corps. The 



170 THE GREAT WAR 

Emperorj after leaving Metz on the l^tli, proceeded no further 
than Gravelotte, eight miles. Leaving that place on Monday, he 
passes, in advance of his escort, through Jarnj, fifteen miles 
from Metz, on his way to Yerdun. Hardly was he out of sight, 
when the town was in the hands of the German dragoons. 

The flank-march by the north road, or by making a wide 
detour further north, still remained possible. Although such a 
retreat entailed on the French commander great dangers, it 
appeared possible that he would undertake it, as the only mode 
of escape from a highly unfavorable position, since otherwise 
the army was cut off from Paris and all its means of assistance. 
On the Prussian side, the 17th was turned to account in bring- 
ing forward for a final struggle the necessary corps, part of 
whom were already over the Moselle, while part had, in the 
night, thrown various bridges over it above Metz. At the same 
time the movements of the French forces were carefully watched 
by the German cavalry. King Wilhelm remained on the spot 
until, from the advanced hour of the day, no further movement 
of the enemy was to be expected. 

On the 17th, ITapoleon III, not deeming himself or the little 
Prince safe at Verdun, proceeded to Eheims. 

On Thursday, the 18th, the final struggle of this week of 
battles occurred. The most complete and intelligible account 
of this fearful battle of Gravelotte, evidently compiled from 
official sources, is that of the Army mid Navy Journal of Sep- 
tember 24, 1 870, which we append : 

" At daybreak the First German Army, with the First, 
Seventh, and Eighth Corps, stood off the hills south of Pezon- 
ville. The Second Army, with the Third, Ninth, Tenth, Twelftli, 
and Guard Corps, were on the left flank south of Mars-la-Tour 
and Yionville. The southern branch of the Yerdun road, west 
of KezonvillCj was in the hands of the Germans. The northern 




H 
H 
O 

O 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. I73 

branch, as far as Cautre was held by the French, whose line 
extended from Amanvillers, through Yerneville and Gravelotte, 
to the Forest of Yaiix. Towards 10 o'clock in the morning, 
after having already spent six hours in visiting the corps in 
position, the King, from the heights of Flavignj, ordered the 
Kintli Corps, in position there, to move toward the woods he 
hind St. Marcel ; while the Seventh and Eighth Corps marched 
against the Forest of Yaux, south of Gravelotte. The latter 
had ordei'S to push the enemy very slowly, in order to give time 
to the Guards and Twelfth Corps to make a long detour on the 
left, by way of Jouaville, Batilly, and Ste. Marie. The Third 
and Tenth Corps were in reserve, and but few of their troops 
were in the fight, these being mostly artillery. The principal 
movement was that on the left. Preceded by Prussian and 
Saxon cavalry, the Second Army advanced, still maintaining 
communication on the right with the First Army. The Twelfth 
Corps took the direction by Mars-la-Tour and Jarny, while the 
Guards advanced between Mars-la-Tour and Yionville on Don- 
court, and the !Ninth Corps crossed the highway to the west of 
Pezonville, toward Cautre farm, north of St. Marcel. Their 
purpose vras to gain the central and northern roads. They 
quickly found that the French were not retreating, and moved 
to the right, meeting at Ste. Marie and Eoncourt resistance, 
which was overcome, and, after another struggle among the 
steep hills at St. Privat-la-Montagne, that place was gained. 
The right flank of this Second Army, holding the centre of the 
whole German line, had been earlier engaged with some ad- 
vanced forces of the French, and toward noon the Ninth Corps 
was engaged at Yerneville. The Guards and Twelfth Corp)s 
reached St. Privat about 4 p. m., and immediately moved south 
and east against Amanvillers. The fighting here was exceed- 
ingly severe. The Germans lay in a long curve, sweeping from 
St. Privat, where \h% Saxons fought on the extreme left, through 



174 THE GREAT WAR 

Ste. Marie and St. Ail (Guards), Yerneville (Kintli Corps), 
Gravelotte (EiglitL. Corps), and Forest of Yaux (Seventh Corps), 
across the Moselle, on the right bank of which a brigade of the 
First Corps and artillery from the reserves were engaged. The 
French army fonght with its back to Germany ; the Germans 
had Paris in their rear. Bazaine's entire army was in line, 
including those troops which had been prepared for the Baltic 
expedition. On the left wing the flanking column, after meet- 
ing with resistance at every point, pushed its enemy back 
through Ste. Marie, Koncourt, St. Privat, St. Ail, Habonville, 
the wood of La Cusse, and Yerneville, until, toward evening, 
two small outworks of Metz lying northeast of Gravelotte, and 
named Leipsio and Moscou, were reached. All three roads out 
of Metz were then firmly in the grasp of the Germans. 

" The right wing had great difficulties to overcome. Early 
in the day its work was to press the French lightly in the Forest 
of Yaux. Back of this wood was the strongest part of the 
French position. It was covered by a deep road with sides fifty 
feet high, back of which was a plateau 325 to 600 feet in height. 
Behind this is the Eozieriulles hill, along the slopes of which 
the highway to Metz runs. Tliis whole steep w^as covered with 
rifle-pits in three tiers. Behind these were the infantry ; behind 
the infantry the artillery. The highway as it runs along this 
hill is only 5,000 yards in a straight line from Fort St. Quentin, 
one of the strong outworks of Metz. But the crest of the hill 
intervenes between them, and by the road the distance is nearly 
twice as great. The French soldiers, driven from this last posi- 
tion and crossing the ridge, would find themselves directly under 
the guns of their forts. When news of the successes on the left, 
and the evident abandonment of the retreat by the French, was 
brought to the King, he moved forward to a hill near Pezon- 
viile, and ordered more positive action on the right wing. The 
French, however, maintained their post with great determina- 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. I75 

tlon. Driven from it at one time, tliey retook it bj a counter- 
charge. The King, to whom news of the success had been sent, 
arrived on the hill back of Gravelotte only to see his cavalry on 
the ^vrol^g side of the defile, on the opposite side of which the 
enemy stood. The fire of the artillery ceased ; the troops had 
lost so heavily that the position seemed to be beyond their grasp. 
The King, however, ordered another attempt, and after an hour, 
during which night came on, the troops were re-formed. They 
were no sooner in motion, than the whole face of the hill re- 
vealed such rows of artillery and infantry delivering an ex- 
tremely rapid and deadly fire, that General von Moltke sent an 
officer to recall the trooj>s. Before he was out of sight the men 
appeared themselves, returning down the hillside, fully repulsed. 
Just then the Second Corps, which had been on the march since 
2 o'clock in the morning, came up, and as soon as enough regi- 
ments showed themselves, they were sent to take the hill from 
which their comrades had so often returned in failure. Follow- 
ing the withdrawing storming party came the Trench in counter- 
attack. Their success was so great, that the German troops 
showed symptoms of serious disorder. Some parts of the line 
began a disorderly retreat, and the moment was critical. Gen- 
eral von Moltke, who had anxiously awaited the coming of the 
Second Corps, rushed up, and himself gave them the word to 
advance. They sprang forward after him, and Vvdien the reen- 
forcement was well up the hill, the repulsed troops were again 
sent forward, going through their terrible experience for the last 
time, as it proved, with great steadiness and spirit. This attack 
succeeded, and at 8.30 o'clock the last position of the French 
Avas in the hands of their enemy. During the night they with- 
drew completely into Metz. The losses in this battle, as in the 
encounters immediately preceding it, were immense. Even now 
they are not officially known, though an account from Paris says 
that Bazaine officially reported his wounded at Gravelotte at 



l^Q THE GREAT WAR 

18,000 ; but tliis probablj includes tlie losses in all the ba,ttles 
west of Metz. Estimating the dead at 5,000, and adding tlie 
captured wounded, 3,000 (np to August 22d), the whole French 
loss would be 23,000. From 6,000 to 10,000 prisoners were 
taken in the battles east and west of Metz. On the German 
side, with the exception of prisoners, the losses must have been 
still greater ; and for 18,000 killed and wounded that Bazaine 
lost, his enemy must have lost at least 25,000. An official rejDort 
of tlie losses on tlie 16tli of August lias been published. It 
shows that there were 626 officers and 15,925 men placed ho7'S 
de combat. Eighteen hundred and thirty-two horses were lost, 
not including those of several South German cavalry regiments." 

The King's despatch from Rezonville says : 

" The French army attacked to-day in a very strong position 
west of Metz, under my leadership, in nine hours' battle com- 
pletely beaten, cut off from its communications with Paris, and 
thrown back on Metz." 

He writes, on the 19th, from Eezonville : 

" That was a new day of victory yesterday, the consequences 
of which are not yet to be estimated. Early yesterday the 
Twelfth Guards and Ninth Corps proceeded toward the north- 
ern road from Metz to Yerdun as far as St. Marcel and Don- 
court, followed by the Third and Tenth Corps ; while the 
Seventh and Eighth, and finally the Second, remained opposite 
Metz. As the former swerved to the right, in thickly-wooded 
ground, toward Yerneville and St. Privat, the latter began the 
attack upon Gravelotte, not heavily, in order to wait until the 
long fiank-march upon the strong position, Amanvillers-Chatel, 
should be accomplished as far as the Metz highway. This 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 1^7 

column did not get into action until 4 o'clock witli the Pivo/ 
Corps ; the Ninth at 12 o'clock. The enemy put forth stout 
resistance in the woods, so that ground was gained only slowly. 
St. Privat was taken by the Guards, Yerneville by the Ninth 
Corps ; the Twelfth Corps and artillery of the Third then w^ent 
into action. Gravelotte and the woods on botli sides were taken 
and held by troops of the Seventh and Eighth Corps, and with 
great losses. In order to attack again the enemy, who had been 
driven back by the flank-attack, an advance beyond Gravelotte 
was undertaken at dusk, which came upon such a terrible fire 
from behind rifle-pits en Stage, and artillery-fire, that the Second 
Corps, which just then came up, was forced to attack the enemy 
■with the bayonet, and completely took and held the strong 
position. It was 8.30 o'clock before the firing gradually silenced 
itself in all quarters. By this last advance the historical shells 
of Koniggriitz were not wanting near me, from which, this time. 
Minister von Eoon removed me. All troops that I saw greeted 
me with enthusiastic hurrahs. They did wonders of bravery 
against an equally brave enemy, who defended every step, and 
often attempted offensive attacks, which were each time repulsed. 
What the fate of the enemy will now be, pushed into the in- 
trenched, very strong position of the fortress of Metz, is still 
impossible to determine. I dread to ask about tlie losses, and 
to give names ; for only too many acquaintances will be nam.ed, 
and often incorrectly. Your regiment (the Queen's) is said to 
have fought brilliantly. Waldersee is wounded severely, but 
not fatally, as I am told. I expected to bivouac here, but found, 
after some hours, a room where I rested on the royal ambu- 
lance whicli? I had brought with me ; and since I have not a 
particle of my baggage from Pont-a-Mousson, I have not been 
undressed for thirty hours. I thank God that he vouchsafed us 
the victory. 

" "WiLHELM." 



1Y8 THE GREAT WAR 

In sncli a battle, extending over thirty or forty square miles, 
no eye-witness can see tlie whole, or can coDiprehend fully all 
tlie movements of the various corps and divisions. "What one 
man could see, however, of this hattle, which up to its date 
must he considered the severest of modern times, a corre- 
spondent of the ISlew York Tribune has described with wonder- 
ful accuracy and life-likeness. Portions of his description are 
not necessary to our work, bnt those which portray the actual 
incidents of the battle w^e gladly transfer to our pages. 

" The troops," says this correspondent, " had been passing 
through Pont-a-Mousson almost continually for several days 
previously ; but now the tramp through every street and by- 
way made between midnight and dawn a perpetual roar. 
Hastily dressing, I ran out into the darkness and managed to 
get a seat on a wagon that was going in the direction of the 
front, now" understood to be a mile or two beyond the village 
of Gorze, some twelve m.iles from Pont-a-Mousson. On our 
way we met a considerable batch of French prisoners, who were 
looked upon with curiosity by the continuous line of German 
soldiers with w^hom we advanced. The w^ay was so blocked 
with wagons that I got out of my wagon and began to walk 
and run swiftly ahead. At Mouvient, on the Moselle, about 
half-way to Metz, I found vast bodies of cavalry — Uhlans and 
Hussars — crossing the river by a pontoon-bridge, and hurrying 
at the top of their speed towards Gorze. Quickening my own 
steps, I first heard the thunder of the cannonade, seemingly 
coming from the heart of a range of hills on the right. Pass- 
ing through the village and ascending the high plain beyond, I 
found myself suddenly in a battle-field, strewn thickly, so far 
as my eye could reach, with dead bodies. In one or two parts 
of the field companies were still burying the dead, chiefly Prus- 
sians. The French, being necessarily buried last, were still 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 179 

lying in vast niini"bers on the ground. A few of those that 1 
saw were not yet dead. 

" As I hurried on, a splendid regiment of cavalry came up 
from behind me, and when they reached the brow of the hill 
they broke out with a wild hurrah, and dashed forward. A few 
more steps and I gained the summit, and saw the scene which 
had evoked their cry, and seemed to thrill even their horses. 

" From the hill to which I had been directed by good 
authority to come, the entire sweep of the Prussian and French 
centres could be seen, and a considerable part of their wings. 
The spot where I stood w^as fearful. It was amid ghastly 
corpses, and the air was burdened with the stench of dead 
horses, of which there were great numbers. I was standing 
on the battle-field of the 16th — the Prussian side. On the left 
stretched, like a silver thread, the road to Yerdun — to Paris also 
— for the possession of which this series of battles had begun. 
It was between the lines of poplars which stood against the 
horizon on my left ; and on, as far as the eye could reach, 
toward Metz, wdtli military regularity, strung on this road like 
beads, w^ere the pretty villages, each with its church-tovv'er, all 
of which are really only a hundred yards apart, although they 
have separate names — Mars-la-Tour, Flavigny, a little south of 
the road, Yionville, Eezonviile, and Gravelotte, which is divided 
into Great and Little Gravelotte, On my right were the thickly- 
wooded hills behind which lies the most important village of 
the neighborhood, which I had just left — Gorze. So environed 
was the foreground of the battle, which should, one would say, 
be called the battle of Gravelotte, for it was mainly over and 
around that devoted little town that it raged. The area I have 
indicated is perhaps four miles square. 

" I arrived just as the battle waxed warm. It was about 
noon of the 18th. The headquarters of the King of Prussia 
were then at the spot which I have described. The great repre- 



180 THE GREAT WAR 

sentative mea of Prussia, soldiers and statesmen, Ts^ere standing 
on the ground watching the conflict just begun. Among them 
I recognized tiie King, Bismarck, General von Moltke. Prince 
Priedrich Karl, Prince Karl, Prince Adalbert, and Adjutant 
Kranski, Lieutenant-General Sheridan, of the United States 
Army, was also present. At the moment the French were 
making a most desperate effort to hold on to the last bit of the 
Yerdun road — that between Pezonville and Gravelotte, or that 
part of Gravelotte which in some maps is called St. Marcel. 
The struggle was desperate but unavailing, for every one man 
in the French army had two to cope with, and their line was 
already beginning to waver. Soon it was plain that this wing 
— the French right — was withdrawing to a new position. This 
was swiftly taken up under cover of a continuous fire of their 
artillery from the heights beyond the village. The movement 
was made in good order, and the position, which was reached 
at 1.30 o'clock, would, I believe, have been pronounced impreg- 
nable by nine out of ten military men. When once this move- 
ment had been effected, the French retreating from the pressure 
of the Prussian artillery-fire, and the Prussians as rapidly ad- 
vancing, the battle-field was no longer about Eezonville, but 
had been transferred and pushed forward to Gravelotte, the 
junction of the two branching roads to Yerdun. The fields in 
front of that village v/ere completely covered by the Prussian 
reserves, and interminable lines of soldiers were steadily march- 
ing onward, disappearing into the village, and emerging on the 
other side of it with flaming volleys. 

" The second battle-field was less extensive than the first, 
and brought the opposing forces into fearfully close quarters. 
The peculiarity of it is that it consists of two heights intersected 
by a deep ravine. This woody ravine is over one hundred feet 
deep, and, at the top, three hundred yards wide. The side of 
the chasm nest to Gravelotte, where the Prussians stood, is 



* BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 181 

mueli lower tlian the other side, which gradually ascends to a 
ffreat height. From their commandinsr eminence the Frencli 
held their enemies fairly beneath them, and poured down upon 
them a scorching fire. The French guns were in position far up 
bj the Metz road, hidden and covered among the trees. There 
was not an instant's cessation of the roar. Easily distinguish- 
able amid all was the curious grunting roll of the mitrailleuse. 
The Prussian artillery was posted to the north and south of the 
village, the guns on the latter side being necessarily raised for 
an awkward half-vertical fire. 

" The French stood their ground and died ; the Prussians 
stood their ground and died — both by hundreds, I had almost 
said thousands. This, for an hour or two that seemed ages, so 
constant was the slaughter. The hill where I stood commanded 
chiefly the conflict behind the village and to the south of it. 
The Prussian reenforcements, coming up on their right, filed 
out of the Bois des Ognons ; and it was at that point, as they 
marched on to the field, that one could perhaps get the best idea 
of the magnitude of the invading army now in the heart of 
France. There was no break whatever for four hours in the 
march of men out of that wood. It seemed almost as if all the 
killed and wounded revived and came back and marched forth 
again. Birnam "Wood advancing to Dunsinane Hill was not a 
more ominous sight to Macbeth than these men of General 
Goben's army to Bazaine, shielded as they were by the woods 
till tliey were fairly v/ithin range and reach of their enemy's 
guns. So the French must have felt; for between 4 and 5 
o'clock they concentrated upon that spot their heaviest fire, 
massing all available guns, and shelling the woods unremit- 
tingly. Their fire reached the Prussian lines and tore through 
them ; and though the men were steady, it was a test to which 
no general cares to subject his troops long. They presently 
swerved a little from that line of advance, and there was no 



]^g2 THE GREAT WAR 

longer a continiions column of infantry ponring out of tliose 
woods. 

" The attack of the Prussians in tlie centre was clearly 
cliecked. About 6 o'clock, however, a brigade of fresli infantry 
was again formed in the wood, and emerged from its cover. 
Once out from under tlie trees, tliey advanced at double-quick. 
The French guns had not lost the range of the wood, nor of the 
ground in front. Seen at a distance through a powerful glass, 
the brigade was a huge serpent, bending with the undulations 
of the field. But it left a dark track behind it, and the glass 
resolved the dark track into falling and dying and dead men. 
Many of those who had fallen leaped up again, and ran forward 
a little way, striving still to go on with their comrades. Of 
those who went backward instead of forward there were few, 
though many fell as they painfully endeavored to follow the 
advance. 

" Half an hour afterwards great numbers of troops began to 
march over the hill where I was standing, and moved forward 
toward the field where so hard a struggle had been so long pro- 
tracted. These also were, I think, a portion of General Go- 
ben's troops, who had been directed upon a less dangerous route. 

" The battle from this point on the Prussian left became so 
fierce that it was soon lost to us, or nearly lost, by reason of 
the smoke. Now and then the thick cloud would open a little 
and drift away on the wind, and then we could see the French 
sorely tried. To get a better view of this part of the field I 
went forward about half a mile, and from this new standpoint 
found mygelf not far from Malmaison. The French line on 
the hills was still unbroken, and to all appearances they were 
having the best of the battle. Put this appearance was due, 
perhaps, to the fact that the French were more clearly visible 
in their broad height, and fighting with such singular obstinacy. 
They plainly silenced a Prussian battery now and then. Put 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 183 

the Prussian line also was strengthened by degrees on this north- 
ern: point. Infantry and artillery were brought up, and from 
far in the rear, away seemingly in the direction of Yerneville, 
shot and shell began reaching the French ranks. These were 
the men and these were the guns of Steinmetz, who there and 
then effected his junction with the army of Prince Priedrich 
Karl, and completed the investment of Metz to the northwest. 

" With reenforcements for the Prussians thus continually 
arriving on both sides of the field, the battle grew more and 
more obstinate. There could be no doubt that the French well 
understood the meaning of the movements of the Prussians, 
and of the gradual development of their line to the north. 

" Steinmetz was able to extend his line gradually further 
and further until the French were outflanked, and began to be 
threatened, as it appeared, with an attack on the rear of their 
extreme right wing. So long as the smoke from the Prussian 
guns hovered only over their front, the French clung to their 
position. The distance from headquarters to wdiere the Prus- 
sian flank-attack stretched forward was great, and, to add to the 
diSiculty of clearly seeing the battle, the darkness was coming 
on. The puffs of smoke from the French guns, mingled witli 
the flashes, brightening as the darkness increased, receded grad- 
ually. The pillars of cloud and flame from the north as grad- 
ually and steadily approached. With that advance the French 
fire every moment grew more slack. It was not far from 9 
3'clock when the ground was yielded finally on the north, and 
the last shots fired on that terrible evening were heard in that 
direction. 

" The King's face, as he stood gazing upon the battle-field, 
had something almost plaintive in it. He hardly said a word, 
but I noticed that his attention was divided between the exciting 
scenes in the distance, and the dismal scene nearer his feet, where 
they Tvere just beginning what must yet be a long task — to 



184: THE GREAT WAR 

buiy the Frencli wlio fell in Tuesday's battle. On them he 
gazed silently, and, I thought, sadly. 

" Connt Bismarck could not conceal his excitement and 
anxiety. If it had not been for the King, the Count would 
clearly have gone forward where the fighting was. His tower- 
ing form was always a little in advance of the rest. 

" When the French completely gave 'up their hold upon the 
road up to Gravelotte, the horses of the headquarters party were 
hastily called, the entire party mounting, and, with the King at 
their head, dashed down to a point not very far from the village. 
Then shouts and cheers arose, and followed them wherever they 
passed. 

" A little after 4 o'clock a strange episode occurred. From 
the region where Stelnmctz was supposed to be, a magnificent 
regiment of cavalry galloped out. They paused a moment at 
the point where the Conflans road joins that to Metz. Then 
they dashed up the road toward Metz. This road between 
Gravelotte and St. Hubert's is cut through the hill, and on each 
side of it .rise cliffs from forty to sixty feet high, except at the 
point where it traverses the deep ravine behind the village. 
When it is remembered that at the time the culminating point 
to which that road ascends v/as held by the French, it will not 
be wondered at that only half that regimdnt survived. Their 
plunge into that deep cut on the hillside, where next day I saw 
so many of them and their horses lying, was of that brave, 
unhesitating, unfaltering kind which is so characteristic of Ger- 
man soldiers, among whom stragglers and deserters seem to be 
absolutely unknown. 

" At a moment that seemed critical, there appeared on the 
field, occupying ground before held by a portion of the forces 
of Prince Friedrich Karl, a large body of troops. They moved 
mto position under the eyes of the King, yet neither the King 
nor any of his staff could account for their appearance. They 



BETWEEN" FRANCE AND GERMANY. 185 

passed the point which in tlie morning had been the royal head- 
quarters. Their march was begun at the time I have mentioned, 
and their advance did not cease till dark ; but the mystery that 
hung over them was not dispelled. Whose was this new army ? 
Whence did it come? The staff insisted that at the point 
whence it moved there were, or at any rate ought to be, no 
troops of the armies of either Steinraetz or of Prince Friedrich 
Karl. The rumor began and spread among the group of men 
who surrounded the King that this fresh, mysterious force was 
a part of the army of the Crown-Prince, and that a new junc- 
tion had been effected. I know of no reason to suppose this 
true. Doubtless the staff soon cleared up the matter to their 
own satisftiction, bat it happened that I was away in another 
part of the field before the riddle was solved. 

" In any event, it cannot be doubted that the presence of 
that large body of men made itself felt upon the fortunes of 
the field. They were visible to the French as well as to us. 
Here was another example of the moral effect that may be and 
so often is exerted in battle by masses of men y/hose presence 
is known to the enemy, but who may not fire a shot in the 
actual conflict. From their line of march it is clear that the 
divisions were finally posted a little in the rear and on the left 
of the Prussian centre at the time when the attacks so long 
directed against the key of the French lines had ceased — in 
fact, had failed for the time. It was possible that the French, 
having suffered far less in holding their ground than the Prus- 
sians in attacking, might have advanced in their turn and have 
undertaken a vigorous offensive movement. If they had any 
such purpose, it is not unlikely that they abandoned it on sight 
of the Prussian reenforcements. 

" Instead of advancing, the French now contented them- 
selves with the mere occupation of the ground to which, earlier 
in the day, they had been driven back. At no time did they 
11 



IQQ THE GREAT WAR 

Berioiisly strive to regain the -westernmost line of hills which 
had been theirs in the morning. At no time did thej recover, 
or seek to recover, by any vigorous forward movement, the 
junction of the roads at Gravelotte. From Y to 8 o'clock the 
weight of the battle tended more and more to the north of the 
road. There was a lull, the meaning of which the French failed 
apparently to interpret. By 7 o'clock they may have believed 
themselves partly victorious. They were still, perhaps, in con- 
dition to renew on the morrow the struggle that had gone on all 
day for that fated road fi'om Metz to Yerdun. If they had not 
gained the road or the battle, they had not clearly lost the latter. 
Two hours later they had lost both. 

" A little before 8 o'clock a large white house on the height 
beyond Gravelotte caught fire. It seemed through the gloom 
to be a church. Its spire grew into flames, and a vast, black 
cloud of smoke arose, contrasting strangely with the white 
smoke of the battle. More and more picturesque grew the 
whole field. As evening fell, the movements of the troops 
could be followed now by the lines of fire that ran flickering 
along the front of a regiment as it went into action. Tongues 
of fire pierced through and illuminated the smoke out of the 
cannons' mouths, and the fuses of the shells left long trains of 
fire like falling stars. ISTo general likes fighting by night in 
ordinary circumstances, for chance takes then the place of skill ; 
but the flanking movement on the French right had been 
resolved on by daylight, and it was the necessity of moving 
troops to a great distance over difficult ground which delayed 
its execution, and brought about what seemed a renewal of the 
battle after the day was done, 

" To leave the French in their positions during the night 
would have been to imperil the plan on which the Prussian 
commander had resolved. So, from 8, or 8.30 to 9 o'clock, the 
decisive blow was struck. When the battle of Gravelotte had 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. Ig7 

actually ended, we knew that the Prussians held the strong 
heights beyond the Forest of Yaux, which commanded the sur- 
rounding country to the limits of artillery-range from Metz ; we 
knew that two great Prussian armies lay across the only road by 
which Bazaine could march to Paris for its relief, or for his own 
escape ; we knew that a victory greater than that of Sunday, 
and more decisive than the triumph of Tuesday, had been won. 
We believed that the French army, which had fought as val- 
iantly and as vainly as before, was now hopelessly shut up in 
its fortress. 

" As I went back to the village of Gorze to pass the night, 
I turned at the last point to look upon the battle-field. It was 
a long, earth-bound cloud, with two vast fires of burning build- 
ings at either end. The day had been beautiful so far as iNTature 
was concerned, and the stars now looked down in splendor upon 
a work of agony and death such as no one could ever wish to 
see again." 

Another correspondent who witnessed the battle, and also 
went over the battle-ground on the following day, after stating 
that the battle will rank with the bloodiest and most hardly- 
contested that have ever been fought in Europe, goes on to say : 

"As I rode up the hill leading to the French position, I 
wondered not at the frightful files of corpses all around me, but 
that such a position could be taken at all. On the further side 
of the road the French had thrown up twelve small 6paulementa 
about breast-high ; in eight of them they had placed mitra- 
illeuses, for the empty eases were scattered all about. In one 
epaulement alone I counted forty-three empty cartridge-holders. 
Now, as each of these boxes contains twenty-five cartridges, 
1,075 shots are fired by one during the day. Doubtless many 
more had actually been fired, for nearly every one did as 1 did, 



IQQ THE GREAT WAR 

and carried off an empty case as a relic. The slope imme- 
diately beneath, the French position, on the Yerdun, was a 
frightful spectacle. Hundreds of Prussian corpses were strewed 
in quite a small space on the fatal slope. "Where the Prussian 
battery had been placed (of whicb I spoke in my last), there 
were thirty horses lying almost touching one another, many 
with the drivers beside them, still grasping their whips. Most 
of the corpses were on their backs, with their hands clenched. 
This position was explained by the fact that most of the men 
had been shot grasping their muskets, and their hands clenched 
as they dropped their weapons and fell. Many corpses of Prus- 
sian officers lay by those of their men, with their wbite glove 
on their left hands, the rigbt ones being bare, in order better to 
grasp the sword. In the hollow road itself the bodies of men 
and horses also lay thick ; the corpses all along the sides of the 
road, for nearly 1,000 yards, made one continually unbroken 
row. A little lower down I found the tirailleur corpses. Many 
of these men had still their muskets in their bands, many fore- 
fingers being stiff on the trigger. On the left of the French 
position were two small cottages which had been a mark for the 
Prussian cannon, and their shells had made a complete ruin of 
the buildings. One roof was completely gone, and the whole 
front wall of the upper story of the other had been blown in. 
On tbe plateau behind the French earthworks all the ground 
was ploughed and torn by the Prussian shells, which, when they 
got the range, were admirably aimed. One third of its horses 
lay dead beside it. A shell had burst beneath one of th-e horses, 
and had blown him, the limber, and one of the gunners, all to 
pieces. All the French prisoners with whom I have spoken 
agree in asserting that it was the terrible accuracy of the Prussian 
artillery which forced them to yield their position. The farm- 
house of La Yillette once stormed and held by the Prussians, 
the earthworks on the Yerdun road became untenable, as from 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 189 

the yard of La Yillette the Prussian jaegers could shoot right 
into the twelve French earthvYorks. Seeing this, one could not 
help asking why so terrible a sacrifice of life was made by send- 
ing the infantry straight up the road at the French works. 
Perhaps it may have been thought necessary to make a moral 
impression on the French, and to show them that nothing would 
stop the Prussian infantry. 

'' It is admitted here that the mitrailleuses did much execu- 
tion at close quarters. That the stories about their doing execu- 
tion at 2,000 metres were pure invention, I now know ; for, had 
they really shot that distance, I should, in all probability, not 
be writing this now, for I was within 1,500 yards of them, and 
never heard of any of their balls coming near us. All that did 
come were Chassepots. After all the talk we had been treated 
to about their great superiority, one would have expected them 
to do better. But the fact is, the French soldiers do not do 
justice to their weapon, which is nndoubtedly better than the 
needle-gun — a totally superannuated weapon, though it is made 
to do all it is capable of by the Germans, who never dream of 
drawing trigger until they feel sure of their aim. Their fire is, 
therefore, less rapid than that of the French, but far more 
deadly. 'Now, nothing so encourages young troops as to find 
that the ' swish,' ' swish ' of balls is not followed by any very 
serious results. On the other hand, it is not at all encouraging 
to find that nearly every shot fired by the enemy tells. So 
much so was this the case on Thursday, that those who were at 
the ' taking ' of Saarbruck by the ' infant Louis,' remarked that 
the French artillery-practice against the station was good, and 
in some cases excellent. But yesterday it is said to have been 
much inferior to what it was at Saarbruck, when they had 
greater opposition. I myself thought the Prussian artillery- 
practice slow ; but when I got up on the top of the plateau 
occupied by the French, I saw how accurate it had been." 



j^90 THE GREAT WAR 

On the 19tli the French army of Marshal Bazahie, which 
had, during the night, rested on its arms near the western out- 
works of Metz, withdrew sullenly into its fortifications, having 
lost in the three days' fighting, in killed, wounded, and prison- 
ers, not far from 60,000 men. Their own reports acknowledge 
12,000 dead and 6,000 unwounded prisoners; while the Ger- 
mans have sent into Germany full twice that number, besides 
the many thousands of the wounded. The Frencli name the 
battles of the 14th, 16th, and 18th of August respectively, Cour- 
celles, Yionville, and Gravel otte. A general order of Marshal 
Bazaine, bearing date Gravelotte, August 16th, was found on 
the battle-field, which gives directions to the ofiicers of the 
several army-corps for the marching of their troops to Yerdnn 
by the two roads ma Conflans and Mars-la-Tour. 

On the 19th the two German armies completely enveloped 
Metz, and its siege was formally commenced. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GBiOIANY. 191 



CHAPTEE IX. 

FROM Chalons, to which city he had betaken himself early in 
this week of battles, the Emperor, on the 17th of August, 
sent to Paris the following decree : 

" The General Trochu is named Governor of Paris and Com- 
mandant-in-Chief of all the forces charged to provide for the 
defence of the capital. 

" Done at Chalons. Napoleon." 



On the 18th. General Trochn issued the following proclama- 
tion to the people of Paris : 

" Inhabitants of Pakis : Amid the peril in which the 
country is, I am named Governor of Paris and Commandant- 
in-Chief of the forces charged to defend the capital in a state 
of siege. Paris seizes the part which belongs to it, and it Avishes 
to be the centre of grand efforts, of grand sacrifices, and of 
grand examples. I come to join in them with all my heart. 
That will be the honor of my life, and the proud crowning of a 
career which, until this day, has remained unknown, for the 
most part, to you. 

" I have faith the most complete in the success of our glo- 
rious enterprise ; but it is upon one condition, the character of 
which is imperious, and without which our common efforts will 
be struck with impotence. 

" I refer to good order ; and I mean, by that, not merely 



192 THE GREAT WAR 

calmness in the street, but calmness at your firesides, calmnes? 
of your spirits, deference to the orders of the responsible author- 
ities, resignation in presence of the trials inseparable from the 
situation, and, finally, the serenity, grave and collected, of a 
great military nation, which takes in its hand, with a firm reso- 
lution, amid solemn circumstances, the conduct of its destiny. 
And to establish the situation in that ef[uilibrium so desirable, I 
do not turn to the powers which I hold by the state of siege and 
from the law. I demand it of your patriotism, and I will obtain 
it from your confidence, in showing myself, to the population of 
Paris, a confidence without limit. 

" I appeal to all men of all parties, belonging to none myself. 
In the army no other party is known than that of the country. 

" I appeal to their devotion. 1 demand of them to hold in 
bounds, by moral force, the hot spirits who do not know how to 
restrain themselves, and to do justice with their own hands to 
those men who are of no party, and who see in the public mis- 
fortune only an occasion to satisfy detestable appetites. 

" And to accomplish my task, after which, I afiirm, I will 
reenter into the obscurity from which I emerge, I adopt one of 
the old devices of the province of Brittany, where I was born : 
' With the aid of God, for the fatherland ! ' 

" At Paris. General Tbochu." 

On the 19th, by imperial order, a Committee of Defence was 
formed in Paris, consisting of General Trochu, president ; Mar- 
shal Yaillant, Admiral Kigault de Genouilly, Baron Jerome 
David, General De La Tour, General Guiod, General d'Aute- 
raarre d'Erville, and General Souiiiain. It possessed the fullest 
powers, and had a special executive committee that met daily in 
the "War Office, receiving reports on the state of the defensive 
works, armament, munitions, and provisions in store, and all 
operations. These reports went subsequently to the Minister of 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 193 

"War, and thence to the Council. All the acts of tlie Corpa 
Legislatif were to take effect without imperial decrees confirm- 
ing them or directing their execution. 

On the 20th General Trochu published an address to the 
people, explaining how he desired to aid them. In this address 
he said : 

" The idea of maintaining order by force of the bayonet and 
the sword in Paris, which is so agitated and given up to grief, 
fills me with horror and disgust. The maintenance of order by 
the ascendency of patriotism, freely expressed by the knowledge 
of the evident danger of the country, fills me with hope and 
serenity. But this problem is arduous, and I cannot solve it 
alone, but I can with the aid of those having sucb sentiments. 
Tliat is what I term moral aid. The moment may arrive when 
malefactors, seeing us defending the city, will seek to pillage. 
Those the honest must seize. The error of all Governments I 
have ever known is to consider force the ultimate power. The 
only decisive power in the moment of danger is moral force." 

On the 21st he issued the following appeal : 

" To the National Guards to the Garde Mobile^ to the Troops 
and Seamen in the Army of Paris, to all the Defenders of 
the Capital: 

" In the midst of events of the highest importance I have 
been appointed Governor. The honor is great, the perils also. 
I depend on your patriotism. Should Paris be subjected to a 
siege, never was there a more magnificent opportunity to prove 
to the world that long prosperity has not effeminated the coun- 
try. Tou have before you the example of an army which h^ 
fought one against three. Their heroic struggle compels the 
admiration of all. Show by youf conduct that you have the 
feeling of the profound responsibility resting upon you." 



104 THE GREAT WAR 

The German reserves, to the number of 200,000, were now 
called out to fill up the gaps in the regiments and occupy the 
territory which had been run over, so as to enable the soldiers 
of the line to go to the front. The bombardment of Strasbourg 
commenced on the 19th, and continued for several days. Vitry, 
a fortified town of some importance on the Marne, on the rail- 
road from Chalons to Nancy, surrendered, and with it a large 
amount of arms, cannon, and ammunition. The French mined 
and destroyed at several places the railroad between Sedan and 
Thionville. 

Since the 8th of August Marshal MacMahon had been en- 
gaged in collecting all the troops in Alsace and Lorraine which 
could be spared, and had received large reenforcements from 
Paris and elsewhere, till his army numbered somewhat more 
than 150,000 men. "With this army he pushed on as rapidly as 
possible on the route to Paris as far as Chalons, the Crown- 
Prince of Prussia pursuing him, and often pressing him closely. 
Up to the 24:th of August MacMahon remained at Chalons. 
The German cavalry had pushed on in advance, and some bat- 
talions of Ulilans (Lancers) had appeared around Epernay. The 
Third German Army, after the battle of Gravelotte, had been 
joined by the Guards, Fourth and Twelfth Corps, which wxre 
organized as a Fourth Army under the Crown-Prince of Saxony, 
and preparations were made for the immediate investment of 
Chalons. 

On the 25th the German forces learned that, the night be- 
fore, MacMahon had evacuated Chalons, and, instead of march- 
ing upon Epernay, had gone northwestward to Kheims, where 
the Emperor had preceded him on the 21st. The Emperor 
meantime had gone on to Eethel. The object of this movement 
was evidently to draw the German army northward, and aid 
Bazaine in raising the siege or environment of Metz. There 
were several strategical difficulties in the way of this movement, 



196 THE GREAT WAR 

whicli should have made a skilful commander hesitate long be- 
fore attempting it. It required a very considerable detour, and 
it is not eas}^ to take a large force rapidly over a long road, — 
especially when, as was the case here, it is much of it a forest, 
and traversed with difficulty, — when it is constantly pressed by a 
foe fully equal and possibly superior in numbers, and flushed 
with victory. Then, again, the route lay for a considerable 
portion of the way close to the Belgian frontier, the territory 
of a neutral ; and their enemy, approaching them from the 
south, could easily force them over the line, where they would 
be disarmed and held as prisoners. The German forces around 
Metz, the First and Second Armies, were more than sufficient to 
hold Bazaine in check, and were being largely reenfoiced from 
the reserves, so that they could easily spare from 50,000 to 
100,000 men to take the French in front, while the Third and 
Fourth Armies were pressing upon their flank. The opportu- 
nity was too tempting a one for the Germans not to avail them- 
selves of it, and, conquering the French armies in detail, soon 
make themselves masters of France. 

MacMahon and his army were making a rapid progress 
northward toward Eethel and Mezieres, having passed the jirst- 
named point with part of his force on the 27th, while the re- 
mainder was marching in a line with it eastward toward the 
Mouse. The country is difficult ; the Argonnes forest, better 
known as the forest of Ardennes, occupying at least one half 
the territory, and the country being hilly and broken. 

The movement of the German armies to cut HacMahon off 
from a junction with Bazaine commenced on the 26th of August. 
At their commencement eight and a half army-corps lay in a 
long line, north and south. This front had to be changed for 
one at right angles to it — a task the difficulty of which was 
greatly increased by the fact that the line of march lay partly 
amid the forests of the Argonnes. The operations were so 
directed as not ojdy to prevent MacMahon from reaching Metz, 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 197 

but also to cut him off from returning to Paris, thus compelling 
him to fight with the alternative of surrender, or of retreat to 
Belgium in case of defeat. 

Within the next three days, notwithstanding these difficulties, 
the front of this great army had not only been changed, but 
they had pushed forward until their advance-guard, part of the 
Twelfth (Saxon) Corps, had reached ISTouart, and the whole 
army were occupying a line nearly parallel with the Meuse, and 
extending from near Stenay westward beyond Youziers. A 
skirmish took place at llTouart, seven miles southwest of Stenay, 
on the 29th of August, between the Saxon advance-guard and 
the head of the Fi-ench column (Fifth Corps), which was attempt- 
ing to reach the Meuse. The French troops were stopped and 
cut off from the road by which they were marching. Voncq 
was also stormed the same day by two dismounted squadrons of 
German hussars, and a large number of prisoners taken. 

Pressed thus closely by his enemy, MacMahon had only the 
alternative of giving battle in this forest, and retreating into 
Belgium in case of defeat, or of crossing the Meuse if he could, 
and resting on Sedan. By this movement, though brought still 
nearer to the Belgian frontier, he would have a strong fortress 
to protect his right wing, and the advantage of a more open 
country to fight in. He chose the latter alternative, but found 
himself so hard pressed that he was obliged to accept the battle 
forced on him on the 30th, before he could cross the Meuse. 
MacMahon's army lay between the Ardennes mountains and 
the river Aisne, the left, formerly the right wing (since they had 
faced the other way in this movement), resting below Tourteron, 
while the right wing was attempting to cross the Meuse at 
Mouzon. The lines on which the various 0017)8 and divisions of 
the German armies moved, and their action through the day, 
are given as follows in their reports. (For the places, see plan 
on page 171.) 



198 THE GREAT WAR 

" According to the orders given tlie Third Army, the First 
Bavarian Corps, which on the 27th had been advanced past 
Yonziers, on the road to Stenay, as far as Bar and Buzancy, was 
to go t'ia Sommauthe toward Beaumont. Tlie Second Bavarian 
Corps followed behind the First. The Fifth Prussian Corps 
moved from Breguenay and Authe toward Pierremont and 
Oches, and formed, therefore, the left wing of the Third Array. 
The Wiirteraberg Division directed itself from Boult-aux-Bois, 
via Chatillon, against La Chene. The Second Prussian Corps 
moved on the left of the Wiirtembergers, via Youziers and 
Quatre Champs ; and a side column of this corps occupied 
Yoncq on the Aisne. The Sixth Corps was to extend itself 
from Yonziers southwesterly, or toward Chalons. The Fifth 
Cavalry Division marched toward Tourteron, the Fourth toward 
Chatillon, the Sixth toward Semuy, with advance troops toward 
Bouvellemont, cutting the road to Mezieres. The Second Divi- 
sion of Cavalry moved toward Buzancy. Headquarters of the 
Crown-Prince were moved at 8.30 o'clock from Cernuc, via 
Grand Pre (where the King's quarters were), toward Breguenay, 
before which place three regiments and some artillery lay in two 
rows about half a mile long. Precisely at noon came the first 
shot from the hills before Oches, where some French artillery 
had posted itself, and was directed against the German artillery 
back of Buzancy, nearly 5,000 paces distant. There was, how- 
ever, no attempt to make a stand, and the position was deserted 
BO soon as German cavalry approached. The artillery retreated, 
following the chain of hills on which it lay, back to Stonne, its 
highest point. Although the ground here was very favorable, 
the retreat was soon continued toward Beaumont, where the 
French centre had been driven in after a sharp fight. The bat- 
tle here was opened about midday by the Fourth Corps, which, 
making a sudden attack upon Beaumont, swept so suddenly 
upon the French, that a camp from which not an article had 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 109 

been removed fell into their hands. This corps was supported 
on the left by the First Bavarian Corps, placed in the Petit- 
Dieulet wood, where, being attacked on its left flank, a return 
attack was made, and the enemy thrown back on La Besace. 
On the right of the Fouith was the Twelfth Corps, operating 
against Letanne. Beaumont having been brilliantly seized, the 
Tourth and Twelfth Corps of the Fourth Army moved against 
the Givodeau wood and Yillemontry, fighting at every step, and 
steadily extending its left wing, in order to occupy the hills 
which enclose Mouzon. From 6 to 8 o'clock a tremendous artil- 
lery and mitrailleur battle was kept up here, to which night 
alone put an end. The Fourth Corps then occupied the place. 
As the bridge here was the line of retreat for a great part of the 
French army, its crowded columns suffered terribly in crossing. 
Large quantities of baggage and material were also abandoned. 
Meanwhile, the western wing of the French army, formerly the 
right, now the left wing, crossed the river at Bazeilles. Part of 
the First Bavaiian Corps having advanced in a northeasterly 
direction toward Voncq, driving back on its way a force that 
had been withdrawn without a fight from a strong position at 
Stonne, attacked them late in the day, and in its turn won guns 
and prisoners, and inflicted severe loss on the retreating columns. 
The German army bivouacked on the line Eaucourt-Yillemontry. 
The advantages gained during this day were, the winning of so 
much ground that the passes of the Ardennes remained entirely 
in German hands, and an approach to the frontier so close that 
the ground between it and the Meuse could be occupied as a 
base of operations. In addition, the number of guns and pris- 
oners taken was enormous, amounting to more than thirty guns 
and 5,000 prisoners. The French appeared to have withdrawn 
toward Sedan, the main body having crossed the Meuse at 
Mouzon, under cover of heavy artillery-fire from the high right 
bank of the river. Mouzon is six miles north of Beaumont and 



200 THE GREAT WAR 

ten miles soutlieast of Sedan. Bazeilles is about four miles 
eoiitlieast of Sedan." 

The next day, August 31st, tlie King telegraphed to the 
Queen : 

" We had yesterday a victorious action by the Fourth, 
Twelfth (Saxon), and First Bavarian Corps. MacMahon beaten 
and pushed back from Beaumont over the Meuse to Mouzon. 
Twelve guns, some thousands of prisoners, and a great deal of 
material, in our hands. Losses moderate. I return immediately 
to the battle-field in order to follow up the fruits of the victory. 
May God graciously help us further, as thus far. Wilhelm." 

This despatch shows that the Fourth Army, under the 
Crown-Prince of Saxony, which was moving between tbe 
Crown-Prince and MacMahon, had been reeuforced from the 
Third Army. 

This battle was of great importance to the German armies, 
as, although the greater part of MacMahon's army was not 
engaged in the fight, only De Failly's corps suffeiing largely, 
yet the whole French army was held back and prevented from 
concentrating so speedily as its commander had intended on the 
east side of the Meuse, and more time was given to the Germans 
to close around it, and, by hemming it in at Sedan, compel its 
surrender. 

The 31st of August was mainly occupied by the Germans in 
bringing their forces across the Meuse, and by MacMahon in 
concentrating his forces around Sedan, most of them having, 
during the night of the 30th and the morning of the 31st, crossed 
at Bazeilles and Kemilly. There was, however, some hard fight- 
ing by the Twelfth (Saxon) Corps from 5 a. m. to about 10 A. m., 
in tLe vicinity of Douzy. There was also a long artillery com- 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 201 

bat at Eemilly between the First Bavarian Corps and the Frencli, 
wliieli resulted in the latter being driven back, and the former 
occupying the position ready for crossing. 

Oji the morning of the 1st of September the two contending 
armies occupied the positions indicated in the annexed map. 

As the German troops had been making forced marches and 
fighting for three days, and it was evident that MacMahou was 
in a trap from which he could not escape, it had been the pur- 
pose of the King of Prussia to give his troops a day of rest on 
the 1st of September, before dealing the finishing stroke to the 
French army ; but the enthusiasm and ardor of the men were so 
great, and their desire to complete the work so earnest, that, late 
in the night of August 31st, the decision was made to move 
forward the ensuing day. 

At midnight the necessary orders were issued by the Crown- 
Prince of Saxony, and the battle was to begin at 5 o'clock in 
the morning. liis army occupied the right flank, the Twelfth 
Corps as advance-guard, behind them the Fourth, then the 
Guards, and, finally, the Fourth Cavalry Division. Those 
troops which remained west of the river were to cross at Douzy. 
On the left, and lying on the left bank of the Meuse, were the 
First and Second Bavarian Corps ; their bridge was thrown over 
opposite Bazeilles. On the left flank the Eleventh Prussian 
Corps laid down its bridge, 1,000 paces below Donchery, and 
close by the Fifth Corps crossed ; on the extreme left flank the 
"Wiirtemberg troops crossed, at the village Dom-le-Mesnil. The 
Sixth Corps was in reserve between Attigny and Le Chene. 
Opposed to these bodies were the French corps of MacMahon, 
Failly, Canrobert, the remains of General Douay's forces, and 
the newly-formed Twelfth Corps. Sedan was the centre of their 
position, and their lines extended from Givonne on the left, along 
the spurs of the Ardennes which lie behind the fortress, to the 
neighborhood of Mezieres, upon which their right flank rested. 
12 



Ems - Cli l$^^y ^^ _ . 7« CA^^rJij^ 




'Venolress& 

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.oriJS 






l'bfV& 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 202 

Headquarters of the Crown-Prince were established on a hil. 
near Chateau Donchery, from which not only the positions of 
all the German troops, but all the developments of the battle, 
could be plainly seen. 

A thick fog overhung the country as the Fourth Army put 
itself in motion, a little after 5 o'clock, and at 6.30 steady artil- 
lery-fire was heard from behind Sedan, where the right wing 
had attacked the enemy on his left flank. His position here 
was very strong, lying in a wooded and hilly country by the 
villages Floing, Illj^, La Chapelle, and Yillers, and traversed by 
the valley in which lies the village of La Givonne. In spite of 
stout efforts on the part of the Germans, the conflict at lengtJi 
came to a standstill for an hour. During this time the Eleventh 
Corps pressed forward over the small hills which lie on the plain 
between Donchery and Sedan, and the Fifth Corj^s undertook 
the tactical march of the day, passing along the high hills north- 
west of the fortress to the rear of the enemy. Its object was to 
unite with the extreme right of the Fourth Army, and thus 
envelope the French. The Wiirtemberg troops, and, later, the 
Fourth Cavalry Division also, were to hold the plain against any 
sortie of the enemy — an event that could hardly have proven 
fortunate for him, as the river-crossings all lay in the hands of 
the Germans. 

The Wiirtemberg troops were also charged with repulsing 
any movement made from Mezieres. It was directed to cross at 
Nouvion, on the right bank, and take position near Yiviers-au- 
Court on the road from Sedan to Mezieres. Breaking camp at 
6 o'clock in the morning, the river was crossed on a pontoon 
bridge which had been thrown across at daybreak, and at 9 
o'clock Yiviers-au-Court was reached. Here they were ordered 
to advance eastward, toward Brigne-aux-Bois in battle-order. 
In front of the latter place the Fifth and Eleventh Prussian 
Corps were met, who were in march toward St. Menges. At 



204. THE GREAT WAR 

10.30 o'clock the order was to take up position near Doncliery, 
"While in this place, at 3 p. m., word came that a column from 
Mezieres was marching in the direction of the pontoon bridge, 
and a detail of one regiment infantry, one squadron cavalry, 
and a field-battery, was sent to head it off, which was success- 
fully done. Toward 5 p. m. the artillery was advanced to a 
point west of Sedan, for the purpose of bombarding the place. 

To go back to the main operations : At 9.15 o'clock the 
Eleventh Corps had finished its extension in the ground west of 
Sedan, and begun a heavy fire from its batteries. At this signal 
the Saxon troops on the right flank, who had not before exhib- 
ited their full strength, attacked in force, and even at this early 
hour the French showed in some points a disposition to retreat. 
But the troops who resorted to this movement only fell into the 
hands of the flanking columns. "West of Sedan, where the 
Eleventh Corps had posted strong batteries, the French made 
two cavalry attacks, which were conducted with great courage, 
and, by some regiments, as the Chasseurs d'Afrique, with the 
greatest valor. The infantry, however, showed less spirit, and 
the number of men taken without arms in their hands was con- 
siderable even at noon. In the meantime the Fifth Corps had 
accomplished its flanking march, falling in, toward the end of 
its movement, with those portions of the Fifth French Corps 
which had begun the retreat. The artillery, which, by the 
Emperor's orders, had been directed against this flanking corps, 
was quickly driven back, and the commander sent word that at 
the most only a few disordered bands could have found their 
way to the frontier. 

The attention of the German leaders was now directed to 
Sedan itself and the ground near it, the only remaining refuge 
for an army that had retreated from so many fields. But even 
this line of retreat was rapidly cut off. The batteries of the 
right and left flanks approached each other rapidly. In this 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 205 

part of the field lay Bazeilles, a village wliich became the scene 
of one of the most terrible events of the war. Already, on 
August 31st, some houses had been fired by shells, because they 
harbored French soldiers, who endeavored to oppose the crossing 
of the river. During this day's battle some Bavarians advanced 
against the town, but met with so destructive a fire from some 
houses that tliese, too, had to be burned. The fight afterward 
extended through the streets, and, after several hours of very 
bloody work, the place was taken. Members of the Sanitary 
Corps advanced to bring off" the wounded who were lying in 
the streets. The Germans report that these were received with 
a murderous fire, and six of them were wounded. Some troops 
then advanced to scour the town, and men, women, and children 
were driven from the houses with arms in their hands. But the 
French seemed determined to make a Saragossa of the place. 
ISTo sooner had the soldiers passed by than the houses filled 
again, and firing from the windows was resumed. Sevei-al sol- 
diers were shot, and orders w^ere given for the destruction of the 
place. In the terrible scene which followed — soldiers, citizens, 
women, and children were burned to death ; and for days after- 
ward the place is said to have been noisome with the stench of 
half-roasted, half-putrid flesh. Scenes of dreadful cruelty oc- 
curred ; and each side charges the other with dragging and 
throwing the living into the flames. 

Continuing on, the Bavarians took the village .Balan, and 
towards midday Villette was shelled from one of their batteries. 
The church-tower was immediately in flames ; the French, artil- 
lery withdrew ; and the E.leventli and Twelfth Corps had now 
Qothing in their way to Sedan. The French were hastening in 
J ark masses to the fortress, and at the same time beyond the 
line of German troops thousands of prisoners were descending 
the hills to be collected in squads in the plain and transported 
to the rear. A little before 2 o'clock the junction of the right 



206 THE GREAT WAR 

and left wings had been accomplished, and a double line ol' Ger- 
mans stood around the town and its crowded refugees. In iso- 
lated positions a few troops still kept up the contest ; but the 
great cannonade had ceased, and a pause began, during which 
the conquerors awaited the course of their enemy. No sign was 
made, and at 4.30 o'clock the batteries were ordered to open 
again. In a quarter of an hour a straw-magazine was in flames; 
and immediately after a white flag appeared upon the fortifica- 
tions. The further history of this important event M'e will leave 
to be told by King Wilhelm, General von Moltke, and Count 
Bismarck, who have written accounts in every way remarkable, 
of the surrender, and the extraordinary occurrences which pre- 
ceded and followed it. 

The letter from the King says : 

" Yendeesse, September 3cl, 1870. 

" You now know from my three telegrams the entire extent 
of the great historical event that has occurred. It is like a 
dream, even when one has seen it develop hour by hour. 

" When I remember that, after a great, fortunate war, I had 
nothing more glorious to expect during my reign, and now see 
this world-historic act completed, I bow myself before God, who 
alone, my Lord and my Helper, has chosen me to fulfil this 
work, and has ordained us to be instruments of His will. Only 
in this sense did I venture to undertake the work — that in 
humility I might praise God's guidance and mercy. 

" Now for a picture of the battle and its consequences, in 
condensed terms : 

"The army had arrived, on the evening of the 31st, and 
early on the 1st, in the positions before described, round about 
Sedan. The Bavarians had the left wing at Bazeilles on the 
Meuse ; near them the Saxons, toward Moncelles and Daigny ; 
the Guards still on the march toward Givonne ; the Fifth and 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 209 

Eleventh Corps toward St. Menges and Fleigneux. The Meusc 
makes here a sharp curve, and therefore from St. Menges to 
Doncherj there was no corps placed, but in the latter town 
Wiirtembergers, who at the same time covered the rear against 
attacks from Mezieres. The Cavalry Division of Count Stolberg 
was in the plain of Donchery as right wing ; in the front toward 
Sedan, the rest of the Bavarians. 

" The battle began at Bazeilles early on the 1st in spite of a 
thick fog, and a very heavy fight gradually spread, in which we 
were obliged to take house by house, which lasted nearly the 
whole day, and in which Schciler's Erfurt Division (from the 
reserve Fourth Corps) had to take part. Just as I arrived on 
the front before Sedan, at 8 o'clock, the great battery began its 
fire against the fortifications. A tremendous artillery battle 
now spread on all sides, continuing for hours, and during which 
ground was gradually won by our side. The villages named 
were taken. 

" Yery deep-cut ravines with woods made the advance of 
the infantry difficult, and favored the defence. The villages of 
Illy and Floing were taken, and the ring of fire drew itself 
gradually closer and closer around Sedan. It was a grand sight 
from our position on a commanding height behind the before- 
named battery, before and on the right of Frenois village, above 
St. Torcy. 

" The determined resistance of the enemy began gradually 
to slacken, as we could discover by the disordered battalions 
which ran hastily back out of the woods and villages., The 
cavalry tried an attack against some battalions of our Fifth 
Corps, which maintained an excellent bearing ; the cavalry 
rushed through the intervals between the battalions, then turned 
around and back by the same way ; which was repeated three 
times by different regiments, so that the field was strewn with 
corpses and horses, all of which we could clearly see from our 



210 THE GREAT WAR 

standpoint. I have not yet been able to ascertain the number 
of this brave regiment. 

"Inasmuch as the retreat of the enemy lapsed' in many 
places into flight, and every thing — infantry, cavalry, and artil- 
lery — crowded into the city and immediate neighborhood, but 
still no sign that the enemy proposed to withdraw himself by 
capitulation out of this dubious position showed itself, nothing 
remained but to order the bombardment of the city by the 
above-mentioned battery. After about twenty minutes it was 
already on fire in many places, which, with the numerous burn- 
ing villages in the whole ring of battle, made a shuddering 
impression. I therefore ordered the fire to cease, and sent 
Lieutenant-Colonel von Bronsart of the general staft' as flag of 
truce, to propose the capitulation of the army and fortress. He 
was immediately met by a Bavarian officer, who informed me 
that a French flag of truce had presented itself at the gate. 
Lieutenant-Colonel von Bronsart was admitted, and upon his 
inquiring for the general-in-chief he was unexpectedly led before 
the Emperor, who wished to give him at once a letter to me. 
When the Emperor asked what messages he had, and received 
for answer, ' To demand the surrender of army and fortress,' he 
replied that for that purjDOse he must apply to General de 
Wimpffen, who had just then taken command in place of the 
wounded Marshal MacMahon, and that he would also send his 
Adjutant-General Reille with the letter to me. It was 1 o'clock 
when Keille and Bronsart came to me. The latter came a little 
in advance, and from him we first learned with certainty that 
the Emperor was present. You can imagine the impression it 
made upon me, above all, and upon all ! Reille sprang from 
the saddle, and handed me the letter of his Emperor, adding 
that besides that he had no message. Before I opened the 
letter I said to him, ' But I demand as the first condition that 
the army lay dov.m its arms.' The letter began in this way : 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 211 

'N'ayant pas pu mourir a la tete de mes troupes, je depose mon 
epee il Yotre Majeste ' — (l!!Tot having been able to die at the head 
of my troops, I lay down my sword to your Majesty) ; confid- 
ing all the rest to me in secrecy. 

" My reply was, that I complained of the style of onr inter- 
course, and desired the sending of an authorized representative 
with whom the capitulation could be concluded. After I had 
given the letter to General Kcille, I spoke some words with him 
as an old acquaintance, and so ended this act. I empowered 
Moltke as commissioner, and instructed Bismarck to remain 
behind, in case political questions came up ; rode then to my 
wagon, and drove here, greeted everywhere on the road with 
stormy hurrahs from the advancing trains, while everywhere 
the popular hymns rose in chorus. It was thrilling ! All had 
struck lights, so that one drove for a time in an improvised 
illumination. At 11 o'clock I was here, and drank with those 
around me to the health of the army which had fought out such 
a conclusion. 

" Since I had received on the morning of the 2d no in- 
formation from Moltke upon the terms of the capitulation which 
should have taken place in Donchery, I drove somewhat down- 
cast toward the battle-field. At 8 o'clock in the morning I met 
Moltke, who came to me to obtain my acquiescence in the 
capitulation which he presented, and at the same time pointed 
out that the Emperor had left Sedan at 5 o'clock in the morn- 
ing, and had also come to Donchery. Since he wished to speak 
to me, and there was a little castle in the park, I chose this for 
the meeting. At 10 o'clock I arrived on the height before 
Sedan. At 12 o'clock Moltke and Bismarck appeared with the 
completed terms of capitulation. At 1 o'clock I placed myself 
in motion with Fritz, accompanied by the staff cavalry escort. 
I alighted before the castle, \\-herc the Emperor came to meet 
rae, TliG visit lasted a quarter of an hour. 'We were both 



212 THE GREAT WAR 

very much moved at thus seeing each other again. All that I 
felt, after l)aving seen NajJoleon only three years before at the 
summit of his power, I cannot describe. 

" After this meeting I rode from 2.30 to 7.30 o'clock through 
the entire army around Sedan. 

"The reception by the troops, the sight of the decimated 
Guards — all that, I cannot describe to you to-day. I was pro- 
foundly moved by so many proofs of love and fidelity. 

" IsTow, li)G wohl. With an agitated heart at the end of such 
a letter, 

" WiLHELM." 

According to T'rench papers, the terms of capitulation were : 

" Between the undersigned, Chief of the General Staff of 
King Wilhelin, Commander-in-Chief of the German armies, 
and the General commanding the French army, both furnished 
with full powers from their Majesties, the King "Wilhelm and 
the Emperor JSTapoleon, the following convention has been con- 
cluded : 

" Article I, The French army placed under the orders of 
General Wimpffen, finding itself actually surrounded by the 
superior troops about Sedan, is prisoner of war. 

" Article II. Considering the valorous defence of that French 
army, exemption for all the generals and officers, also for all the 
superior officials having the rank of officers, who give their 
pai'ole of honor in writing not to carry arms against Germany, 
and not to act in any manner against her interests, up to the 
end of the present war. The officers and officials who accept 
these conditions retain their arms, and the effects which belong 
to them personally. , 

" Article III. All the arms, as well as the material of the 
army, consisting of flags, eagles, cannon, munitions, &c., shall 



BETWEEN FRANCE AJ^D GERMANY. 213 

be delivered at Sedan to a military commission appointed by 
the general-in-cliief, to be sent immediately to the German com 
missioners. 

" Article lY. The place of Sedan shall be placed in its 
present condition, and at the latest on the evening of the 2d, 
at the disposal of his Majesty the King Wilhelm. 

" Article V. The officers who do not accept the engagement 
mentioned in Article II, as well as all the troops, disarmed, 
shall be conducted, ranged according to their regiments or eorps, 
in military order. This measure will commence the 2d of Sep- 
tember, and be finished the 3d. These detachments shall be 
conducted to the ground bounded by the Mouse near Iges, to be 
delivered to the German commissioners by their officers, who 
will then surrender their command to their under-officers. The 
surgeons shall without exception remain at the rear to attend 
the wounded. 

" At Frenois, September 2, 1870. 

" MoLTKE and De Wimpffen." 

The King's telegram announcing the success of his army was : 

" Since 7.30 o'clock continuously advancing battle round 
about Sedan, Guards, Fourth, Fifth, Twelfth Corps, and Bava- 
rian. Enemy almost entirely thrown back on the city. 

" Wilhelm." 

The King also sent the following despatches from Sedan at 
1.30 p. M. : 

"The capitulation by which the entire army in Sedan [be- 
come] prisoners of war, is just now concluded with General 
WimpfFen, who takes command in the place of the wounded 
Marshal MacMahon. The Emperor has surrendered only him- 



214 THE GREAT WAR 

self to me, since lie does not occupy tlie command, and lianda 
over every thing to the regency in Paris. I shall determine his 
residence after I have seen him at a rendezvous which takes 
place immediately. What a change of fortune through God's 
guidance ! 

« WiLHELM." 

" What a thrilling moment, that of the meeting with ISTa- 
poleon ! He was bowed, but dignified and resigned. I have 
given him Wilhelmshohe, near Cassel, for a residence. Our 
meeting took place in a little castle before the western glacis of 
Sedan. From there I rode through the army about Sedan. 
You can imagine the reception by the troops — indescribable ! 
At dusk — 7.30 o'clock— I had finished the five hours' ride, but 
returned here only at 1 o'clock. God help further ! 

" WiLHELM." 

On the 2d of September General von Moltke, the Chief of 
Staff of the Prussian army, issued the following order for carry- 
ing out the capitulation : 

" Hbadquartees, FRiNOis, September 2, 1870. 
" The French army lying in and about Sedan has capitu- 
lated. OflScers will be liberated on their word of lionor; the 
under-officers and common soldiers are prisoners of war. Arms 
and army material will be given up." (Here follows the text 
of the capitulation already given.) " The prisoners of war, 
whose number is not yet ascertained, will be assembled in the 
bend of the Meuse, near Yillette and Iges, and afterward con- 
ducted away in echelons. The Eleventh and Twelftli Koyal 
Bavarian Army-Corps, under the general command of General 
von der Tann, are appointed to the first guard. The supplying 
of the prisoners, for which, according to the promise of the 




THE LAST CHARGE OF THE FEEISTCH AT SEDAN. 




THE FIELD GUNS CAPITTRED BY THE GERMANS AT SEDAN. 



BETWEEN FKANCE AND GERMANY. 21Y 

Frencli general commanding, stores are to be brought from 
Mezieres to near Donchery by railroad, will also be regulated 
by General von der Tann. That no diflSculty in the approach 
of trains is laid in the way, is carefully to be observed. An 
infantry regiment from the Eleventh Corps will be placed in the 
fortress as garrison to-morrow after Sedan shall have been evacu- 
ated. 

" The withdrawal of the prisoners in two lines by way of 
Stenay, Etain, and Gorze to Remilly, and Buzancy, Clermont, 
and St. Mihiel to Pont-a-Mousson, will be conducted by the 
army under his Royal Highness the Crown-Prince of Saxony 
find the royal commander-in-chief of the Third Army, according 
to the order of this morning. In order to avoid every doubt, it 
is to be remarked that the French officers captured yesterday in 
battle, and to-day before the close of the capitulation at 11 
o'clock, are to be treated in accordance with the rules previously 
in force. 

" Officers and officials who give their parole must themselves 
prepare the proper notification. Both classes must report as 
soon as possible to the quartermaster-general of the army. The 
horses to be delivered on the part of the Erench army shall, in 
accordance with the orders of his Majesty the King, be distrib- 
uted for the benefit of all the active German forces, and the 
army commanders will be hereafter informed upon their respec- 
tive quotas. 

" The clearing up of the battle-field is the duty of the Gen- 
eral of Depot-Inspection of the army of his Poyal Highness the 
Crown-Prince of Saxony. The burial of the dead is to be hast- 
ened by means of the civil authorities. 

"YoN MOLTKE." 

The following letter from Count von Bismarck describes his 
part in the negotiations : 



218 THE GREAT WAR 

"DoNCHERT, September 2, 1870. 
" After I had come here yesterday evening, according to your 
Majesty's order, to take part in tlie negotiations upon the capitu- 
lation, the latter were interrupted until about 1 o'clock at night 
by the granting of time for consideration, which General Wimpf- 
fen begged after General von Moltke had decidedly declared 
that no other condition than the laying down of the arms would 
be accepted, and that the bombardment would begin again at 9 
o'clock the next morning if the capitulation were not concluded 
by that time. At 6 o'clock this morning General Eeille was 
announced, who informed me that the Emperor desired to see 
me, and was already on the way here from Sedan. The General 
i-eturned immediately in order to inform his Majesty that I fol- 
lowed him, and shortly after I found myself perhaps half-way 
between here and Sedan in the neighborhood of Frenois, in pres- 
ence of the Emperor. His Majesty was in an open carriage 
with three superior officers, and an equal number in the saddle 
near by. Of the latter. Generals Castelnau, Eeille, Yaubert, 
and Moskowa were personally known to me, the last-named 
appearing to be wounded in the foot. Arrived at the carriage, 
I dismounted from the horse, stepped to the side of the Empe- 
ror, and, standing on the carriage-step, inquired after the orders 
of his Majesty. The Emperor then expressed the wish to see 
your Royal Majesty, apparently under the impression that your 
Majesty was also in Donchery. After I replied that the head- 
quarters of your Majesty were at present fifteen miles distant, in 
Vendresse, the Emperor inquired if your Majesty had fixed 
upon a place to which he should go at once, and afterward what 
my views thereupon were. I answered him that I had come 
here in full darkness, and the neighborhood was therefore un- 
known to me, and placed at his disposal the house occupied by 
me in Donchery, which I would immediately leave. The Empe- 
ror accepted this, and rode slowly toward Donchery, but drew 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMAN r. 210 

up some hundred paces before the bridge leading over the Mense 
into the city, in front of a laborer's house standing ah^ue, and 
asked me if he conld- not descend there. 1 had the house in- 
spected by Councillor of Legation Count Bohlen-Bisraarck, who 
had meantime followed, me. After he had reported that its inte- 
rior was very bare and small, but that the house was free from 
wounded, the Emperor descended, and desired me to follow him 
within. Here, in a very small room, containing a table and two 
chairs, I had a convei'sation of about an hour with the Emperor. 
His Majesty expressed chiefly the wish to obtain more favorable 
terms of capitulation for the army. I declined absolutely to 
consider this subject with his Majesty, as this purely military 
question was to be settled between General von Moltke and 
General de "Wimj^fFen. In return I asked the Emperor if his 
Majesty was inclined to negotiations for peace. The Emperor 
replied that, as prisoner, he was not now in a condition [to treat 
for peace] ; and to my further question to whom, accord! ug to 
his views, the Government of France would now revert, his 
Majesty referred me to the existing Government in Paris. After 
explanation of this point, which was not to be decided with cer- 
tainty from yesterday's letter of the Emperor to your Majesty, 
I perceived that the situation to-day, as yesterdaj^, offered no 
other practical question than the military one ; nor did I conceal 
this from the Emperor, but expressed the necessity which result- 
ed therefrom to us of obtaining before all things, by the capitu- 
lation, a substantial means of securing the military results which 
we had won. I had already, yesterday evening, weighed the 
question in every direction with General von Moltke, whether it 
would be possible, without injury to German interests, to offer 
better terms than those fixed upon to the members of an army 
that had fought well. After due consideration, we were both 
forced to hold the negative of this question. "When, therefore, 
General von Moltke, who meanwhile had approached from the 



220 THE GREAT WAR 

city, went to your Majesty in order to lay before your Majesty 
the wish of the Emperor, this was done, as your Majesty knows, 
not with the purpose of supporting the same. 

" The Emperor next went into the open air, and invited me 
to seat myself near him before the door of the house. Hia 
Majesty laid before me the question whether it were not possible 
to allow the French army to go over the Belgian frontier, in 
order to have it disarmed and disposed of there. I had also dis- 
cussed this possibility with General von Moltke the evening 
before, and quoting the motives indicated above, I declined to 
go into the discussion of this m.ethod. In regard to the political 
situation, I took, for my part, no initiative, and the Emperor 
only in so far as he bewailed the misfortune of the war, and 
declared that he himself had not desired the war, but had been 
forced to it by the pressure of public opinion in France. 

" From information received in the city, and especially 
tlirough examination by the officers of the general staff, it was, 
in the meantime, between 9 and 10 o'clock, ascertained that 
Bellevue Castle, near Frenois, was sm'ted to the reception of the 
Emperor, and also that it was not yet filled with wounded. I 
reported this to his Majesty, in the form that I pointed out Fre- 
nois as the place which I would submit to your Majesty for the 
interview, and therefore put it to the Emperor if his Majesty 
would go there at once, inasmuch as a stay in the small laborer's 
house was inconvenient, and the Emperor would perhaps require 
some rest. This his Majesty willingly entered into ; and I 
escorted the Emperor, who was preceded by an escort of honor 
from your Majesty's body-guard of cuirassiers, to Bellevue Cas- 
tle, where, meanwhile, the remainder of the suite and the equi- 
pages of the Emperor, whose arrival from the city appeared to 
have been considered uncertain until then, had gone. Also 
General de Wimpffen, with whom, in expectation of the return 
of Gen*eral von Moltke, the discussion of the negotiations rela- 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY, 221 

tive to a capitulation, which had been interrupted yesterday, 
were resumed by General von Podbielski, in presence of Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel von Yerdy and the chief of staff of General de 
Wimpffen, which two officers were charged with the treaty. I 
took part only in the beginning, by laying down the political 
and legal conditions in accordance with the revelations furnished 
me by the Emperor himself, inasmuch as I immediately there- 
after received, through Count von ISTostitz, as messenger from 
General von Moltke, the information that your Majesty would 
not see the Emperor until after the close of the capitulation of 
the army — a notification by which the hope of receiving any 
other terms than those previously decided upon had to be given 
up. I then rode, with the intention of reporting to your 
Majesty the position of the affair, toward your Majesty at Che- 
hery ; met on the way General von Moltke with the text of the 
capitulation signed by your Majesty, which, after we had en 
tered Frenois with him, was at once accepted without opposi- 
tion, and signed. The bearing of General de Wimpffen, as well 
as that of the other French generals, the night before, was very 
dignified ; and this brave officer could not restrain himself from 
expressing to me his deep pain that he should be just the one to 
be called, forty-eight hours after his arrival from Africa, and 
half a day after assuming the command, to place his name under 
a capitulation so ominous to French arms ; nevertheless, the lack 
of provisions and munitions, and the absolute impossibility of 
any further defence, laid upon him the duty, as general, of re- 
straining his personal feelings, since, in the existing situation, a 
farther shedding of blood could alter nothing. The acquies- 
cence in the dismissal of the officers upon their word of honor 
was recognized with great thankfulness, as an expression, of' your 
Majesty's intention not to trample upon the feeling* of aa avmj 
which had fought bravely, beyond the line which, in view of 
our political and military interests, was. necessarily drawn. 
13 



222 THE GEEAT WAR 

General de Wimpffen. has also subsequently given expression to 
this feeling, in a letter in which he spoke his thanks to General 
von Moltke for the considerate forms in -which the negotiations 
have been carried on from his side. 

" Count Bismaeck." 

The severe wound received bj Marshal MacMahon on the 
31st of August prevented his presence in the final battle or the 
capitulation, and also prevented his rendering any report of the 
battle. General de Wimpffen, who was in command during the 
battle, issued an address to his soldiers after the capitulation, of 
whicb the following is a translation •: 

" Sedak, September 3, 1870. 
" SoLDiEES : On Thursday you fought against a force greatly 
superior in numbers, from daybreak until dark. You resisted 
the enemy with the utmost bravery. When you had fired your 
last cartridge, were worn out with fighting, and not being able 
to respond to the call of generals and oflacers to attempt to rejoin 
Marshal Bazaine on the road to Montmedy, you were forced to 
retreat on Sedan. In this desperate efifort but 2,000 men could 
be got together, and your General deemed the attempt utterly 
hopeless and impracticable. Your General found, with deep 
regret, when the army was reunited within the walls of the 
town, that it had supplies neither of food nor ammunition ) 
could neither leave the place nor defend it, means of existence 
being alike wanting for the population. I was therefore reduced 
to the sad alternative of treating with the enemy. I sent, yes- 
terday, to the Prussian headquarters, with, full powers from the 
Emperor, but could not at first bring myself to accept the con- 
ditions imposed by the enemy. This morning, however, men- 
aced by a bombardment to whicb we could not reply, I decided 
to make a fresh attem.pt to get honorable terms. I have ob- 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 223 

tained conditions by wliich we are saved mucli of tlie possible 
annoying and insulting formalities which the usages of war gen- 
erally impose, 

" Under the circumstances in which we find ourselves, it 
only remains for us, officers and soldiers, to accept with resigna- 
tion the consequences of this surrender. "We have at least the 
consolation of knowing a useless massacre has been avoided, and 
we yield only under circumstances against which no army could 
fight, namely, want of food and ammunition. Kow, soldiers, in 
conclusion, let me say, that you are still able to render brilliant 
services to your country, without being needlessly slaughtered. 

" Db Wimpffen, 
" General Commanding-in-ChiefP 

A member of General de Wimpfien's staff soon after the 
battle published an account of the General's part in it, reflecting 
very severely on the management of the whole matter by the 
Emperor, asserting that he refused to De Wimpffen the opportu- 
nity of making an escape with the greater part of the army, 
and, when he sought to resign, compelled him to continue in the 
command and capitulate in consequence of his own blunders. 
To these charges the Emperor's adjutant-generals replied, and, 
though admitting his offer of resignation, demonstrated the im- 
possibility and folly of his attempting to escape with any consid- 
erable portion of his force. 

But though there are no official reports of the battle and sur- 
render by French officers, there are not wanting graphic and 
unusually accurate descriptions of both by French correspond- 
ents. One of these, from the pen of a French officer, a corre- 
spondent of the Tribune^ we append, as perhaps the best account 
extant from a French standpoint : 

" I pass over all that has happened since I wrote you from 



224 THE GREAT WAR 

Mezieres, to come at once to tlie events of August 31st and Sep' 
tember 1st — the latter tlie saddest day the Trench arms have 
ever witnessed. 

" Early in the morning of the 31st orders were given to 
bring into Sedan all the wagon-trains and oxen which had been 
left outside the glacis. By this time the streets were blocked up 
by troops of every kind, which had entered the town during the 
night. I tried to ride down to the Porte de Paris, where the 
train was stationed, to carry the orders. I was obliged to get 
off my horse and make my way as best I could between the 
horses and caissons, which choked up every street and square of 
the town. As I reached the Porte de Paris, I met the wagon- 
train entering as fast as possible, followed closely by the rushing 
oxen, and intermingled with the weeping and terror-stricken 
peasantry of the neighborhood flying into the town for protec- 
tion. They little knew that it was about the worst place they 
could have chosen. The gates on that side were immediately 
afterward closed, while the troops slowly filed out through the 
opposite gate toward Douzy, where all MacMahon's forces were 
posted, expecting to be again attacked by the Prussians, who 
had closely followed up the Prench army. 

" About 10 o'clock that morning cannonading was heard six 
or seven miles away, toward the village of Bazeille. I went up 
on the rampart overlooking the country in that direction. 
Thence I could see the Prussian position, and, with my field- 
glass, could watch the firing ; but I could not see the French 
lines, which were hid from me by trees about a mile from the 
town. I therefore, at noon, walked out of the town at the Porte 
de Balan, and ascended, on my left, the rising ground which is 
close by the town. ]S"ot more than half a mile from the gate I 
passed through regiments of reserve infantry. Their arms were 
piled and the fires smoking, the soup not having long been 
eaten. I continued ascending, and everywhere passed reserve 



BETWEEN" FRANCE AND GERMANY. ^ 225 

corps of infantry and artillery. I got higher and higher, from 
hillock to hillock, till I reached a battery of reserve, the guns of 
which were nnlimbered and placed facing the rear of the French 
left. This battery was so pointed as to fire over the crest of the 
rising ground on which I stood. Abont a quarter of a mile dis- 
tant, in front of a little churchyard, stood also several officers of 
the different corps which were stationed on my right and left, all 
being of the reserve, 

" From the point I had now reached a charming prospect 
was within view. The French line of battle extended right in 
front, spreading on the slope of the ground which forms one side 
of this basin of the Meuse. In front of the centre of the French 
lines, and lower down in the vale, was, the village of Bazeille, 
which was then beginning to burn, the Prussian shells havmg set 
fire to it. Parallel almost to the front of the French positions 
ran the Meuse, crossed by a bridge a little to the left of Bazeille. 
The French right was upon a knot of wooded ground held by 
tirailleurs, the wooded ground extending nearly to the grounds 
of Sedan. The left was lost to my sight behind the inequalities 
of the ground toward the road to Bouillon. As far as I could 
see, on the right and left and in front of me, were massed regi- 
ments of all arms ; but toward the left, on the second line, was 
a very large force of heavy cavalry- — dragoons and cuirassiers. 

'• The sun was shining brightly, and every thing was plainly 
visible. The glittering of weapons, the bright and showy colors 
of the French uniforms, the white smoke curling under the blue 
sky, or lingering like vapor beneath the trees, the lurid flames 
rising from the burning village of Bazeille, all seen from a com- 
manding position, formed a spectacle such as one has but rarely 
the opportunity to witness. The principal Prussian batteries 
were directly opposite the French centre, on a plateau or table- 
land which terminated abruptly, and made it a very strong posi- 
sion. 



226 THE GEEAT WAK 

" For some time cannonading continued on both sides. At 2 
o'clock a force of Pnissian infantry advanced across tlie bridge 
in the village of Donzy, and immediately there began a very 
sharp fusillade^ lasting, however, not more than ten minutes. I 
think the French must have lost ground in that encounter, 
although I could not see it, because of some trees that inter- 
vened ; but a battery of six mitrailleuses advanced and opened 
fire through the trees. Six volleys came all at once. The Prus- 
sians fell hurriedly back, leaving whole ranks behind, which had 
gone down like those leaden soldiers which children play with. 

" At about 4.30 o'clock the firing had ceased everywhere. 
The village, which had been blazing all day, was still smoking. 
The French remained iu the same position. Tliough the day had 
apparently been without result, its description is a necessary pre- 
lude to the bitter story of the morrow. At 5.30 o'clock 1 re- 
turned to the town. 

" The Emperor, who had arrived during the night, had issued 
a proclamation which was posted on the walls, saying that he 
had confided the command of the armies to the generals whom 
public opinion had seemed to select as most capable of leading 
them, and that he himself intended to fight as an officer, forget- 
ting for a while his position as a sovereign. 

" The next morning — Thursday, September 1st — I returned, 
as soon as the gates of the town were opened, to my post of ob- 
servation on the elevated ground where the battery was still 
placed. The French positions did not seem to me much altered, 
but the right was now on the other side of Sedan. At 7 o'clock 
the cannonade began in earnest, some slight firing having taken 
place earlier. The Prussian batteries facing us appeared to me 
much more numerous ; indeed, it seemed to me there were bat- 
teries everywhere. They roared from every point of the Prus- 
sian line, which then stretched nearly parallel in front of the 
French. T could follow the falling of their shells, which ex- 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 227 

ploded as fhej touched the ground, and fell with wonderful pre- 
cision. I noticed, also, how quickly tliej changed and corrected 
their fire. As soon as a French corps took up a position, it was 
instantly assailed by shells. The first would perhaps fall a few 
feet short or beyond, hut the second or third was sure to find its 
way to the troops and do its awful work among them. The 
French shells, on the contrary, exploded generally before they 
reached the ground, and the smoke of the explosion formed 
innumerable little clouds at different heights, some at such an 
elevation that the shell could do no harm, I should think, to the 
enemy. 

" I noticed some inexplicable movements. A few squadrons 
of Prussian cavalry made as if they would charge a French force 
which was toward the left. Immediately two regiments of 
French cavalry charged m turn upon the Prussian squadrons, 
which fell back and fled. But at the same moment a Prussian 
corps of infantry opened a murderous fire ui3on those too eager 
French cavalry regiments, and they came back sadly shattered 
from their rash pursuit. About 9 o'clock I could not help fan- 
cying that the Prussians were extending farther to the left ; for, 
on asking whether certain new batteries were French, I was told 
they were Prussian. The Prussian line was evidently curling 
around us. 

" I have learned since that the Crown-Prince had crossed the 
Meuse during the night about five leagues from Sedan, and that 
this had not been known to MacMahon. A large force of Bava- 
rians must also have arrived after the commencement of the bat- 
tle, for it was Bavarian troops who began pounding us from the 
left. At 10.30 o'clock the advance of the Prussians was percep- 
tible on both wings at the same time. Some French infantry 
which was close to the town on the east side gave way, as it 
seemed to me, rather quickly. Soon afterward shells were com- 
ing from behind my left, and it became evident that the French 



228 THE GREAT WAR 

position had been turned, and tliat a fresli German corps Jhad 
taken a position in our rear. 

" The reserves were now necessarily directed against these 
points. Tlie battery near which I stood was already in action, 
and I thought it quite time to beat a retreat. The place was 
becoming as dangerous as any in the field. Among the guns 
close to me, the Prussian shells began falling with their usual 
beautiful precision ; so I got on the other side of the slope, and 
made my way toward the town. 

" As the road to Bouillon, which crossed the field of battle, 
was wholly closed to me now, I also perceived that I should be 
shut up in that circle which the Prussians had been drawing 
about the army and the town, and which was ultimately com- 
pleted. I made my way as fast as I could, by the safest paths. 
"When I reached the suburb before the Porte de Balau, I found 
it encumbered with soldiers of all corps, hastening, as I was, into 
the town. It was a defeat, evidently, yet it was not 11 o'clock, 
and the battle was destined to continue at various points for 
some time longer, though continuing without any real hope of 
victory. 

" To one entering the town as I did, there was no longer any 
battle to describe. It was first a retreat, and too soon a rout. I 
thought niyself lucky to get away from the field as I did ; for, 
an hour afterwaid, the rout of those forces that had been near 
by me was complete. Already soldiers were crushing against 
each other in the struggle to get inside the town. Dismounted 
cavalry were trying to make their way, some even by the ram- 
parts, leaping down from the counterscarp, others forcing their 
way in by the postern gates. From a nook of the ramparts, 
where I rested a moment, I saw also cuirassiers jumping — horses 
and all — into the moat, the horses breaking their legs and ribs. 
Men were scrambling over each other. There were officers of 
all ranks — colonels, and even generals, in uniforms which it was 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 229 

impossible to mistake — mixed in this sliameful melee. JBeliind 
all came guns, with their heavy carriages and powerful horses, 
forcing their way into the throng, maiming and crushing the 
fugitives on foot. 

" To add to the confusion and horror, the Prnssian batteries 
had by this time advanced within range, and the Prussian shells 
began falling among the struggling masses of men. On the 
ramparts were the ISTational Guards manning the guns of the 
town, and replying with more or less effect to the nearest Prus- 
sian batteries. It was a scene horrible enough to have suited 
the fancy of Gustavo Dore himself. T could form but one idea 
of our unhappy army — that it was at the bottom of a seething 
caldron. 

" I hurried back as best I could to my hotel, following the 
narrow streets, where the shells were least lilvely to reach the 
ground. > Wherever there was a square or open place, I came 
upon the bodies of horses and men quite dead or still quivering, 
mown to pieces by bursting shells. Peaching my hotel, I found 
the street in which it stood choked, like the rest, with wagons, 
guns, horses, and men. Most luckily, at this moment the Prus- 
sian fire did not enfilade this street ; for a train of caissons filled 
with powder blocked the whole way, itself unable to move back- 
ward or forwaTd. There was every chance that these caissons 
would explode, the town being then on fire in two places ; and 
I began to think Sedan was a place more uncomfortable than 
even the battle-field over which a victorious enemy was swiftly 
advancing. 

" From friends whom I found at the hotel I learned that the 
Emperor, who had started early in the morning for the field of 
battle, had returned about the same time that 1 did, and passed 
through the streets with his stafi". One of my friends was near 
him on the Place Turenne, when a shell fell under the Em])eror'3 
horse, and, bursting, killed the horse of a general who w^as be- 



230 THE GREAT WAR 

hind liim. He himself was untonclied, and turned around and 
smiled ; thoiigli mj friend thought he saw tears in his eyes, 
which he wiped away with his glove. Indeed, he had cause 
enough for tears on that fatal 1st of Septemher, 

" Meantime, shells began to fall in the direction of our street 
and hotel. We all stood under the vaulted stone entrance, as 
the safest shelter we could find. I trembled on account of the 
caissons still standing in the street, and filling all the space, from 
end to end. It was at this time Avhen we waited, watching pain- 
fully for the shell which would have sent us all together into 
another world, that General de "WimpfFen came past, making a 
vain effort to rally and inspirit his flying troops. He shouted, 
^Vive la France! En avant!^ But there was no response. 
He cried out that Bazaine was taking the Prussians in the rear. 
Kews which had been current all the morning at intervals, com- 
ing now from the mouth of General de Wimpffen, seemed to be 
believed, and a few thousand men were rallied, and followed him 
out of the town. People began to have hope, and for one brief 
moment we believed the day might yet be saved. N"eed I say 
that this intelligence was a patriotic falsehood of brave General 
de AVimpfien ? Mad with anguish, and in direct opposition to 
the Emperor's orders, he had resolved to rally what men he 
could, and make a stand. He could not have known that he 
was bound in the grasp of at least 300,000 men. 

" The bugle and the trumpet ring out on all sides. A few 
thousand men hearken to the sound. My friend Kene de Gui- 
roye, of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, whom I have just met, after 
losing sight of him for ten or twelve years, got on horseback 
again and joined the General. The sortie took place thus : 
They went out at the Porte de Balan. The houses of the 
suburb are already full of Prussians, who fire on the French 
out of eveiy window. The church, especially, is strongly^ gar- 
risoned, and its heavy doors are closed. The General sent off 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 



231 



De Guiroye to bring two pieces of cannon. These soon arrived, 
and with them the door of the church was blown in, and 200 
Prussians were captured and brought back with the French, 
who, in spite of all efforts, were themselves soon obliged to 
retire into the toAvn. It was the last incident of the battle — 
the last struggle. 

" While this took place at the Porte de Balan, the Prussian 
shelling went on, and the shells began to fall into the hotel. 
Shocking scenes followed. A boy, the son of a tradesman 
around the corner of the street, came in crying, and asking for 
a surgeon. His father's leg had been shot off. A woman in 
front of the house met the same fate. The doctor who went to 
the tradesman found him dead ; and, returning, attempted to 
carry the woman to an ambulance. He had scarcely made a 
step, when she was shot dead in his arms. Those of us who 
stand in the gateway and witness such scenes have got beyond 
the feeling of personal fear. Any one of us, I will venture to 
say, would give his life to spare France on this dreadful day. 
Yet we stand pale and shuddering at the sight of the fate which 
befals the poor people of the town. 

"I care not to dwell upon horrors, which, nevertheless, I 
shall never be able to forget. I can mention more than one 
brave officer who did not fear to own that he shrank from the 
sight of what had become a mere massacre. Those who were 
safely out of the way as prisoners, whether officers or men, need- 
ed no pity. AVhen, after a time, it became clear that there was 
no sign of Bazaine, the hopes of the French again departed. A 
sullen sort of fight still went on. The guns of the town an- 
swered the Prussians, An aid-de-camp of the Emperor went by 
on foot, and I heard him ask the officers near by to help him in 
putting an end to the fire. Such being the Emperor's wish, at 
length the white flag was hoisted on the citadel. The cannonade 
ceased suddenly about 4.30 o'clock. Eager as v/e were to know 



232 THE GREAT WAR 

the cause, we cannot leave tlie house, for the street is impassable, 
and we have to he content with learning the mere fact of the 
surrender. As night drew on, the crowd a little diminished, 
and by some effort it was possible to make one's way about the 
town. The spectacle it offered was more horrible than war. 
Dead were lying everywhere ; civilians and soldiers mingled in 
the slangliter. In one suburb I counted more than fifty bodies 
of peasants and bourgeois — a few women among them, and one 
child. The ground was strewn with splinters of shells. Starv- 
ing soldiers were cutting up the dead horses to cook and eat, for 
provision had again failed us, as every thing has failed since this 
campaign began. I was glad to get away from the sight of our 
disasters, and lose their remembrance in a few hours of sleep, 

" The next day we were told that the Emperor had gone to 
the King's headquarters to treat for a surrender. At 11 o'clock 
his household and carriages left the town, and we knew that he 
was a prisoner, and the Empire no more. About the same hour 
there was posted in the streets a proclamation from General 
de Wirapffen, saying that, notwithstanding prodigies of courage, 
the army, having no more ammunition, found itself unable to 
respond to the summons of its chiefs and force its way to Mont- 
medy. That being surrounded, he had made the best conditions 
he could — conditions such as would inflict no humiliation on the 
army. 

" These conditions prove to be the surrender of the whole 
army, not less than 100,000 men, as prisoners of war, with all 
their arms, baggage, horses, standards, and guns. The officers 
who sign an engagement not to serve against Prussia during the 
war may return to their homes, the remainder to be sent to Ger- 
man towns in Germany. Many officers refuse to sign, preferring 
to share the captivity of their men. 

" On Saturday the whole force laid down their arms, l^ot a 
few soldiers, in their rage, broke rather than give up then' arms, 



BETWEEN PRANCE AND GERMANY. 233 

and the streets were littered with, fragments of all kinds of weap- 
ons broken : swords, rifles, pistols, lancers, helmets, cuirasses, 
even mitrailleuses covered the ground ; and in one place, where 
the Meiise runs through the town, the heaps of such fragments 
choked the stream and rose above the surface. The mud of the 
streets was black with gunpowder. The horses had been tied to 
the houses and gun-carriages, but nobody remembered to feed or 
water them, and in the frenzy of hunger and thirst they broke 
loose and ran wild through the town. Whoever liked might 
have a horse — even officers' horses, which were private property 
— for the trouble of catching them. 

" When the Prussians came into the town they were very 
sore and angry at the sight of all this destruction and waste. 
What must have pleased them still less, was the state in which 
they found the military chest. As soon as the surrender was 
resolved on, the French officers were told to make out the best 
accounts they could, present them, and receive payment. iNatu- 
rally, the statements thus brought in soon proved sufficient to 
empty the treasury. I know of officers who demanded and 
received payment for horses that were not killed and baggage 
which had not been lost. Demoralization showed itself in every 
way. Even the standards were burned or buried — an act of bad 
faith, not to be palliated even by the rage of a beaten army. 

" Their rage is greater against no one than General de Failly. 
He had a room in the hotel where I was staying. On Friday a 
great multitude of soldiers gathered before the house, the doors 
of which were closed, demanding General de Failly with such 
shouts and menaces that the landlord thought it prudent to 
hurry him out of a back window. The soldiers, could they have 
reached him, would have torn him to pieces. Since then I have 
heard the report that he was shot by one of his own men ; but 
no such event had happened on Saturday, and could not well 
happen later. 



234 THE GREAT WAR 

" It was a relief on Saturday wlien tlie Prussians came in 
and occupied the town, and restored order. I am sorry to have 
to acknowledge that all through the campaign the French, have 
acted much more like a conquering army, in a hostile country, 
than the Prussians. All the annoyance I have experienced per- 
sonally came from my own countrymen — from the peasants, who, 
above all, saw a spy in every stranger. When I fell into the 
hands of the Prussians, I found them courtesy itself. On leav- 
ing Sedan, and thence to the frontier, in passing through the 
Prussian posts, I was stopped often. I had hut to say, ' I am the 
correspondent of an American journal,' and I was at once sent 
kindly forward. On the back of my French military pass the 
Prussian Staff had endorsed a Prussian safe-conduct. Often I 
was not obliged even to show my papers — my word was taken ; 
and, once out of Sedan, I was speedily through. 

" When I left Sedan on Sunday morning things were rapidly 
ffettino; in order. The streets were cleared of dead horses and 
men. The indescribable filth of the town was swept into the 
river. The shops were opening again. Discipline had taken 
the place of disorder. I saw enough of Prussian organization 
and energy to change, if the grievous defeat of a noble army 
had not already changed, the opinion I have so often expressed, 
that ultimate victory for France was sure. 

" I have followed MacMahon from the day when I found him 
reorganizing his army at Chalons to the fatal day at Sedan, when 
he surrendered the last organized force in France, save the rem- 
nant of that which is shut up in Metz. Certainly, when I was 
at the camp of Chalons, and then at Pheims, I had observed 
that the number of stragglers was enormous, and I continually 
met soldiers who did not know where their regiments were. I 
had seen men and officers disabled by wounds which French 
soldiers of other days would have despised ; I had remarked how 
untidy and careless the men were allowed to be about their dress 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 235 

and equipments. These things, slight, but significant to a mili- 
tary eye, had caused me, no doubt, some misgivings as to the 
rapidity of the success we had a right to expect. I saw, also, 
how prone French officers were to avoid the fatigues of long 
marches and the discomfort of bivouacs. I remember how often 
I have traversed the French lines at dead of night and at early 
dawn, and never heard a challenge, never came across a French 
vedette, never have fallen in -with a party of scouts. On the 
other hand, I have seen officers spend the time that ought to 
have been given to their men, in cafes or in poor village inns. 
Often even officers of the staff seemed to neglect their duties for 
paltry amusements, showing themselves ignorant, sometimes, 
even of the name of the Department in ■which they were ; so 
that I have known a French General obliged to ask his way from 
peasants at the meeting of two roads. I struggled long against 
all this kind of evidence, but the end is only too clear. Painful 
it is to me, but I am bound to declare my belief that any further 
effort France may make can only cause useless bloodshed ; and 
that a means of escape from her peril must now be sought other- 
wise than by force of arms." 

JSTot less vivid and graphic are the descriptions of the battle 
and surrender from correspondents who were in the Prussian 
headquarters and on the field during the whole of that terrible 
day. One of these descriptions, from the same pen that fur- 
nished to the Tnbune the glowing description of the battle of 
Gravelotte, is deserving of a place. "We give portions of it : 

" On the evening of Wednesday, from 5 to 8 o'clock, I was 
at the Crown-Prince's quarters at Chemery, a village some thir- 
teen miles from Sedan to the south-southwest on the main road. 
At 5.30 we saw that there was a great movement among the 
troops encamped all around us, and we thought, at first, that the 



236 THE GREAT WAR 

King was riding through the bivouacs ; but soon the 37th regi- 
ment came poaring through the village, their band playing ' Die 
loacht am Mhein ' as they marched along with a swinging stride. 
I saw at once, by the men's faces, that something extraordinary 
was going on. It was soon plain that the troops were in the 
lightest possible marching order. All their knapsacks were left 
behind, and they were carrying nothing but cloaks, slung around 
their shoulders, except that one or two hon vivants had retained 
their camp-kettles. But if the camp-kettles were left behind, 
the cartouche-cases were there — hanging heavily in front of the 
men's belts, unbalanced, as they ought to be, by the knapsacks. 
Soon I learned that the whole Prussian corps — those lent from 
Prince Priedrich Karl's army, the Second Army, and the Crown- 
Prince's — were making a forced march to the left, in the direc- 
tion of Donchery and Mezieres, in order to shut in MacMalion'a 
army in the west, and so drive them against the Belgian fron- 
tier. I learned from the officers of the Crown-Prince's staif, that 
at the same time, while we were watching regiment after regi- 
ment pass through Chemery, the Saxons and the Guards, 80,000 
strong, on the Prussian right, under Prince Albert of Saxony, 
were also marching rapidly to close on the doomed French army 
on the right bank of the Meuse, which they had crossed at Re- 
milly on Tuesday, the 30th, in the direction of La Chapelle, a 
small village of 930 inhabitants, on the road from Sedan to 
Bouillon, in Belgium, and the last village before crossing the 
frontier. 

" Any thing more splendid than the men's marching it would 
be impossible to imagine. I saw men lame in both feet hobbling 
along in the ranks, kind comrades, less footsore, carrying their 
needle-guns. Those who were actually incapable of putting one 
foot before another, had pressed peasants' wagons and every 
available conveyance into service, and were following in the 
rear, so as to be ready for the great battle, which all felt sure 



BETWEEN FKANCE AND GERMANY. 237 

would come off on the morrow. The Bavarians, wlio, it is een- 
erallj believed, do not march so well as thej fight, were in the 
centre, between us at Chemery and Sedan, encamped around the 
woods of La Marfee, famous for a great battle in 1641, during 
the wars of the League. When I had seen the last regiment 
dash through — for the pace at which they went can really not 
be called ' marching,' in the ordinary sense,— I rode off, about a 
quarter past eight in the evening, for Yendresse, where the 
King's headquarters were, and where I hoped to find house-room 
for man and beast, especially the latter, as being fiir tlie most 
important on the eve of a great battle. 

" When I got within about half a mile of Yendresse, going 
at a steady trot, a sharp ' Halt ' rang out through the clear air. 
I brought my horse to a stand-still, knowing that Prussian sen- 
tries are not to be trifled with. As I pulled up, twenty yards off 
I lieard the clicks of their locks as they brought their weapons 
to full cock and covered me. My reply being satisfactory, I 
jogged on into Yendresse, and my mare and myself had soon 
forgotten sentinels, forced marches, and coming battles, one of 
us on the straw, the other on the floor. 

" At 7 o'clock on Thursday morning my servant came to 
wake me, saying that the King's horses were harnessing, and 
that His Majesty would leave in half an hour for the battle- 
field ; and as a cannonade had already been heard near Sedan, 
I jumped up, seized crusts of bread, wine, cigars, &c., and 
crammed them into my holster, taking my breakfast on the way. 

" Just as I got to my horse, King Wilhelm drove out in an 
open carriage with four horses, for Chevange, about three and a 
half miles south of Sedan. Much against my will, I was com- 
pelled to allow the King's staff to precede me on the road to the 
scene of action, where I arrived myself soon after 9 o'clock. B 
was impossible to ride fast, all the roads being blocked with 
artillery, ammunition wagons, ambulances, &c. As I rode on tc 
14 



238 THE GREAT WAR 

the crest of tlie liill whicli rises sharply about 600 or TOO feet 
above tlie little hamlet of Chevange, nestled in a grove below, a 
most glorious panorama burst on my view. As General For- 
syth, of the United States Army, remarked to me later in the 
day, it wonld have been worth the coming, merely to see so 
splendid a scene, without ' battle's magnilicently stern array.' 
In the lovely valley below us, from the knoll on which I stood 
with the Xing and his staff, we could see not only the whole 
Valley of the Meuse (or Maas, as the Germans love to call the 
river that Louis XIY stole from them), but also beyond the great 
woods of Bois de Loup and Francheval, into Belgium, and as far 
as the hilly forest of l!Tumo, on the other side of the frontier. 
Eight at our feet lay the little town of Sedan, famous for its for- 
tifications by Yauban, and as the birthplace of Turenne, the 
great Marshal. It is known, also, as the place where sedan 
chairs originated. As we were only about two and a quarter 
miles from the town, we could easily distinguish its principal 
edifices without the aid of our field-glasses. On the left was a 
pretty church, its Gothic spire of sandstone offering a conspicu- 
ous target for the Prussian guns, had General Moltke thought fit 
to bombard the town. To the right, on the southeast of the 
church, was a large barrack, with the fortifications of the citadel. 
Behind it and beyond this to the southeast again was the old 
chateau of Sedan, with picturesque, round-turreted towers of the 
sixteenth century, very useless, even against fonr-pounder Krupp 
field-pieces. This building, I believe, is now an arsenal. Be- 
yond this was the citadel — the heart of Sedan, on a rising hill 
above the Meuse to the southeast, but completely commanded 
by the hills on both sides the river, which runs in front of the 
citadel. 

" The French had flooded the low meadows ni the valley 
before coming to the railway bridge at Bazeille, in order to stop 
the Germans from advancing on the town in that direction. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 239 

With tlieii- usual stupidity (for one can find no other word for it), 
the French had failed to mine the bridge at Bazeille, and it was 
of immense service to the Prussians throughout the battle. The 
Prussians actually threw up earthworks on the iron bridge itself 
to protect it from the French, who more than once attempted 
early in the day to storm the bridge, in the hope of broaking the 
Bavarian communication between the right and left banks of the 
Mouse. This they were unable to do ; and although their can- 
non-shot have almost demolished the parapet, the bridge itself 
was never materially damaged. 

" On the projecting spurs of the hill, crowned by the woods 
of La Marfee, of which I have already spoken, the Bavarians had 
posted two batteries of six-pounder rifled breech-loading steel 
Krupp guns, which kept up a duello till the very end of the day 
with the siege-guns of Sedan across the Mouse. Still further to 
the right flank, or rather to the east (for our line was a circular 
one — a crescent at first, with Sedan in the centre, like the star on 
the Turkish standard), was an undulating plain above the village 
of Bazeille. Terminating about a mile and a half from Sedan, 
at the woods near Rubecourt, midway — that is to say, in a line 
from Bazeille north — there is a ravine watered by a tiny brook, 
which was the scene of the most desperate struggle and of the 
most frightful slaughter of the whole battle. This stream, whose 
name I have forgotten, if it ever had one, runs right behind the 
town of Sedan. 

" From the woods of Fleigreuse on the north, behind the 
town rises a lull dotted with cottages and fruit-laden orchards, 
and crowned by the wood of La Givonne, which runs down to 
the valley of which I have just spoken. Between this wood and 
the town were several French camps, their white shelter-tents 
standing out clear among the dark fruit-trees. In these campa 
one could see throughout the day huge masses of troops which 
were never used. Even during the height of the battle they 



240 THE GREAT WAR 

stood as idle as Fitz-John Porter's at tlae second battle of Bull- 
Run. We imagined that tliej must have been undisciplined 
Gardes Mobiles, whom the French Generals dared not bring out 
against their enemj. 

" To the Prussian left of these French camps, separated from 
them bj a wooded ravine, was a long bare hill, something like 
one of the hills on Long Island. This hill, on which was some 
of the hardest fighting of the day, formed one of the keys of the 
position of the French army. When once its crests were cov- 
ered with Prussian artillery, the whole town of Sedan was com- 
pletely at the mercy of the German guns, as they were not only 
above the town, but the town was almost within mnsket-range 
of them. 

" Still further to the left lay the village of Ely, set on fire 
early in the day by the French shells. South of this the broken 
railway-bridge, blown up by the French to protect their right, 
was a conspicuous object. 

" Right above the railway-bridge, on the line to Mezieres, 
was the wooded hill crowded by the new and most hideous 
' chateau,' as he calls it, of one Monsieur Pave. It was here the 
Crown-Prince and his staff stood during the day, having a rather 
more extensive but less central view, and therefore less desirable 
than ours, where stood the King, Count Bismarck, von Roon, the 
War Minister, General Moltke, and Generals Sheridan and For- 
syth — to say nothing of your correspondent. 

" Having thiis endeavored to give some faint idea of the 
scene of what is, in all probability, the decisive battle of the 
war, I will next give an account of the position of the difierent 
corps at the commencement of the action, premising that all the 
movements were of the simplest possible nature, the object of the 
Prussian Generals being merely to close the crescent of troops 
with which they began into a circle, by effecting a junction be- 
tween the Saxon corps on their right and the Prussian corjis on 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 241 

their left. This junction took place about noon, near the little 
A'illage of Ollej, on the Bazeille ravine, behind Sedan, of which 
I have already spoken. Once their terrible circle formed and 
well soldered together, it grew steadily smaller and smaller, until 
at last the fortifications of Sedan itself were entered. 

" On the extreme right were the Saxons — one corps d'armee, 
with King Wilhelm's Guards ; also a corps d'armee in reserve 
behind them. The Guards had suffered terribly at Gravelotte, 
where they met the Imperial Guard ; and the King would not 
allow them to be again so cruelly decimated. Justice compels 
me to state that this arrangement was very far, indeed, from 
being pleasing to the Guards themselves, who are ever anxious to 
be in the forefront of the battle. 

" The Guards and Saxons, then about Y5,000 strong, were all 
day on the right bank of the Meuse, between E-ubecourt and La 
Chapelle, at which latter village Prince Albert of Saxony, who 
was in command of the two corps which have been formed into 
a little extra army by themselves, passed the night of Thursday. 

" The ground from Rubecourt to the Meuse was occupied by 
the First Bavarian Corps. The Second Bavarian Corps extended 
their front from near the Bazeille railway-bridge to a point on the 
high road from Donchery to Sedan, not far from the little village 
of Torcy. Below the hill on which the Crown-Prince was 
placed, the ground from Torcy to Illy, through the large village 
of Ploing, was held by the First and Tliird Prussian Corps, be- 
longing to the army of Prince Fried rich Karl, and temporarily 
attached to the army of the Crown-Prince. 

" This was the position of the troops about 9 o'clock on 
Thursday morning, September 1, and no great advance took 
place till later than that, for the artillery had at first all the 
work to do. Still further to the left, near Donchery, there were 
20,000 Wiirtembergers ready to cut off the French from Mezi- 
eres, in case of their making a push for that fortress. 



242 THE GEEAT WAR 

" The number of the Prussian troops engaged was estimated 
by General Moltke at 240,000, and that of the French at 120,000. 
We know that MacMahon had with him on Tuesday 120,000 
men, that is, four corps; his own, that lately commanded by 
General de Failly, now under General Le Brun ; that of Felix 
Douay, brother of General Abel Douay, killed at Weissenburg ; 
and a fourth corps, principally composed of Garde Mobile, the 
name of whose commander has escaped me. MacMahon, al- 
though wounded, commanded in chief on the French side. 

" It is almost needless to say that the real commander-in-chief 
of the Prussians on that day was von Moltke, with the Crown- 
Prince and Prince Albert of Saxony, immediately next in com- 
mand. 

" There were a few stray cannon-shots fired, merely to obtain 
the range, as soon as it was light ; but the real battle did not 
begin until 6 o'clock, becoming a sharp artillery-fight at 9, when 
the batteries had each got within easy range, and the shells be- 
gan to do serious mischief. At 11.55 the musketry-fire in the 
valley behind Sedan, which had opened about 11.25, became 
exceedingly lively — being one continuous rattle, only broken by 
the loud growling of the mitrailleuses, which played with deadly 
effect upon the Saxon and Bavarian columns. General Sheridan, 
by whose side I was standing at the time, told me that he did 
not remember ever to have heard such a well-sustained fire of 
small-arms. It made itself heard above the roar of the batteries 
at our feet. 

" At 12 o'clock precisely the Prussian battery of six guns, on 
the slope above the broken railway-bridge over the Meuse, near 
La Yillette, had silenced two batteries of French guns at the 
foot of the bare hill already mentioned, near the village of Flo- 
ing. At 12.10 the French infantry, no longer supported by their 
artillery, were compelled to retire to Floing, and soon afterward 
the junction between the Saxons and Prussians behind Sedan 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 243 

was announced to iis by General von Eoon, eagerly peering 
througli a large telescope, as being safely completed. 

" From this moment the result of the battle could no longer 
be doubtful. The French were completely surrounded and 
brought to bay. At 12.25 we were all astonished to see clouds 
of retreating French infantry on the hill between Floing and 
Sedan, a Prussian battery in front of St. Menges making accu- 
rate practice with percussion shells among the receding ranks. 
The Vfhole hill, for a quarter of an hour, was literally covered 
with Frenchmen running rapidly. 

" Less than half an bour afterward — at 12.50 — General von 
Roon called our attention to another French column in full 
retreat to the right of Sedan, on the road leading from Bazeille 
to the La Givonne wood. They never halted until they came to 
a red-roofed liouse on the outskirts of Sedan itself. Almost at 
the same moment General Sheridan, who was using my opera- 
glass, asked me to look at a third French column moving up a 
broad, grass-covered road through the La Givonne wood, imme- 
diately above Sedan, doubtless to support the troops who were 
defending the important Bazeille ravine to the northeast of the 
town. 

" At 1 o'clock the French batteries on the edge of the wood 
toward Torcy and above it opened a vigorous fire on the advanc- 
ing Prussian columns of the Third Corps, whose evident inten- 
tion it was to storm the hill northwest of La Givonne, and so 
gain the key of the position on that side. At 1.05 yet another 
French battery near the wood opened on the Prussian columns, 
which were compelled to keep shifting their ground till ready for 
their final rush at the hills, in order to avoid offering so good a 
mark to the French shells. Shortly afterward we saw the first 
Prussian skirmishers on the crest of the La Givonne hills, above 
Torcy. They did not seem to be in strength, and General Sheri- 
dan, standing behind me, exclaimed, ' Ah ! the beggars are too 



2M THE GREAT WAR 

weak ; they can never hold that position against all those 
French.' 

" The General's prophecy soon proved correct, for the French 
advanced at least six to one ; and the Prussians were forced to 
retreat down the hill to seek reenforcements from the columns 
which were hurrying to their support. In five minutes they 
came back again, this time in greater force, but still terribly in- 
ferior to those huge French masses. 

" ' Good heavens ! The French cuirassiers are going to 
charge them,' cried General Sheridan ; and sure enough, the 
regiment of cuirassiers, their helmets and breast-plates flashing 
in the September sun, formed in sections of squadrons and 
dashed down on the scattered Prussian skirmishers, without 
deigning to form a line. Squares are never used by the Prus- 
sians, and the infantry received the cuirassiers with a crushing 
' quick-fire ' — schneUfeiier — at about a hundred yards' distance, 
loading and firing with extreme rapidity, and shooting with un- 
failing precision into the dense French squadrons. The efi'ect 
was startling. Over went horses and men in numbers, in masses, 
in hundreds ; and the regiment of proud French cuirassiers went 
hurriedly back in disorder ; went back faster than it came ; went 
back scarcely a regiment in strength, and not at all a regiment 
in form. Its comely array w^as suddenly changed into shapeless 
and helpless crowds of flying men. 

" The moment the cuirassiers turned back the brave Prussians 
actually dashed forward in hot pursuit at double-quick, infantry 
evidently pursuing flying cavalry. Such a thing has not often 
been recorded in the annals of war. I know not when an ex- 
ample to compare precisely with this has occurred. There was 
no more striking episode in the battle. 

" Wlien the French infantry saw their cavalry thus fleeing 
before foot-soldiers, they in their turn came forward and attacked 
tlie Prussians. The Prussians waited quietly, patiently enduring 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 245 

a rapid and telling fire from the Chassep6ts, until their enemies 
had drawn so near as to be within a hundred yards of them 
Then to the fire of the Chassepots they returned a fire as rapid 
from their needle-guns ; and the French infantry could no more 
endure this Prussian fire than the cavalry, to whose rescue they 
had come. The infantry fled in its turn, and followed th? cav- 
alry to the place whence they came, that is, behind a ridge, 
about 600 yards on the way to Sedan, where the Prussian fire 
could no longer reach them. 

" The great object of the Prussians was gained, since they 
were not driven from the crest of the hill they fought to hold. 
Holding it thus against cavalry, the Prussians persuaded them- 
selves that it was possible to establish artillery on this hill. 

" ' There will be a devil of a fight for that crest before it is 
won or lost,' said Sheridan, straining his eyes through his field- 
glass at the hill, which was not three miles from us. The full 
sun was shining upon that hill ; we, gazing upon it, had the sun 
behind us. 

" At 1.30 French cavalry — this time, I presume, a regiment 
of carabiniers — made another dash at the Prussians, who, on 
their part, were receiving reenforceraents every moment ; but 
the cardbinie7's met with the same fate as their brethren in iron 
jackets, and were sent to the right-about with heavy loss. The 
Prussians took advantage of their flight to advance their line 
about 200 yards nearer the line which the French infantry held. 

" This body of adventurous Prussians split into two portions, 
the two parts leaving a break of a hundred yards in their line. 
We were not long in perceiving the object of this movement, for 
the little white puffs from the crest behind the skirmishers, fol- 
lowed by a commotion in the dense French masses, show us that 
these ^ diablcs de Prussians'* have contrived. Heaven only knows 
how, to get two four-pounders up the steep ground, and have 
opened fire on the French. Something must at this point have 



246 THE GREAT WAR 

been very mucli mismanaged with tlie French infantry ; for, 
instead of attacking the Prussians, whom they still outnumbered 
by at least two to one, they remained in column on the hill ; and, 
though seeing their only hope of retrieving the day vanishing 
from before their eyes, still they did not stir. Then the French 
cavalry tried to do a little Balaklava business — tried, but without 
the success of the immortal six hundred, who took the guns on 
which they charged. The cuirassiers came down once more, this 
time riding straight for the two field-pieces ; but before they 
came within 200 yards of the guns, the Prussians formed line, as 
if on parade, and, waiting till those furious French horsemen had 
ridden to a point not fifty yards away, they fired. The volley 
seemed to us to empty the saddles of almost the whole of the 
leading squadron. The dead so strewed the ground as to block 
the path of the squadron following, and close before them the 
direct and dangerous road they had meant to follow. Their dash 
at the guns became a halt. 

" "When once this last efitirt of the French horse had been 
made and had failed — failed, though pushed gallantly so far as 
men and horses could go — the French infantry fell swiftly back 
toward Sedan. It fell back because it saw that the chance of its 
carrying that fiercely-contested hill was gone, and saw, also, that 
the Prussians holding the hill were crowning it with guus, so 
that their own line could not much longer be held facing it. In 
an instant, as the French retired, the whole slope of the ground 
was covered by swarms of Prassian tirailleurs, who seemed to 
rise out of the ground, and push forward by help of every slight 
roughness or depression in the surface of the hill. As fast as 
the French went back these active enemies followed. After the 
last desperate charge of the French cavalry. General Sheridan 
remarked to me that he never saw any thing so reckless, so 
utterly foolish, as that last charge. ' It was sheer murder,' 

"The Prussians, after the French infantry fell back, ad- 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 24T 

vanced rapidly — so rapidly that the retreating squadrons of 
French cavalry, being too closely pressed, turned suddenly round 
and charged desperately once again. But it was all no use. 
The days of breaking squares are over. The thin blue line soon 
stopped the Gallic onset. 

" It struck me as most extraordinary that at this point the 
French had neither artillery nor mitrailleuses, especially the lat- 
ter, on the field to cover their infantry. The position was a most 
important one, and certainly worth straining every nerve to de- 
fend. One thing was clear enough, that the French infantry, 
after once meeting the Prussians, declined to try conclusions 
with them again, and that the cavalry were seeking to encour- 
age them by their example. About 2 o'clock still other re- 
enforcements came to the Prussians over this long-disputed hill 
between Torcy and Sedan to support the regiments already 
established there. 

" All the time that this great conflict was going on under 
Fritz's eyes, another was fought not less severe and as murderous 
for the Bavarians as the one I have attempted to describe was 
for the French. If there was a want of mitrailleuses on the hill 
above Torcy, there was certainly no lack of them in the Bazeille 
ravine. On that side there was, for more than an hour, one con- 
tinuous roar of musketry and mitrailleuses. Two -Bavarian offi- 
cers told me that the loss in their regiments was terrific, and that 
it was the mitrailleuses which made the havoc. 

" At 2.05 in the afternoon the French totally abandoned the 
hill between Torcy and Sedan, and fell back on the faubourg of 
Caval, just outside the ramparts of the town. ' 'Now the battle 
is lost for the French,' said General Sheridan, to the delight of 
the Prussian officers. One would almost have imagined tliat the 
French had heard his words — they had hardly been uttered when 
there came a lull in the firing all along the line, or rather circle, 
as such it had now become. 



248 THE GREAT WAR 

" Count Bismarck cliose tliat moment to come and Lave a 
talk with his English and American friends. I was anxious to 
know what the Federal Chancellor had done about the neutrality 
of Belgium, now threatened, and my curiosity was soon gratified. 
' I have told the Belgian Minister of War,' said Count Bismarck, 
' that, so long as the Belgian troops do their utmost to disarm 
any number of French soldiers who may cross the frontier, I will 
strictly respect the neutrality of Belgium ; but if, on the con- 
trary, the Belgians, either through negligence or inability, do 
not disarm and capture every man in French uniform who sets 
his foot in their country, we shall at once follow the enemy into 
neutral territory with our troops, considering that the French 
Lave been the first to violate the Belgian soil. I have been 
down to have a look at the Belgian troops near the frontier,' 
added Count Bismarck, ' and I confess they do not inspire me 
with a very high opinion of their martial ardor or discipline. 
When they have their great-coats on, one can see a great deal of 
paletot, but hardly any soldier.' 

" I asked His Excellency where he thought the Emperor was : 
' In Sedan ? ' ' Oh, no ! ' was the reply ; ' ]!Tapoleon is not very 
wise, but he is not so foolish as to put himself in Sedan just now.' 
For once in his life Count Bismarck was wrong. 

" Aj; 2.46 the King came to the place where I was standing. 
He remarked that he thought the French were about to try to 
break out just beneath us, in front of the Second Bavarian Corps. 
At 3.50 General Sheridan told me that Napoleon and Louis were 
in Sedan. 

" At 3.20 the Bavarians below us not only contrived to get 
themselves inside the fortifications of Sedan, but to maintain 
themselves there, working their way forward from house to house. 
About 4 o'clock there was a great fight for the possession of the 
ridge above Bazeille. That carried, Sedan was swept on all 
sides by the Prussian cannon. This point of vantage was car- 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 249 

ried at 4.40. Wlien carried there could no longer be a shade oi 
doubt as to the ultimate fate of Sedan. 

" About 5 o'clock there was again a sudden suspension of the 
cannonade along the ■whole line. Many were the speculations as 
to the cause, but nobody seemed to divine the truth. You must 
judge of our surprise when, five minutes later, we saw a Trench 
officer, escorted by two Uhlans, coming at a handsome trot up 
the steep bridle-path from Sedan to our post, one of the Uhlans 
carrying a Avhite duster on a faggot-stick as a flag of truce. The 
messenger turned out to be a French colonel, come to ask for 
terms of surrender. After a very short consultation between the 
King and General von Moltke, the messenger was told by the 
General that, in a matter so important as the surrender of at 
least 80,000 men, and an important fortress, it was necessary to 
send an officer of high rank. ' You are, therefore,' said the Gen- 
eral, ' to return to Sedan and tell the Governor of the town to 
report himself immediately to the King of Prussia. If he does 
not arrive within an hour, our guns will again open fire. You 
may tell the commandant that there is no use of his trying to 
obtain any other terms than unconditional surrender.' The par- 
hmentaire rode back with this message. When he was fairly 
out of ear-shot his mission was most eagerly canvassed. 

"At 6.30 there arose a sudden cry among the members of 
the King's staff, ^ Der Kaiser ist daP and then came a loud 
hurrah. Soon we began to look anxiously for the arrival of the 
second flag of truce. In ten minutes more General Reilly rode 
up with a letter for the King of Prussia. 

"As soon as the French General was in sight, the slender 
escort of cuirassiers and dragoons we had with us was drawn up 
in line, two deep. Behind the King, in front of the escort, was 
the staff; and ten yards in front of them again, stood His 
Majesty, King Wilhelm of Prussia, ready to receive General 
Reilly. That officer, as we soon learned, was the bearer of an 



250 THE GREAT WAR 

autograpli letter from the Emperor JSTapoleon to King Wilhelm. 
The Emperor of the French wrote : ' As I cannot die at the head 
of my army, I lay my sword at the feet of yonr Majesty ' — [' Ne 
jjouvani pas mourir a la tete de mon armee, je viens mettre mon 
Spee auxpieds de voire JIaJeste ']. 

" Why l^apoleon III could not die, as did thousands of his 
soldiers, sword in hand, with his face to the foe, is not so clear. 

" On receipt of this most astounding letter, there was a brief 
consultation between the King, the Crown-Prince, who had come 
over from his hill on the arrival of the flag of truce, Count Bis 
marck. General von Moltke, and General von Eoon. After a 
few minutes' conversation, the King sat down on a rush-bot- 
tomed chair, and wrote a note (on another chair held as a table 
by two aides-de-camp) to the Emperor, asking him to come next 
morning to the King of Prussia's headquarters at Yendresse. 

" While the King was writing this note Count Bismarck came 
up to Generals Slieridan and Forsyth, and myself, and heartily 
shook our hands. ' Let me congratulate you most sincerely, 
Count,' said General Sheridan. ' I can only compare the sur- 
render of ISTapoleon to that of General Lee at Appomattox 
Court-House.' 

" When it came my turn to grasp the Chancellor's hand, I 
could not help saying, after I had warmly congratulated him, 
' You cannot but feel a pride, Count Bismarck, in having con- 
tributed so largely to the winning of to-day's victory.' ' Oh ! 
no, my dear sir,' w^as the mild answer ; ' I am no strategist, and 
have nothing to do with the winning of battles. What I am 
proud of is, that the Bavarians, the Saxons, and the Wurtem- 
bergers have not only been on our side, but have had so large a 
share — the largest share — in the glory of the day ; that they are 
with us, and not against us. That is my doing. I don't think 
the French will say now that the South Germans will not fight 
for our common Fatherland.' 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 251 

" I asked His Excellency whether Louis was taken with his 
papa, and was told that no one knew ; and I think that no one 
much cared where that little man was. 

" When the King had wiitten his letter, he himself handed 
it to General Eeillj, who stood bareheaded to receive it — the 
Italian and Crimean medals glittering on his breast in the fading 
sunlight. Queen Yictoria's image and superscription have not 
often been seen on the uniforms of men surrendering without 
conditions. 

" At Y.40 General Eeillj left for the beleaguered town, es- 
corted by the Uhlans. The duster which had served as a flag of 
truce was offered to me as a souvenir of that memorable day ; 
but it had a strong resemblance to other dusters, and I declined 
the proffered relic. 

" As soon as General Reilly was gone I was most anxious to 
be off to the Belgian frontier, in the hope of getting messages 
through ; but Count Bismarck's aid-de-camp assured me that it 
was physically impossible to go that night, and that I must wait 
till morning, and even then must be careful not to fall into the 
hands of stray French soldiers, who were known to be dispersed 
in all directions along the Belgian frontier, and to be little better 
than bandits. So I slept at the village of Chevange, a mile be- 
hind our post, after a little hunting for quarters, actually getting 
a bed. 

" ISText morning early I started for Belgium. As I rode along 
I suddenly came first on a knot of Uhlans ; then on two lackeys 
in the green and gold Imperial livery. Directly behind them 
came His Majesty Napoleon III, in his travelling carriage, on 
his way to report himself a prisoner at King Wilhelm's head- 
quarters at Yendresse, a little dirty village some eight miles 
from Sedan." 



252 THE GREAT WAR 



CHAPTEE X. 

WHILE this desperate fighting, terminating in an inevitable, 
if not an inglorious, surrender, was going on around Se- 
dan, Marshal Bazaine, for whose benefit and release MacMahon 
had perilled and lost his army, attempted to break out of Metz 
by a sortie from the northeast. Why he selected this point, 
which would, if successful, have carried him still farther away 
from MacMahon's army, does not exactly appear; possibly 
because he may have believed the German investing force weak- 
est at that point. 

The sortie was commenced on the morning of August 81st, 
at which time the army of Marshal MacMahon was not less 
than seventy miles distant, and the railroad connections brokeii. 
and in the hands of the Prussians. The German force on the 
east side of the Moselle besieging, or rather isolating, Metz, 
belonged to the Second Army, and that corps, consisting almost^ 
entirely of East-Prussian line-troops and Landwehr, was under 
the special command of General von Manteuffel. This corps 
lay in almost a semicircle from Malvoy and Olgy, eight or nine 
miles north of Metz, to the river Sille, three miles south of the city. 

The fighting commenced between 9 and 10 o'clock in the 
morning of August 31st, the French troops massing heavily, and 
hurling themselves on the German left wing just at Colombey 
and Bellecroix, villages nearly due east from Metz. They were 
vigorously supported by the fi.re from Port Bellecroix and Port 
St. Julien, as well as fr*om some batteries hitherto masked. 
There was a feint of attacking the German right wing lying 
between Malvoy and Charly, but it was only a feint. About 3 




GEJSTERAL MANTEUFFEL. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 255 

P. M. the French, under command of General Leboeuf in person, 
made a most determined and resolute attack upon the German 
centre at Servigny, Retonfay, and ISToisseville, supported by 
concealed batteries and the forts. The fighting M^as of the most 
desperate and obstinate character. Servigny, ISToisseville, Re- 
tonfay, and Poixe were each taken and retaken several times, 
much of the fighting on the German side being done with the 
bayonet. The battle did not cease till 11 p. m., and the troops 
on both sides rested on their arms. 

Fighting was resumed the next morning at 4 A. m., although 
the whole field was covered with a thick fog. The ground about 
the village of ISToisseville was again fought over obstinately, the 
village itself being captured and lost three times by each party. 
On the left flank, Flanville and Corney were captured by the 
Germans ; and on the right, after desperate fighting, the French 
were driven southward and into Metz, being pushed into and 
through the Grimont wood, and Grimont itself, under the guns 
of Fort St. Julien. Once more the French centre advanced 
against Servigny, and its right fiank took and retook, but finally 
lost, Mercy le Haut ; but their attacks were delivered with less 
force than at first, and finally ceased about midday, September 
1st. The loss on the German side was about 3,000, ofiicers and 
men; on the French side, considerably heavier. The full reports 
of these battles have not yet, we believe, been published, but 
we subjoin the despatches of two of the German generals. 

From Malaincourt General Stiehle (chief of staff to Prince 
Friedrich Karl) telegraphed on the 2d of September : 

" From the morning of August 81st to midday of September 
1st Marshal Bazaine has almost unceasingly attempted, with 
several corps from Metz, to break through toward the north. 
General Manteuffel, under chief command of Prince Friedrich 
Karl, has repulsed all these attempts in glorious battles, which 
15 



256 THE GREAT WAR 

maj be united under tlie name of Battle of Koisseville. The 
enemy was again thrown back into the fortress. The First and 
ISTinth Corps, Knmmer's Division (line and Landwehr), and the 
Twenty-eighth Infantry Brigade, took part in the battle. The 
principal fighting took place at Servigny, ISToisseville, and Reton- 
fay. Night- surprises were repulsed with East-Prussian bayonets 
and clubbed muskets. Our losses not yet ascertained, but not 
very large proportionally ; those of the enemy heavy." 

General Manteuffel telegraphed : 

" Since yesterday morning Marshal Bazaine has been in bat- 
tle day and night with his entire army, against the First Army- 
Corps and Kummer's Division ; and yesterday night and to-day 
he has been everywhere diiven back. The French have fought 
with the greatest courage, but have to give way to the East- 
Prussians. Prince Friedrich Karl, the commander-in-chief of 
the blockading troops, has yesterday and to-da}'' expressed his 
recognition and his good wishes for both victories. The Fourth 
Landwehr Division took a distinguished part in to-day's victory. 

" VON Manteuffel." 

The French troops, finding a'l their efforts to break through 
the cordon of troops which surrounded them unavailing, with- 
drew, in the afternoon of September 1st, within their fortified 
lines. 

Strasbourg, Laon, Toul, and Pfalzburg still held out, and 
these, Math Metz, detained nearly 200,000 German troops to 
isolate and besiege them. Tiiere was, however, no lack of Ger- 
man soldiers, notwithstanding the terrible slaughter of the bat- 
tles already fought. On the 4th of September the King of 
Prussia, at the head of the Fii-st, Third, and Fourth Armies — 
a force of not less th;:n 300,000 men — was marcliino^ toward 




5^ "^i; 

til?- 






BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 257 

Paris. Subsequent reenfbrcements brought up the entire Ger- 
man armies in France to above 700,000 men, notwithstanding all 
losses. 

AVliile this surrender was going on at Sedan, and the at- 
tempted sortie at Metz was proving unsuccessful, what was the 
condition of affairs at Paris ? There had not been wanting indi- 
cations of tlie speedy downfall of the Empire. Even as earlj as 
the battle of Woerth, on the 6th of August, the Ollivier Minis- 
try had tried in vain to repress the bold questioning and the 
daring and inconvenient interpellation of the Kadicals in the 
Corps Legislatif; and after the downfall of that Cabinet, the 
Palikao Ministry found themselves compelled to allow the Radi- 
cal members a share in the Committee of Defence. Denuncia- 
tions of the Emperor's policy and generalsliip had become alarm- 
ingly frequent, and, though the Palikao Ministry had persistent- 
ly deceived the people, representing nearly every defeat as either 
a victory, or, at most, a drawn battle, and on the very day of 
the surrender, and at least an hour after the preliminaries of the 
capituhition had been agreed upon, had published a despatch 
from the Emperor, saying, " All goes wonderfully well ; our 
plans all succeed," yet there was a restlessness and impatience 
which betokened the coming storm. And a fearful storm it 
proved. 

" The commotion," says an eye-witness, " commenced on 
Saturday, September 3d. The news of the Emperor's surrender, 
and the capitulation of MacMahon's army, were made known to 
the Empress at 7 o'clock in the evening. She immediately re- 
tired into her apartment, and refused to receive even intimate 
friends. Toward 9 o'clock the broad facts were known to a few 
persons only, but a general uneasiness prevailed, and angry 
groups assembled. At 11 o'clock on Sunday, while the Mobiles, 
on their way to camp at Saint Maur, accompanied by a small 



258 THE GREAT WAR 

crowd, were proceeding up the Boulevards toward tlie Bastille, 
tliej sung the Marseillaise, and some shouted, '■La Decheancel ' 
— ' The Overthrow ' (of the Empire). This cry had been already 
heard in other localities. 

" Opposite the guard-house of the Police Sergeants, on the 
Boulevard Bonne INovelle, the police charged a crowd with 
drawn swords and revolvers, hilling a Garde Mobile, a National 
Guard, and injuring several people. The mob turned upon the 
police and drove them back. The news of this act excited great 
indignation, and cries of ' Down with the Police Sergeants ! ' 
were heard everywhere. The crowd had also assembled in the 
Place de la Concorde and about the Chamber of Deputies. 
This crowd was also charged by the police, and many individu- 
als were hurt. The bridge was barred to the public, and 
paraded by the police and troops till midnight. 

" At the sitting of the Chamber, at noon, Count de Palikao 
made the following official statement of the disaster to Mae- 
Mahon's army, and the capture of the Emperor : 

" ' FEENCHMEisr : France has encountered a great misfortune ! 
After three days' heroic fighting by MacMahon against 300,000 
enemies, 40,000 men were made prisoners. General Wimpffen, 
who had assumed the chief command of the army in the place 
of the severely-wounded Marshal MacMahon, subscribed the 
capitulation. This terrible misfortune shall not shake our cour- 
age. Paris is to-day in a state of defence. The military forces 
of the land are organizing themselves, and within a few days a 
new army will stand under the walls of Paris. Another army is 
forming on the banks of the Loire. Your patriotism, your 
unanimity, your energy, will save France. The Emperor was 
made prisoner in this battle. The Government unites with the 
great bodies of- state. They will take every measure which the 
gravity of the occasion demands.' 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 259 

" Jules Favre demanded a vote of dScJieance^ but the Cham 
ber adjourned till nest day at 12 o'clock. The news was not 
generally known till after 9 o'clock on Sunday morning, when 
the Ministerial statement appeared on the walls and in the 
morning papers. Soon immense excitement was apparent every- 
where. By noon the Place de la Concorde was crowded, and 
the passage of the bridge interrupted to the public by the Police 
Sergeants, gendarmerie on horseback, and the troops on the 
bridge and around the Chamber. Popular Deputies were recog- 
nized, and met with acclamations and cries of 'Z« DechSance ! ' 
and ' Vive la Re^utliqxie ! ^ As the day wore on the crowds 
augmented. On the passage of companies of National Guards, 
the people shouted, ' Yive National Garde I ' ' Yive la Hepu- 
hlique ! ' and the Guards recij^rocated. 

" At 2 p. M. the gates of the Tuileries garden were closed, 
and had remained so since morning, watched by the Zouaves 
and other detachments of the Imperial Guard. The people on 
the outside were trying to shake the gates on the side of the 
Place de la Concorde. At 2.30 o'clock a rush was made by a 
part of the crowd, headed by some of the ]N^ational Guard. The 
Police Sergeants and gendarmerie made an armed demonstration 
of resistance, but suddenly yielded, and the crowd rushed by, 
shouting, ^Za Decheance ! ' and ' Vive la Me^vMiquc I ' People 
fraternized with the gendarmes and troops, and these with the 
National Guard. There was no resisting the masses who fol- 
lowed, and soon they surrounded the Chamber, and finally 
invaded it. At 3 o'clock shouting and commotion in front of 
the Chamber w^ere heard. I saw the crowd from the Place de la 
Concorde. A procession marched slowly along the quay. The 
members of the Left i-ecognizcd that they were being escorted 
to the Hotel de Yille. Then came a rush of the mob from the 
other side of the bridge, the National Guards, the Mobiles, and 
the troops shouting, '•La Decheance ! ' and ' Vive la Repullique ! ' 



260 THE GREAT WAR 

" It becomes known tliat the Emperor is deposed by the 
Chamber, and that the Eepublic is declared. The people rush 
upon the Police Sergeants and disarm them. One National 
Guard has his head gashed with a sword, and is led away. The 
Police Sergeants get off the best way they can. The people 
assail the gates of the Tuileries. The Guards, after a menace, 
consent to a parley. The men clamber up and wrer'^,h off the 
eagles from the gates. The gates are presently opened, and the 
people flock in, going toward the palace. The flag is still flying 
from the top of the central pavilion. The crowd approaches 
the private garden. There is a detachment of troops there. 
The officer is summoned to open the gates. He refuses, but 
says he can let his men be replaced by the National Guard. 
This is done, and the officer saves his honor. The people walk 
in, and immediately invade the interior of the palace. The flag 
is torn and handed down. The Empress has left. The Mobiles 
and people amiise themselves looking at the albums and the 
Prince Imperial's playthings. They notice that the draperies of 
the windows are partly removed. The people write with chalk, 
' Death to Thieves.' They respect property. The whole palace 
is visited, but nothing removed. 

" Meanwhile, in the morning, at an earlier hour, the Depu- 
ties were returning to appoint a committee to consider the three 
proposals submitted by Palikao, Thiers, and Favre. These were 
as follows. That of Jules Favre, presented the previous day, 
was : 

" ' Article I. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and his dynasty are 
declared incapable of the powers which the Constitution has con- 
ferred upon them. 

" ' Article II. A Commission of Government will be nomi- 
nated by the Corps Legislatif, composed of ... , which 
will be invested with all the powers of Government, and which 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 261 

has for its express mission to resist invasion to the uttermost, and 
to chase the enemy from the country. 

" ' Article III. M. the General Troclm is retained in the 
functions of Governor-General of the city of Paris.' 

" This was signed hy tv/enty-eight members. The sitting 
adjourned at midnight. 

" Meeting again at noon, the Minister of War, Count Pali- 
kao, read the following proposition for a law : 

"'Article I. A Couucil of Government and of ISTallonal 
I>efence is instituted. This Council is composed of iive mem- 
bers. Each member of the Council is named by a majority 
absolute of the Corps Legislatif. 

" ' Article 11. The Ministers are named subject to the ap- 
proval of the members of the Conncil. 

" ' Article III. The General, Count Palikao, is named Lieu- 
tenant-General of this Council. 

" ' Done in the Council of the Ministers the 4:th September, 

1870, for the Emperor, and in virtue of the powers which 

he has confided to us. 

" ' Eugenie,' 

" M. Thiers then read the following proposal, signed by forty- 
five or forty-six members : 

" ' In view of the circumstances, the Chamber names a Com- 
mission of Government and of National Defence. A constituent 
assembly will be convoked as soon as the circumstances per- 
mit it.' 

" The Minister of "War announced that the Government was 
perfectly willing to consult the country. It is agreed to discuss 
the th^'ee propositions together. The Chamber adjourned for a 
short time. A company of National Guards having charge of 



262 THE GREAT WAR 

the gates shouted, '■La Decheance I ' and, as the Deputies passed, 
some few Nationals mounted the steps of the Palace of the 
Corps Legislatif, and signalled their comrades from the Pont de 
la Concorde. Presently the latter rushed forward, followed bj 
tlie crowd, all classes intermixed, and shouting ' Vive la Rejpu- 
hlique ! ' Once inside the palace-gates, the people spread them- 
selves all over the building, except the hall where the sessions of 
the Deputies are held. The next hall was occupied by troops, 
who fraternized Avith the people. 

" Cremieux addresses the peo]jle. They demand the with- 
drawal of the troops. Palikao appears, and promises that the 
troops shall be removed. Schneider, president of the Corps 
Legislatif, led by two officers, crosses the courtyard, pale, hag- 
gard, and with tears in his eyes. He disappears into the hall 
where the sessions are held. Attempts are made to force its 
doors. General Motterouge orders the National Guards to de- 
fend the entry. There are loud cries of ^ Decheance!^ and 
' Vive la RejpvMique ! ' The Deputies of the Left pass out and 
receive acclamation. Gambetta recommends calmness, and says, 
' The majority must proclaim the Decheance!' 

" In one of the galleries somebody begins a speech. A few 
Deputies of the Eight enter, but suddenly, as if panic-stricken, 
they retreat precipitately. Schneider now appears. He at- 
tempts to speak ; grows foggy ; becomes unnerved ; puts on his 
hat and leaves the chair. At this moment a small side-door 
under the galleries opens, and about thirty push through. A 
National Guard causes them to withdraw, and closes the door, 
locking it. On the tribune there are shouts and gesticulations. 
Every body speaks at once. 

" Another party of citizens forces its way in. The presi- 
dent's cry of ' Order ! ' is drowned by shouts of ' Vive la Rejpu- 
hlique!^ Palikao endeavors to obtain a hearing, and, failing, 
puts on his hat and quits the Chambers. The president tries 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 263 

unsuccessfallj to allaj tlie uproar, two Deputies going to his 
assistance, and all three very violently gesticulating. The 
Deputies of the Left address the people, striving to quell the 
tumult. Then Gambetta appeals to them to preserve order, and 
to await the arrival of the [Representatives, as they will bring in 
the question of Decheance. 

" It is now 3 o'clock. Suddenly a crowd of people rush into 
the hall. TJie Deputies try to keep them back, but the hall is 
entirely invaded. The president puts on his hat and leaves the 
hall, declaring the session closed. As he qnits his seat, IsTational 
Guards and people come crowding in. There are general cries 
of ' Vi've la Bepuhliq^ue ! ' The Deputies of the Left mix with 
the people, and all cry, ' To the Hotel de Ville ! ' Gambetta 
and other Eepublican leaders leave the Chambers and go in 
procession down the Pont de la Concorde, followed by the 
crowd. 

" Meanwhile, outside the Chambers men climb up to the 
statue of Law, over the portal, and destroy the eagle which 
adorns the baton in the hands of the image. Then it is itself 
destroyed — the head first, then the arms. Gambetta and the 
procession pass down the Quai des Tuileries. Soldiers applaud 
and shont with the crowd. A lieutenant-colonel cries, ' Vive la 
Republiqiie ! ' The procession stops and fraternizes. The Tur- 
cos and the Spahis at the barracks of the Quai d'Orsay w^ave 
their turbans. The flag over the pavilion of the Tuileries is 
hauled down. In front of the Prefecture there are cries of 
' Down with Pietri ! ' The Prefecture is closely shut. 

" Arrived in front of the Hotel de Ville, the crowd forces its 
way in. Jules Pavre and Jules Perry go to the further end of 
the great hall. Two Gardes Mobiles, with drawn swords, clam- 
ber up the ornamental chimney and seat themselves in the lap 
of a marble nymph. Gambetta, Cremieux, and Keratry press 
in and take a place beside Favre, followed by Picard, Etienne 



264 THE GREAT WAR 

Arago, Glais-Bizoin, Schoelclier, and others. Gambetta, Cr6- 
mieus, and Keratry are bj tlieniselves at tlie Mayor's table. 

" Amid the tumult, Gambetta declares the Republic a fact, 
and that Emmanuel Arago is api)ointed Mayor of Paris. The peo- 
ple shout approval. The Bureau is constituted. Keratry is ap- 
pointed Prefect of Police. The Bureau retires to ccustitute a 
Provisional Government and Ministry. At 4 o'clock the Bureau 
returns, and Gambetta declai'es the Provisional Governraent, 
constituted under the title of Government for the IvTational 
Defence, consisting of Arago, Cremieux, Pavre, Simon, Gam- 
betta, Ferry, Glais-Bizoin, and Gamier-Pages. The people 
shout Eochefort's name. It is added amid acclamation. The 
members of Government again retire. There is a discussion 
whether the tri-color or the red flag is to be adopted. Schoel- 
clier says ' tri-color, ' and it is adopted. 

"The Pochefort ej)isode was as follows: A hundred of 
Eochefort's constituents met, by aj)pointment, at 3 p. m., at the 
Great Market Hall. At a given signal the leader raised a cane 
with a flag attached to it, and, with a shout, ' To Sainte Pela- 
gic ! ' ascended. The group was joined by other men who up to 
that time had been lurking in the immediate vicinity, making in 
all about 300 when they reached the prison. There v/ere three 
marines acting as sentries outside. One of them made believe 
to lower his bayonet. It was raised by his comrade. The 
crowd took the guns and broke them, but fraternized with the 
marines. There was no opposition from the wardens. Pochefort's 
cell-doors were burst in, and he was taken out. 

" There was no coach at the door. A lady passing in one got 
out of it, and made Rochefort get in. He was driven to the 
H6tel de Yille, arriving there at 5 o'clock, and was carried in 
triumph to the throne-room, where, amid the shouts and con- 
gratulations of friends, he learns that he is a member of the new 
Republican Government." 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 265 

The first act of tlio new Kepublican Government was to issue 
the following address : 

" To THE Army : When a general has compromised his com- 
mand, it is withdrawn from him. "When a Government has 
placed the weal of the fatlierland in danger by its mistakes, it is 
set aside. That is what France has just done. In displacing a 
dynasty which is responsible for our misfortunes, it has at one 
stroke completed a great act of justice in the eyes of the world. 
France has executed the judgment which had long been secretly 
expected of her by all. France has at the same time performed 
an act of salvation. The nation has for its preservation only the 
necessity of raising itself, and, besides that, to hold to two 
things : its determination, which is unconquerable ; and its hero- 
ism, which has not its equal, and which has aroused the aston- 
ishment of the world during undeserved disasters. Soldiers, in 
the terrible crisis through which we are hastening, we have 
seized the helm, but with it we have not in any w^ay sought 
party ends. "VYe find ourselves not at the helm, but in battle. 
We are the Government of no party, but we are a Government 
of the ISTational Defence. "We have only one object, only one 
desire : the good of the fatherland by the army and tlie nation, 
which gathers around the glorious symbol which eighty years 
ago drove back Europe. To-day, as tlien, the name Eepublie 
means : Thorough concord between army and people for the 
defence of the fatherland. 

" General Trochu, Garnier-Pages, 

Emmanuel Arago, Glais-Bizoin, 

Cremieux, Pelletan, 

Jules Favre, E. Pioakd, 

Jules Ferry, Kochefort, 

Gambetta, Jules Simon." 



266 THE GREAT WAR 

Jules Favre, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, notwithstanding 
the gloomy outlook in regard to the war, issued the following 
circular, which bears the appearance of expressing a courage and 
resolution which he could hardly have felt : 

" The policy of France is peace, leaving Germany the master 
of her own destinies. The King of Prussia had said that he 
made war against the dynasty, and not against France ; yet the 
dynasty is gone, and France is free, yet is this impious war con- 
tinued. Will the King face this res]3onsibility before the world 
and before history ? France yields not one foot of soil, not a 
stone of a fortress. A shameless peace means the extermination 
of our cause and that of Europe. "We are undismaj^ed. The 
army is resolate and provided. Three hundred thousand com- 
batants can hold Paris to the last. They can hold the city for 
three months, and conquer. If crushed, France will arise and 
avenge it. Let Europe know that the Ministry have no other 
aim or ambition than peace ; but, war proving inevitable, we 
will continue the struggle, confident of the triumph of justice." 

One of the first things which engaged the attention of the 
new Governmentj as being more pressing even than the reorgan- 
ization of labor — the favorite hobby of French Republicans — 
was the necessity of some negotiations for peace. They had, 
unfortunately, committed themselves, at the outset, to the posi- 
tion that they would not relinquish a foot of territory or a stone 
of any fortress. Thus hampered, M. Jules Favre, while solicit- 
ing the good offices of the neutral powers to aid in his efforts for 
peace, sought and obtained an interview with the Prussian Pre- 
mier, von Bismarck. He was met at once by a serious prelimi- 
nary difficulty : on the supposition that he and Bismarck might 
agree upon some terms for peace, who was to guarantee their ful- 
filment ? The Provisional Government was merely the rule of a 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 26Y 

few self-cliosen persons, -who had taken advantage of the confu' 
Bion of the period to place themselves in power. They had no 
vote of the people to sustain them in their position, not even the 
sanction of the popular voice in the cities of France. They 
were wholly irresponsible — much more so, even, than the impe- 
rial dynasty they had assumed to displace. M. Favre urged 
that, if they could agree upon terms, they might be submitted 
to a popular vote within four or six weeks ; but Bismarck re- 
plied, that this was asking too much ; that, if their treaty should 
be rejected, and the Germans had remained inactive while wait- 
ing for the decision, they would be greatly worse off than to go 
on as they were now doing; they would, in fact, be thereby 
relinquishing almost the entire results of their victories thus far. 
He insisted, as the necessai-y condition of an armistice looking 
to peace-negotiations, that they must have material guarantees 
of the good faith of France, and named, among these, the pos- 
session of Metz and Strasbourg — both of which must soon caj)it- 
ulate at all events — and the temporary occupation of some one 
of the forts of the outer cordon around Paris. As M. Favre did 
not dare to accept these propositions, the interview terminated ; 
Count von Bismarck intimating that any treaty of peace must 
include the surrender of the two fortresses of Metz and Stras- 
bourg, and perhaps some other territory, together with a consid- 
erable money indemnity. 

On M. Favre's return, the propositions of Count von Bis- 
marck were indignantly rejected by his colleagues, and M. 
Favre was rebuked by them for even listening to them ; and on 
the 24:th of September the following was issued from Tours, to 
which city, since Paris was placed in a state of siege, the Gov- 
ernment had migrated : 

'■^Proclamation to France : Before the siege of Paris, Julea 
Favre desired to see Count von Bismarck, to know the inten- 



2G8 THE GREAT WAR 

tions of the enemy. The following is the declaration of the 
enemy: Prussia wishes to continue the war in order to red ace 
France to a second-rate power, Prussia demands Alsace and 
Lorraine as far as Metz, by right of conquest. Prussia, before 
consenting to an armistice, demands the rendition of Strasbourg, 
Toul, and Mont Yalerien. Paris is exasperated, and will rather 
bury herself beneath her ruins. To so insolent pretensions we 
can respond but by resistance to the last extremity. France 
accepts the struggle, and counts upon her children. 

. " Gkemieux, 
Glais-Bizoin, 
foukichok." 

Meanwhile, von Bismarck addressed to each of the North- 
German representatives abroad the following Circular : 

"Meaux, Friday, September 16, 1870. 

" Tour Excellency is familiar with the Circular which M. 
Jules Favre has addressed to the foreign representatives of 
France in the name of the men at present holding joower in 
Paris, and who call themselves ^Le Gouvernement de la Defense 
National.'' I have learned simultaneously that M. Thiers has 
entered upon a confidential mission to the foreign courts ; and I 
may presume that he will endeavor, on the one side, to create a 
belief in the love for peace of the present Parisian Government, 
and, on the other side, will request the intervention of the neu- 
tral powers in favor of a peace w^hich shall deprive Germany of 
the fruits of her victories, and for the purpose of preventing 
every basis of peace which would make the next attack of 
France on Germany more difficult. 

" We cannot believe in the sincerity of the desire of the pres- 
ent Parisian Government to make peace so long as it continues, 
by its language and its acts at home, to excite the passions of 




UHLAJS-S TRACKLN-a A BALLOOJM, 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 2G9 

the people and to increase the hatred and bitterness of a popula- 
tion stung by the sufferings of war, and to repudiate in advance 
every basis acceptttble to Germany as unacceptable by France. 
By such a course it becomes impossible to make peace. The 
people should be prepared by calm words, and in terms corre- 
sponding to the gi'avity of the situation. 

" If we are to believe tliat negotiations with us for peace are 
honestly intended, the demand that we should conclude an 
armistice without any guarantees for our conditions of peace 
could be meant seriously only on the supposition that we lack 
military or political judgment, or are indifferent to the interests 
of Germany. Moreover, the hope entertained by the present 
rulers in Paris of a diplomatic or material intervention of the 
neutral powers in favor of France, prevents the French nation 
from seeing the necessity of peace. When the French nation 
become convinced that, as they have wantonly conjured up the 
war alone, and Germany has had to fight it out alone, they umst 
also settle their account with Germany alone, they will soon put 
an end to their resistance, now surely unavailing. 

" It would be an act of cruelty to the French Government 
by tlie neutral powers to permit the Parisian Government to 
nourish among the people hopes of intervention that cannot be 
realized, and thereby lengthen the contest. 

" "VVe are far from any inclination to mix in the internal 
affairs of France. It is immaterial to us y/hat kind of a Gov- 
ernment the French people shall formally establish for them- 
selves. The Government of the Emperor JSTapoleon has hitherto 
been the only one recognized by us. Our conditions of peace, 
with whatever Government legislating for the purpose we may 
have to negotiate with, are wholly independent of the question 
how or by whom the French nation is governed. They are pre- 
scribed to us by the natui-e of things, and by the law of self- 
defence against a violent and hostile neighbor. 



ii70 THE GREAT WAR 

"The imanimoiis voice of tlie Germanic Governments and 
the German people demands that Germany shall be protected by 
better bonndaries than we have hitherto had against the dangers 
and violence we have experienced from all French Governments 
for centuries. So long as France remains in possession of Stras- 
bourg and Metz, so long is its offensive strategically stronger 
than onr defensive, so far as all South Germany and North Ger- 
many on the left bank of the Ehine are concerned. Strasbourg 
in the possession of France, is a gate wide open for attack on 
South Germany. In the hands of Germany, Strasbourg and 
Metz obtain a defensive character. 

" In more than twenty wars we have never been the aggres- 
sors of France ; and we demand of the latter nothing else than 
our safety in our own landj so often threatened by it. France, 
on the other hand, will regard any peace that may be made now 
as an armistice only, and, in order to avenge the present defeat, 
will attack us in the same quarrelsome and wanton manner as 
this year, as soon as it feels strong enough in its own resources 
or in foreign alliances. 

" In rendering it difficult for France, from whose initiative 
alone hitherto the disturbances of Europe have resulted, to re- 
sume the offensive, we at the same time act in the interest of 
Europe, which is that of peace. From Germany no disturbance 
of the European peace is to be feared. Although France had 
been trying to force the war upon us for four years, we, by our 
care, and by restraining the feelings of our national self-respect, 
so incessantly outraged by France, had prevented its occurrence. 
We mean now, for our future safety, to demand the price of our 
mighty efforts. We shall demand only that which we must 
have for our defence. ]Srobody will be able to accuse us of want 
of moderation, if we insist upon this just and equitable demand. 

"Your Excellency will make these views your own, and 
advocate them in discussions. Bismaecs:." 




STEASBURG CATHEDRAL WITH NEIOHEOIHNC 



BI'TLDIWGS IF FLAMES. 



BETWEEN FEANCE AND GERMANY. 273 

During this period of ineffectual negotiation the Germans 
were by no means inactive. The First, Third, and Fourth 
Armies, largely reenforced, pressed on toward Paris, and on the 
20th of September .the investment of Paris was complete. On 
the 23d, Toul surrendered, and Strasbourg followed on the 27th 
of September. The garrison of Toul was very small (only about 
2,350), but the fortifications were of suc:h strength that they had 
endured a long siege. The amount of war-material surrendered 
was large. The garrison of Strasbourg numbered 17,000 men 
and 451 officers, aside from the large population of the city. 

The events of the 1st and 2d of September, followed by the 
revolution of the 4:th of September, seemed to have so confused 
and stunned the minds of the French leaders and people as to 
render them incapable of any judicious action. Even General 
Trochu, the only one of their leaders who had any clear idea of 
their difficulties and dangers, confined his efforts to fortifying 
Paris, regardless of the fact that, with a population of two mil- 
lions in the city, and an army of 430,000 cut off by the sieg«? 
from any active movements, a capitulation must be inevitabl© 
within a short period — not more, certainly, than ten or twelve 
weeks — and that capitulation would involve the surrender of 
this great array, and the virtual annihilation of the entire Freneb 
military power. Of the entire armed force "which France had 
been able to put into the field, or could in any emergency bring 
into service, estimating it in round numbers at 1,000,000 men — 
though that number was never under arms at once during the 
war — not less than 150,000 were Tiors de combat from sickness, 
wounds,' or death on the field of battle. 60,000 men had been 
taken prisoners previous to the surrender at Sedan ; over 100,000 
were made prisoners there ; nearly 30,000 at Metz, in the battles 
of August 31st and September 1st, and the subsequent capitula- 
tions of Toul, Strasbourg, &e. More than 200,000 more were 
shut up in Metz and eventually surrendered ; and these 430,000 
16 



274: THE GREAT WAR 

being withdrawn from active service, tliere would be left, in the 
event of their surrender, but a mere handful of troops to defend 
France against the invader. It seems never to have occurred to 
these leaders that 150,000, or 200,000 men at the utmost, could 
defend Paris better than twice that number, and that, with fewer 
mouths to feed, they could protract the siege proportionally 
longer ; while their armies in the field might inflict such damage 
upon the enemy as to compel him to raise the siege of the capi- 
tal. But the greatest misfortune which afflicted France during 
the whole of this war was the want of honest, capable, and 
efficient leaders. The people were brave and patriotic, though, 
except the regular army, they were unskilled in the use of arms ; 
but their leaders, when not traitors — as some of them undoubt- 
edly were — ^lacked knowledge of military affairs, and capacity 
for the important and responsible positions in which they were 
placed. The siege of Paris illustrated this most painfully. 
With two millions of people shut up in that great city, the accu- 
mulated supplies dealt out by weight and measure, and their 
enemy carefully guarding every avenue by which further sup- 
plies could reach them, the great mass of the population seem to 
have been turbulent and troublesome, improvident, and insensi- 
ble to the dangers which threatened them. Crime was rampant, 
riots frequent, and the sorties to drive back the foe and raise the 
siege infrequent and ineffective. At the same time, their ten- 
dency to boasting and exaggeration seemed constantly to in- 
crease. Every little sortie, however badly conducted or speedily 
repulsed, was magnified into a wonderful victory. They had 
elain 15,000, 20,000, or 30,000 Prussians, with a loss of only a 
hundred or two themselves ; — the Prussians had become disgust- 
ed, and were about to abandon the siege ; indeed, they had 
already abandoned it, and the way was now open to all parts of 
France ; — the German leaders were wounded or killed in these 
sanguinary battles, or had died of typhoid fever, or become 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 275 

maniacs from remorse ; — von Moltke, Prince Friedrich Karl, the 
Crown-Prince of" Prussia, tlie Crown-Prince of Saxony, tlie 
Duke of Mecklenburg-Scliwerin, and General Manteuffol, were 
all reported as dead, and the Eang of Prussia had gone back to 
Berlin in a straight-jacket, under the care of Count von Bis- 
marck. If it had been only idle, sensational papers which had 
propagated these silly stories it would have been bad enough, 
for the immense crop of falsehoods would have indicated that 
the people were ready to be deceived ; but it was their leaders — 
such men as Gambetta, Cremieux, Glais-Bizoin, and Ferry — 
who reiterated these falsehoods, and, in default of any founda- 
tion upon which to base them, fabricated, in their proclamations, 
the details of conflicts and victories which were entirely ficti- 
tious. 

The sympatliy of the friends of free and liberal government 
were at first heartily with the newly-proclaimed. French Repub- 
lic ; they hoped to see a sound Government of the people, for 
the people, spring from the corruption, rottenness, and decay of 
the Empire ; but a Government founded upon falsehood, and 
maintaining its hold upon the people solely by the grossest mis- 
representations, whatever may be the motive of those falsehoods, 
soon loses its hold on the confidence or sympathy of right-think- 
ing men of all nations. For the people they may feel the ten- 
derest concern ; for their leaders, their only emotion can be that 
of disgust. 

"When the German armies were about closing around the 
doomed city, a part of the Provisional Government removed to 
Tom's, and there exercised their functions. At first it was only 
Cremieux, Glais-Bizoin, and Fourichon who thus attempted to 
govern from Tours. Keratry subsequently joined them, and 
Gambetta, after remaining awhile in Paris, finally escaped from 
that city in a balloon. Troehu, Favre, Ferry, Eochefort, and one 
or two more less prominent, remained in Paris. The Tours sec- 



2Y6 THE GREAT WAR 

tiou postponed the election of a Constituent Assembly indefi- 
nitely, and, while making the most frantic appeals to the Euro- 
pean powers to intervene and secure peace, constantly proclaimed 
that they would not give up one foot of territory or one stone of 
a fortress. 

Great efforts were made to raise an army in the south of 
France, to be called the Army of the Loire. Only undisciplined 
and raw recruits were available, with few exceptions, for this 
army, but it was expected to do great things. General Bour- 
baki, who, by an adroit manoeuvre, had succeeded in getting out 
of Metz before its surrender, was to have command of it, and its 
numbers were variously stated at from 100,000 to 150,000 men. 
At length, in. the last days of October, General Bourbaki assumed 
command ; but, finding that it had at no time mustered over 
60,000 men, and that these were the rawest of recruits and con- 
stantly deserting, he offered to resign, but was not allowed to do 
so. Garibaldi, the Italian Iiero, was called to command one of 
the armies of the Republic, and, though crippled and suffering 
from the still unhealed wounds of Montana, he came, only to find 
that all his efibrts would be neutralized by the jealousies of Gam- 
betta and his associates, and that not more than 6,000 men— not a 
quarter of them well equipped — could be allowed to gather around 
his standard. The Franc-iireurs, a class of guerillas or brigands, 
formed themselves into bands of considerable numbers, and occa- 
sionally raided on the German lines ; but finding that, under the 
wholesom^e though rigid regulations of King Wilhelm, they were 
liable to be marched immediately to execution when caught, they 
very generally preferred the safer if less honorable plan of plun- 
dering their own countrymen. 

There were, indeed, occasional sorties of some magnitude both 
from Paris and Metz ; but these seldom rose to the dignity of 
battles, and were invariably unsuccessful, though one or two of 
them inflicted considerable loss upon the Germans, but a much 




THE SIIARPSHOOTEBS OF THE YOSGES LYING I^^ AMBUSCADE ANI> 
ATTACKING A GEKMAN CONYOY. 



BETWEEN PRANCE AND GERMANY. 2TD 

greater one on tliemsclves. Tlie most notewortliy of these at 
Paris M'as one of the 19th of September, and another early in 
October. ISTeither seem to have been in any respect a success 
for the French, though both were yannted as such. The affair 
of the 19th of September originated in an attack made by Gen- 
eral Ducrot, ■svho, in violation of his parole of honor given at 
Gravelotte, had taken a command again in the French army, 
upon the Germans vs^ho were occupying the woods of Meudon, 
Clamart, Chatenay, Fontenai, and Choisy, a line of six miles on 
the south of Paris. Ducrot had about 40,000 men, and occupied 
a strong position at Yillejuif, and the heights of Chatillon and 
Clamart ; but, attacking rashly, and without knowiug what force 
was in his front, he threw himself against the corps of Yogel de 
Falkenstein, over 100,000 strong ; and though a part of his 
troops fought well, others were panic-stricken, and, in the end, 
he was soundly whipped, and lost his fortified position — a serious 
disaster to the French cause. Subsequent to this, there were 
three or four successive sorties made in the same direction by the 
French, but their only result was that, after considerable severe 
fighting and heavy losses, the Germans each time gained some 
ground they had not previously held. 

The Germans were meanwhile overrunning and capturing 
other cities of France. Epinal, Etampes, Angerville, Orleans, a 
large and important city on the Loire, the granary of France, 
Gien, and later Dijon, were taken and held by their troops, and 
Tours, Lyons, and Marseilles threatened. 

The new troops raised outside of Paris after its isolation were 
raw recruits, a small proportion (the Gaiiies Mobiles) capable, 
with sufficient training and good officers, of making very superior 
troops, but, under the circumstances, entirely unable to cope with 
the thoroughly-trained German soldiers, commanded as they 
were by the best military talent of the century. The greater 
part of the French levy, whether known as National Guards^ 



280 THE GREAT WAR 

Partisans, FranG-tiveurSy or by other titles, were utterly incapa- 
ble, and eitlier ran or surrendered after tbe first fire. Knowing 
nothing of the use of fire-arms (since ISTapoleon III had pro- 
hibited their use, except in the regular army), they had no confi- 
dence in themselves, and could not be made to fight, except 
■where the objects of their assault were unarmed. 

The contempt naturally felt by the German soldiers for such 
foes is well illustrated by an official report of a commission sent 
by the King of Prussia to ascertain the exact state of afiairs in 
the eastern and central provinces of France, made at Yersailles, 
October 10th, 18Y0 : 

" Recent events throw light upon the forces at the disposal of 
the French Government over and above those enclosed in Paris, 
Metz, and some other fortresses. Several marches southwest of 
Strasbourg the corj^s djarmee^ under the command of General 
von AVerder, fell in with a body of troops whose composition 
proved that the production of fresh regular forces need be no 
longer feared in France. It had been organized some weeks 
since at Langres, and belonged to the Southern Army. The re- 
cruits had come from the Haute-Marne, Saone, and Tonne, Cote 
d'Or, and the country near Dijon. If at all capable of playing 
a part in the war, it ought to have marched north, and endeav- 
ored to relieve Strasbourg while there was time ; but consisting 
chiefly of Mobiles, it could not venture on so independent a step, 
and contented itself with troubling our southern communications 
between Alsace and Paris. Its greatest exploit was an attempt 
to surprise Kancy, which, however, was so easily foiled by one 
Landwehr battalion that we could not even boast of having had 
an engagement. Such were the troops General von AVerder 
(with General von Dagenfeld under him as chief of the Baden 
Division) attacked near Epinal. He put 2,000 Tiors de conibat, 
ourselves losing less than one eighth of this number. This has 



BETWEEj^ FRANCE AND GERMANY. 281 

probably disposed of the Soiitliern brancb of the French army fo 
a little while. 

" Further west the Bavarian First Corps, reenforced by one 
Prussian division of infantry and two Prussian cavalry divisions, 
under the command of General von der Tann, assumed an ener- 
getic ofl'ensive against the hosts congregating on the Loire. 
Some time ago, when wc had completed the investment of Paris, 
two Prussian cavalry divisions, among them Prince Albrecht's, 
had been despatched to patrol the country south of the capital, 
in the direction of Etampes, Pithiviers, and Orleans. They had 
had many skirmishes with Francs-Tireui'S, who abounded in that 
neighborhood, and though unable to resist our attack in any one 
single instance, yet clung to their hiding-places in the woods, and 
were apparently intent upon organizing a guerilla war. These 
Francs-Tireurs came from the Seine and the Southern Depart- 
ments. 

" "When our cavalry had penetrated as far as the forest of 
Orleans, the Crown-Prince ordered General von der Tann, who 
had his headquarters at Longjumeau, to proceed in the direction 
of that city, and further on to Tours, the seat of the Provisional 
Government. With General von der Tann's Corps marched the 
Twenty-second Division of the Eleventh Prussian Corps, as also 
our two cavalry divisions. This force arrived on the 7th at Ar- 
pajon, and on the 8th reached Etampes, by Etrechy. At Etam- 
pes the van were engaged by the enemy, who, seemingly show- 
ing fight, caused our troops to prepare for battle. Our infantry 
marched through a ravine in the direction of Angerville, with 
cavaby on both sides. Had the enemy remained in their former 
position we should have outflanked and might have seriously in- 
jured them by this movement ; but on getting near Angerville, 
where the defile widens into a vast plateau, we found the French 
had retreated on learning the approach of a considerable force. 
Only the village of Monnerville, south of Etampes and Anger- 



282 THE GREAT WAR 

ville, was still occupied hy a small rear-guard. On tins occasion 
we became acquainted with a new description of troops called 
Partisans, forming a sort of bodj-guard to tlie Government at 
Tours. In the account-books thej had with them their pay and 
other emoluments from the Itepublican authorities were accu- 
rately stated. They were mostly men above 40, or youngsters 
between 16 and 18, those between these two extremes having 
been previously drafted into the Mobiles. Directly we got to 
Etampes and Angerville the Partisans remaming in those towns 
were either taken prisoners or ran av/ay. They were, indeed, 
unable to defend themselves, being totally ignorant of every 
thing military, and, moreover, armed with Minie rifles, which 
cannot compete with modern weapons. In reply to our ques- 
tions, they said they knew nothing of the service, and altogether 
represented their situation as pitiable. The peasants would not 
give them any thing to eat, nor even direct them how to find 
their way across the country. The fear of the Germans was so 
universal in those parts that everybody shunned intercourse with 
the indigenous troo;^s. The costume of the Partisans consists in 
a short black coat, black trowsers, gaiters, and a red sash round 
the waist. They wear hats with broad brims, those of the cap^ 
tains being about four timec as large as those woi-n by the pri- 
vates. The Commander-in-Chief of the body taken prisoners at 
Angerville was a private gentleman from ITantes. Most of them 
dad the words Pa7'tisans de Gers on their hats. The Depart- 
ment de Gers being 400 miles south of Paris, and only 150 miles 
north of the Pyrenees, their presence in the Orleannois would 
seem to prove that the central Departments are already drained 
of most of the people that can be induced to join. 

" Since then Orleans has been taken by General von der 
Tann. It is one of the wealthiest cities in France. The region 
Qorth of it, the so-called Beauce, is certainly the most fertile dis- 
trict we have as yet entered. It provides Paris with enormous 



BETWEEN FEANCE AND GERMANY. 283 

quantities of excellent M'lieat, ground by the steam and water 
mills in the province. It also abounds in oats (which will be a 
great acquisition for our cavalry), and produces grapes and every 
variety of fruit in such plenty that, in addition to supplying 
Paris, its choice articles are exported to foreign countries. The 
possession of the Beauce will sensibly diminish the number of 
our provision trains from Germany. 

" The occupation of Orleans is also important from a strategi- 
cal point of view. Situate on the right bank of the Loire, and 
being the point of junction for the Central Railway and the 
lines from Nantes, Bordeaux, and Toulouse, it protects our army 
from attack from the south, and all but prevents our enemies in 
the E'orth holding communications with the South. By blowing 
up a single arch of the two magnificent bridges over the Loire, 
each of which has cost 2,000,000f , we render it difficult for a 
Southern enemy to penetrate North, the next two bridges at Jar- 
geau and Beaugency not being strong enough foi' artillery to pass 
over. Gicn, higher up the river, is already ours, .and the Sologne, 
wdiich is the name of the country lower down, beyond Blois, is 
so barren and destitute of roads that it serves as a natural safe- 
guard from that side. Orleans is known for the pacific disposi- 
tion of its inhabitants, and has large barracks and other buildings 
which will be useful should the campaign be prolonged." 

An added difficulty which the French Provisional Govern- 
ment had to encounter, was found in the diversity of opinion 
among the people, and the want of cordiality which existed tow- 
ard them in many parts of France. In Marseilles and Lyons, 
the Red Republicans were largely in the majority, and organized 
a provisional government of their own, whose object was to pro- 
claim the doctrines of the Revolution of 1791. " Down with the 
aristocrats ! " was their cry ; and these ruffians were disposed to 
seize the reins of government, and rule revolutionnairement. A 



284 THE GREAT WAR 

fear of the German troops, and a disposition to conciliate them 
by good treatment and ready surrender, prevailed very widely 
among the smaller towns and villages of France, and it was not 
easy to raise volunteers for the army in any section to which they 
had penetrated. 

The tract, sixty or seventy miles in width, and extending 
from the Rhine to Paris, over which the conquering armies had 
passed, was thoroughly stripped of food for man and beast, and 
the horrors of famine were felt throughout the whole district 
early in October. 

On the 29th of October Metz was surrendered by Marshal 
Bazaine, although it was said there was provision sufficient for 
the army for four months longer. Yet, as a capitulation must 
come sooner or later, and there was no hope of the raising of the 
siege, it was perhaps humane and wise to give up before starva- 
tion came. By this capitulation an army and garrison of 
173,000 soldiers, and over 20,000 sick and wounded, were sur- 
rendered, the details being as follov/s : 

" 67 infantry regiments ; 13 battalions of Foot Chasseurs ; 
18 fort and depot battalions ; 36 cavalry regiments, namely : 
10 of Cuirassiers, 1 of Guides, 11 of Dragoons, 2 of Lancers, 
3 of Hussars, 6 of Chasseurs, and 3 of Chasseurs d'Afrique ; 
also, 6 depot squadrons ; 115 field batteries ; 17 batteries of 
mitrailleuses ; 69 eagles belonging to iiifantry, 2 of which were 
captured at Mars-la-Tour, and 36 eagles belonging to cavalry. 

" Including the garrison surrendered, the army originally 
comprised 221 battalions of infantry and 162 squadrons of horse. 
The original numerical strength was 210,000 infantry, 21,450 
cavalry, 690 guns, and 102 mitrailleuses. 

" Besides the foregoing, there were three marshals — Bazaine, 
Canrobert, and Leboeuf ; three corps commanders — Frossard, De 
Caen, and I'Admirault ; 40 division generals ; 100 ])rigadier- 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 285 

generals ; of sound prisoners, 90,000 sent to ITortli Germany, 
and 50,000 sent Sonth ; the sick and wounded being distributed 
in the same proportion." 

Thirty-five thousand had perished in the siege and the 'sorties 
made by the besieged, not inchiding those who were slain in the 
three battles of August 14th, 16th, and 18th. 

The intelligence of this surrender was received at Tours by 
the Provisional Government with great rage and indignation. 
Marshal Bazaine was denounced as a traitor, and the resolve to 
continue the resistance unflinchingly was duly promulgated in 
the following proclamation : 

" FBEisrcH Republic. 
" Liberty — Equality — Fkateenitt. 

" PEOCLAMATIOIir TO THE FeENCH PeOPLE. 

" Feenchmen : Raise your spirits and resolution to the fear- 
ful height of the perils which have broken upon the country. 
It still depends on us to mount above misfortune, and show the 
world how great a people may be who are resolved not to perish, 
and whose courage increases in the midst of calamity. 

" Metz has capitulated. A General, upon whom France 
counted, even after Mexico, has just taken away ivient cVeyi- 
lever) from the country, in its danger, more than a hundred 
thousand of its defenders. Marshal Bazaine has betrayed us. 
He has made himself the agent of the Man of Sedan and the 
accomplice of the invader ; and, regardless of the honor of the 
army of which he had charge, he has surrendered, without even 
making a last effort, a hundred and twenty thousand fighting 
men, twenty thousand wounded, gums, cannon, colors, and the 
strongest citadel of France— Metz-Virgen ; but for him, to the 
contamination of the foreigner, such a crime is above even the 
punishments of Justice ! 



286 THK GREAT WAR 

" Meanwhile, Frenchmen, measure the depths of the abyss 
into which the Empire has precipitated you. For twenty years 
France submitted to this corrupting power, which extinguished 
in her the springs of greatness and of life. The army of France, 
stripped of its national character, became, without knowing it, 
an instrument of tyranny and of servitude, and is swallowed up, 
in spite of the heroism of the soldiers, by the treason of their 
chiefs. 

" In the disasters of the country in less than five months, 
250,000 men have been delivered over to the enemy— - a sinister 
sequel to the military coup de 7nain of December. 

" It is time for us to reassert ourselves, citizens ; and, under 
the segis of the Eepublic which we have determined not to allow 
to capitulate, within or without, to seek, in the extremity even 
of our misfortune, the renovation of our political and social 
morality and manhood. 

" However tried by disaster, let us be found neither panic- 
stricken nor hesitating. Let it be seen that we are ready for the 
last sacrifices ; and, in the face of enemies whom every thing 
favors, let us swear never to give up so long as there remains an 
inch of sacred soil under the soles of our feet. Let us hold 
firmly the glorious banner of the French Eevolution. Our 
cause is that of Justice and of Eight. Europe sees it ; Europe 
feels it. In the presence of so many unmerited misfortunes, 
Europe, of her own accord, receiving from us neither invitation 
nor encouragement, is moved, and begins to act. ISTo illusion is 
now left. Let us no longer languish or grow weak, and let us 
prove by our acts that we can ourselves maintain honor, inde- 
pendence, integrity — all that makes a country proud and free. 

" Long live the Eepublic, one and indivisible ! 

" Cremieux, 
Glais-Bizoin, 
Gambetta." 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 287 

This proclamation Iiad the merit of being more truthful than 
those which had preceded it, but it did not come up to the full 
measure of the misfortunes of France. At this very time over 
three hundred thousand French soldiers- were prisoners in Ger- 
many ; one hundred and fifty thousand more had perished by 
sickness, or had fallen on the field of battle ; the regular army, 
except a few regiments on garrison duty, or who had but jus^ 
returned from Algeria, was completely destroyed ; the more 
than four hundred thousand troops shut up in Paris were com- 
posed of National Guards, Guard Mobiles, and other raw re- 
cruits, not only wholly undisciplined, but completely ignorant 
of the use of fire-arms, having been forbidden to possess them 
during the whole of Louis ISTapoleon's administration. The 
armies which Gambetta was trying to raise and arm in the 
provinces were equally undisciplined and ignorant. There were 
no generals of known reputation left except Trochu and Ducrot, 
who were both in Paris, and Bourbaki in the Army of the Loire, 
whose fidelity to the Provisional Government was probably un- 
justly doubted. Tlie energy and executive ability which Gam- 
betta had displayed, and which had enabled him to improvise 
large armies, was very creditable to him under the circumstances 
in which he v/as placed ; but if he permitted himself any mo- 
ments of sound reflection, he must have seen that his task was a 
hopeless one. The errors already committed in the defense of 
Paris rendered its surrender at no very distant day inevitable ; 
and the irregular and undisciplined troops he had collected and 
could collect were not only incompetent to compel the raising of 
the siege of Paris, but were unable to withstand the thoroughly 
trained and disciplined German troops whenever they met in 
anything like equal numbers. There was nothing to hope for 
in the future, except a peace made on terms whieh would be 
more severe and distressing with each added day of resistance. 
Meanwhile the vdnter months were drawing on, and the crops, 



288 THE GREAT WAR OE ISYO 

unusually scanty as tliey were, had been in many sections either 
harvested, or seized by the invading forces ; the French peas- 
antry, never too provident, and living almost from hand to mouth, 
were famishing, and looked forward in grim despair to a winter 
of famine and death. 

Already, too, were the hoarse mutterings of another revolu- 
tion heard from various quarters, and the Provisional Govern- 
ment found its authority denied, and its orders unheeded in 
Southern France. 

Yet the pride and conceit of tlie French leaders and of the 
French people was unsubdued. Though almost everywhere de- 
feated, they insisted that every reverse was a victory, or, at the 
most, but a blessing in disguise ; and until they were sufficiently 
humbled to own their weakness, there seemed no hope of their 
relief. 

Alas, poor France ! how bitterly dost thou suffer for all thy 
sins in the past ! The blood of thousands of martyrs slain by 
thy kings ; the terrible disorder and anarchy of thy great Revo- 
lution; the greed and vain-glory which led thee to crave and 
take, whenever thou hadst the opportunity, the lands and spoil 
of other nations ; the insane love of glory which has made thee 
willing to plunge into war on the slightest pretexts, and thus 
rendered thee the terror of all thy neighbors ; and, above all, 
the licentiousness and corruption which have eaten out thy life, 
and rendered thee seemingly only fit for destruction — all these 
thy crimes rise up in judgment against thee, and cry for ven- 
geance on thy head. But if thou wilt be wise, there is still hope 
for thee. When thou hast passed through the furnace, and thy 
dross is thoroughly purged from thee, there shall arise a new 
France, purer and better than the old, and take its place among 
the sisterhood of nations, a regenerated and truly great people. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 230 



CHAPTER XI. 

IN continuing our narrative of the events of tlie war after the 
surrender of Metz, we must confine ourselves mainly to two 
topics : the siege of Paris, with its sorties and final surrender ; 
and the efforts made in the provinces to compel the raising of 
the siege of Paris, and also to defeat the Germans in other parts 
of France. Though distinct from each other, these two topics 
were so connected that they can only be considered properly 
together. 

We have ah-eady detailed the approach of the German armies 
to Paris, their partial investment of the city on the 15th of Sep- 
tember, and the more complete beleaguering of it by the close 
of the month ; but one or two items in relation to this invest- 
ment are worthy of notice, though ante-dating the capitulation 
of Metz. 

The German armies first deployed, about the middle of Sep- 
tember, before the northeastern defences of Paris. This part of 
the line of investment was established without serious opposi- 
tion, greatly to the surprise of the Germans, who anticipated 
resistance at the passage of the Seine. Trochu's troops were 
certainly unfit at this time to be trusted in battle, and could not 
have prevented the investment, though they might have retarded 
it under a skilful general, without jeopardy to themselves. If it 
was wise, however, not to oppose the passage of the Seme with 
Buch troops, it was madness to attempt, as Trochu did four days 
later, the reoccupation of the elevated country south of Paris. 
The extension of the German line from the Seine to Versailles 



290 THE GREAT WAR 

in front of tlie sontlicrn line of forts, brought on an engagement 
(September 19tb) knovf n to the Frencb as the Battle of Cliatillon, 
and to the Germans as that of Sceaux. Lying between the two 
towns thus named, and commanding the country round, and the 
French forts in its front, is a range of hills known as the Heights 
of Sceaux ; and it was for the possession of this position that the 
battle was fought. General Trochu, v/ith apparently culpable 
negligence, had failed to seize and fortify this important position. 

lie had declared his intention to remain strictly on the de- 
fensive, until he could arm, organize, and discipline the immense 
mass of Gardes Mobiles^ marines, and volunteers who had 
crowded into Paris for its defence. He doubtless had also some 
indefinite hope of aid coming from the army which had already 
begun to form on the Loire at Orleans ; but dependence on this 
force, or on his own unskilled soldiery, was, as events proved, 
mistaken confidence. But after resolving that nothing remained 
to him but to hold the defensive, Trochu was weak enough to be 
overruled by the advice of subordinates and the wishes of his 
associates in the Government, and consented to make an efi:brt 
to retake the Heights, which he had permitted the Germans to 
seize without opposition. If it w^as folly not to have secured 
them before the approach of the Germans, it was insanity to 
attempt to recapture them with a single corps of half-drilled, 
untried troops. The unwisely-ordered attack was badly directed 
and tardily conducted ; the troops displayed great gallantry, but 
they also displayed their want of discipline, and their efforts 
naturally resulted in positive repulse. 

The movements of the Germans in strengthening their lines 
south and west of the city more than once induced Trochu to 
make reconnoissances, which in one or two instances resulted in 
brief yet serious engagements. On September 30th tv/o columns, 
operating from Chatillon and St. Cloud, advanced to develop 
changes which had been made in the investing line in front of 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 293 

these positions, hut they had hardly deployed before overwhehn- 
iiig numbers of Germans were advancing from their bivouacks 
to meet them. The French were driven back at both points, 
and, being flanked on their right by the overlapping lines of the 
Germans, suffered severe losses. Tiie only result of the affair 
was to reveal precisely what the French did not wish assured 
them — that the Germans were daily transferring forces from the 
east to the west side of Paris, and preparing to bombard the city 
on its weakest front. By these movements, masked by the 
Heights of Sceaax and their own strongly maintained lines, the- 
Germans finally disposed their great forces around the city in 
the order named on our map, which illustrates the operations of 
the siege. 

The Saxon Corps, a brave' body of troops, but weakened by 
their heavy losses in the battles around Metz, were first in order 
on the north-northeast of the city, overlooking La Bridie, St. 
Denis, and the Fort de L'Est. 'Next in order, northeast of the 
city, were the Prussian Guards, the finest corps of the Prussian 
Army, having in their front the Fort of Auber villi ers ; next, at 
the east and southeast, lay the Wiirtemburg Division, the troops 
which distinguished themselves at Sedan. Between these and 
the city were the strong forts of Romainville, Denois, Rosny, 
and Nogent. South of the city, and to the south-southeast, lay 
the small Fifteenth Prussian Corps, the Sixth Prussian, and the 
Second Bavarian Corps, and along the front of this line bristled 
some of the strongest forts of the Parisian defences — Charenton, 
Ivry, Bicetre, Montrouge, Vanvres, and Issy. At the southwest 
and west the Eleventh and Fifth Prussian Corps held strongly 
fortified lines, having the great fortress of Mont St. Yalerien, 
occupying a neck of land formed by a bend of the Seine, in their 
front ; while the Fourth Prussian Corps extended from the op- 
posite bank of the Seine to Pierrefitte, where it joined the Saxon 
Corps. 

17 



294 THE GREAT WAR 

Tlie circle thus completed about Paris was never broken ; but 
it must not be supposed that the whole army was stretched out 
along the positions we have named. From the five or six pickets 
who watched from the entrenched posts nearest the enemy the 
every movement of the besieged, to the last cantonment of the 
corps in the rear, fully five miles of grou-nd intervened. *Tlie 
picket posts were all shell-proof earthworks, hardly larger than 
the " gopher holes " of our own troops, but much more elab- 
orately built. Behind each of these posts their reserves of a 
company were posted in farm-houses ; behind these a regiment 
in some convenient hamlet or chateau ; behind these, again, a 
brigade cantoned in the comfortable dwellings of the nearest 
village ; further still to the rear a division lived in camps, or 
chateaus, or towns ; and, last of all, distant, yet not so far away 
that it could not promptly deploy to aid the advance when at- 
tacked, were the corps in possession of the larger cities, as Yer- 
sailles, St. Germain, &c. This disposition gave the Germans 
every facility for concentrating immense numbers on any threat- 
ened point to repulse the sorties of the French. The system on 
which the Germans conducted the siege was different in many 
respects from that in vogue during our own war. The advanced 
posts, where small bodies of men kept vigilant lookout on the 
proceedings of the French in the city and forts, were strongly 
entrenched with the design of being held until supports could 
come up. In their immediate rear larger forces were posted in 
camps, or stationed in convenient farm-houses, villas, and cha- 
teaus ; while divisions and corps, still further to the rear, were 
cantoned in the numerous villages and towns which form sub- 
urban Paris. With houses to live in, warm beds and rich linen 
to rest upon, wine in the cellars, fruit on the trees, and vege- 
tables from near and distant gardens of the occupied depart- 
ments, the besiegers had little to dread from delay, and could 
afford to wait until famine forced capitulation. Strong as this 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 295 

line was known to be, the French did not despair of breaking 
through it ; and while the Germans prepared for the bombard* 
raent, their enemy made two or three fniitless efforts to raise the 
siege and escape. The most of these were made against Trochu's 
judgment, and, badly supported and worse directed, failed igno- 
miniously. The first of any note, made on October 28th against 
Le Bourget, on the north of Paris, appears to have been per- 
mitted as a sort of concession to a corps of Paris volunteers, 
led by noted Communists. It is significant of the condition of 
Paris at this time, that, on its failure and the repulse of their 
corps with heavy loss, Communists of Paris invaded the Hotel de 
Ville, captured Trochu and the members of the Government, 
proclaimed a new Republic, and for several hours were in pos- 
session of the Government. A corps of Mobiles happily arriv- 
ing, thrust the new leaders out, and restored the Committee of 
ISTational Defense, else France would have been again revolution- 
ized by a Paris mob. 

But while this siege was thus daily enclosing more firmly in 
its iron gripe the doomed city, Avhat was doing in the provinces 
in the way of effort to compel the German King to raise the 
siege ? Justice requires the acknowledgment that their exertions 
were great ; and if success had been possible with their undisci- 
plined troops, the great obstacles in the way of organization, and 
the scarcity of able and efficient generals, they would have gone 
far toward achieving it. After the failure of M. Favre's efforts 
to obtain an armistice and negotiate a treaty of peace on terms 
which he and his associates considered admissible, no further 
efforts were made in that direction for some months, and all the 
energies of the fiery, but not always wise, Gambetta, were turned 
toward the organization of new armies, and, as his proclamations 
phrased it, hurling back the invader. We have already men- 
tioned his escape with Fourichon, Cremieux, and Glais-Bizoin 
from Paris in a balloon, and the establishment of one branch of 



296 THE GREAT WAR OF 88'70 

the Government at Tours. He had no sooner arrived there than 
he undertook the work of rallying and organizing and training 
forces for the purpose of taking the field against the Germans. 
He inspired the people with his own enthusiasm, and, by sheer 
force of personal character and energy, he brought comparative 
order out of chaos, and organized three great armies, great 
in numbers, but still fatally and necessarily lacking in that dis- 
cipline which was indispensable for success. Camps were estab- 
lished at Lille and Rouen in the north, at Conlie in the west, 
and at Orleans, Bordeaux, and Lyons in the south ; and to these 
flocked the recruits who had not, undirected and unwisely, hud- 
dled in Paris. The formation of the most distant of those camps 
was not interrupted by the Germans, whose main forces were 
still engaged before Metz and Paris ; but General von Moltke 
seems early to have contemplated a dispersal of the forces which 
were concentrating, with more daring than discretion, at Orleans, 
only forty miles in the rear of his position south of Paris. A 
small army, detached from the investing force at Versailles, 
under General von der Tann, advanced upon Orleans on Octo- 
ber lOth, surprising the French advance at Artenay on that day, 
and driving the main body of the Array of the Loire out of 
Orleans on the following day. Beyond Orleans, von der Tann 
durst not venture, and the result of the expedition was simply 
to push the recruiting French a little further south. At the 
same time, von der Tann's right became exposed to attack from 
the troops forming at Conlie, behind Le Mans, and thus he was 
placed on the defensive, in a position which demanded his 
utmost vigilance. He was glad to remain quiet until a month 
later, when the surrender of Metz gave him promise of large 
reenforcements from the disengaged army of Prince Friedrich 
Karl. No sooner had this event occurred (October 26th), than 
von Moltke resolved on the dispersal of the French armies in 
the provinces. Yon Steinmetz's old army, recruited to 75,000 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 299 

or 80,000 men, was given to General ManteufFel, and directed 
against the camps about Lille and Rouen, and the fortified posi- 
tions in the north. Prince Friedrich Karl, with the old Second 
Army, was pushed westward, with orders to disperse d'Aurelles 
de Paladines below Orleans, and Chanzj at Conlie or Le Mans. 
Yon Werder was already forcing the advance-guard of the 
Lyons Army further southward, and debouching from the Yos- 
ges into the Saone Yalley. 

The French Minister of War at Tours no sooner heard of the 
surrender of Metz, than he resolved (after absurdly stopping in 
his rage to outlaw Bazaine and set a price on his head) to throw 
the Army of the Loire in overwhelming force on von der Tann 
before Prince Friedrich Karl could come up, hoping to crush 
him, and perhaps reach the rear of the investing line about 
Paris. Some sort of unity of action appears to have been 
secured by communication with Trochu by carrier-pigeons, but 
all plans failed. Chanzy and d'Aurelles were hastily concen- 
trated for the attack, the former making also a flank movement 
from Le Mans to the rear of von der Tann's position at Artenay. 
But the German was too well aware of the danger menacing 
him to relax in vigilance. Constant reconnoissances of his cav- 
alry warned him of the French movement ; and, though forced 
to abandon Orleans on N"ovember 9-10, he did not yield without 
a struggle, which delayed the French advance, and hastened the 
approach of Prince Friedrich Karl from Metz. 

Anything like victory had been so unusual with the French 
in the progress of the war hitherto, that their success in driving 
von der Tann out of Orleans almost crazed them. The German 
General had yielded, not without a stubborn resistance, to a 
force more than three times that of his own army, and by his 
resistance had effected a delay which enured to the benefit ot 
the German army subsequently ; but the losses he sustained were 
far less than the French journals, with their extraordinary talent 



300 THE GKEAT WAR 

for exaggeration, represented. Such announcements as the fol- 
lowing, in a battle where the entire loss in killed, wounded, and 
prisoners could not have exceeded 2,000, and by the defeated 
party was stated at but half that number, are even more absurd 
than some of the glowing despatches of our own war : 

" The Prussians have lost over 10,000 men in killed and 
wounded, and 1,800 prisoners, in the battles around Orleans, and 
are retreating toward Chartres and Etampes. A large number 
of guns, thrown away by the enemy, have been picked uj), and 
distributed among the National Guards at Orleans. The entire 
Army of the Loire is advancing." 

The last item, like mucli of the rest of the despatch, was 
entirely false. Tlie entire Army of the Loire were not advanc- 
ing, and, with their knowledge of the speedy approach of the 
army of Prince Friedrich Karl, did not dare to advance. 

In justice to General d'Aurelles de Paladines, who, in conse- 
quence of this victory, was exalted from comparative obscurity 
into one of the greatest commanders of modern times, it should 
be said that he was not so much disposed to over-estimate his 
success. His despatch to Minister Gambetta was as follows : 

" "VYe have taken possession of the city of Orleans, after a 
fight which has lasted two days. Our aggregate losses in killed 
and wounded do not reach 2,000, while those of the enemy arc 
much larger. 

" We have made more than 1,000 prisoners thus far, and arc 
continually adding to them as we follow up the fleeing enemy. 
Among the property captured are two cannon of the Prussian 
model, twenty ammunition-wagons, and a great number of vans 
and provision-wagoi^. The hottest of the fight took place 
around Coulmier, on Wednesday, the 9th. Notwithstanding the 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 30| 

bad weather and otlier unfavorable circumstances, the elan dis- 
played by the troops was remarkable." 

His congratulatory order to his officers is in still better taste : 

"The action of yesterday was a glorious one for our army. 
Every position of the enemy was vigorously carried, and the 
enemy is now retreating. I have informed the Government of 
your conduct, and am instructed to return to you their thanks 
for your victory. Amid the disasters in which France is 
plunged, her eyes are upon you, and she counts upon your cour- 
age. Let us all make every effort, in order that this hope may 
not be mistaken. 

" D'AHRELLES DE PalADINES, 

" Comimander-in- Chief . 
" General Headquarters, Novemhcr 10, 18Y0." 

M. Gambetta, with that rashness which often leads impulsive 
and energetic men to jump at conclusions, decided that in Gen- 
eral d'Aurelles de Paladines he had found the commanding 
officer he had sought amid the number whom he had been 
obliged to reject, and gave liim full control of his newly-organ- 
ized and not thoroughly-disciplined Army of the Loire. The 
other armies of the j)rovinces were commanded by General 
Bourbaki, the only one of Napoleon's old generals, except 
Ducrot, who was in Paris, who was not a prisoner. General 
Chanzy was at this time second in command to General d'Au- 
relles. lie was another new man, but apparently a good 
officer, if his troops and liis subordinate officers could have been 
depended upon. In the north of Prance another army, likewise 
raw recruits, was put under the command of General Faidherbe, 
an officer of considerable ability, who had been for some years 
Governor of the French colony of Senegal, on the west coast of 
Africa. 



302 THE GREAT WAR 

The German General von der Tann fell back from Orleans to 
Tourj, and subsequently to Angerville, in the direction fron 
whence he expected reenforcements from the army of Prince 
Friedrich Karl; but he showed no panic and no disposition to 
avoid attacks. 

Meanwhile, M. Gambetta had issued a proclamation to the 
army, announcing that the Government expected the deliverance 
of the capital from its valor. But, greatly to his surprise. Gen- 
eral d'Aurelles de Paladines did not follow up his success so 
promptly as had been expected. Day after day he remained 
near Orleans in a state of inactivity which the Government 
could not account for. He saw, more clearly than the Minister 
of War did or could, that his success had been merely tempo- 
rary, and in some sense accidental, and that a forward move- 
ment, until Orleans had been put in a state of complete defense, 
would, with his imperfectly-trained and not very steady troops, 
imperil what he had gained. During these two or three weeks, 
then, he had been exerting himself to the ntmost to put the city 
into such a condition of defense that it might be able to repel 
any attacks of a considerably superior force. He had formed an 
entrenched camp before the city, and fortified it with ninety-five 
naval guns manned by seamen from Cherbourg. Behind this 
defense he believed his army might hold its ground under any 
circumstances, while drawing reserves and supplies from the 
country behind the Loire. 

But while he was making these preparations for defense, as 
early as the middle of ISTovember, General von Yoight Khetz, 
commander of the Tenth German Corps, part of the army of 
Prince Friedrich Karl, had arrived at Tonnere with 20,000 men : 
and the Duke of Mecklenburg, with the right wiug of the Ger- 
man army on the Loire, no longer regarding the French general, 
marched westward, occupied Dreux after a short engagement, 
marched across the Department of the Eure et Loire, and tlen 



BETWEEN" FRANCE AND GERMANY. 303 

tlirougli the Orne and tlie Sartlie as far as Belleme. Notwitb- 
standing the weakened condition of General von der Tann, who 
remained behind, General d'Aurelles still remained in his posi- 
tion before* Orleans, instead of striking at him before the Ger- 
man reenforcements could come up. . 

The Duke of Mecklenburg, in his march westward, had only 
encountered a feeble resistance from small bodies of ill-organized 
troops raised in tlie west. When, at last, toward the end of JSTo- 
vember. General d'Aurelles was ready to move, his army of the 
Loire formed a semi-circle around Oi'leans from the Forest of 
Cercottes, which it occupied, to the environs of Meung. His 
extreme left, the Seventeenth Corps, under command of General 
de Sonis, was at first stationed at Chateaudan, an advanced and 
dangerous position, so far from the remainder of the army that it 
was in danger of being cut off. This position it was found 
necessary to abandon, and draw his lines closer to Orleans. The 
Sixteenth Corps, under command of General de Chanzy, lay 
next, on the left ; the centre, with the headquarters, was occu- 
pied by the Fifteenth Corps, under General Martin de Pallieres ; 
on the right lay the Twentieth Corps, commanded by General 
Crouzat, who had been summoned in great haste from Chagny. 
The extreme right v/as formed by the Eighteenth Corps, which 
at first was stationed at Gien, but took up a p;3sition at the 
extremity of the Forest, and in front of Montargis. The Ger- 
man right was commanded by the Duke of Mecklenburg, the 
centre by General von der Tann, and the left by Prince Fried- 
rich Karl, who, when he arrived on the field of battle, ranked 
both the other commanders. The plans for the whole move- 
ment, it is hardly necessary to say, had been projected by that 
consummate strategist^ General von Moltke. 

On the 28th of November, General d'Aurelles attacked the 
Tenth Prussian Army Corps and First Cavalry Division, form- 
ing the extreme left wing of the German Army, at Beaune de 



304 THE GREAT WAR 

Rolande, and had very nearly overthrown them, when the arri- 
val of Prince Friedrich Karl, who took command in person, 
changed the fortunes of the day. Beaune de Eolande is twenty- 
seven miles northeast of Orleans and sixteen miles northwest of 
Montargis. The French loss in this engagement, in killed, 
wounded, and prisoners, was not far from 7,000. General d'Au- 
relles was slightly wounded. The German loss did not exceed 
1,000 men. The object of General d'Aurelles in giving battle 
at this point, so far from Orleans, was undoubtedly to furnish 
moral aid, and, if possible, substantial assistance, to the sortie 
which, under General Trochu's direction, General Ducrot was 
then making from Paris. Beaune de Eolande is only about 
twenty-two miles, or one good day's marcli, from Fontainebleau, 
which was to be the point of junction ; and if the commander 
of the Army of the Loire could succeed in breaking through 
Prince Friedrich Karl's lines, and Ducrot could force his way 
through the ranks of the besiegers of Paris, there would be some 
hope of raising the siege of the capital. It was unfortunate for 
General d'Aurelles that he could succeed in bringing only a part 
of his force into action at Beaune de Polande — only the Twen- 
tieth Corps being in full force, and some brigades or divisions 
from the Fifteenth and Sixteenth. The result, though not 
regarded as a serious defeat at the time, proved a very serious 
disaster subsequently in its effect. Ducrot's sortie, unsupported 
by this diversion, proved, as we shall presently see, a failure, 
and with its want of success perished the last well-grounded hope 
of raising the siege of Paris. Moreover, the planting of the 
German force across the only available route to Fontainebleau 
blocked all movements in that direction, and rendered all efforts 
to reach the weakest point in the besiegers' line unsuccessful. 
On the 1st of December, undaunted by his repulse of the 28th 
of November, General d'Aurelles suddenly and vehemently 
attacked the German centre, under General von der Tann, while 







O 

o 

H 
H 

O 

o 



i4 ^ 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 307 

he was reconnoitring on the old road to Cliartres, and drove him 
in a northwesterly direction past Lorgny. The four days which 
followed were days of severe and heavy fighting, though at no 
tiuie, except perhaps on the 4:th of December, were the greater 
part of the forces of either army engaged. On the 2d, General 
de Chanzy, who was in command of the corps making this move- 
ment, continued his advance as far as Orgeres and Bargneux ; 
but in the afternoon of that day the Duke of Mecklenburg re- 
enforced von der Tann, and drove de Chanzy back as far as 
Artenay, and a part of his force still farther, to Poupry. Gen- 
eral d'Aurelles now found that the time for offensive action had 
passed, and that he must mass his troops for the defense ol 
Orleans, which Prince Fried rich Karl was e^'idently bent on 
recapturing. He had, unwisely, made his lines too extensive ; 
and now, so rapid were the Prince's movements, that his Eigh- 
teenth and Twentieth Army Corps, which were stationed at and 
near Montargis, could not be brought up for the defense of the 
city. Prince Friedrich Karl sent his Ninth German Corps to 
Toury Bazoches, his Third to Pitluviers, and his Fifteenth, with 
three brigades additional, to Boyne ; thus interposing a force of 
more than three corps between the two outlying coi-ps of d'Au- 
relles and the other three corps on which he was obliged to rely 
for the defense of Orleans. The Ninth German Corps, which 
the Prince joined on the morning of the 3d of Decembei-, was 
the centre, and marched on the road from Paris to Orleans ; the 
Third Corps formed the left, and moved on the road from Fon- 
tainebleau to Orleans ; and the Fifteenth, with the Duke of 
Mecklenburg's divison and the Tenth Arniy Corps, occupied the 
Chartres and other roads. The Eighteenth Division (the Duke 
of Mecklenburg's) advanced to Artenay, which the French had 
already evacuated, and at Moulin d'Anvilliers, a few miles far- 
ther on, overtook the French troops, and defeated them after 
Bome severe fighting, and continued their advance to Chevilly, 



308 THE GREAT WAR 

wLicli, though the key to the wood of Orleans, fell into then 
hands without farther fighting. On the evening of the day, the 
Third German Corps, after taking Sancerre, which was strongly 
fortified, and Chillers-aux-Bois, had advanced as far as Toiiry. 
The Ninth Corps had only reached Crottes and Aschires, as 
Chateau St. Germain-le-Grand had been strongly fortified. The 
Tenth Corps had taken Neuvelle-aux-Bois and driven the French 
back into the wood. On the 4:th of December the attack was 
renewed. The Ninth Corps advanced, and was met by a sharp 
fire from the wood. General von Blumenthal took Cercottes 
after some very severe fighting. In the mean time, the 36th 
Brigade advanced about four miles beyond St. Live, where the 
way had been strongly barricaded. On the right wing, the 
Grand Duke had gradually driven the French backward toward 
Orleans ; and on the left, the Tliird Corps had reached St. Loup 
with but little fighting. In the evening the German troops 
occupied the north, west, and east of Orleans. The road to the 
south alone remained open to the French, and by this they 
efiected their retreat on the night of the 4th of December, the 
Germans reoccupying the city. In this series of battles the 
French lost nearly 20,000 in killed and wounded, and 14,000 
prisoners taken at Orleans, 77 guns, a great number of military 
equipages, and four armed steamboats. A still more serious dis- 
aster was, that the Army of the Loire was cut in two, the Eigh- 
teenth and Twentieth French Corps being compelled to cross the 
Loire and go south toward Bourges ; while the three Army 
Corps, which were immediately before Orleans, fled at first to 
Blois, and subsequently, fighting desperately, made their way 
toward Le Mans. On their way to Blois they were overtaken 
by the Germans between Meung and Beaugency ; and from the 
7th to the 12th of December, after severe fighting, were com- 
pelled to retreat, losing 2,000 prisoners and six guns, besides a 
large number of killed and wounded. The other half of the 



\ 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 311 

French army, in their retreat toward Bourges, were pursued in 
the same way and with similar results. Tliis series of disasters 
led the officers of the Provisional Government at Tours to deter- 
mine to remove the capital to Bordeaux ; but Minister Gambetta 
endeavored to conceal this violent disruption of his best army, 
by promptly issuing an order creating two armies of it, one 
under Bourbaki, former commander of the Imperial Guard, and 
the other under General Chauzy. General d'Aurelles was re- 
moved from command. This defeat was commented upon as 
"a blessing in disguise" by Paris papers, one of which, deter- 
mined to see only the bright side of things, exultingly declared, 
" We have now two great armies where was only one before." 
Gambetta made the further great mistake of sending the escaped 
forces under Bourbaki on an ill-considered expedition against 
von Werder in the Yosges, instead of concentrating it upon 
Chanzy in the west. 

We turn now from this disaster at Orleans, to give some 
account of the sortie led by Ducrot, to which we have already 
referred. This was by far the most important attempt made by 
the besieged garrison of Paris to break through the lines of the 
besiegers, and, though it failed to accomplish its object, partly 
from the contemporaneous failure of General d'Aurelles, already 
noticed, and partly from the extraordinary facilities possessed by 
the Germans for concentrating their forces on a given point, yet 
it was stubborn enough, and inflicted sufficiently heavy losses 
upon the German army to demonstrate what French troops, 
properly trained and skilfully led, would be capable of accom- 
plishing. 

The sortie, which had been long in contemplation by General 
Trochu, had for its objective the district lying on the bends of 
the Marne, east-southeast of Paris, beyond Yincennes. There 
were also feints made against the lines of the besiegers, on the 
south and west, to divert attention from the true point of attack. 



312 THE GREAT WAR 

The reasons for selecting tliis point were sound. Mucli of 
the tract conld be rendered untenable for German troops by the 
fire from forts De ISTogent and De Charenton, which swept a con- 
siderable portion of the two peninsulas formed by the double 
bend of the Marne ; the investing line was weakest at this point, 
being held by Saxon and Wurtemburg troops — excellent sol- 
diers, but decimated by their previous terrible fighting around 
Metz ; they had Yincennes for a base of operations, and held 
already some of the small villages adjacent; and, finally, this 
was in a direct line toward Fontainebleau, the proposed rendez- 
vous with the Army of the Loire. General Ducrot, who com- 
manded this expedition, was one of the old officers of Napoleon 
III, who had been taken prisoner at Sedan, but, as he declared, 
did not accept a parole, and subsequently, in consequence of the 
carelessness of the guard, made his escape. He possessed con- 
siderable military ability and skill, and was regarded by General 
Trochu as his most trusty lieutenant. The force put under his 
command consisted of about 150,000 selected troops, a part of 
them belonging to the Garde Mobile, but all very carefully 
drilled. General Trochu was on the field in person, though 
devolving the command of the sortie entirely on General Du- 
crot. On the 29th of November General Yinoy led a moderate 
force toward L'Hay and Choisy-le-Koi, on the south of Paris ; 
but this was merely as a feint. On the same day Generals Tro- 
chu and Ducrot addressed the army in the most energetic lan- 
guage, on the greatness of the issue of the intended operations, 
and the duty of shrinking from no sacrifice for the country. 

In the night of November 29th-30th, General Ducrot issued 
from the Forest of Yincennes, crossed the Marne at several 
points with a force of about 120,000 men, and fought obstinately 
throughout the day (November 30th), to break through the lines 
held by the Wurtemburgers and Saxons. Tie succeeded in 
advancing a considerable distance, but, when night fell, had 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 313 

been compelled to fxill back to Brie and Cbampignj, on the 
river, where, however, he remained. By a reference to our map 
of Paris and its vicinity, the reader will observe that the Marno 
runs nearly due west from Cournay for some distance, then 
makes a sweep south ; on the eastern bank of this sweep stands 
the village of Brie, and then the river forms a couple of loops, 
within the most northerly of which are the villages of St. Maur 
and Champigny, and, some distance to the east of the wide neck 
of the loop, the larger village of Yilliers-sur-Marne. It was in 
and around the three villages of Brie, Champigny, and Yilliers, 
that the bloody drama of ITovember 30th was enacted. Brie 
and Champigny, at nightfall, remained in the hands of the 
French, and Yilliers was as stoutly held by the Saxons. On the 
next day there was no fighting, but hostilities were resumed on 
the 2d of December. 

"We have the following brief reports of the events of the 
sortie, from the pen of General Trochu : 

" Chateau betwken Bkie-sur-Marxe and Champigny, ) 
November 30, 3 o'clock. ) 

" The right wing has maintained the brilliantly-taken posi- 
tions. The Mobile Guard, after wavering somewhat, has carried 
itself bravely, and the enemy, whose losses are serious, was 
forced to withdraw himself behind the ridge of the hills. The 
situation is good. The artillery under General Frebault has 
fought excellently. If it had been said, a month ago, that an 
army would form in Paris capable of crossing a difficult stream 
in the face of an enemy, and of driving before it the Prussian 
army intrenched on the hills, no one would have believed it. 
General Ducrot has behaved wonderfully, and I cannot honor 
him here too much. Susbiele's division, which, outside of and 
on the right wing of the general engagement, had with great 
courage taken the joosition of Montmesly, was not able to main- 
tain itself there against superior forces, and has returned to Cre- 



314 THE GREAT WAR 

teil, but its diversion was very useful. I pass tlie night at the 
scene of the battle, which will be continued to-morrow. 

" General Tjjochu. 

" RosNT, 7.42 p.ir. 

" The end of the day has been good. A division of General 
d'Exea passed the Marne and resumed the ofiensive ; we remain 
in the positions. The enemy has left us two cannon, and left his 
wounded and dead on the field. 

^' [These two guns were taken at Epinay, east of St. Denis,] 

" December 1. 

" Oui- troops remain this morning in the positions which they 
took yesterday and occupied during the night. They remove 
the wounded left by the enemy on the battle-field, and bury his 
dead. The transport of our wounded is completed with the 
greatest regularity. The army is full of courage and determina- 
tion. 

"Plateau between Champigny and Villiees, ) 
December 2, 1.45 noon. ) 

■" Attacked this morning at daybreak by enormous forces. 
We have been more than seven hours in battle. At the moment 
of writing to you, the enemy gives way over the whole line, and 
surrenders to us again the heights. As I hastened through our 
tirailleurs from Champigny to Brie, I have received the honor 
and the inexpressible joy of tlie troops exposed to the heaviest 
fire. There will be, without doubt, offensive counter attacks, 
and this second battle will, like the first, last a whole day. I do 
not know what future awaits these proud effbrts of the republi- 
can troops, but I grant them this acknowledgment, that, under 
tests of every kind, they have made themselves well worthy of 
recognition by the fatherland. 1 add to this, that to General 
Ducrot the honor of these two days is due. 

" General Tkochu. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 315 

" Paris, Nogent, 5.30 p, a. 
" I return to my quarters in the fort very tired and very con- 
tented. This second great battle is much more decisive than the 
previous one. The enemy attacked us at the hour of reveille 
with reserves and fresh troops. We could oppose to him only 
the combatants of the second day before, fatigued, with incom- 
plete supplies, and stiffened by the winter nights, which they 
had passed without covers, since, in order to lighten us, we had 
been obliged to leave them behind in Paris. But the astonish- 
ing courage of the troops has replaced all. We fought three 
hours in order to retain our positions, and five hours to take 
those of the enemy, in which we remain. That is the balance 
of this hard and splendid day. Many will not see their hearths 
again ; but these lamented dead have won for the young repub- 
lic of the year 1870 a glorious page in the military history of 
the fatherland. General Tkochu." 

On the 3d of December the French forces recrossed the 
Marne, destroying the bridges, and concentrated themselves in 
the Forest of Vincennes, ostensibly to follow out their opera- 
tions, in reality because their effort to break the German lines 
had proved a failure. They had taken about four hundred pris- 
oners. The next day they returned to the fortifications. Their 
losses were officially stated as 1,008 killed and 5,022 wounded, 
prisoners and missing not given. 

It must be confessed that this narrative of the three days' 
fighting by General Trochu is sufficiently vague. Fortunately, 
we have the means of knowing more fully the incidents of the 
three days' battle, though the narrative is from a neutral (the 
correspondent of the London Daily News) in the German 
camps : 

" The whole Saxon forces (says this correspondent) engaged 
in the recent operations numbered but 10,000 men. They occu- 
18 



310 THE GREAT WAR 

pied positions at Noisy-le-Grand, Champs, Cournay, Yilliers, 
and in their vicinity was a division of Wurtemburgers, com- 
manded by General von Obernetz, a Prussian officer. The 
Wurteinburgers occupied positions at Ormesson, Chennevieres, 
and Koiseau, and in tlieir vicinity was a brigade of the Second 
Corps. Tliis force was made up of contributions from various 
other portions of the same corps, and was commanded by Gen- 
eral von Fransecky, who had nominal direction of all the opera- 
tions, supervised, however, as regarded the Saxons, by Prince 
George in person, whose heedlessness of danger must have sorely 
tried the nerves of his staff. 

" A contingent force supported the "Wurtemburgers ; the 
Saxons had no backing but their own valor. In all, the Ger- 
man troops engaged and immediately supporting amounted to 
22,000 men. This force, it seems, had been detailed for an offen- 
sive movement, and the programme was greatly complicated by 
the unexpected counter-offensive movement of the French pro- 
jected against Yilliers, and with hopes of ultimately breaking 
through the cordon surrounding them. It thus happened that, 
as the Germans were pressing in to drive the French out of Brie 
and Champigny, the French were simultaneously pouring out to 
take Yilliers. 

" On the road that passes through ISToisy, the south bank of 
the Marne is low, with a gradual rise, furrowed by inconsider- 
able rectangular depressions. As one reaches ISToisy and looks 
southward, he sees toward Brie, and athwart the thick part of 
the loop of the Marne, a broad, flat space, offering a favorable 
scope for military evolutions. From this plain toward Yilliers 
there rises gradually a low but shaggy elevation, covered chiefly 
with copse-woods and vineyards. "This elevation is not continu- 
ous to YiUiers. There are occasional depressions, debouchments 
of which cause the trivial hollows that occur on the road to 
!Noisy. The general tendency is, nevertheless, upward, so that" 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 317 

the table-land at the back of wbicli Yilliers lies is liiglier than 
any ground between it and the plain. The ridge, therefore, 
though hampered by hedges and brushwood,, would form no bad 
position for resistance to a force which, having deployed on the 
plain, should attempt to carry it, if it were not swept by the 
direct fire from Fort Nogent at easy range, and enfiladed at 
longer range, but still effectively, by batteries on Mont Avron. 

" When I crossed the river, at 9 o'clock, Noisy was an eligi 
ble point from which to observe operations. Shells from Mont 
Avron %vere coming very thick ; now there was a shower of 
slates as a shell crashed through a roof, lifting the solid rafters as 
if they were laths ; now half the side of a house went down 
bodily as some huge projectile struck and crushed it. Brie 
divided with Noisy the attentions of the French batteries, and 
Brie is more open to attack. Tiie 107th Regiment had made a 
dash into Brie out of Kosny early in the morning, and I won- 
dered nmch how it had fared with them — hard enough, no doubt 
— but could they hold the place under such ding-dong pelting ? 
By 10 o'clock the question was resolved. First came a drove of 
French prisoners, red-breeched regulars, up toward Noisy, along 
the slight shelter afforded by the road ; then Saxon soldiers and 
more prisoners ; and, finally, the. bulk of the 107th, in very open 
order, making the most of the few opportunities for cover. It 
was not a pleasant way to traverse. Forts fired heavily on cap- 
tors and captured alike. More than one Frenchman was slain 
by missiles from French weapons. 

" As the struggling columns came up, I learned that the 
107th, in a rapid rush in the morning, had surprised the occr- 
pants of Brie, some asleep, others drinking coft'ee. There was z, 
trifling resistance. Nearly 500 prisoners were taken, including 
eight officers. The reason for relinquishing Brie was, that the 
terrible, persistent fire from the forts rendered it utterly un- 
tenable. 



318 THE GREAT WAR 

" The prisoners looked like sturdy fellows, anything but ill- 
fed. One of them bade me good morning, and told me cheerily 
that, if any one indulged in the anticipation of the speedy capit- 
ulation of Paris, he was extremely out in his reckoning. Food 
was plentiful, he said, with a laugh, and the programme was 
' sorties every day, in every direction.' The prisoners were 
escorted back to Chelles, where, later in the day, I saw them 
penned in the yard of the town-hall. 

" As the Prussians from Brie finished filing through Noisy, 
an ominous sight met my eye in another direction as I peered 
through a loophole I had contrived there. On the gradual slope 
of the further bank of the Marne, under the wing of Fort 
Nogent, and extending right and left along tlie Chaumont rail- 
way, were dense columns of French infantry. How they came 
there, I know not. It was as if the spectacle had sprung up by 
magic. Now they stood fast, closing up as the fronts of battal- 
ions halted. Tlien there was a slow movement forward, as the 
head of the column dipped out of sight between the village of 
Nogent and the river. Then there seemed to be a final halt. 
The dense masses stood, their bayonets glittering in the sun, as 
if the men had come out for a spectacle. 

" But little by little there was a gradual trickling off down 
to the bight of the river between Nogent and Brie. There was 
a railway-bridge (the Chaumont Kailway) — a lofty viaduct — but 
a gap in one arch had rendered it useless. Presently, on the 
plain to the south of Brie, a knot of red-breeches became visible, 
that grew denser and denser every moment. Simultaneously, 
the whole sprang into life. From the farm -buildings about Le 
Tremblay, from St. Maur and Joinville, there poured out vast 
bodies of French troops, deploying at double-quick. The line 
seemed to extend right athwart the neck of the loop of the river. 

"At Champigny, I am informed that "Wurtemburgers, after 
desperate fighting, had driven the French out not long after 8 




KUINS OF TIIE BUEKT PALACE OF ST. CLOUD, KEAE PAEIS, FIEED BY 

FEENCH SHELLS. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 321 

o'clock, to be in turn subjected to violent attack and partial ex 
pulsion. The sharpshooters daslied into the thicket lining the 
foot of the rising ground, and scrambled through. The troops 
behind them followed — a serried column. Whence had they 
come? They had crossed during the night and occupied the 
loop. Their bridges must have been between Joinville and 
Nogent ; and the nullification of Brie enabled the utilization at 
a later hour of a bridge between Brie and the railway viaduct. 

"The Bois de Grace, lying in front (south) of Champs, 
afforded favorable cover for a detour into the rear of Villiers, 
which evidently was the point for which the French advance 
was intended. Their force — I refer exclusively to that section 
of it that threatened Yilliers — must have been at least 20,000. 
How large was the force M'ith which the Wurtemburgers had to 
deal toward Champigny, I had no means of ascertaining. In 
those dense columns standing in support under IS^ogent, there 
could not have been less than 20,000. There were 20,000 of the 
left advance, with whom 10,000 Saxons had to cope — not with 
them alone, but with those terrible projectiles, a storm of which 
incessantly clashed into the upper ground where Yilliers stands, 
and into the glades behind. 

" The French skirmishers were thrown out with as mucli 
regularity as if the day's work had been but a peaceful parade. 
The forces were deployed with surprising rapidity and apparent 
discipline ; but there appeared considerable looseness in their 
formation ; a total want of intervals, and, indeed, in places an 
overlapping of battalions. Had there been nothing else for the 
Saxons to do but to repulse an assault on Villiers directed solely 
against it, the task would have been comparatively simple, and 
not very sanguinary, notwithstanding the artillery-fire by the 
French. But the advance, threatening, as it did, in the evolu- 
tion by which it was deployed, to sweep right on, overlapping 
Yilliers, up the space between that place and Noisy, and so to 



322 THE GREAT WAR 

get throngli upon Champs, called for other tactics. ViUiers 
could only serve as a position on which to lean the Saxon left ; 
it became necessary to meet the French in the open space. 

" From behind Yilliers several (German) regiments came out 
to the right of the brow of the hill under the shell-fire. As the 
French came up the gentle acclivity, the guns of the forts con- 
tinned playing without interruption. So narrow was the margin 
between the combatants, that I question much whether a shell or 
two did not fall in the French ranks. I stood by the 108th 
Regiment as it quitted a position in which it had found some 
shelter. Two lieutenants gayly shook hands with a hussar aid- 
de-camp who liad just rode up with an order, as they passed him 
to go out into the battle. On went the regiment in dense col- 
umns of companies, shells now crushing into the ranks, now 
exploding in the intervals. 

" The line was formed, rear files closing up at the double- 
quick, and, in a twinkling, less than fifty yards separated the 
combatants. Then came a volley, then sharp firing by file, and 
tlie French broke and gave ground, only to get back to the next 
dip of the ground, to let the guns of the fort go to work again. 
The Saxons had to find what cover they might. When the regi- 
ments came back — they liad not been gone twenty minutes — 
thirty-five ofiicers out of the forty-five had gene down. Neither 
of the blithe lieutenants were to the fore. Now there came a 
lull in the musketry-fire, as a few moments before there had been 
a lull in the cannon. The Saxons could not get their artillery 
into action with advantage. The ground itself was unfavorable, 
while the fire from the forts must have speedily silenced their 
field-guns ; tLerefore this great advantage was lost to them. 

"All this took place before noon. After a little time the 
artillery-fire from the forts slackened considerably. The French 
infantry made no demonstration. On the German left, however, 
about Champigny, it was evident that hard fighting was going 



BETWEEN FKANCE AND GERMANY. 323 

Dn. About 1 o'clock the Frencli made another advance, having 
received considerable reenforcenients. The Saxon infantry con- 
fronted them with the old result, but a diiferent policy was this 
time adopted. It was plain that the only escape from the thun- 
derbolts of the forts hiy in getting at close quarters with the 
French infantry, unless, indeed, a retrograde movement was to 
be made—and that was not to be thought of. So, when the 
French fell back, the Saxons followed on, as if they would settle 
the question with the bayonet's point. It was the old cry, 
" Vorwarts, immer vorwarts ! " but the vorwarts was very slow. 

" What happened in the next hour, I could only guess by the 
constant crackling of small-arms. The forts confined themselves, 
apparently for the chief part, to firing into and over Champigny 
and Yilliers. At length the French were slowly and stubbornly 
falling back across the north side of the neck of land, the Sax- 
ons pushing them hard, the French ever and anon rallying. On 
this position of the plain, south of Brie, thei-e was a prolonged 
struggle. The Saxons were striving to get at and cut the pon- 
toon-bridge ; but this became an impossibility when Fort Nogent 
went to work again with the frightful accuracy of which the 
short range admitted. The combatants parted about 3 o'clock, 
both sides falling back. The fire of the fort continued some 
little time longer. 

" What shall I say of the result ? Jfot much have the Sax- 
ons gained. Was there much to gain ? The Wurtemburgers 
hold one end of Champigny. Brie stands empty and desolate ; 
there were French in it this morning ; later, there were Saxons 
That is all. But look at the bloody side of the picture. The 
number dead I cannot ascertain, but the German wounded were 
over 1,000. The French, if they lost fewer killed and wounded, 
lost 1,000 prisoners. Had it been possible for the Saxons to 
hold Brie, the French advance would have been impossible ; it» 
flanking fire would have prohibited breasting the slope toward 



g24r THE GREAT WAR 

Yilliers. The French had a mitrailleuse somewhere in the plain 
At any rate, the day's work was the final failure of the French 
hopes. The German line stood everywhere unbroken. Paris 
was no more free than before." 

In an order of the day announcing the termination of the sor- 
tie, General Ducrot said, that " if he had persevered in his plan 
after the resistance he had encountered, he should only have 
courted disasters, and imperilled the cause of the defense." This 
was the last important sortie made before the capitulation of 
Paris. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 



325 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE FrencL. armies had been defeated at Orleans, at Amiens, 
and before Paris. Aside from the temporary success of Gen- 
eral d'Am-elles de Paladines at Orleans in November, and a few 
(rifling engagements between small bodies of men on either side, 
they had been uniformly unsuccessful throughout the war ; but 
though there was cause for grave apprehension, there was, even 
yet, none for discouragement. Numerically, notwithstanding 
the three hundred and fifty thousand or more French troops who 
were prisoners in Germany, the French armies outnumbered the 
Germans on French soil. They were, indeed, for the most part, 
raw recruits, innocent of any knowledge of the use of fire-arms, 
or of any military training or drill, and so not a match for the 
veteran troops of tlie German Emperor ; but they were fast 
learning, and they were fighting for their homes and their coun- 
try. They were badly ofiicered ; their generals and their subor- 
dinate officers knew little or nothing of the topography of the 
country where they were fighting, and there was no master-mind 
to plan engagements and combine the forces for victory, as von 
Moltke did for the Germans. Gambetta, who really possessed 
considerable organizing power, was young, impetuous, hasty in 
action, and seldom well-informed in regard to the localities 
where the German troops wei-e, and hence made grievous blun- 
ders. His judgment of men was defective, and he repeatedly 
proclaimed that he had found the men who could organize vic- 
tory, and, within five or six weeks, denounced the same men 



326 THE GREAT WAR 

as traitors to France. His notorious exaggerations of trifling 
actions, or even serious defeats, as great victories, eventually led 
the people to distrust his statements. Trochu, more calm and 
frank in his character, seemed to lack heart in the enterprises he 
undertook, and, though promising constantly to make sorties or 
to concentrate his forces against the enemies of France, always 
found reasons for delay. 

We should not judge these men too hardly. Their circum- 
stances were peculiarly trying, and in these great emergencies 
they doubtless felt that they were unequal to the occasion. Yet 
there was but little more of zeal, energy, skill, and faith needed 
to have given tliem the victory on several occasions. Orleans 
was lost unnecessarily, by the too great expansion of the French 
lines. Had General d'Aurelles had his men well in hand, and 
manning strongly their crescent-shaped lines in front of that city, 
Prince Friedrich Karl, skilful general as he was, must have re- 
coiled from a fight in which the odds would have been so great. 

Still nearer to a victory did the French come under Trochu 
and Ducrot, in the sortie of ISTovember 30th to December 3d, 
which was described in the last chapter. If, instead of with- 
drawing across the Marne, and giving up the fight on the 3d of 
December, Trochu had flung his reserves against the Saxons that 
day, with that elan which used to be the characteristic of French 
troops, he would have broken their line, and, as the Crown- 
Prince of Saxony frankly admitted, have compelled the Ger- 
mans to raise the siege, for the time at least. 

But it was the misfortune of the French armies throughout 
the war to have leaders who were not thoroughly in earnest in 
their efibrts for the preservation of the nation. So it liappened 
that while, on the 12th of December, w^ith suitable leaders, the 
cause of France would not have been wholly desperate, yet the 
measures which were taken before that time had rendered the 
overthrow of the nation, under its leaders, inevitable. 

\ 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 327 

Apparently unaware that his only hope of success lay in con- 
centrating his armies and hurling them against the weak points 
of that mighty cordon which surrounded Paris, and encouraging 
the Parisian garrison to cooperate with them by well-planned sor- 
ties, Gambetta sought rather to scatter his troops as widely as pos- 
sible over France ; thinking, perhaps, that it would be more diffi- 
cult for the Germans to capture them. Thus, when Prince Fried- 
rich Karl had cut his Army of the Loire in two, and Bourbaki, 
with his half, had gone southward to Bourges, and de Chanzy, 
with his Corps d ^ArTiiee, west-northwest to Blois, Yendome, and 
Le Mans, instead of bringing Bourbaki westward to Tours, where 
he might have been within supporting distance of de Chanzy, 
Gambetta sent him almost two hundred miles to the eastward, to 
attack General von Werder, in the vicinity of the Swiss frontier. 
Garibaldi, with 30,000 men, was kept in the vicinity of Dijon — 
nearly as far distant, and in the same direction ; while General 
Faidherbe, with two corps, was in the extreme north of France, 
and General Laysel, with 30,000 more, in the vicinity of Havre. 
Some of these troops were indeed prevented from concentration 
by the interposition of moderate forces of German troops be- 
tween them and Orleans ; but, in most instances, a resolute will 
would have found a way of pushing through. The camps of 
instruction were said to contain 250,000 men — not well trained, 
it is true, but stUl capable of being of some service. 

Yet, from the 12th of December, the outlook constantly grew 
darker and darker to the final surrender ; while, with an infatua- 
tion which would have been ludicrous had not its consequences 
been so sad, Gambetta sent a despatch to Trochu, on the 14th of 
December, as follows : 

" For four days I have been in Bourges with Bourbaki, 
busied in reorganizing the three corps, namely, the Fifteenth, 
Eighteenth, and Twentieth, of the First Army of the Loire, 



328 THE GREAT WAR 

which, in consequence of forced marches in the most terrible 
rain, had been thrown into very bad condition. This work 
requires still four or five days. The positions occupied by Bour- 
baki cover at the same time Nevers and Bourges ; the other part 
of the Loire Army retreated, after the evacuation of Orleans, 
toward Beaugency and Marchenoir, in which positions it has 
resisted all the efforts of Friedrich Karl — thanks to the uncon- 
querable energy of General de Chanzy, who appears to be the real 
warrior whom recent events have brought out. That army, con- 
sisting of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-first Corps, 
and, according to General Trochu's arrangements, supported by 
all the powers of the west, has accomplished a wonderful retreat, 
and inflicted the severest losses upon the Prussians. De Chanzy 
withdrew himself from a great flank march of Friedrich Karl on 
the left bank of the Loire. Friedrich Karl attempted in vain to 
cross the Loire at Amboise and Blois, and to threaten Tours. De 
Chanzy is to-day in the most perfect security in La Perche, ready 

to take the offensive in the direction of as soon as his 

troops have rested ; the latter have fought steadily and in the 
most extraordinary manner, against superior ibrces of the 
enemy, since November 30th and up to December 12th. You 
see that the Army of the Loire is far removed from being de- 
stroyed, as the Prussian falsehoods have given out. It is divided 
into two armies of equal strength, which are ready to take the 
field. Faidherbe in the north is said to have taken La Fere, 
with much munition, artillery, and provision. But we are very 
uneasy as to your fate. For nearly eight days we have no news 
from you, either direct or through the Prussians, or from other 
nations. The cable to England is interrupted. What is hap- 
pening ? Pelieve us from our anxiety, and improve the oppor- 
tunity offered by the southwest wind to send off" a balloon, 
which will then probably fall in Belgium. 

" The withdrawal of the Prussians becomes more and more 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 339 

noticeable. Tliej appear to be tired of the war. If we can 
keep on — and we can, if we really will it — we will triumph over 
them. According to trustworthy accounts which have reached 
me, they have already suffered immense losses. They supply 
themselves only with the greatest difficulty. But we must give 
ourselves to the greatest sacrifices, not lament much, and fight to 
the death. In the interior reigns everywhere the most astonish- 
ing order. The Government of the National Defense is every- 
where respected, and finds obedience everywhere." 

At this very time Prince Friedrich Karl was watching every 
movement of do Chanzy, much as a cat watches a mouse which 
she has already captured, but which she permits to rim within 
certain narrow limits. Blois had already fallen, and Vendome 
was entered two days later; Montmcdy had capitulated, and 
Amiens was tottering to its fall. The German forces on French 
soil were officially stated at Y28,000, of whom more than 510,000 
were effective, and the calling out of 124 battalions— equal to 62 
regiments more of the Landwehr Eeserves— did not strongly 
indicate that the Geiinans were withdrawing, or that they were 
very weary of the war. On the 20th of December, the German 
column on the right bank of the Loire pursued de Chanzy's army 
in the direction of Lc Mans ; while that on the left bank ad- 
vanced toward Tours, finding 6,000 French wounded, abandoned 
without medical attendance, on the road. The next day (21st of 
December) an official despatch from Yersailles announced : 

" The Nineteenth Division reached the bridge before Tours 
to-day, found opposition by the inhabitants, and therefore threw 
thirty shells into the city. White flags were then raised, and 
the city begged for occupation by the Prussians. The division 
contented itself, however, in accordance with its instructions, 
with destroying the railroad, and withdrew to its appointed can- 
tonments." 



330 



THE GREAT WAR 



By a reference to our map of France, it will be seen tliat 
de Clianzy's army, instead of approaching toward Paris, and so 
being ready to second any further sorties, was being pressed 
gradually away from it toward the southwest. This pressure 
became still stronger a week or two later, a portion of Prince 
Friedrich Karl's army being thrown between it and the outer 
line of the besiegers at Nogent le Eotron and Chartres. The 
approach of French armies toward Paris from other points was 
guarded against with equal care. General Faidherbe, who had, 
at the head of a considerable force (60,000 or T0,000 troops), 
approached as near to Paris as the vicinity of Pouen (about 
ninety miles), when General Manteuffel, who had been detached 
from the army of Prince Friedrich Karl, commenced driving 
him northward and northwestward, causing him to retreat 
through Pouen, Beauconnet, Mbntigny, Frechencourt, Querrieux, 
Pont Noyelles, Brissy, Becquemont, Daours, I'Haller, and on the 
23d of December, after a severe action at the last-named point, 
the German forces occupied Amiens, taking 1,000 prisoners, and, 
on the 25th, pushed on after Faidherbe toward Arras. 

On the 21st and 22d of December the French garrison in 
Paris again made sorties against the position of the Saxon Corps, 
somewhat north of their previous battle-ground ; but their attack 
was not steadily maintained by a strong force, and more than 
1,000 of their troops were taken prisoners. In order to divert 
attention fi'om their movements, they made two feints at the 
same time from Mont Yalerien, on the west of Paris, toward 
Buzenval and Montretout, and on the north, from St. Denis, 
toward Pierrefitte and Stains. General Ducrot commanded the 
column operating against the Prussian Guards, whose position 
was northeast and north-northeast of Paris ; and Generals Mal- 
roy and Blaise commanded the right wing in the attack upon the 
Saxon Corps. All told, 100 battalions were in line. The French 
occupied the villages Courneuve, Bobigny, and Bondy, 2,000 to 



BETWEEN FKANCE AND GERMANY. 331 

3,000 paces in advance of the forts, with their advanced posts ; 
Drancy, 2,000 paces further, being occupied only at night, as the 
German line was hut 2,000 paces distant. The Prussian outpost 
line extended from Pierrefitte througli Stains and Le Bourget, 
about 4,000 paces from the line of forts. The main body of the 
Guards was posted 3,000 paces to the rear in the line Garges, 
Dugny, Pont Iblon, Le Blanc Mesnil, Aulnay, and Sevran on 
the Ourcq canal, and the railroad to Soissons. Here began the 
Saxon (Twelfth) Corps, whose line extended to the Mame. 
Many points of this principal line were within range of the forts. 
French troops marched out of St. Denis December 20th, proceed- 
ing toward Aubervilliers, while three brigades threatened the 
left of the Guards, in front of Bobigny. Le Bourget was first 
attacked at 1 o'clock in the mornino-. Strona; detachments 
moved from Courneuve toward Dngny, leading the Germans to 
think that the attack would be on the south and west ; but, sud- 
denly changing their direction, the French attacked at the north- 
ern gate, which, with the churchyard, was taken, and 125 men 
captured. The attack on the south gate failed, and, reenforce- 
ments being sent, the Germans succeeded in driving out the 
French after a hot fight from house to house. In storming the 
churchyard, the last point held by the French, the Germans took 
359 prisoners. According to the reports of the latter, the rela- 
tive strength of the contestants was — Germans, 2,000; French, 
6,000. At Stains, on the right wing of the Prussian corps, a 
severe attack was repulsed without a single house of the town 
falling into French hands. 

Elsewhere the operations of the day were begun by a tremen- 
dous fire from the forts along the whole front, and missiles of the 
heaviest calibre were thrown a distance of 8,000 paces ; but the 
excessive range so interfered with the aim, that very little injury 
was done. Protected by the fire from the forts, the French artil- 
lery opened with two batteries before Courneuve, ten field and 



332 THE GREAT WAR 

three mitrailleur batteries north and northeast of Dranc}^, near 
Groslay Ferme, sweeping the whole field as far as Dugny, Pont 
Iblon, Le Blanc Mesnil, Anlnay, and Sevran. This fire was 
returned by the batteries of the Second Division of Guards from 
positions between Le Blanc Mesnil and Aulnay. At noon, two 
of these batteries crossed the river at Pont Iblon and took posi- 
tion 2,000 paces from the French, and, being followed by two 
more, showed themselves superior to the French ; the two bat- 
teries on the French right wing were silenced after two hours' 
lively work, and the fire of the others was weakened. Two 
other German batteries advanced, the fire of which completed 
the work. The French batteries gradually became silent, the 
infantry retired, and the sortie was repulsed. The losses of the 
Prussians were 14 officers and 400 men. The strength of the 
columns operating against them was estimated at 40,000, but 
only the regular troops were really in action at Le Bourget and 
Stains. The Mobiles and ]S"ational Guards were retained at such 
great distance, that the reserves on the German side were not 
deployed. 

The Twelfth, or Saxon Corps, stretching from Sevran to the 
Marne, had no fighting of importance until noon, when a French 
division advanced from IsTenilly and passed the advanced posts 
in Maison Blanche and Yille Evrart. A freshet in the river pre- 
vented an attack upon the position at Chelles, and the Wurtem- 
burg artillery was able to bring a flank fire to bear on the 
French. At five o'clock the German commander ordered the 
retaking of Ville Evrart and Maison Blanche. The latter was 
easily accomplished ; but Yille Evrart is composed of strongly- 
built houses standing alone, and in this small labyrinth the battle 
continued until midnight. General Blaise, commander of a Ger- 
man brigade, fell here. Some of the houses remained in posses- 
sion of the French until morning, when the increasing freshet in 
the Marne compelled the Germans to leave at three, and the 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 333 

French at eiglit o'clock. The other sorties from Mont Yalerien 
and from St. Denis were onlj demonstrations, and the fighting 
was nowhere severe. 

On the morning of the 2Yth of December the Germans be- 
gan a steady bombardment of Fort Avron, a large and strong 
work lying east of Paris and 3,000 paces beyond Fort Rosny. 
Thirteen batteries, monnting Y6 guns, played npon it incessantly 
during the day from a distance of 5,000 paces ; and so accurate 
and destructive was their fi.re, that the garrison abandoned it the 
same evening, and the Germans occupied it the next day, and, 
as soon as they could rearrange its guns, opened upon forts 
IS'oissy, de Rosny and de ISTogent, which were silenced before 
the new year. The loss of Fort Avron was a very severe one 
for the French, as it's fire had protected them in their previous 
sorties. On IS'ew Year's day, Mezieres, a strongly-fortified town 
west-northwest of Sedan, after a long siege and a severe bom- 
bardment, capitulated, more than 2,000 prisoners and 106 guns 
being surrendered. 

On the 2d of January, 18T1, Count "Wartensleben, command- 
er of the Fifteenth German Division and of a cavalry detach- 
ment, both forming a portion of General Manteufiel's army, 
overtook General Faidherbe's troops at Salpignies, near Ba- 
paume, in the north of France, and, after two days' fighting, the 
Germans were victorious, the Frencli losing about 4,000 in killed 
and wounded, and 500 prisoners, and the German loss in killed, 
wounded, and missing being 1J066. The Frenclr retreated in the 
direction of Douai and Arras, on the 4:th, and lost about 800 
more prisoners. 

The besieging army before Paris, having their heavy batteries 
in position, commenced, on the 5th of January, the bombard- 
ment of the southern and south-southwestern defences of the 
city — i. e., the forts Issy, Yanvres, and Montrouge, the Pont du 
Jour, and the gunboats in the Seine, These points were. all out- 
19 



334r THE GREAT WAR 

side of the city walls, but formed a part of the first line of de- 
fences. It did happen occasionally, however, that the shells 
fired at long range fell inside of the city walls. Fort Issy was 
soon silenced, and the other forts not long after, as we shall see 
by and by. Meantime, on the 5th, Rocroy, a strongly-fortified 
post near Mezieres, was captured, with T2 guns, 300 prisoners, 
and a large amount of stores. 

The Army of Prince Friedrich Karl, which had been engaged 
since the 12th of December in a careful watch and observation 
of every movement of General de Chanzy's army, and had 
promptly follow^ed each with a blow, discovered, on the 5th of 
January, by their reconnoissances, that he was again in motion 
near Azuy, and the Prince immediately started in pursuit. On 
the 6th he came up with two French army coi'ps at Azuy, five 
miles northwest of Vendome, on the road to Le Mans. A heavy 
battle ensued, in which the French were driven out of the town 
and closely pursued. They retreated for the next three days, 
stopping every few hours to fight, and, though new troops, stood 
their ground well. The number of stragglers from the ranks' 
constantly increased, however ; and as they were pushed by the 
Germans through l!Togent le Rotron, Sarge, Savigny, La Chartre, 
St. Calais, and Ardenay, they lost over five thousand prisoners 
and many guns, aside from the killed and wounded. At length 
the time arrived when de Chanzy felt that he could not retreat 
farther without destroying the morale of his troops ; he must 
stand, and deliver battle. He arrived at this decision a little too 
late. Prince Friedrich Karl had already sent the Grand Duke 
of Meeklenburg-Schwerin, with a large force, to make a detour 
to the north and come in upon the left flank of the French, 
while he should attack them in front. 

In the afternoon of the 10th of January the two armies con- 
verged upon the French within five miles of Le Mans. An eye- 
witness of the battle thus describes it : 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. ^35 

** The Frencli Army of the Loire, the last hope of France, 
has been defeated to-day in a bloody battle fought within five 
rriiles of this city (Le Mans). We heard the roar of the cannon 
all day, and the population crowded to the housetops and sub- 
urbs, and through the thoroughfares, watching the progress of 
the fight. I have never before witnessed such intense excite- 
ment, although the French people have become accustomed to 
the roar of cannon. 

'^ At nine o'clock this morning the right wing of the French 
army in position east of Le Mans was suddenly attacked by the 
vanguard of the German forces, which, emerging from the wood 
on the extreme right of the French, moved forward to attack. 
Upon the alarm being given, the advance-posts of the French 
infantry wheeled into line of battle, and the artillery was pushed 
forward, on the open ground between the severed ranks of the 
various commands. The cavalry took up an advantageous posi- 
tion on the right and left wings. 

" A more perfect line of battle could not have been formed 
by the finest army in Europe. The artillery was well supplied 
with ammunition, and the infantry had 100 rounds to each man. 
In addition, the supply-trains were well posted, and easy of 
access. 

" Real bloody work soon began. The field of battle was in 
a valley, and the two armies occupied heights opposite each, 
other, the French line forming a semicircle extending twelve 
miles, overlooking the valley, which was covered by twelve 
inches of snow. On the opposite heights the Prussians held a 
somewhat similar ^ . sition. 

" Shortly after nine o'clock the Prussians began a furious can- 
nonade from the wood near the extreme left. They were flanked 
by an immense force of cavalry partly concealed by the wood. 
Their position was where the German infantry massed with the 
evident intention of turning de Chanzy's right. The artillery-fire 



:{36 THE GREAT WAR 

on both sides "was continued without intermission until the am- 
munition was nearly exhausted. It was a fierce, well-sustained 
duel, the German and French artillerists displaying marked skill 
and courage. 

" At length the Prussian commanders gave the order for an 
advance, and the German infantry moved forward. The French, 
equally rapid, advanced along their whole line, and the opposing 
armies met in the valley in a fair hand-to-hand fight. The mus- 
ketry-fire was very severe and effective. The German troops 
were cool and collected, and the French impetuous and gallant. 
Indeed, both armies behaved with notable bravery until near 
noon, when the Gardes Mobiles began to waver, and, being un- 
able to hold their position, a retreat commenced. Meantime the 
dead and wounded lay upon the battle-field by thousands, and 
the snow-fields were red with human blood. 

" The carnage was fearful on both sides. Before five o'clock 
in the evening 15,000 French soldiers had fallen, and at this hour 
the whole army started in full retreat. The French and German 
forces were about equally matched. I should judge that they 
numbered 60,000 men each. Although the French have been 
beaten, they have not been routed." 

The battle was renewed the next day with more decisive 
results. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, who had moved 
southward from Chartres, fighting heavily all the way, succeed- 
ed early that day in following out the strategy which had been 
so successful at Orleans, and isolated the French Twenty-first 
Corps, so that it could render no aid to de Chanzy. He reported 
10,000 prisoners taken, with small loss on his side. Meantime 
the fighting between de Chanzy 's main army and Prince Friedrich 
Karl was desperate, but resulted finally, as all the previous bat- 
tles had done, in the defeat of the French, though more deci- 
sively than before. The same correspondent who witnessed the 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 337 

previous day's battle was also present at this, and thus de- 
scribes it : 

" After the battle of the previous day, General de Chanzy, dis- 
playing much energy, rallied his broken columns, and, having 
received reenforcements, determined to strike another blow to 
retrieve his fortunes, knowing that the whole hope of France 
centred upon the ability of his army to break through the strong 
opposition of the Ked Prince, and advance to the relief of Paris. 
After a night of unceasing labor and anxiety, daylight found the 
French forces prepared for the conflict. Their army consisted 
of three corps, the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-first re- 
spectively, under the command of Admiral Jourequiberry, and 
Generals Colomb and Jouffroy. These corps averaged 50,000 
men each, making an effective force of 150,000 men, the whole 
under the supreme control of General de Chanzy. By ten o'clock 
in the morning Joureqniberry's corps had taken up a position on 
the right bank of the river Huisne, General Colomb's on the 
plateau of Auvours, and General Jouffroy's on the right, cover- 
ing the village of Brette. 

" The Prussians advanced along three roads, and are said to 
have been under the command of Prince Friedrich Karl him- 
self. They were apparently 100,000 strong. Soon after ten 
o'clock sharp firing was opened by the Prussians from well- 
located batteries on the left of the French, It was replied to 
with spirit. Yery soon a lai-ge force of German infantry, flanked 
by cavalry, advanced under cover of a heavy artillery-fire, strik- 
ing the right of Admiral Joureqniberry's position. The assault- 
ing column was met by a fierce artillery-fire from many guns, 
including a number of mitrailleuses of the new pattern. The 
struggle now became exceedingly severe, and was well-contested. 
But although the Germans suffered heavy loss, they finally suc- 
seeded in driving back the French, capturing early two gunS; 
and taking and holding the important position near the river. ■ 



338 THE GREAT WAR 

" General de Chanzy, perceiving the danger which threatened 
his position, moved forward his reserves of artillery to the sup- 
port of Admiral Jourequiberry. These opened a terrific fire, 
which checked for awhile the further advance of the Germans 
in that direction. Two or three severe assaults were made by 
the Germans to secure further advantages, the object being to 
take the position held by the French at La Tillere. The French, 
however, were strongly posted, and fought with great courage 
and determination. Each assault was repulsed with serious loss 
to the Germans, the French also losing heavily. 

" Meantime an equally fierce attack was made on the French 
line covering the railroad to Chartres and Paris. After two 
hours' desperate fighting the French centre was driven back. It 
retreated, however, slowly and in good order for a short distance 
only, to a position in rear of that first occupied, and where the 
rising ground afforded good facilities for the artillery. Here a 
heavy force of guns was parked, which, manned by the marines, 
opened a severe and well-directed fire upon the advancing ene- 
my. This not only checked the Germans, but compelled them 
to fall back in turn. A heavy counter-fire soon opened from the 
German batteries, which, during the engagement, had advanced 
to a commanding position on the left of the railroad. 

" The superiority of the German guns in firing soon became 
apparent. After an unequal duel the French fire slackened, the 
Germans causing great loss to the French lines. Still, the 
French infantry maintained their position heroically, and an- 
other attempt to dislodge signally failed. For some time the 
engagement had the character of an artillery duel ; but when 
the German lines had taken the positions assigned them, a more 
active attack commenced, evidently with a desire on the part of 
the Germans to capture the position on the right bank of the 
Huisne, in order to execute a flanking movement, with the 



BETWEEN" FRANCE AND GERMANY. 341 

object of cutting between the army and Le Mans, and capturing 
a large number of prisoners. 

" At four o'clock tbe tactics of the Germans seemed to bo 
changed. A heavy massing of troops took place on the French 
right, under cover of the wood, near the village of Brette, which 
was held by the French. The wood was on the extreme left of 
the Prussian position, stretching for miles to the southeast of the 
plain between the road and villages, and were commanded by 
the Prussian artillery, which was well-posted on the left, under 
cover of the wood. A sharp and precise needle-gun fire was 
opened on the French line and position left of the village of 
Brette, not more than YOO yards distant. It soon became evi- 
dent that it would be impossible for them to long hold the posi- 
tion unless the Germans w^ere dislodged. The heavy fire of 
artillery directed on the woods had apparently but little effect. 
A large body of French infantry advanced in good order across 
the plain, but were compelled to retire with heavy losses before 
a murderous fire from both artillery and musketry. The contest 
for the possession of Brette was kept up at this point till dark, 
when an order reached the French to fall back upon Le Mans. 
As the French infantry slowly fell back, the artillery was 
brought to the front, and it maintained a steady lire upon the 
German line, successfully covering the retreat. The Germans, 
apparently in contempt of their partial success, seemed disin- 
clined to pursue the advantage they had gained in the day's 
fighting. General de Chanzy actively superintended the retreat, 
which was never disorderly at any time. Thus, after a bloody 
encounter, lasting until dark, in which the carnage had been 
fearful on both sides, nothing decisive had been gained by the 
Germans. All their successes had been negative, and the French 
officers and soldiers remained hopeful. 

" But an event occurred which made a total change in the 
prospects of the French. It was an event common enough in 



342 THE GREAT WAR 

tlie history of war. Had it failed, the result would have been 
disastrous to the Germans. It succeeded, and shattered the 
hopes of the French. Darkness had fallen upon the battle-field, 
or rather, I should say that day had gone ; for the evening was 
not very dark. One could see the vast fields of snow, dotted 
here and there by dark objects — the bodies of the victims of the 
day's struggle — while the patches of woods rose up grimly from 
the midst of the white fields. Suddenly, and without their 
preparations attracting attention, a strong force of Germans 
renewed the battle. Making toward the French right at La Til- 
lere, the most important position held by the Army of the Loire, 
immense masses of infantry, supported by a large force of cav- 
alry, advanced with the utmost rapidity, scattering in all direc- 
tions the French forces opposed to them. 

" The attack was not anticipated by the French. The sud- 
denness and rapidity with which the movement was executed 
took them completely by surprise, and but little resistance was 
offered. At the onset the Gardes Mobiles of Brittany were 
seized with panic and fled in great disorder. This completely 
destroyed the Frencli line of battle, as their whole force on the 
right bank of the Huisne was compelled to make a rapid retreat 
to save itself from capture. The defeat was complete ; or, if it 
lacked anything of being so, the movement of the next morning 
by General von Yoights Retz, who, by a neatly-accomplished 
flank movement, entered Le Mans, which the French had in- 
tended to occupy, and compelled their retreat in disorder toward 
Alengon and Laval. 

" The losses of the Gennans in the pursuit of de Chanzy's 
army from January 6th to 12th were 17Y officers and 3,203 
men. They captured 22,000 unwounded prisoners, 2 eagles, 
19 guns, more than a hundred loaded wagons, and great quan- 
tities of arms and war- material. General de Chanzy's effective 
force numbered, in the beginning, 122,000 men, so that its losses 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 



843 



by capture amount to one-sixth its strength, while the killed and 
wounded were more than 8,000 more." 



General de Chanzy felt this defeat very keenly, the more so as 
it had, aside fi'om the actual losses, almost entirely destroyed the 
morale of his army. In an order of the day issued on the 13th 
of January to the remainder of his army, he said : 

" After the successful engagements in which, in the valley of 
the Huisne as well as on the banks of the Loire at Yendome, 
you gained victories over the enemy — after the success of the 
11th at Lc Mans, where you resisted the attacks of the hostile 
forces under the chief command of Prince Friedrich Karl and 
the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, maintaining all the positions, 
a shameful weakness, an inexplicable panic, has suddenly come 
upon you, which partly compelled the surrender of important 
positions, and endangered the safety of the whole army. An 
energetic effort to make this good w^as not attempted, although 
the necessary orders were immediately given ; and we therefore 
had to surrender Le Mans. France has its eye upon its second 
army. We must not halt. The season is severe ; your fatigue 
is great, and you have been compelled to suffer privations of 
every kind ; but the country suffers heavily, and when a last 
eff'ort may be sufficient to rescue it, we must not refuse it. 
Know, too, that for yourselves safety lies in the most determined 
resistance, and not in retreat. The enemy will appear before 
our positions ; we must receive him steadily, and wear away his 
powers. Eange yourselves about your leaders, and show that 
you are still the same soldiers who conquered at Coulmiers and 
Yillebon, at Jaunes and Vendomc." 

This studious concealment of the gravity of the situation 
from the army is an artifice so often adopted by military leaders, 
especially with a failing cause, that perhaps it calls for no re- 



344 THE GREAT WAR 

mark ; but we cannot conceal from ourselves the belief that 
de Chanzy knew that his cause was hopeless, except under some 
unforeseen and unexpected reverse to the Germans, from the day 
in which he evacuated Orleans ; and that the month of fighting 
which followed was, so far as he was concerned, merely the grim 
conflict of despair. 

It is certain, at all events, that he attempted no further offen- 
sive movements, but, withdrawing his troops from Alengon, 
which was occupied by the Prussians on the 16th, he concen- 
trated them in the vicinity of Laval, and there awaited the not- 
distant end of the war. 

With a brief sketch of General de Chanzy, whose merits as an 
officer seem to have been equal to those of any of the French 
leaders, notwithstanding his repeated defeats, we close this chap- 
ter. 

General de Chanzy is a native of the Department of Ardennes, 
and was born in 1823. His early predilections were for a sail- 
or's life, and at the age of sixteen he ran away from home and 
went to sea. A year of this kind of life sufficed, and in 1840 
he entered the military school at St. Cyr, and, after graduating 
there, was ordered to duty as lieutenant in Algeria, where he 
remained for about fifteen years, rising by merit to the rank of 
major. He took part in the Italian war of 1859, where he was 
promoted to a lieutenant-colonelcy. In 1860 he was sent to 
Syria to quell the difficulties, and served with such ability as to 
be advanced to a colonelcy the same year. On his return to 
France he was, at his own request, sent again to Algeria, where 
he attained successively the rank of brigadier and major-general. 
He remained in Africa until September or October, 1870, when 
he was recalled by the ISTational Government of Defense, and at 
first placed in command of a division. He took part in the bat- 
tle of Coulmiers, on the 8th of November, and subsequently 
being made commander of the Sixteenth Corps, carried the 



BETWEEN FRAKCE AND GERMANY. 345 

strong positions held by the right wing of the German army at 
Patay. Of his subsequent career, both at the recapture of Oi* 
leans by the Germans, and that long, and, on the whole, disas- 
trous retreat which terminated at Laval, we have given sufficient 
account in the previous pages. One radical defect seems to have 
been characteristic of all the French generals who had had their 
military training in Algeria : they regarded everything like 
strategy with contempt, and all topographical knowledge as use 
less, placing their entire reliance on the elan^ or first impulsive 
movement, of their troops ; and if they failed in that, retreating 
somewhat dispirited, for a new attack on another day. Their 
tactics were those of the lion or tiger, who, regardless of all out- 
ward circumstances, makes a sudden but carefully-calculated 
spring, and, if he fails, slinks back to try the experiment again 
after considerable delay. A German general at Le Mans would 
have studied well his battle-ground, have guarded carefully 
against surprises and flank movements, and especially would not 
have sufi'ered himself to be so adroitly crowded out of Le Mans, 
and compelled to run the gauntlet toward Alengon and Laval. 



346 THE GREAT WAR 



CHAPTER XIII. 

THE other wing of the Army of the Loire, which, under com- 
mand of General BourbaM, had retreated to Bourges after 
the recapture of Orleans, and subsequently been sent by Gam- 
betta to attack General von Werder, who was in the Yosges De- 
partment of the Haut-Saone, besieging Belfort, and keeping the 
newly-acquired German territories, Alsace and Lorraine, in 
order, comes next in place for review. We have spoken with 
some severity of Gambetta's want of judgment in sending Bour- 
baki on this expedition, instead of concentrating his troops to 
raise the siege of Paris. Let us, however, do justice to the fiery 
young War Minister. While results have demonstrated that the 
policy of concentration would have been the wiser one, there 
were still not wanting powerful arguments in favor of the course 
he adopted. The possession of Alsace and Lorraine was the 
great bone of contention between the French and Germans ; 
Belfort, a strongly-fortified town of that region, was the only 
French fortress which had held out under a protracted siege, and 
its brave garrison deserved support. With its fall, the preserva- 
tion of French territory intact would be impossible ; with its 
preservation, and the raising of the siege so long protracted, the 
old French prestige might be recovered. More than this : the 
region beyond the Yosges was the weakest and least-protected 
portion of the German frontier ; who could tell whether Bour- 
baki, who had a great reputation as a fierce fighter, might not, 




GrxrE \.L BO I RBAKI. 




MOVING HEAVY SffiGE GUNS AT THE SIEGE OF PAEIS. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 349 

if properly supported, be able to follow tlie example of the Eo« 
mail general, and, while the enemy were thmidering at the gates 
of the French capital, cany the war with relentless severity into 
their own homes, and even cause Berlin to know the terrors it 
was visiting upon Paris? Garabetta was bold and daring 
enough to risk all upon a single chance ; and, looking upon the 
matter in the light we have indicated, he is not to be too hastily 
condemned for what proved, in its results, a stupendous blunder. 
Having determined to send Bourbaki on this expedition, it is 
but justice to him to say that he did all in his power to make 
the expedition successful. Recruits were gathered and armed 
with great promptness, till it was announced, early in January, 
that his force, which, when he left Bourges, was but 60,000, was 
increased to 200,000 men, well armed and equipped. This, like 
most of the French reports, was doubtless an exaggeration ; but 
there is some evidence that he did have, for a short time, 150,000 
under his command. He maintained for a time his old reputa- 
tion ; attacked with great rapidity and pluck first one wing and 
then the other of von "Werder's army, which he largely outnum- 
bered, gained some trifling successes, and, assisted by a vigorous 
sortie from the garrison, gave the sturdy old Teuton, for a thue, 
a surfeit of fighting ; but very soon von Werder, who had shown 
no disposition to raise the siege of the beleaguered fortress, was 
largely reenforced, and then came his turn. On the 13th of 
January General Bourbaki made a feint on Visoul, and, after 
severe fighting, was repulsed, though the action was not deci- 
sive. General von Werder the next day evacuated Yisoul, and, 
on his way to a position before Belfort, encountered and repulsed 
a part of the French forces at Villerseul. On the 15th Bourbaki 
again assumed the offensive, attacking von "Werder at Montbe- 
liard and Chazny, six miles southwest of Belfort, but was again 
repulsed. On the 16tli the fighting was renewed at Chazny and 
Bethoncourt, but with the same result. On the 17th, after a 



350 THE GREAT WAR 

hard daj's fighting, he was defeated, and began to think seriously 
of a retreat. 

He softened this necessity, in his report to Gambetta on the 
18th, under the euphemism of a " return to-morrow to the posi- 
tions we occupied before the battle ; " but the fact was, that the 
retreat had already begun. His report was as follows : 

" I ordered to-day (18th) a general attack on the enemy from 
Montbeliard to Montvaudois, endeavoring at the same time to 
cross the Lisameat, Liettencourt, Busserel, and Hericourt, and to 
capture St. Valbert. I also gave orders that the left wing 
should try to turn the enemy, in order to facilitate the opera- 
tion ; but the troops which were destined to make this move- 
ment were threatened by an attack on their flanks, and they 
were obliged to maintain their positions. We had to contend 
against considerable forces of the enemy supported by formida- 
ble artillery, and reenforced from all sides. The enemy, in con- 
sequence of these favorable conditions, the strength of the posi- 
tion he occupied, and the intrenchments he had erected, was 
able to resist all our eflbrts, but suffered serious losses. 

" The attack we made on the 15th was renewed on the 16th 
and ITth, and if it has not produced the desired effects we ex- 
pected therefrom, in spite of the courage displayed by the 
troops, it has inspired our enemy with respect, and he has 
deemed it prudent to remain on the defensive. 

" The weather is so bad that it renders difficult any forward 
movement, 

" I have decided to return to-morrow to the positions we 
occupied before the battle." 

It was time ; for, although he had verified his old reputation 
as a brave and stubborn fighter, the odds were becoming too 
heavy. Yon Werder's force, as now reenforced, alone was too 
strong for him ; and two or three days later he found that Man- 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 35I 

teuflfel, who had so persistently followed and so thoroughly de- 
feated Faidherbe in the north of France, leaving von Goeben to 
look after the wreck of the French army, had transferred his 
choicest troops to the east, and was now in his rear. On the 
25th, Manteuflel crossed the Doubs, and occupied St. Yit, Quin- 
gey, and Mouchard, thus crowding him toward the Swiss fron- 
tier. There was no alternative for him except capitulation, or 
escape into Switzerland, where his troops would be disarmed and 
held as prisoners. Between the 17th and the 26th of January 
Bourbaki had lost 20,000 of his men as prisoners, aside from the 
killed and wounded, and besides about 10,000 previously cap- 
tured, killed, and wounded in the continuous and severe battles 
of January 13th-17th. Frantic with his losses, and determined 
not to witness the culmination of these disasters, the fierce and 
desperate French general attempted suicide, but, though severely 
wounded, he did not succeed in taking his life; and General 
Clinchart, who succeeded him in the command, could only 
march the remainder over the frontier into Switzerland, which 
he did on the 28th and 29th of January. Eighty thousand 
French troops were thus surrendered to the neutral authorities 
of Switzerland ; but one division, under command of General 
Cremer, managed to escape and make their way southward. 

We have already alluded to the final defeat and rout of Gen- 
eral Faidherbe's army in the north of France. That general, 
after falling back to Cambrai and Arras before Manteuffel, 
attempted to retrace his steps in order to aid another sortie 
which had been determined on by the Paris garrison, and threat- 
ened the line of La Fere, Chauncy, IsToyon, and Compiegne. 
He knew that the German force in his front had been weakened, 
and that General Manteuifel had left to General von Goeben the 
task of finishing the defeat which he had himself begun ; yet, 
with his troops weakened by defeat and sickness, and with the 
knowledge that von Goeben's veterans greatly outnumbered his 



352 THE GREAT WAR 

partially-trained troops, it was a very hazardous and unwise^ 
though a very daring, act in him to attempt to take the offen- 
sive. General Faidherbe was really one of the ablest and best 
of the French generals, and the motives which he declares 
prompted him to this bold movement were undoubtedly the true 
ones, and reflect credit upon him both as a soldier and a man. 
The effort was, however, in every respect, unsuccessful. It ac- 
complished nothing in aid of the Paris sortie, which, as we shall 
see, was, equally with this, a failure ; and it only sacrificed an 
army which under other circumstances might have rendered 
some service to the French cause. On the 18th of January, 
when Faidherbe's command had 'reached the vicinity of St. 
Quentin, von Goeben stormed the railway station of the town, 
and, confronting him on that and the succeeding day in a very 
severe battle, defeated him and drove him out of St. Quentin, 
and compelled him to fall back upon Cambrai. The French loss 
in killed and wounded was very heavy— not less, probably, than 
that of the Germans, which was over 3,000 ; but the French lost 
also 7,000 unwounded and more than 2,000 wounded men as 
prisoners, and six guns. General Faidherbe's report is as follows : 

" Sir : I have the honor io forward you a short report of the 
battle of St. Quentin. ■ 

" Comprehending the necessity of advancing, in order to 
assist the sortie of the Army of Paris, I proceeded, on the 16th 
instant, toward the southeast, in order to turn the army which 
was opposed to me, and to threaten the line of La Fere, Chaun- 
cy, IsToyon, and Compiegne. I was sure I should draw upon 
myself a crushing force ; but there are circumstances in which it 
is duty to sacrifice one's self. 

" It was before St. Quentin that I threw myself against the 
main body of the Prussian troops coming from Eheims, Lahn, 
La Fere, Ham, Peronne, Paris, Amiens, and Normandy. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 353 

"As I informed you in my telegram of the 20th January, 
t]ie Army of the JSTorth, which had given proofs of great brav- 
ery, completely maintained its positions, which were very good, 
until the evening ; but then the continual arrival of fresh troops 
to the enemy, and the exhausted state of our troops, rendered it 
necessary that the order to retreat upon Cambrai should be 
given. The corps of General Lecomte was ordered to take the 
road by Gateau ; that of General Paulz d'lvoy, that by Caste- 
let ; while I, with the cavalry, took an intermediate road which 
passes by Monbrechain. 

" The heads of two Prussian columns then entered St. Quen- 
tin, one by the La Fere road and the other by the Paris road. 

" The enemy commenced to collect, first, the wounded ; 
second, a large number of men who, under different pretexts, 
had remained iii the town instead of being in their places in the 
battle ; third, all those unfortunate men who, worn out by 
fatigue and suffering from hunger, after four days of forced 
marches and two days of fighting, were unable to effect a re- 
treat of eleven leagues through the mud on a cold, dark night ; 
fourth, finally, some of those brave soldiers who sacrificed them- 
selves in the rear-guard to cover the retreat. This is the extent 
of their trophies. They made no prisoners on the field of bat- 
tle ; and we have brought back intact our twelve batteries of 
division and our three batteries of reserve. Our four divisions 
being reduced by six weeks of operation and fighting to 6,000 
or 7,000 men each, we had but little more than 25,000 combat- 
ants at the battle of St. Quentin. The First German Army, 
having been reenforced by several corps, may be estimated as 
double the strength of our forces. Notwithstanding this reverse, 
I hope that the Army of the North will be able to prove, in a 
few days, that it is not yet reduced to powerlessness. 

" Paidheebe." 



20 



354 THE GREAT WAR 

The hope expressed in the closing sentences of this report 
was not destined to be realized. His losses in killed, wounded, 
and prisoners in the battles before St. Quentin, and the subse- 
quent retreat, proved to exceed 15,000 ; and the retreat itself 
was disorderly and broken, and did not cease till a portion of 
the panic-stricken and wearied troops had reached Lisle. Of the 
50.000 men who had taken the field in December, it would have 
been difficult, on the 25th of January, to have rallied 15,000. 

Longwy, an important fortress near the Belgian frontier, had 
been summoned to surrender early in January, and refusing, the 
German forces had commenced bombarding it on the 18th of 
Januaiy, and, after seven days' endurance .of a very severe fire, 
it capitulated on the 25th, 4,000 prisoners and 200 guns being 
taken. In the vicinity of Dijon, the Garibaldi-s, father and son, 
with their Italian compatriots and the force under the command 
of the younger Garibaldi — about 30,000 troops in all — after some 
trifling successes, were nearly surrounded by Prussian troop>3, 
and in two or three days more would have been compelled to 
surrender. 

On the night of the 13tli of January a series of resolute sor- 
ties, though made by an insufficient number of troops in each 
case, was made from Paris, toward the north, against Le Bourget 
and Drancy, the position of the Prussian Guards, and toward the 
southwest against Meudon and Clamart, the Eleventh Prussian 
Corps and the Second Ba^•arian. Each attack was promptly 
and fully repulsed, and the French in some parts of the line fell 
back in disorder. 

On the 19th of Januaiy General Trochu led another and the 
last sortie against the Germans. His force at this time engaged 
was 100,000 men. The sortie was intended to keep up the cour- 
age of the people of Paris, and to assure them that the Govern- 
ment was doing all in its pov/er. It was also expected to compel 
the Germans to relinquish for the time the bombardment ot 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 355 

Paris, which was beginning to be troublesome, though never 
pushed witli any great severity', and especially to prevent their 
talcing up any new positions for bombardment. The Germans 
held St, Cloud, Montretout, the heights of Buzenval, and Fort 
d'Issy, which they had silenced and occupied some days before. 
General Trochu made the strong fortress of Mont Yalerien his 
base, and at daybreak of the 19tli the three army corps under 
liis chief command issued from the fort. The right, commanded 
by Ducrot, attacked in the direction of Reuil and the heights of 
La Jonchere. The centre, under Bellemare, took Montretout, 
part of St. Cloud, and the heights of Buzenval. The left, under 
Vinoy, went upon a reconnoissance toward the stone mill in 
front of Issy. 

At first, as usual, the French troops met with some success. 
The German troops were taken by sui'prise and driven out of 
Montretout ; the other two corps were repulsed from the first. 
But as soon as the m.agnitude of the sortie was discovered, the 
Crown-Prince Friedrich Wilhelm took command, and, the Prus- 
sian batteries being brought to bear on the French, soon checked 
the ardor of their advance, and presently forced them to retreat. 
Notwithstanding the formidable army of French troops, the 
attack was very feebly sustained, and in the evening Montretout 
was retaken by the Germans, and no resistance was made by the 
French. The German losses in tbis sortie were 39 officers and 
616 men killed and wounded. The French losses were about 
6,000 men, over 1,000 dead being found on the field, and almost 
300 being taken prisoners. On the 20th, General Trochu sent a 
message to ask a forty-eight hours' truce to bury the dead, but 
was refused unless he would make a written application. Per- 
mission was given, hov/ever, to remove the wounded. The fail- 
ure of this sortie caused great discouragement in Paris, and led 
to the removal of Trochu from the command of the city, which 
was assigned to General Le Flo. 



353 THE GREAT WAR 

Meantime, the bombardment of the southern portion of the 
city was increasing in severity, and the losses of life and the 
destructicfn of property in that section were daily becoming 
more serious. Several hundreds of citizens, a considerable num- 
ber of them women and children, were either hilled or wounded 
by the shells, which fell very thickly in that portion of Paris. 

The outlook was becoming increasingly dark -and gloomy. 
Nowhere on French soil were the arms of France successful ; or, 
if there was a temporary success, it was speedily followed by a 
disaster so complete and overwhelming that the memory of the 
trifling good-fortune was obliterated from the minds of the peo- 
ple. The "War Minister, M. Gambetta, had attempted to keep 
up the courage of the people by bulletins of victories whose ori- 
gin was wholly in his own fertile brain, or which, at the best, 
were mere skirmishes ; while of the heavy disasters which fol- 
lowed he made no report. The Army of the Loire was divided, 
and both sections were broken, defeated, routed, and entirely 
demoralized ; the portion under command of General de Cbanzy, 
though still numerically the strongest of the French armies out- 
side of Paris, had been so thoroughly beaten and dispirited, that 
its commander did not dare to risk another battle with it, and it 
had lain at Laval for two weeks, a mob rather than an army, 
There could be no hope of relief to beleaguered Paris from that 
source, though there was said to be 100,000 men on its rolls. 
The other half of the Army of the Loire, subsequently the mag- 
nificent Army of the East, commanded by General Bourbaki, 
was in rapid and disorderly retreat, with the stern and resolute 
von Werder in close pursuit, and Manteuffel on its right flank, 
pressing it constantly nearer and nearer the Swiss border ; its 
general sick of life, and desperate from his misfortunes, seeking 
an escape from his troubles by attempted suicide, and his suc- 
cessor completing the tragedy, by a surrender of a third of 
France's great armies to the neutral Swiss. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 357 

The patriot-hero Garibaldi, whose love of liberty was so in 
tense that he worshipped even the name of a Republic, and who, 
despite his age, his infirmities, and his still bleeding wounds, had 
come with his noble sons and his trusty Italian compatriots to 
fight the battles of a nominally free Government, had found his 
way hedged up by all conceivable difficulties, and, though he 
persevered in his struggle against the Germans, felt that 
the cause for which he was contending was hopeless ; and, 
after perilling his own life and the lives of his comrades with- 
out result, was at length compelled to withdraw to his own 
home. 

The gallant Faidherbe, after contending for months against a 
greatly superior force, and undertaking, with a daring which 
strongly reminds us of the days of chivalry, to advance toward 
Paris in the face of dangers, which made the attempt the most 
forlorn of *' forlorn hopes," was driven back in disorder and dis- 
may almost to the shores of the Atlantic. 

The schools of instruction for new soldiers had nominally 
250,000 men in them — really, perhaps, half that number ; but 
they were the rawest of raw recruits, unacquainted with the use 
of fire-arms, and so verdant that a dozen German Uhlans would 
chase a thousand of them. The conscription for 1871 could be 
called out, but the people were sick of w^ar, and there was not 
power enough in the Government of National Defense to compel 
them to come into the service. 

In Paris matters were approaching a crisis. The population 
had borne the trials and sufiferings of a state of siege better than 
could have been expected. They were for the most part a peo- 
ple fruitful in resources ; and so, when beef gave out and mut- 
ton was not to be had, they took to horse-steaks, mule-roasts, and 
asinine cutlets, without serious grumbling. When even these 
became too high for the consumption of the poor, the flesh of 
dogs and cats, and even rats, was prepared into toothsome dishes. 



358 



THE GREAT "WAR 



The wild beasts of tlie Jardiii des Plantes furnished an addi- 
tional supply for their lean larders ; and birds of all sorts, from 
the pigeons of the streets to the sparrows which abounded on the 
house-tops, became recognized game even on the tables of the 
wealthy. Bread, the great article of food with the French, had 
deteriorated greatly in quality, and this caused more grumbling 
than the meat-famine. For the bread of Paris, usually prover- 
bial for its excellence, there had been substituted, perforce, a vile 
compound of wheat, rye, oatmeal, and the poorest quality of 
rice, the last three ingredients ^jredominating ; and the bread 
was black, heavy, and unwholesome. 

Under this famine of bread and meat the sickness of the city 
liad greatly increased ; small-pox, typhus and typhoid fevers, and 
the asthenic diseases induced by famine, cold, insufficient fuel 
and clothing, and depression of spirits, had a notable increase. 
The deaths, toward the last, reached nearly or quite 3,000 per 
week, and, as usual under such circumstances, little children 
were the largest sufferers. The morals of the city, never very 
high, had not improved under the state of siege, yet the depre- 
ciation was rather in the general moral tone of the community 
than in acts of outbreaking crime and violence. There are, how- 
ever, in Paris, at all times a very considerable body of lawless 
people who would delight in nothing so much as the reign of 
anarchy and terror ; and there is hardly anything in this world 
more terrible and destructive than a Parisian mob. This class 
had been kept under for some months, but now there were not 
wanting evidences that it was likely to make itself heard and 
felt. The clamor which, after the failure of the sortie of the 
19th of January, 18Y1, compelled Trochu's resignation, was 
largely instigated by this class ; and if they once gained the 
ascendancy, the scenes of the French Revolution would be re- 
enacted with all the diabolical additions of cruelty and fiendish- 
ness which their depraved imaginations could invent. 




EETUEJY OF CAEEIER PIGEON. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 3^1 

Tlirongliout northern, eastern, ant.1 central France there was 
universal ruin and disaster. The French peasants, whose means 
of living are never much in advance of their actual necessities, 
had been unable to gather fully their crops, which this year 
were but scanty, and had been plundered of everytliing they 
had reserved, either by their own soldiers or by the German 
Uhlans, and, in the midst of an uncommonly severe winter, they 
were starving. 

There was no room to hope for any military success whicli 
would justify any further continuance of the war. 

It was probably as much from the conviction of the dangers 
which menaced France from wdthin her capital, as from the con- 
sciousness of the utter hopelessness of any good result from the 
contiunance of the struggle, that Jules Favre, the wisest, ablest, 
and coolest of the members of the Government of National 
Defense, for the third time during the war, sought an interview 
with Count von Bismarck, to solicit an armistice, with a view to 
the organization of a Government which might be duly empow- 
ered to treat for peace, 

M, Favre held a conference with Count von Bismarck on 
the 24tli of January, before the crisis had fully come, although 
it was evidently fast approaching. In his previous interviews 
with the Prussian Premier, M, Favre had been uuTviUing to con- 
sider the subject of yielding any territory or surrendering any 
fortress ; but times had changed very greatly within two or 
three months. In November, 18T0, though somewhat crippled, 
the French nation was yet unconquered ; its armies were strong 
in num.bers, well-equipped, and, tliougii not v.-ell-disdplined, 
they were capable of making a good fight ; Pai-is was yet strong, 
and famine, though not far off, had hot yet crushed the spirit of 
its people. Now, there was no power of further effectual resist- 
ance. Paris was subdued by famine ; the armies of the prov- 
inces were defeated, routed, demoralized, and many of them 



362 THE GREAT WAR 

prisoners ; all France, in tlie depth of its suffering and sorrow, 
was praying for peace — all, except the Red Republicans, who 
babbled about eternal resistance, the assassination of kings and 
princes, and other measures of like character for maintaining the 
war, but who had no feasible plans to ofler, and were only pow- 
erful in schemes of mischief. 

There was, of course, some difficulty in an-angiiig terms for 
an armistice which would be acceptable to Germany without too 
deeply wounding French sensitiveness. It was not in human 
nature to forget the cruel arrogance with which the first Napo- 
leon, after the battle of Jena, had dictated the harshest of terms 
to the Prussian king at Tilsit ; yet it mnst be acknowledged that, 
with France entirely at his mercy, the German statesman was 
quite as magnanimous as could be expected. The agreement for 
an armistice was signed January 28th, and we are indebted to 
the Emperor Wilhelm for a brief but accurate summary of its 
terms. His telegram to the Empress was as follows : 

" Versailles, 2 p. m., Sunday, January 29th. 

" Last night an armistice for three weeks was signed. The 
Regulars and Mobiles are to be confined in Paris as prisoners of 
war. The National Guard will undertake the maintenance of 
order. We occupy all the forts. Paris remains invested, but 
will be allowed to revictual as soon as arms are surrendered. 

" The National Assembly is to be summoned to meet at Bor- 
deaux in a fortnight. All the armies in the field will retain their 
respective positions, the ground between opposing lines to be 
neutral." 

The armistice covered land and sea (excepting only the De- 
partment of the Jura, where Bourbaki then was), and was to 
expire at noon of February 19th. As we have already stated, 
Bourbaki's army within a day or two crossed the frontier into 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 3G3 

Switzerland, and surrendered themselves as prisoiKjrs of war. 
The Inie of division between the German and French forces sepa- 
rated into two portions the Departments of Calvados and Orne. 
The Germans held the Departments of the Sartho, Indre-et- 
Loire, Loire-et-Clier, Loiret, and Yonne. At Paris the Germans 
held all the forts, and the Parisians retained command of the 
citj wall, but it was dismantled, the gun-carriages being taken 
away. At the same time, heavy guns were moved into the 
forts, to make sure that the Paris population did not take the 
law into its own hands. Within four days postal communication 
was opened, and the supply of food began to come into the city, 
the German army supplying the people and garrison for the first 
two or three days from its own rations. The city paid a contri- 
bution of 53,000,000 francs— equal to $10,600,000— to the con- 
querors. 

By this armistice, and the surrenders which accompanied it, 
the number of French soldiers wlio were prisoners of war was 
increased to more than Y00,000, aside from nearly or quite 
250,000 who had died in the field of battle, or from sickness or 
wounds. Of these 700,000, a very large number would not live 
to return. When we add to these losses of fighting men the 
very large number of German a,rtisans driven out of France at 
the beginning of the war, and the population of the ceded prov- 
inces, we shall find that France had decreased in inhabitants 
materially since its quinquennial census of 1866. 

The meeting of the National Assembly at Bordeaux was 
fixed for February 15th — a date which necessitated an extension 
of the armistice, which was granted, eventually, to the 1st of 
March. At first the decree of Gambetta, which disqualified for 
election to the Assembly members of families reigning over 
France since 1789, all persons who had acted as Imperial official 
candidates in past elections, held ofiice as Ministers, Senators, or 
Councillors of State under the Empire, and Prefects who had 



364 THE GREAT WAR 

accepted office between the 2d of December, 1851, and the 4th 
of September, 1870, seemed likelj to thwart the design of the 
armistice. It was his design, by this extremely injudicious de- 
cree, to keep out of the National Assembly all the Bourbons and 
Orleanists and their adherents, and every one who, by having 
received office from Louis Napoleon, might be supposed to sym- 
pathize with him. The effect of this decree would have been to 
array all classes of monarchists against the Kepublicans, who 
were not at any time a majority in the nation. Count von Bis- 
marck at once protested against it as imjust, and preventing a 
free expression of the opinion of the nation, and demanded, as 
preferable, the re-assembling of the Corps Legislatif, which had 
been irregularly dissolved on the 4th of September. Jules 
Favre and his associates of the Paris portion of the Government 
of National Defense repudiated Gambetta's decree at once, and 
declfired that the elections should be free ; but Gambetta defend- 
ed it very warmly, and indulged in language toward the Ger- 
man Premier, in relation to his supposed desire for the reinstate- 
ment of Louis Napoleon, which was, to say the least, in the 
M'orst possible taste. The power of the French "War Minister 
was gone, however, and MM. Favre, Pelletan, Gamier, Pages, 
and Emmanuel Arago, repairing to Bordeaux on the 7th of Feb- 
ruary, issued immediately an order by telegraph to the Prefects 
of all the Departments of France, annulling- Gambetta's decree 
as incompatible with the principle of universal suffrage. They 
also removed Gambetta from his position as Minister of "War, 
though they could not turn him out of the Cabinet. 

The elections proceeded with great activity from this time, 
and, though the effect of the first promulgation of Gambetta's 
decree had been unfavorable, the political complexion of the 
National Assembly was nndecided, none of the five or six par- 
ties having a majority of the 700 votes of the Assembly. Tlie 
Orleanists were somewhat the most numerous, and next, per 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 365 

liaps, the Bonapartists ; the moderate Kepublicans mimbered 
about 160 ; and tliere were smaller factions of the adherents to 
the Bourbons of the elder branch, the Red Republicans, and the 
Constitutional monarchists, who had no particular fancy for any 
of the Imperial or E.ojal aspirants of Bourbon, Orleans, or Bo- 
naparte stock. 

At a preliminary session of the Assembly held on the 13th 
of February, for the purpose of ascertaining the probable com- 
plexion of the Assembly, and taking some measures toward an 
early organization, Jules Favre, for himself and his associates, 
resigned the powers confided to them as the Government of 
National Defense, the resignation to take effect as soon as a Pro- 
visional Government could be organized. 

At the first regular session of the Assembly, M. Grevy, a 
moderate Republican, though ^Yith some monarchical leanings, 
but a man of high character, was elected President of the As- 
sembly, receiving 519 out ot 538 votes. 

On the 17th, M. Adolphe Thiers, well known as one of the 
ablest of French statesmen, an earnest Royalist and adherent to 
tlie House of Orleans, and Premier of Louis Philippe, was cho^ 
sen Provisional President of the Republic, with power to select 
his own Ministers. On the 19th, he announced as his Cabinet 
the following : 

Jules Dufauee, Minister of Justice. 

Jules Favee, Minister of Foreign Afiairs. 

Ernest Picaed, Minister of the Interior. 

Jules Simon, Minister of Public Instruction. 

Felix Lambeecht, Minister of Commerce. 

General Le Flo, Minister of War. 

Admiral Pothuan, Ministei of the Marine. 

Louis Joseph Buffett, Minister of Finance, and President 
of the Council. 

A committee of fifteen, with which President Thiers, M. 



366 THE GREAT WAR 

Favre, and M. Picard, of his Cabinet, were associated, was ap- 
pointed by the Assembly the same day, and proceeded, on the 
20th., to Versailles, and entered upon the negotiations for peace. 
The discussions upon this su^bject with the German Commission- 
ers were very earnest, and many propositions and counter-propo- 
sitions were made. The British Government used its influence 
to induce Germany to require a smaller amount of indemnity 
than was at first demanded, and it was said to have been 
through their influence that it was reduced from six milliards 
of francs, equal to $1,200,000,000, to five milliards of francs, or 
$1,000,000,000. Germany demanded the possession of Belfort, 
which had surrendered after the proclamation of the armistice ; 
but this France was unwilling to give up. The terms finally 
settled upon and announced by President Thiers to the National 
Assembly at Bordeaux, February 28th, as having been agreed 
upon by the Commissionei'S on the 26th of that month, were as 
folloAvs : 

" France cedes one-fifth of Lorraine, including Metz and 
Thionville, and all of Alsace except Belfort, and pays an indem- 
nity of five milliards of francs — one milliard this year, and the 
remainder in 1872 and 18Y3. The fortified cities of Luneville, 
Nancy, and Belfort are left to France. Longwy, Thionville, 
Metz, and Saarrebourg go to Germany. The German troops will 
gradually witlidraw from French territory as the payments are 
made. The armistice is prolonged to the 12th of March ; and, 
last of all, the Germans are to enter Paris. The Champagne 
country will be held by 50,000 Germans, with Prince Friedrich 
Karl as Governor, until the indemnity is paid." 

This preliminary treaty, as it was called, was ratified by the 
Kational Assembly on the 1st of March by a vote of 546 yeas 
against 107 nays. The lied Republicans, and some of the more 




MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ASSP.MBLV AT BOKDEAUX. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 369 

moderate ones, voted against it, on the ground that there should 
be no cession of French territory. 

Tlie following detailed description of the lines laid down in 
this preliminary treaty was subsequently published : 

" The line of demarcation between France and Germany, as 
at first proposed, is retained, with one exception. It commences 
in the northwestern frontier at the Canton of Cattenom, in the 
Department of the Moselle ; runs thence to Thionville, Briery, 
and Gorze ; skirts the southwestern and southern boundaries of 
the arrondissement of Mctz ; thence proceeds in a direct line to 
Chateau-Salins, and at Petloncourt, in that arrondissement, tnrns 
and follows the crest of the mountains between the valleys of 
the rivers Seille and Vezouze, in the Department of Muerthe, to 
the Canton of Schirmeck, in the northwestern corner of the 
Department of the Yosges ; thence it runs to Saales, divid- 
ing that commune, and, after that, coincides with the western 
frontiers of the Upper and Lower Ehine Departments, until it 
reaches the Canton of Belfort ; thence it passes diagonally to 
the Canton of Delle, and then terminates by reaching the Swiss 
frontier. 

" An alteration made at the last moment in these boundaries 
gives Belfort to France, and cedes additional territory around 
Metz to Germany. - 

" Germany is to possess her acquisitions from France in per- 
petuity. 

" It is agreed that, as soon as the preliminaries are ratified, 
the Germans shall evacuate the Departments of Calvados, Arne, 
Gorthe,- Eure-et-Loire, Loiret, Loire-et-Cher, Indre-et-Loir, and 
Tonne, and all territory on the left bank of the Seine. The 
French troops will retire behind the river Loire until peace is 
finally declared, except from Paris and other strongholds. 

" After the payment of two milliards of francs the Germans 



370 THE GREAT WAR 

■will occupy only the Departments of Marne, Ardennes, IIaut« 
Marne, Meuse, Yosges, Meurthe, and the fortress of Belfort. 

" Germany will be open to accept suitable financial instead 
of territorial guarantees for the payment of the war indem- 
nity." 

An attempt was made by M. Conte, a former private secre- 
tary of Louis ISTapoleon, who was a member of the National 
Assembly, on the day of the ratification of this treaty, to justify 
the action of the Emperor. This occasioned some commotion, 
but led to the introduction, by M. Targe, of a resolution decree- 
ing the fall of the Empire, and stigmatizing Louis !Napoleon as 
the author of the misfortunes of France. This was passed by 
acclamation, no voices being heard in the negative. 

The Germans were very moderate in their claims in regard 
to entering Paris. But 30,000 troops were permitted to go 
within the walls, and these were ordered to confine themselves 
to a triangular section of the city, of Avhich the Seine formed 
the east side, the enceinte from Point du Jour to Porte des 
Ternes the west side ; while the Faubourg St. Honore and the 
Avenue des Ternes from the Eue Eoyal to the enceinte^ the north 
side or base. It included the Arc de TTiom;phe^ in which the 
first Napoleon had long ago inscribed his boast, now strikingly 
falsified : " At the approach of the Conqueror, the German 
Empire has come to an end." 

There were some slight disturbances, and the Paris mobs 
seemed determined to wreak the vengeance which they dared 
not visit on the German troops, upon the French police, trades- 
men, and guides, who showed any civility to the Germans ; but 
thanks to their wholesome terror of the invaders, and to the 
careful arrangements made by General d'Aurelles de Paladines, 
who commanded the National Guard of Paris, there were no 
serious outbreaks of violence. On the 3d of March the German 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 371 

troops marched quietly out of the city, and were presently on 
their route homeward. 

The ])reliininary treaty was formally ratified by the Emperor 
Wilhelm at Yersailles on the 3d of March, and was announced 
CO the Empress in the following despatch, which was received 
with great demonstrations of joy in Berlin : 

" Versailles, March 3 

" I have just ratified the conditions of peace, which the Bor- 
deaux Assembly have accepted. Thus far the work is complete 
which was through seven months of battles to be achieved, 
thanks to the valor, devotion, and endurance of our incom- 
parable army, and the sacrifices of the whole Fatherland. The 
Lord of Hosts has everywhere visibly blessed our enterprises, 
and by His mercy has permitted an honorable peace. To Him 
be the honor ! to the Fatherland the thanks. 

" WiLIIELM." 

On the 4th of March the Emperor reviewed 100,000 of his 
troops in the Bois de Boulogne, Prince Friedrich Karl, General 
von Moltke, and Count von Bismarck being present. The final 
treaty of peace was to be negotiated at Brussels, the plenipoten- 
tiaries being M. Favre on the side of the French, and Herr von 
Arnim on the part of Germany. The time fixed for the com- 
mencement of negotiations was March 15th, but they would 
probably occupy several months. The German Emperor re- 
turned to Berlin on the 12th of March, and all the German 
troops, except the Army of Occupation, were on their way 
homeward before the 20th of that month. 

Meantime, France was in a state of iinrest. The depart- 
ments which had been desolated by the war, except Paris, were 
rejoiced at the return of peace, although they were great suffer- 
ers from the privations which the war had inflicted ; but the 



372 THE GREAT WAR 

turbulent classes in Paris were disappointed that tliey could not 
have a reign of terror and bloodshed. The score of newspapers 
which sprang np like mushrooms at the cessation of hostilities, 
were loud in their denunciations of the treaty, of the Germans, 
and of everything like order. One of them (Kochefort's paper) 
openly advocated regicide ; o«thers inculcated revenge, and 
sought to inculcate on the people the duty of nursing their 
hatred of the Germans till the time came when they could take 
vengeance on them for their humiliation. The departments 
which had suffered comparatively little from the war encouraged 
the same sentiments, and there is reason to fear that a civil war 
may yet be added to the woes of the nation. 

The question, What form of Government is most likely to be 
approved by the people ? is one of great difficulty. As a per- 
manent Government, a majority of the jDeople evidently do not 
desire a republic. The French people like to be governed, and 
to be governed with a strong hand. A republican Government 
implies thoughtfulness and foresight among the people them- 
selves, who are alike the governors and the governed ; but the 
French jDeople, like the other Celtic nations, do not like the 
trouble of doing their own thinking ; they prefer that the Gov- 
ernment shall do it for them. Thrice within the past seventy- 
five years have they tried a republic, and in each instance — 
unless the last shall prove an exception — they have lapsed from 
it into an absolute monarchy. For them, undoubtedly, a quali- 
fied constitutional monarchy is unquestionably the best Govern- 
ment. "Who this constitutional monarch shall be, whether Bour- 
bon, Orleans, or Bonaparte, or neither, is an interesting question, 
but one into which it is not our province to enter at this time. 

"We ma}'-, however, with propriety consider the burdens 
which the new Government, whatever it may be, will inherit. 
The national debt of France, on the 1st of January, 1870, was 
$2,852,695,870. To this was added, in the course of the year, 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 373 

two loans, one of $150,000,000, July IGtli, 1870, and the otliei 
of $50,000,000, on tlie 25th of October, for the prosecution of 
the war. Beyond this, for military operations outside of Paris, 
a debt was incurred of $220,000,000, and for the defence of 
that city and its supplies of food, about $200,000,000 more. 
The indemnity to be paid to the Germans is $1,000,000,000 
more, making a total of $4,472,695,870, or about twice the 
amount of onr national debt ; while her population is less, and 
her national wealth materially less than ours. Her annual cur- 
rent expenditure for interest on debt and Govei-nment expendi- 
ture in 1869 was $425,000,000 ; and there will be an addition of 
nearly, or quite, a hundred millions a year for interest, giving 
her an annual expenditure of $525,000,000 — a very heavy load 
for her already over-taxed people to bear. She is, indeed, un- 
der bonds to hecp the peace for a generation to come, at least. 

The advice given to the nation by the veteran Thiers, on 
accepting the Provisional Presidency on the 19th of February, 
1871, was eminently sensible, and indicated a far higher states- 
manship than most of the French leaders have manifested. The 
first duty of the nation was, most certainly, to endeavor to re- 
pair her losses, restore her national credit and her commercial 
prosperity, and keep her people well and profitably employed. 
The discussion of political questions and constitutionl provisions 
could in their case be profitably postponed to a more favorable 
period. These are the words of the venerable statesman. Will 
France heed his counsel ? 

" "Without placing before you a plan of government, which is 
always somewhat vague, I shall present you with some views on 
the thought of union which governs me, and on wdiich I would 
base the reconstruction of our country. In a state of society 
that is prosperous, regularly constituted, and yields gently to the 
progress of opinion, each party represents a political system. 
21 



374 THE GREAT WAR 

To combine all in tlie same administration, -would be placing 
there opposing forces v/liicli would either neutralize each other, 
or, in the event of dissensions, end in inertia or conflict. 

• " But, alas ! does our present situation show society regularly 
constituted, yielding gently to the progress of opinion ? France, 
precipitated without serious reasons or sufficient preparation into 
war, has seen one-half of her soil invaded, her army destroyed, 
her fine organization disrupted, her old and powerful unity com- 
promised, her finances embarrassed, the greater part of her sons 
withdrawn from labor to die on the battle-fields, order profound- 
ly disturbed by the apparition of anarchy, and, after the enforced 
surrender of Paris, war suspended only for some days, and ready 
to recommence if a Government esteemed by Europe, cour- 
ageously accepting the authority and assuming the responsibility 
of doleful negotiations, fails to put an end to appalling calami- 
ties. 

'' In presence of this state of things, are there, can tliere be, 
two policies ? But must there ]iot be ou]y one, strong, expe- 
dient, consistent, and urgent, in order to maho peace as prompt- 
ly as possible under the evils v,'hich overwhelm us ? 

" Who will not maintain that we must, as soon and as com- 
pletely as possible, terminate the foreign occupation by means of 
a peace courageously negotiated, and which v/ill not be accepted 
unless it is honorable ; relieve our fields of the enemy which 
tramples and destroys them ; recall from foreign prisons our cap- 
tured soldiers, officers, and generals ; reconstruct of them a dis- 
ciplined and valiant army ; reform by election our Councils- 
General and our dissolved Municipal Councils ; reorganize our 
disorganized Administration ; terminate ruinous expenses ; re- 
establish, if not our finances, which would not be the vrork of a 
day, at least our credit — the only means of meeting our pressing 
engagements ; return to the fields and workshops our Mobiles ; 
open obstructed roads ; rebuild destroyed bridges, and thus ere- 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 375 

ate employment — the only means by which onr astisans and 
peasants can live ? 

" Is there any one v/ho can say that there is anything more 
pressing than all this ? And is there here one, for example, who 
wonid gravely discuss articles of the Constitution, while our 
people, dying of hunger, are obliged to give foreign soldiers the 
last morsel of bread tbat remains ? 

" No, no, gentlemen ! Tranquillize ; reorganize ; revive 
credit ; reainmate industry ; behold the only policy jjossible, or 
even conceivable, at this moment. In all this, every sensible, 
honest, enlightened man, be he for a monarchy or a republic, can 
work usefully, and, if he works only for a jear or six months, he 
may return with a bigh head and satisfied conscience into the 
ranks of his countrymen. 

" Ah, no doubt, when we shall have rendered our country 
the pressing services I have enumxcrated — when we shall have 
raised from the soil where she lies prostrate that noble being 
called France — when r^e shall have stanched ber wounds, re- 
stored her strength, she will return to consciousness ; and then, 
reanimated, and in full freedom of mind, she will say how she 
wishes to live. 

" When this work of reparation shall be over — and it may 
not be very long — the time of discussion and of considering the 
theories of government will have come, and, having accom- 
plished our reconstruction under a republic, we can determine 
with discernment our destinies ; and this judgment will be pro- 
nounced, not by a minority, but by a majority of our fellow-citi- 
zens — that is, by the national will itself. 

" Such is the only policy possible, expedient, and adapted to 
the unhappy circumstances we are in. It is to it my honorable 
colleagues are. ready to devote their experienced faculties ; it is 
to it that, for my part, despite age and the fatigues of a long life, 
I am ready to consecrate all the strength that remains to me. 



376 THE GREAT WAR 

witliout any design or any otlier ambition, I swear to you, than 
to attacli to my last days the regrets of my fellow-citizens, and, 
permit me to add, without even being assured of it, after the 
most intense devotion, to obtain justice for my efforts. But, no 
matter ; in presence of our suffering and perishing country, all 
personal considerations would be unpardonable. Let us be uni- 
ted, and, by showing that we are capable of concord and wis- 
dom, we shall obtain the esteem of Europe, and, with her esteem, 
her support, and, further, the respect of the enemy himself; and 
all this will be the strongest support you can give to your nego- 
tiators, when defending the interests of France in the negotia- 
tions that are about to open. Defer, then, to a period which 
cannot be far, the political dissensions which have divided us, 
and may divide us still more ; and let difference of opinion, 
which I know is the result of sincere convictions, only return 
when it shall no longer be an attack upon the existence and 
safety of the country." 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. &77 



CHAPTER XIV. 

WITH a brief review of tlie leading incidents of this great 
war, we take our leave of our readers. 

When, on the 15th of July, 1870, Louis ITapoleon Bonaparte 
declared war with Prussia, the numerous vicissitudes of his 
eventful life may have suggested to him the possibility that the 
war, if long protracted, might prove unfavorable to his hopes ; 
but no seer could have predicted to him that, in seven weeks 
from that day, he would be defeated, dethroned, and a prisoner 
to the one man among all the crowned heads of Europe whom 
he most hated ; and that all the hopes and dreams in which he 
had indulged of the perpetuation of a Bonaparte dynasty in 
J'rance would be utterly dissipated. 

And yet, as we look upon the matter now, it seems the most 
natural thing in the world that just this thing should have hap- 
pened. He knew that he was unprepared for the war he hadi 
most wantonly provoked ; but he did not know that the fraud©- 
and moral corruption of which he had been guilty had perme- 
ated the entire body politic ; that all his subordinates, finding 
their chief defrauding the nation, had undertaken the same 
game for themselves. 

He knew that Prussia was strong in her armies, her finances, 
her resources ; but he did not know her condition of preparation 
for war, her complete military organization, the genius of her 
great strategist, nor the enthusiasm which would be awakened 
throughout Germany by her going to war in a just cause. 



S78 THE GREAT WAH OF 1870 

And, after tlie declaration of war, in the three weeks wliich 
followed before a blow was struck, amid all his boastings and 
declarations of the necessity by which he was driven unwillingly 
into war, was there no fear of a retribution for his numerous 
crimes against the nation, and against the God who rules over 
the nations ; no misgiving that the time was approaching when 
his conduct as a ruler should be judged impartially by the 
nations whom he had attempted to dupe ? Whether this was 
so or not, there was a marked and manifest difference between 
his manner and proclamations and those of the Prussian King. 
The one was boastful, defiant, and appealed to the passion of 
his nation for glory ; the other, quiet, and confident of the 
justice of his cause, looked to Heaven for aid and success. 

The slight affair at Saarbruck on the 4th of August possessed 
no significance or importance in itself, but was made the occa- 
sion of a vainglorious despatch by the Emj)eror, and the an- 
nouncement of the weeping of his veterans over the tranquillity 
of his wonderful boy. The more serious battles of Forbach and 
Spicheren Heights, and of Weissenburg on the 6th of August, 
showed the boastful Emperor that victory would not always 
perch upon his banners ; and when this was followed, on the 8th, 
by the decisive battle of Woerth and the precipitate retreat of 
MacMalion, it was almost pitiable to see how quickly his tone 
was changed from vaunting to terror. " Frossard has lost a 
battle," he telegraphs. " MacMahon has been defeated, with 
heavy loss, at Woerth. All can yet be reestablished." Bad 
news followed fast and faster. Strasbourg, Pfalzburg, and Toul 
were besieged. MacMahon, while doing his best to collect 
reenforcements, was pursued pitilessly and relentlessly by the 
Crown-Prince. Bazaine's army, with which his headquarters 
were, and which had thrown out its advance toward Saarbruck 
and Forbach, was compelled to fall back in hot haste to its forti- 
fications at Metz, and, pressed by the greatly superior force of 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 87? 

the German King and his trusty Lieutenants von Steinmetz and 
Prince Friedrich Karl, found itself compelled to attempt to gain 
the open country and the highways leading from Metz to Paris, 
to avoid being shut up in the fortifications of Metz. 

The attempt was made too late. The battle of Courcelles, 
fought on Sunday, August 14:t!], detained Bazaine in Metz to 
save the city, which was threatened with instant capture if he 
left it. The delay of the 15th to bury the dead gave time to 
the army of Prince Friedrich Karl to cross the Moselle and plani 
themselves strongly across the lower road to Verdun and Paris, 
at Mars-la-Tour, while a sufiicient number of Steinmetz's vete- 
rans threatened the upper or Conflans road, to make a passage 
by that difficult, if not impossible. 

Bazaine had waited too long ; but, convinced more fully 
than before of the absolute necessity of his controlling one or 
both these roads, he made, on the 18th, his final effort to obtain 
possession of the lower, and, failing in that, of the upper road. 
But he had by this time more than 250,000 troops opposed to 
him ; and, though the fighting on the French side was more 
gallant, earnest, and obstinate than in any other battle of the 
war, and they returned to the charge again and again with an 
energy and resolution worthy a better cause, yet, at 9 p. m., they 
were thoroughly beaten, and driven into the fortifications of Metz, 
from which most of them only emerged as prisoners. 

Thus far the Germans had been uniformly successful, rather 
from their ability to endure " hard pounding," their persistence 
and determination, than from any remarkable displays of skill 
on the part of their leaders. Their losses had been heavy — 
heavier, somewhat, probably, than those of the French ; but 
their superior size, weight, endurance, and intelligence had given 
them the advantage even over the vaunted and really deadly 
mitrailleuse. . 

From this time forward the victories of the Prussians were 



380 THE GREAT WAR OF 1870 

as much tlie result of strategic skill as of hard fighting. Ba* 
zaine being shut up, or, to use an expressive phrase of Genera] 
Grant's, " bottled up " in Metz, a large army of observation was 
required to hold him in check ; for this purpose the Landwehr, 
or reserves, were ordered up, and, meanwhile, the greater part 
of the First Army (Steinmetz) was put in marching order for 
Paris. At Chalons it formed a junction with the Third Army 
(that of the Crown-Prince), and a Fourth Army, made up from 
the Saxon troops, the Poyal Guard, and a corps from Prince 
Friedrich Karl's army, joined the two. 

MacMahon, who had been marching swiftly on Paris, had, on 
reaching Chalons, been ordered by the Emperor, now at Eheims, 
to turn northward and make a detour by Pheims, Pethel, Sedan, 
and Montmedy, in the hope of relieving Bazaine and raising the 
siege of Metz. 

The movement was a stupendous blunder, and the great 
strategist von Moltkc saw it, and at once improved his oppor- 
tunity. 'No sooner had MacMahon fairly turned northward, 
than von Moltke commenced pushing his troops toward the 
north between the Aisne and the Mouse, through a difficult coun- 
try, the forest of Argonnes and the Ardennes mountains, and, 
in spite of the difficulties of the route, was soon on the flank of 
; MacMahon's advance-guard. True to his strategical principles, 
he struck a heavy blow jast as they were attempting to cross a 
fiver — the Meuse ; and, meanwhile, he was sending over the 
Fourth Army, under the Crown-Prince of Saxony, at a higher 
point, v/hile he obstructed the passage of the French. The next 
day, the eventful 1st of September, the battle began early. 
Pressed in rear and on either flank, the French army could only 
fall back upon the fortified town of Sedan. MacMahon was 
dangerously wounded early in the day, and the command de- 
volved upon General de Wimpflen, though Napoleon III was 
present and directed in part. It was about 3 p. m. when the 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 3S1 

jaded and beaten French corps attempted to enter Sedan. All 
Order was lost ; it was more a mob than an army, and part of 
tlie town was already in possession of the Germans, who bad 
entered with the French. There was no alternative bat surren 
der. German troops occupied every height, and were in such 
position that, while they could soon make the town untenable, 
there was no way of escape. Under these circumstances, the 
Emperor, General de "WhnpfFen, and the entire army, 127,000 
strong, including sick and wounded, were surrendered. This 
event precipitated the revolution already imminent in Paris. 
The overthrow of the Napoleonic dynasty was demanded by the 
people and accorded by the authorities ; the Corps Legislatif 
perished with it ; the Empress took her flight to England ; the 
Tuileries was taken possession of by the people, and a self- 
elected Provisional Government, professedly in the interests of 
the Republic, but composed of men of all shades of opinion, 
took control of the national affairs. 

" The Government of National Defense," as this new and 
almost self-constituted body was called, while denouncing in the 
strongest terms the deposed Emperor for bringing the nation 
into such great and sore troubles, yet was equally vindictive 
with him toward the Germans, and hnried its anathemas aa:amst 
them, while it frantically implored other nations to intervene to 
procure for them a peace. At this juncture, peace might have 
been made with Germany on comparatively favorable terms. 
The line of the Saar might ha\'e been prolonged through the 
Vosges so as to include Belfort and Strasbourg, and some mod- 
erate indenmity demanded ; and this would then have fully sat- 
isfied Germany; for neither Strasbourg, Pfalzburg, nor Metz 
had yet capitulated, nor was Paris besieged. But, with a most 
unwise determination to tickle the ears of the mob, the new 
Government raised the cry, " Not a foot of territory nor a stone 
of a fortress shall ever be surrendered ! " And, though they 



382 THE GREAT WAR 

sent Favre to negotiate for peace with the German statesman 
Bismarck, they had so liampered him bv these war-cries, tliat lie 
was unable to effect any arrangement looking toward peace ; 
and an angry correspondence followed, in which the cool and 
diplomatic German had greatly the advantage. 

It was at first proposed to hold elections for a Constituent 
Assembly ; but the War Minister, Garabetta, opposed it, be- 
cause it was decidedly uncertain whether such an Assembly 
would allow them to retain their power. 

Meantime, the Germans prosecuted the war relentlessly. 
Paris was reached by their troops on the 15th of September, and 
its investment commenced on the 20th ; and though the circuit 
of their lines around it was almost ninety miles, and they had 
not for some time more than 200,000 troops which they could 
employ for this siege, their cordon, once formed, was never bro- 
ken. The railroads leading into the city were severed, and its 
supplies cut off; the Government divided' — Gambetta, Cre- 
mieux, Glais-Bizoin, and Fourichon going to Tours, while Favre, 
Trochu, Emmanuel Arago, Garni er, Pages, and Pelletan, re- 
mained in Paris. During the month of September the new 
French Government contented itself with abortive negotiations 
for peace, missions to neutral powers, and somewhat high-sound- 
ing proclamations ; but when, on the 2Tth of that month, Stras- 
bourg, with 17,000 men, capitulated unconditionally to the Ger- 
man forces, and Orleans was bombarded and occupied by von der 
Tann's army on the 11th of October, the French AVai- Minister 
W'as roused to almost superhuman exertions ; and, wdiile occa- 
sionally sending out absurdly exaggerated proclamations of 
French successes which proved to have been French defeats, he 
certainly deserved credit for the energy and executive ability 
with which he gathered armies from all parts of France, organ- 
ized, armed, supplied, and put them in the field. He formed, in 
the vicinity of Orleans, a great army of over 200,000 men, most 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 383 

of whom, indeed, had never borne arms, but, under skilful offi- 
cers, could soon be made serviceable troops. The skilful officers 
were, to be sure, not readily to be obtained, for most of those 
who had seen service were prisoners. But it was not alone this 
Army of the Loire which was to be organized and officered. 
Another ot equal numbers was formed in the north of France, 
and placed under the command of General Faidherbe. Still 
another, though of less extent, was organized in the east in tlie 
vicinity of Dijon, and Garibaldi's Italian Legion was made its 
nucleus. Schools of instruction for troops were established at 
all the military depots, and. within two months he had gathered 
in these over 250,000 troops, independent of the conscription of 
18Y1, which was being called out as rapidly as possible. In 
addition to these great assemblages of regular soldiers, a consid- 
erable force of irregular troops, to perform the duties of scouts, 
rangers, and gueiillas, were organized under the names of 
Franc-tireiirs, Partisans de Gers, efec, &c., which were intend- 
ed to render similar service to the French army with that per- 
formed by the Uhlans for the Germans. In thus reorganizing 
the French army from the population which for twenty years 
had not borne arms, M. Gambetta certainly displayed great 
executive ability ; and though there were, every now and then, 
examples of his impulsive nature, such as that proclamation in 
which he declared that Bazaine was a traitor, and outlawed and put 
a price upon his head ; or those in which he announced succes- 
sive viiitories, whose details he had manufactured to encourage 
the French troops ; or those in which, with fiery indignation, he 
denounced the Germans and their king as foes to universal hu- 
manity, because they would not grant an armistice on the terms 
he desired ; or vented his wrath on generals whom he had a 
week or two before exalted as almost demigods, when their suc- 
cesses turned to failures ; yet much can be pardoned in a man 
^vho, with all his failings, showed a truly patriotic spirit, and 



384 THE GREAT WAR 

wlio, ill tlie midst of a corrupt and demoralized nation, was thor- 
ouglily and unimpeacliablj honest. 

But these great executive abilities were not sufEcient to save 
France, or to drive out the German force which had. planted 
itself so strongly upon her soil. The work of conquest went 
steadily forward. Closer and closer were drawn the lines around 
Paris, and nearer and nearer approached the grim spectre of 
famine ; and the feeble sorties made from time to time could not 
sever the cordon which bound the beleaguered city. Outside 
of Paris, after the fall of Strasbourg and tlie capture of Orleans, 
which we have already chronicled, there was such a succession 
of disasters as never before befell a brave and warlike nation. 
Metz capitulated on the 27th of October, together with Ba- 
zaine's army, consisting of 3 marshals, 66 generals, 6,000 officers, 
and 173,000 privates. Dijon surrendered on the 30th of Octo- 
ber, New Breisach on the 6th of ITovember, and Yerdun on the 
9th. Thionville, after obstinate and protracted resistance, capit- 
ulated on the 25th ; and the sorties fi'om Paris, from Mezieres, 
from Belfort, Montmedy, and La Fere, were promptly repulsed, 
with heavy loss on the part of the besieged. There was, indeed, 
a temporary relief from these great disasters in the repulse of 
the Prussians at Coulmiers and Patay ; and the recapture of 
Orleans by the Army of the Loire, under General d'Aurclles de 
Paladines ; but it was only temporary. The German General 
von der Tann, soon after his evacuation of Orleans, was re- 
enforced from the army of Prince Friedrich Karl, and soon be- 
gan to make demonstrations looking to the recovery of his lost 
ground. The most formidable sortie from Paris made during 
the war, under Trochu and Ducrot, from the 29th of November 
to the 2d of December, proved a failure after two or three days 
of hard fighting, though another day's conflict would probably 
have resulted in success. A succession of severe battles around 
Orleans, in which Prince Friedrich Karl managed to separate 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 335 

and isolate two corps of the Frencli armj, resulted, on tlie 4tli 
of December, in the surrender of Orleans, and the retreat of the 
sundered French Army of the Loire, one portion toward Tours, 
Blois, and Le Mans, and the other toward Bonrges. The retreat 
was attended with considerable losses. M. Gambetta, with 
ready tact, organized the two divisions into two armies, one 
under General de Chanzy, the other under General Bourbahi ; 
the former commander. General d'Aurelles de Paladines, being 
under a cloud for his want of success. 

The tide of disaster continued to swell. Rouen was occu- 
pied b}^ the Germans on the 5th of December ; Beaugency on 
the 8th ; Dieppe on the 9th ; Pfalzburg, a strong fortress and 
bravel}!" defended, capitulated on the 12th ; and Montmedy, 
almost as strong, on the 14th. The French were driven from 
Yendome on the 16th, and from I^Tuits on the 18tli. Tours 
capitulated on the 20th ; Sangre, Blois, and Bapaume were cap- 
tured on the 25th and 26th ; and Fort Avron, the strongest 
of the defences of Paris on the east, bombarded and occupied 
on the 29th ; and Forts Rosny, Noissy, ITogent, d'Issy, and 
Yanvres, on the east and soutli of Paris, bombarded and si- 
lenced. 

General Manteuffel had had, during the month of December, 
numerous conflicts, generally but partial ones, w^ith General 
Faidherbe's army in the north of France, and liad pushed it 
back through Eouen, Amiens, and Bapaume, to Arras ; but 
early in January, Faidherbe, under instructions from Paris, be- 
gan to move southward again ; and General Manteuffel and his 
trusty lieutenant. General von Goeben, moved against him as 
speedily as possible. This was part of a concerted movement of 
Gambetta's, in which General de Chanzy, who was not far from 
Le Mans, General Faidherbe, who was to move southward in the 
line of Rouen, and the Parisian garrison, who were to make a 
Bortie to the southwest and west of Paris, were to cooperate. It 



386 THE GREAT WAR 

proved a failure in all its parts. Faidherbe found himself resist- 
ed by a superior, or at least a more resolnte force, under General 
von Goeben, and was driven back with heavy losses, and his 
army demoralized, through St. Quentin to Arras and Lille. 
General de Chanzy, who had been followed closely and watched 
carefully in all his movements from the time he left Orleans, on 
tlie 4th of December, found that he must light Prince Friedrich 
Karl's entire army before he could approach any nearer to 
Paris ; and, after four days of severe fighting (December 9th- 
13th )^ being twice flanked by the Grand Duke of Mecklenbui-g- 
Schwerin, was thoroughly defeated and routed, losing about 
15,000 in killed aiid wounded and 22,000 unwounded prisoners, 
and compelled to retreat to Laval, with his troops almost disor- 
ganized. Through some misunderstanding, the sortie from Paris 
was not rightly timed, and, being feebly made, only resulted in 
heavy loss of prisoners. 

In the east of France, Garibaldi had had some trifling suc- 
cesses over the Germans in the vicinity of Dijon ; but when the 
siege of Belfort by von Werder, and the movements of Bour- 
baki with his Army of the East, had led to the reenforcement 
of the German forces from Manteuffel's army and a portion of 
Prince Friedrich Karl's, Garibaldi's little army of about 30,000 
men was in great peril, and only escaped capture by reason of 
the armistice. 

Bourbaki undertook to raise the siege of Belfort, and to 
drive von Yferder's army across the Pliine ; but after four days 
of hard fighting (January loth-lTth), repulsed each day but 
returning to the attack, he was compelled to commence a re- 
treat, in which he lost heavily both in killed and wounded and 
in prisoners, and finally, outflanked by Manteuff"el and crowded 
upon the Swiss frontier, he attempted suicide ; and his successor, 
General Clinchart, about the 1st of February, surrendered to the 
Swiss the remainder of his army, said to number over 80,000 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 387 

men. Meamvliile, Abbcvilliers, Loiigwy, and finally Bclfort, 
surrendered. 

On tlie 2d!:tli of January, 1871, M. Jules Favre, tlie ablest 
diplomatist of the French Cabinet, commenced his third efibrt 
to arrange with the German Premier, Count von Bismarck, for 
an armistice of sufHcient duration to permit the negotiation of a 
treaty of peace which would be binding. In his previous 
attempts M. Favre had been greatly hampered by the refusal of 
his colleagues to submit to any cession of territory, or anything 
less than the whole of their demands, some of vfhich v/ere utter- 
ly untenable, and hence both the former attempts at negotiating 
an armistice had failed. ISTow, however, their pride was hum- 
bled, and they began to com.jjrehend how fatal would be any 
further resistance if peace was attainable, and hence did not put 
him under such limitations as they had clone previously. The 
discussion of the points involved in the armistice occupied three 
days ; and on tbc 27th M. Favre returned to Paris, and an 
armistice was agreed upon, which was to commence on the 29th 
of January and last twenty-one days. It was subsequently ex- 
tended to the 26tli of February, to the 1st, and, finally, to the 
6th of March. 

Tins armistice provided for the surrender of the fortifications 
of Paris, for the laying down of the arms of its garrison, except 
a division of 12,000 men, to whom was assigned the duty of 
keeping order in Paris during the armistice. It also prescribed 
the lines which should bound the captured territory, required an 
indemnity of $4:0,000,000 from the captured city, and permitted 
its revictualling, and the exchange of prisoners. Provision was 
made, further, for the election and assembling in Bordeaux, on 
the 15th of March, of a E'ational Assembly, who might author- 
ize the negotiation of a treaty of peace, and wlio should be 
cj^ualified to ratify it. 

Some obstnictions were thrown in tlie way of the carrying 



388 THE GREAT WAR 

out of tlie measures agreed upon by the contracting parties to 
this armistice, by Gambetta and Trochu ; but tbey were speedily 
repudiated by the other Members of the Government of Na 
tional Defense, and their authors were removed from office. 

The National Assembly met, elected M. Grevy its presiding 
officer, and, receiving the resignations of M. Favre and his col 
leagues, chose M. Adolphe Tiiiers President of the Provisional 
Government; and he appointed M. Favre his Premier. The 
preliminary treaty of peace, whose provisions we bave already 
cited,^ was negotiated by MM, Favre and Thiers on the French 
side, and Count von Bismarck and Herr von Arnim on the Ger- 
man, and ratified by the National Assembly on the 3d of March, 
and by King Wilhelm (wlio had been crowned, on the 19th of 
Jannary, by vote of the Confederated States of Germany, Em 
peror of Germany) on the 5th of that month. On the 1st of 
March 30,000 German troops entered Paris, and marched out on 
the 3d ; and within the following ten days all except the Army 
of Occupation returned to Germany. 

Thus ended the most remarkable war of modern times — re- 
markable alike for its rapidity of movement, the vast masses of 
men put in the field, its terrific slaughter, its stupendous surren- 
flei-s — for the Germans had, on the lOtli of February, in their 
hands and in the hands of neutrals, over 900,000 prisoners of 
war ; four of the largest armJes of modern times, viz., McMa- 
bon's at Sedan, Bazaine's at Metz, Trochu's at Paris, and Bour- 
baki's in Switzerland, having surrendered withm five months, 
besides more than a hundred and fifty thousand prisoners taken 
in the various engagements of the war. It was remarkable, too, 
for the new weapons brouglit into use, and the extent to which 
modern appliances in chemistry and the arts were made subser- 
vient to military purposes. The mitrailleui' and the various 
breech-loading rifles were tested far more thoroughly than ever 
before, some of them, indeed, for the first time in actual warfare. 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GEEMANY. 339 

The superiority of the rifled steel cannon of Krupp over the 
French bronze guns was conclusively shown ; and the folly of 
dependence upon a navy, however perfectly constructed, armed, 
or manned, in a war between two powers whose lands are con- 
tiguous. 

Terrible and destructive as this war has been both to human 
life (for it is estimated that, from wounds and sickness bred in 
the camps, and from death on the battle-field, more than six hun- 
dred thousand men to-day lie dead because of this war, and per- 
haps two-thirds as many are hopelessly crippled and maimed) and 
to property ($2,500,000,000 will not cover the losses of France 
alone, including the indemnity), it is yet destined, we firmly 
believe, to prove beneficial to civilization, and for the ultimate 
advantage of both nations, in the political changes which will 
ensue from it. In France, it has broken forever the power of 
one of the least progressive and the most mischievous and bel- 
ligerent people of Europe, and the one which has most disturbed 
the general peace for ages. In Germany it has suddenly ele- 
vated to the position of arbiter of Europe the most peaceful and 
domestic of races. It has reduced from the first position that 
one of the great powers most positively committed to the false 
polic}^ that its national prosperity depended on the misfortunes 
of its neighbors, and that to embarrass other powers and to con- 
tract other influences was the surest way of extending its own 
importance. It has elevated to the first rank that nation which, 
of all others in Europe, believes that individual and national 
greatness depend on the general prosperity. It has destroyed 
an Empire whose policy was War, while its cry was Peace ; but 
it has at the same time created a greater and a better one, whose 
undoubted policy must be Peace. In France it has pricked and 
instantly exploded a despotism, which might have continued for 
a generation of peace to enervate the people it tyrannized over. 
In Germany it has not less suddenly aroused a spirit of nation- 
22 



390 THE GREAT "WAR 

alitj, whicli rendei's at once possible tliat long-coveted unity of 
the German race wliicli an age of peace niiglit not have consoli- 
dated. While the French Empire existed, there could be no real 
peace in Europe. While the Geraian Empire reujains, there can 
be no war without its consent ; and the past policy, the fixed 
principles, the natural sympathies of her people, not the mere 
written records of her Government, violable at the will of one 
man, are pledges of her peaceful purposes. Let us sympathize 
with the race whicli has been so painfully humiliated ; but let us 
also rejoice with that larger civilization of all Europe which 
gains by what the French have lost. The war is yet to find its 
most important result, its chief apology, and its greatest bless- 
ing, in the increased impulse it will give to a higher and better 
civilization in Europe. It is in their enlarged liberty that the 
French are yet to see themselves blessed by their own overthrow. 
France has not merely been relieved of the cancer of the Em- 
pire that ate its heart out, but her people have been liberated 
from false and enervating direction, and are free to enter upon a 
sounder and truer education than that which has heretofore 
made them a race of polished but frivolous people — smooth and 
elegant of exterior, but too deficient in the great impulses which 
belong to more earnest and progressive races. We shall not be 
many years — the French will not be a generation — in recogniz- 
ing that the war has been one of the mysterious agencies of civ- 
ilization, spreading knowledge, which is the only true source of 
power ; the unsuspected means of developing industry, which 
creates wealth. By the war, France is relieved of a ruler, an 
army, a system of government which absorbed and wasted her 
prosperity ; and not only she and Germany, but all Europe, will 
be saved henceforth much of that cost in wealth and loss in 
national spirit which follows the maintenance of large standing 
armies. Relieved of these dread incubi, France may become the 
rival of England and Germany in maimfactures ; for the deli- 



BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. 391 

cate taste, the natural appreciation of the beautiful in art and 
mechanism, and the deftness and skill of her operatives in all 
the finer manufactures, assure her a readj preeminence in this 
direction ; and, once educated beyond the belief that the glory 
of a nation is found in its prowess in war, not its peaceful pros- 
perity, she may become, as a manufacturing state, more prosper- 
ous and truly influential than at any period of her former exist- 
ence. 

The influence of the war, also, in favor of religious liberty, 
and the progi'ess of that freedom of religious worship which has 
so long been withheld in France, cannot but be beneficial. The 
war had its origin in part, and in great part, in the machinations 
of Jesuit managers to humble Prussia as the great Protestant 
power of the Continent, and to place upon the throne of France 
a ruler fully committed to reaction, to religious persecution, and 
to the enforcement of the Roman Concordat. It closes with 
Prussia at the head of the German Confederation, more power- 
ful and influential than ever before, and France humbled, but 
more hostile than ever she was in the past to the sway of a des- 
pot, or the intolerance of Rome. The war has shown France 
the evils of fraud, corruption, and deception. It has made her 
citizens a sadder but a wiser people ; and with the disappearance 
of their former frivolity and moughtlessness, and the inordinate 
conceit which has marred their character, we may well hope 
there will come a disposition to profounder and more serious 
thought, a greater earnestness of purpose, and a higher moral 
principle. If this result shall follow, we may rejoice in the 
belief that the present misfortunes of that fair land have worked 
out for her greater blessings than any material prosperity could 
have done, and that all Europe, and the world, will participate 
with her in the benefits which have come to her from adversity. 

To nations, as to individuals, there should, and generally 
does come, in seasons of disaster, that penitence for past errors 



392 THE GKEAT WAR. 

and that desire to begin a new and better national life, wMch 
causes these afflictions to be subsequently recognized as " bless- 
ings in disguise," and as having wrought out a higher and 
nobler national destiny. 

But if, alas ! these bitter lessons should all be lost, and 
France, despite her heavy burdens and her sad experiences, be- 
come again what she was under the Empire — vain, thoughtless, 
frivolous, and corrupt 

'No ! no ! we have not the heart to portray, or the words to 
describe, the ruin which must come upon a nation so often and 
so terribly admonished, if it does not heed the warnings it has 
received. 



APPENDIX. 



PHILANTHROPY OF THE WAE. 

IT is not so widely known as it should be, that, at the close of our 
war, and before the short war of 1866 between Prussia and Aus- 
tria, an International Sanitary Commission was organized in Central 
Europe, mainly through the efforts of Rev. Dr. Bellows and some 
other members of the United States Sanitary Commission, M. Aug. 
Laugel, of Paris, and some prominent and philanthropic citizens of 
Switzerland and Prussia. 

This organization bore good fruit in the war of 1866, and secured 
from France, Prussia, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy, a pledge that the 
badge and flag of its members — a red cross on a white ground — should 
be protected at all times on the field. 

No sooner was war declared, in the summer of 1870, than the Com- 
mission organized its branches and Ambulance Corps in both countries, 
and made large preparation for the fierce battles which were soon to 
come. In France, the Empress patronized and aided the Commission 
in their work ; but the most efficient assistance they received was from 
American and British citizens, who organized Ambulance Corps, and 
contributed largely to the fund for supplies. Dr. Evans, who had ren- 
dered good service to our Sanitary Commission during our war, was at 
the head of the American movement. In Germany, the Queen and 
Princesses were all active in the promotion of this good work, and the 
King and Crown-Prince aided it by their influence and authority. 
Queen Augusta took charge of the hospitals at Berlin ; the Crown- 



394 APPENDIX. 

Princess Victoria of those at Frankfort ; Princess Alice of Ilesse of 
those at Darmstadt ; the Grand Duchess Louise of Baden of those at 
Carlsruhe ; and the Crown-Princess Caroline of Saxony of those at 
riomburg. 

The Grand Duchess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, a sister of the Ger- 
man Emperor, was not behind her royal sisters and cousins in her devo- 
tion to the wounded. She had a large hospital for them under her own 
special charge, and was ably assisted in its care, as well as in its organi- 
zation, by an American lady, Miss Clara Barton, whose services to the 
sick and wounded, and to the dead soldiers of our own civil war, will 
ever be held in grateful remembrance. Other American ladies who had 
been active and useful in our war, also lent a helping hand in this good 
work ; among the number. Miss Safford, so well remembered by our 
soldiers as the "Cairo Angel," Mrs. Evans, &c., &;c. 

There was need of their best efforts : for, before the close of the 
war, there were of the two armies almost half a million sick and 
wounded. Ambulance Corps were organized, with their superintend- 
ents and attendants, in both France and Germany ; and in both coun- 
tries many English and German gentlemen and ladies enlisted, and the 
large sums contributed from America and England were faithfully and 
•carefully expended, and the supplies distributed! Rev. Dr. Bellows 
gave to the French Sanitary Corps the benefit of his large experience 
and great administrative ability, and was ably seconded by Dr. Evans, 
of Paris, Messrs. Sykes, Swinburne, Johnstone, and other American 
gentlemen and ladies who had been for some time residents of that city. 
These generous philanthropists continued their devotion to their work 
till the close of the war, and many of them endured great hardship and 
suffering, -and, as was often the case in our war, the overtasked body, 
when the terrible strain was over, sank from exhaustion. 

Many of the wealthy citizens of Finance vied with the German 
princes in the largeness of their gifts to the suffering soldiers, not only 
offering large sums o-f money, but giving up their chateaus and castles 
for hospitals for the sick and wounded. Notable among these was the 
Count Henri de Chamber d, the representative of the elder Bourbon 
line^ and a claimant for the French throne. His extensive chateau, 



APPENDIX. 397 

amply furnished, and provided with several hundred beds, was placed at 
the service of the Government for the wounded French soldiers. 

Large contributions were made to the sanitary funds of both coun- 
tries by the people of the United States and of Great Britain. It was 
estimated that nearly 11,500,000 was sent from the United States to 
Germany, a considerable portion of it, of course, from citizens of Ger- 
man birth or family. To France the amount was not so large, but was 
estimated at $500,000 before the close of the war ; and subsequently, 
on the representation of the famine and suffering in those portions of 
France which had* been traversed by the armies of the two nations, a 
sum of more than 1200,000 was made up and sent to relieve the suf- 
fering. 

In consequence of the surrenders at Sedan, Strasbourg, and Metz, 
and those of the smaller fortified towns, as well as the great number of 
prisoners, wounded and unwounded, taken in the frequent engagements 
and retreats of the French armies, many thousands of the French sick 
and wounded fell into German hands ; and the testimony of these to 
the tender care of their captors for their needs is almost 'imiform, the 
few exceptions being due either to ignorance or the misconduct of the 
patients themselves. The Zouaves and Turcos in some instances mani- 
fested a brutal and cruel temper, and returned injuries and violence for 
the kindness they received. Of the few wounded Germans who fell 
into the hands of the French, some complained of harsh treatment and 
cruelty ; but this was, doubtless, generally the result of ignorance or 
penury, rather than of intentional malice, though some of the cases 
required a broad mantle of charity to cover them. 

The record of the International Sanitary Commission and its branch- 
es during this war is the one bright spot in the midst of the horrors of 
war. There was also an impromptu organization, something like the 
Christian Commission in our war, which did a vast deal of good in the 
distribution of portions of the Scriptures, and moral and religious 
periodicals, tracts, and books among the soldiers. It was not so thor- 
oughly organized, or prepared for so extensive and general a work, as 
the Christian Commission, but it supplied to the soldiers who could 
read, much literature which was both instructive and profitable. 



APPENDIX II. 



M. LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS, 

President of the French Provisional Oovernment of February, 1871. 

The venerable statesman who was chosen in February, 1871, to 
guide the helm of State in France, at a time when she was in the con- 
dition of greatest peril, has been the subject of more vicissitudes and 
changes, and has kept up a stouter heart and a more constant faith in 
the future, than any other public man in France. 

Louis Adolphb Thiers was born in Marseilles, April 16th, 1797. 
His father was a large manufacturer of cloths, and was ruined by the 
Revolution. His mother was from the illustrious family of Chenier, 
and her brothers undertook the education of the young Louis Adolphe, 
who early manifested remarkable abilities. He entered the Lyceum 
(collegiate school) of Marseilles at the early age of nine years, and at 
eighteen graduated with the highest distinction. He studied law at 
Aix, and was admitted to the bar in 1820, but soon became convinced 
that, for him, the path to distinction lay in politics and literature rather 
than in the practice of the law. The year of his admission to the bar 
he contended for a prize offered by the Academy of Aix for the best 
memoir of the Marquis de Vauvenargues, a French moral philosopher 
and author, who had been a native and citizen of Aix. His memoir 
was found to be the best ; but the judges, being Royalists, and regard 
ing young Thiers as a Jacobin, postponed their decision to the next 
year, to give opportunity for further competition, making the same 
topic the subject for the next annual prize also. M. Thiers revenged 
himself for this injustice in a characteristic way. He sent in his manu- 
script the next year without change, but wrote another memoir of Vau- 
venargues in different style, which he dated and mailed from Paris, for 
the new prize ; and, when the decision was made, received both prizes. 



APPENDIX. 399 

In September, 1821, he went with his faithful friend and classmate, 
M. Mignet, to Paris, to seek his fortune. Both were poor and without 
powerful friends, and it was at the most reactionary period of the Bour- 
bon Kestoration. Thej worked hard for a bare subsistence, and at first 
found but slight encouragement. At length, just at the close of the 
year, Thiers, through the influence of the great Liberal orator, Manuel, 
obtained a subordinate situation on the staff of the Constitutionnel, 
where his bi-illiant talents soon secured his advancement. His skill in 
political discussion, his wide range of general knowledge, his extraordi- 
nary memory, and his complete fearlessness, made him invaluable to 
the paper, which was the principal organ of the Liberal party. He was 
not less brilliant as an art-critic than as a political writer, and his dra- 
matic criticisms attracted attention in all quarters. A narrative of a 
short tour in the Pyrenees and the south of France, published in the 
columns of the Co7istitutionnel in 1824, and subsequently issued in a 
volume, gave him some additional reputation. It is not surprising, 
then, that, before the close of 1823, he was in receipt of a liberal share 
of the profits of the paper which he had already so greatly benefited 
by his ability as a writer. His literary activity was even beyond the 
needs of the Constitutionnel, and he added to his labors there the edit- 
ing of The Historic Tablets, a magazine of great merit, in which Mignet 
and some of his other friends were his collaborators. 

He went into society considerably at this time, and one of his friends 
thus describes his personal appearance : " The smallness of his stature, 
the extreme plainness of his features, which were half hidden under an 
enormous pair of spectacles, his peculiar pronunciation, and his singular 
habit of constantly shrugging his shoulders, and dancing (or, as a New 
Englander would say, tetering) at every word, and an absolute lack of 
the ordinary graces of manner, made him appear a being apart from all 
others. But when he spoke, you could not refrain from admiring his 
wit and vivacity, the glow of his Oriental imagination, and the vastness 
of his attainments. Nothing seemed to be foreign to him ; he was 
equally at home in science, literature, and art ; and, turning from the 
most brilliant literary improvisation, he would discuss, the next mo- 
ment, with equal fulness of knowledge and soundness of judgment, 



400 APPENDIX. 

questions of finance, political economy, war, or political action. He 
was a great favorite, at this period, with Talleyrand, and the other emi- 
nent men of the Opposition." 

Young as he was, he had already commenced the great literary labor 
of his life, his " History of the French Revolution," the plan of which 
he subsequently expanded to include the history of the Consulate and 
the Empire, the Restoration, and the Monarchy of July (the reign of 
Louis Philippe). The "History of the French Revolution" appeared 
complete in 1827, in ten octavo volumes ; and though, in subsequent 
editions, some crudities were removed, and there was occasionally a 
substitution of a maturer style of thought and a sounder judgment, yet 
it was, in its first edition, one of the most remarkable works of the 
century. We miss the stateliness of style of Chateaubriand, Lamar- 
tine, and Martin ; but in its profound knowledge and comprehension of 
the whole subject, the rapid march of the narrative, its intensely dra- 
matic character, its admirable clearness, and its evident sympathy with 
Republican freedom — a sympathy which it required some courage to 
avow under the administration of a Government so despotic as that of 
the Restoration — it has not been surpassed in modern times. 

After its publication, M. Thiers entertained a project for writing a 
general history, and resolved to prepare himself for it by an extensive 
tour of travel. He had made all his arrangements, even to securing a 
passage for a voyage round the world, in August, 1829, when the Polig- 
nac Ministry was organized, and he resolved to remain at home to do 
battle against that Cabinet, which daily advanced tovfard an absolute 
despotism. 

Feeling that the old methods and weapons of warfare of the Consti- 
tutionnel were not sufficient for a strife which had for its ultimate pur- 
pose the establishment of liberal opinions and government, M. Thiers 
founded, with his friends Mignet and Armand Carrel, t'le National, of 
which each in turn, Jor a year, was to be editor-in chief. M. Thiers's 
turn came first, and then began a struggle in which he put himself at 
once at the head of the Liberal party, or Young France, as it was 
called. 

The Polignac Ministry had for its object the subversion of the 



APPENDIX. 401 

French charter ; the National was devoted to its maintenance, even at 
the cost of the overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty. Nothing could 
exceed its fearlessness ; and when, after a succession of bold and uncom- 
promising articles, one of them bearing the title " The King reigns, but 
he does not govern," the National announced the candidature of the 
Duke of Orleans (Louis Philippe) for the throne, the Bourbon Govern- 
ment, exasperated beyond measure, prosecuted the paper, and con- 
demned it to pay a heavy fine. Thiers had so fully won the confidence 
of the people, that a subscription was promptly started, which soon 
raised the amount of the fine, and letters of sympathy poured in upon 
him by thousands. From this time forward the paper assumed a defi- 
ant attitude, and day after day demanded of the Government why it did 
not consummate its coup d''etat. The Government, aware that it was 
•treading on dangerous ground, and fearing a revolution, hesitated long, 
but finally, on the 20th of July, issued its decrees, one of which sup- 
pressed the National. A protest was at once drawn up and signed by 
all the Liberal leaders and journalists ; and when the police officers 
came to take possession of the office of the paper and prevent its far- 
ther publication, M. Thiers answered that he should yield only to vio- 
lence. The Bourbons were too late ; the Revolution of July bad 
already begun, and on the 31st of July the Bourbon King and his Min- 
istry were in exile, and Louis Philippe Lieutenant-General of the king- 
dom, and, ten days later, proclaimed King of the French. The active 
part which M. Thiers had taken in accomplishing this revolution indi- 
cated the propriety of making him a member of the Government. lie 
was assigned to a position in connection with the finances. lie was 
promoted in this department four months later, under the Lafitte Min- 
istry, lie was at the same time a member of the Chamber of Depu- 
ties from the College of Aix, and Counsellor of State. The next four 
months he was really, though not nominally, Financial Minister, and 
showed remarkable aptitude for the position. 

On the fall of the Lafitte Ministry he withdrew from office, and 
made a visit to the south of France. In 1832 he was called into the 
Cabinet as Minister of the Interior, and three months later was trans- 
ferred to the post of Minister of Commerce and Public Works. In 



402 APPENDIX. 

this position he did much to beautify and adorn Paris, and to promote 
a harmony of feeling throughout the nation. At his direction the statue 
of Napoleon was replaced upon his column. The Arc de VEtoile and 
the palace of the quay d'Orsay were erected, the Madeleine restored, 
and new fountains, boulevards, and canals were constructed. In 1834 
he was again Minister of the Interior, and remained in power, though 
with occasional attempts at withdrawal, in consequence of the rivalry 
between M. Guizot and himself, until January, 1836, when he resigned. 
In February, 1836, he was made Premier of a new Cabinet, and Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs, but resigned in August following. In 1834 he 
had been elected a Member of the French Academy. A year of travel 
in Italy and two years of opposition in the Chamber of Deputies fol- 
lowed, and in March, 1840, he was again Premier, and Minister of For- 
eign Affairs ; but, owing to disagreement with the King on some mat- 
ters of policy, and the rivalry of Guizot, he resigned in October follow- 
ing. For the following seven years, though in the Opposition, M. 
Thiers did not devote so much time as previously to politics, but set 
himself diligently to the work of preparing his great history of the 
" Consulate and Empire." He travelled extensively over the ground 
of Napoleon's triumphs and defeats, and collected material from all 
sources in great abundance. The first two volumes "appeared in 1^45, 
and the others (there are twenty in all) at occasional intervals up to 
1862. The work was crowned by the French Academy in 1861, and 
received the prize of 20,000 francs ($4,000) ; but the prize was returned 
to the Academy by M. Thiers, who made it the foundation of a new 
prize to be called by his name. On the approach of the Revolution of 
February, 1848, M. Thiers avowed himself in favor of it. He re- 
proached the Government of Louis Philippe with its weakness and cow- 
ardice, and its lack of a definite policy, and acknowledged his conviction 
that another revolution was needful, and that the career of royalty was 
completed. Just at the crisis, the King sent for him to form a new 
Ministry with Odillon Barrot, but it was too late to accomplish any- 
thing. Though distrusted by the more radical Republican leaders, he 
soon conquered for himself a position, and, as the advocate of the great 
middle class in the Constituent Assembly and the Corps Legislatif, he 



APPENDIX. 403 

became alike the foe of radical measures and of all reactionary tenden- 
cies. He sustained Cavaignac, acquiesced in the election of Louis Na- 
poleon as Prince-President, though he had at first opposed it, predicted 
the coup d^etat long before its occurrence, was arrested at the time 
(December 2d, 1851), banished to Frankfort, but in the following Au- 
gust was, without any application on his part, notified that he would be 

permitted to return to Paris. lie did return, and for eleven years 
lived in retirement, occasionally travelling in other countries, and de- 
voting himself sedulously to literary and art studies. In 1863 he was 
elected to the Corps Legislatif from one of the districts of Paris, not- 
withstanding the strenuous opposition of the Government, and took a 
decided position in opposition to the Government. In 1866, after the 
Austro-Prussian war, he reviewed the course of the French Government 
in a speech replete with his old fire, closing with the memorable words, 
" There remain no more errors to be committed." His thorough 
knowledge of the administration of Government, his fearlessness, and 
the fierceness of his invective, rendered him a terror to the imperial 
Government ; and when he was again a candidate for election to the 

Corps Legislatif, in !May, 1867, they made great efforts to defeat him, 
but in vain. 

The Ollivier Ministry of January 2d, 1870, was composed mainly 
of his personal friends, and at first he seemed disposed to treat it with 
some kindness, interposing in its behalf when it was too severely 
harassed by the radical Republicans ; but when Ollivier became merely 
the mouth-piece of Napoleonic ideas, Thiers applied the lash of his 
invective unsparingly. When the war Avas announced, he opposed it 
vehemently, and at no inconsiderable personal peril ; predicted disaster 
to France from it, and refused to vote aid for it. After Sedan, he was 
one of the most active of the Opposition in aiding in arrangement for a 
Provisional Government, and visited most of the courts of Europe to 
interest them in intervening for a peace ; and though his mission had 
not the success he must have hoped for, yet it undoubtedly had some 
influence in modifying the terms of the final treaty. The National 
Assembl}^, which met at Bordeaux according to the armistice, elected 
him, on the 19th of February, Provisional President of France, with 



404 APPENDIX. 

power to select his own Cabinet. In the negotiation of the treaty which 
followed, as well as in his counsels to the Assembly and to the French 
people, he manifested that strong, clear common sense which has ever 
been one of his most marked characteristics. 

While not devoid of faults, M. Thiers is eminently a patriot. He 
believes in France, and seeks her interests first and last. He has been 
charged with fickleness, but his modifications of his views, when there 
are changed conditions of affairs, is rather an indication of sound judg- 
ment than of fickleness. As statesman, historian, leg" viator, diploma- 
tist, and patriot, M. Adolphe Thiers has few equals, and no superiors, in 
France to-day. 



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